Many U.S. defense officials and analysts focus almost entirely on threats posed by China, but to dismiss Russia would be a mistake. China does present the greater long-term concern, if only because Russia’s economy cannot sustain its growing population, military spending, and foreign policy efforts and cannot keep pace with the economic strength of the United States or China, but this does not eliminate the danger Russia poses to the United States and her allies in the near-term.
History reveals that many great power rivalries have ended in conflict when a new power challenges a long reigning one. The phenomenon—what historian Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides trap”—results when a hegemon has difficulty adjusting to a new world order where it must share power, and often the hegemon unintentionally starts conflict as it seeks to suppress the rising new power. In the Peloponnesian War, the conflict brought about the demise of the hegemon as it underestimated the new power’s strength and the will of the population. Should the United States fall into this trap with China, it must be ready to fight in the east while avoiding a two-front war with Russia in the west. In such circumstances, Russia would be more likely to test a distracted United States and the strength of the NATO alliance, just as it took advantage of U.S. distraction in the Middle East over the past two decades to regain a foothold in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
To avoid a two-front conflict, the United States must have allies prepared to stand on their own against Russia. Admiral James Stavridis, former commander of NATO, explains: “The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends.” Allies can act as a multiplier of U.S. military strength by providing access to difficult places, facilitating logistics, and sharing valuable intelligence.
Present Danger
In the short term, conflict is more likely with Russia. As a percentage of GDP, Russia spends much more on its military than the United States or China (at least, using official Chinese numbers).
Russia focuses on growing its military, expanding its borders, and increasing its military capabilities in preparation for conflict. It has been aggressive, even invading U.S. partners such as Georgia and Ukraine. Beyond the hybrid warfare that has made headlines in recent years, Russia continues to disrupt U.S. freedom of the seas and the skies and threatens trade routes. In the Black Sea region especially, Russia has made its priority to become a disruptor to the United States and its allies.
Russian Presence in the Black Sea
The Black Sea is Russia’s gateway to the world, by way of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Montreux Convention limits the number of warships from non-Black Sea states that can enter. This makes it an ideal place for Russia to train with minimal interference. The Director of the Georgian Coast Guard explains that Russia often restricts large areas of the Black Sea for exercises, reducing access for cargo vessels and other navies across wide areas. Russia has moved considerable numbers of ground troops into the region, making its Southern Military District one of the largest and most capable.
Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 using hybrid warfare, working with separatists who had cultural ties to Russia. The lessons learned guided the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and later Moldova. Each conflict gave Russia the opportunity to test new forms of hybrid warfare, use new tactics, and assess the U.S. and NATO willingness to intervene, actions potentially to prepare for a more difficult invasion of a NATO member. Russian President Vladimir Putin only responds to power, which is why the United States’ weak admonishments after the Georgia conflict made the Ukraine invasion in 2014 more likely. Therefore, the United States must take strong action with a clear message of deterrence to prevent conflict elsewhere. The U.S. strategy toward Russia must be proactive versus reactive, and it must begin on the Black Sea.
Leverage Georgia’s Willing Partnership
While the United States should continue to train with and develop its NATO partners in the region to increase presence, it also must strengthen Georgia and Ukraine, neither of which is a NATO member. Georgia, in particular, is ideal for partner building. The small country is strategically located between Russia and the Middle East, and while still young in its independence and growing as a democracy, it ardently supports the United States.
Following the 2008 Russian invasion, which resulted in Russian occupation of 20 percent of the country, Georgia became an even stronger U.S. supporter and doubled down on its commitment to join NATO. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Georgia was the largest non-NATO contributor and had the second highest number of troops there, behind only the United States, when it was invaded in 2008. Unusually, Georgia sent forces without restrictions on how they would be employed, and those forces served alongside U.S. troops in some of the most dangerous regions, such as Helmand province, which most NATO countries did not do. In addition, the country spends more than the 2 percent of GDP on defense required of NATO members. The Georgian Ministry of Defense made even clearer its commitment by declaring that Georgia will only buy military equipment from the United States. The country has laid the foundation to become a realistic forward-operating location with large military bases and room for expansion—two well-developed Black Sea ports and military systems that already integrate with U.S. weapons and intelligence systems.
As a result, Georgia has become a thorn in Russia’s side. It uses its democratic and capitalist system to influence its Caucasus region neighbors. Valuable gas pipelines and trade routes run through the country, a vulnerability for Russia. In addition, Georgia has become a physical barrier between Russia and the Middle East and its allies in the Caucuses, making it strategically important to Russia. The United States must partner with Georgia to expand U.S. influence in the Black Sea region and reduce Russia’s sphere of influence.
NATO Membership
In conjunction with the State Department, the Department of Defense should advocate for Georgia’s NATO membership as a long-term goal. In addition to its service during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Georgia has increased its participation in NATO exercises. In 2019, it took the lead in the large-scale Georgia-NATO exercise Agile Spirit. Admiral James Foggo lauded Georgia for its professionalism and competency, expressed admiration for the commitment the country has made to developing its military, and stressed the importance of a continued relationship between the country and NATO.
An obvious obstacle to membership is that Russia occupies 20 percent of the country, but not proceeding with membership creates vulnerability and presents a missed opportunity to the United States. The Russian invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred in 2008, just months after NATO offered promises of future membership but failed to move ahead with a membership action plan. Germany and France have long resisted Georgian membership for fear of provoking Russia. As a result, NATO effectively signaled to Russia its unwillingness to commit to Georgia, and Russia seized the opportunity, knowing an occupation would stall future membership.
Russia has shown in the cases of both Georgia and Ukraine that it feels comfortable invading U.S. allies as long as they are not yet NATO members. Therefore, the United States should push hard for Georgia to join NATO, to establish clearly that Russia cannot veto membership by invading countries. This is a long-term goal, but an important one for protecting U.S. interests.
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Delayed NATO membership notwithstanding, the United States can immediately move forward with increased bilateral security cooperation. Georgia is a very willing partner that presents a unique opportunity for the United States. A U.S. base in Georgia would be unrealistic at present, not only because of logistical challenges and resource limitations, but also because a U.S. base in such close proximity to occupying Russian forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be unnecessarily provocative. However, the U.S. military should continue to train Georgian troops, increase intelligence sharing capabilities, expand foreign military sales, and invest in the development of Georgia’s military infrastructure and its small army.
Developing Georgian facilities to better support its own forces—as well as U.S. rotational forces—would be realistic and align with U.S. interests. Georgia is well situated to be an excellent forward operating location before or during a conflict with either Russia or Iran. U.S. troops would benefit from the ability to train in the region, receiving an invaluable opportunity to get familiar with climate and topography, and the unique challenges that come with each new location. Improved Georgian bases would allow the United States to expand training opportunities with joint ground exercises, naval exercises (including naval gunfire support), and special forces tactics in that environment.
The Defense and State Departments should also endeavor to extend Georgia status as a major non-NATO ally. This would provide Georgia with access to additional funding and remove policy barriers to increased U.S. military cooperation. It also would send Russia a strong message about U.S. commitment to Georgia. A bilateral partnership is in the national security interest of the United States, ensuring Georgia can defend itself while deterring Russia by making Russian aggression unjustifiably costly.
Black Sea Cooperation
The United States cannot address every global threat alone. Strategic alliances and partnerships multiply U.S. force abroad. A dependable network of partners will be integral to any successful long-term strategy facing Russia or China. Strong alliances can multiply U.S. power by integrating weapons systems and battalions, and expanding intelligence networks fundamental to winning and preventing wars.
First, the United States must act as the lynchpin to foster cooperation among the Black Sea states, even though regional U.S. presence is limited. The collective capabilities of local partners will be key to maintaining regional stability. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is large and advanced enough, with six new Admiral Grigorovich–class frigates and Kilo-class submarines all upgraded with the Kalibr missile system, that it has deterred cooperation to date.
History shows, however, that a strong U.S. presence can motivate countries to work together. To that end, DoD should establish a consortium of Black Sea states. The U.S. should set an initial agenda to address readily agreeable topics, such as ensuring free trade over the seas and by pipelines. As trust and cooperation grow, the topics should increase in complexity to freedom of the seas, and—eventually—maritime domain awareness, security, and intelligence sharing. The consortium will create a foundation for cooperation, complemented by U.S.-led maritime and land-based exercises that begin with U.S. leadership but in due course become successful with minimal U.S. participation.
The United States also should look for opportunities to foster cooperation and communication among countries that might not otherwise operate together but have similar interests. For example, Georgia might benefit from increased partnership with Greece and Israel. U.S. presence would foster initial trust and develop the framework necessary for these countries to develop a security network based. The Department of Defense could establish a working group with military leaders from Georgia, Greece, and Israel that begins cooperation by discussing overlapping security interests and challenges, and table-top exercises. This could eventually expand into out-of-area deployments and joint exercises, which increase readiness, and a mature intelligence-sharing network.
Georgian security is an excellent investment for the United States, but it is only a first step. Russia’s influence in the country and region increases every day. The U.S. must look to take real action to support other partners such as Ukraine in the near future. Without a strong show of U.S. commitment, countries that are forced to choose between Russia and the West may eventually (and reluctantly) choose Russia, and the United States will have missed a strategically important opportunity.