A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERVENTION IN HAITI
Commander R. B. Coffey, U. S. Navy
Preliminary Occurrences at Cape Haitian In the spring of 1915 a revolution, led by General Rosalvo Bobo, began in Haiti against the government of President Vilbrun Guillatime Sam. As characteristic of all revolutions in this country the fighting began in the north. Until July the revolutionists had not got beyond Cape Haitian in their advance on the capital at Port au Prince.
On June 19 the French cruiser Des Cartes landed a force of fifty men at Cape Haitian for the protection of foreign interests. On July 1 the commander cruiser squadron, Rear Admiral W.B. Caperton, U.S.N., who initiated and carried through the operations incident to the intervention, arrived at Cape Haitian with the U.S.S. Washington, under orders from the Navy Department to thank the French commander for his action and to take necessary steps to protect property and preserve order. The U.S.S. Eagle was assigned to his command and arrived at Cape Haitian on July 4.
At this time the government forces occupied Cape Haitian and the territory to the southward and westward. The revolutionary forces were close to the town approaching from the eastward of the Haut du Cap River (Sketch 3). In order to insure the protection of property and preservation of order, Rear Admiral Caperton informed the commanding officers of the contending forces that fighting in Cape Haitian would not be permitted and that he was prepared to land U.S. Naval Forces to lend effect to this decision. On July 9, when the fighting drew near the town, a detachment of one officer and twenty-nine marines from the Washington occupied a position on the Cape Haitian-Petite Anse Road—the only road at that time open to the advance of the revolutionists, and the Washington and Eagle prepared to support quickly this detachment by further troops and gunfire. This landing was necessary to prevent a sudden rush of combatants into Cape Haitian. The position occupied by the marines was a strong defensive one across a peninsula, barely fifty yards wide, and well within supporting distance of both ships (Position A, Sketch 1). One flank rested on the Haut du Cap River and the other on the sea. This was the first landing of troops in Haiti. From then until July 27 order prevailed in Cape Haitian, while the fighting continued at intervals in the outlying country, and at times came within a mile of the town.
The Occupation of Port au Prince
On July 27 information reached Cape Haitian that a revolutionary outbreak was occurring in Port au Prince; that the Guillaume government had been overthrown; that many political prisoners had been murdered in their cells; and that the President with other government officials had taken refuge in the French and Dominican legations. This information was confirmed in the course of the day by cable from the American Charge d'Affaires at Port au Prince, who further stated that a forcible entry into the French legation was threatened to remove the President; that many had been killed in the course of the fighting; and that some foreign legations had cabled for men-of-war. The force on shore in Cape Haitian was immediately withdrawn and, at 8 P.M. July 27, Rear Admiral Caperton sailed for Port au Prince with the Washington, leaving the Eagle—Lieutenant Aubrey K, Shoup, U.S.N.—in charge of the situation at Cape Haitian.
The Washington arrived at Port au Prince at 11:50 a.m., July 28. Two staff officers were immediately sent ashore to investigate and report conditions. These officers found the situation practically as previously reported, but that an hour before the Washington arrived a mob of about sixty Haitians had forcibly entered the French legation and had removed and killed President Guillaume. Parts of his body were at this time observed being paraded about the streets. There was no government or authority in the city and chances of increasing disorder were great. The French legation was visited by these officers and the French minister, the British Charge d'Affaires, and the American Charge d'Affaires were invited to go on board the Washington and confer with the Admiral.
It was realized at once that the interposition of American naval forces in the affairs of Haiti was necessary; and that, to prevent European complications which were most probable in view of the violation of the French legation, prompt action was required. The city was in anarchy, the excitement and riot were growing, and the danger to foreigners was increasing every moment. At 4 P.M. it was decided to land immediately and take charge of the city.
The landing force was placed under the command of Captain George Van Orden, U.S.M.C, and consisted of the Washington's marine detachment, the twelfth expeditionary company of marines, and three companies of seamen from the Washington—total about 340 officers and men. The only places where landings can be made at Port au Prince are directly in front of the city on the wharf (Position A, Sketch 2) and on the beach at Bizoton, about two miles to the westward of the city limits (Position B, Sketch 2). As nothing at all was known as to the nature and degree of resistance that would be encountered, as the city would be entered about dark with unseasoned troops, in view also of the topographical lay of the town, in which the native part lies with its long axis north and south, which would leave in the air both flanks of a force entering at the front of the town, and as the town could not be effectively cleared by an advance into its front, it was decided to land at Bizoton and enter the town on its south flank. This gave the troops a march of two miles on a broad road before resistance was expected, and afforded time to straighten out the men and get them in hand and in proper formation before coming under fire. It also permitted an advance through the town with one flank resting on the water front where it could be supported readily by armed launches, and in a direction which would allow the use of the ship's guns on the landing force's front without endangering our own men, should it become necessary to open fire from the ship. This plan, further permitted a free use of the ship's guns in a more sparsely settled area to cover the actual landing, when the men would be in boats in an unfavorable formation for meeting an attack. In short, it was proposed to make a flank attack, rather than a frontal attack.
The landing so late in the afternoon was undesirable as it brought the men into the town at night, with all the disadvantages of night fighting with raw troops. However, after a careful estimate of the situation, it was decided that the necessity of controlling affairs at once was so compelling that the disadvantages of night operations must be accepted. On entering the harbor the Washington had immediately taken a position, in accordance with plans prepared some months before, which placed her as close to the beach as possible and which gave effective support to the landing force in its landing, advance to, and entry into the city (Position C, Sketch 2). It was further planned for the Washington to shift berth to a position off Fort Islet (Position D, Sketch 2), after the landing force entered the city, so as to be able to fire into the city, if this should become necessary, without endangering our own men as they advanced to the northward. In addition, two armed steam launches were to keep abreast of the landing force to give support to its left flank. The campaign order covering this landing operation is attached.
The plan was carried out as thus outlined. The landing force completed its landing at 5:48 p.m., July 28, and began its advance at 5:50 P.M., in accordance with the orders of the commander of the landing force. Upon reaching Fort Lerebours the advance guard deployed with its left flank on the water front and with one section to a street to cover the first five principal streets running north and south. The advance guard immediately proceeded north along these streets to Rue des Casernes at the center of the city. The main body moved to the right flank of this line and, with a section in its front, a squad on the next street to the right as a flank guard, and with the remainder concentrated as a reserve, it moved in the right rear of the line toward the New Caserne. The landing force thus stretched across the native district of the city to sweep all resistance before it. The right reached almost to the foreign section, from which little trouble was anticipated. The reserves were held in rear of the right flank to extend the line in that direction most promptly should trouble develop there.
As the advance began it became dark. During this advance considerable sniping occurred along the entire front of the left of the line from civilians and soldiers. The resistance, however, was not organized and was promptly cleared away. None of our men were hit, but two Haitians were killed and ten wounded, including an officer. All armed Haitians were disarmed as they were encountered and a large amount of ammunition, rifles, and other war material was seized.
Upon arrival at Rue des Casernes the line halted and a guard was sent to the French legation. At the President's palace, which is next to this legation, a mob was encountered, which was, however, more noisy than hostile. In this mob was found General E.E. Robin, the commander of the Haitian revolutionary forces in Port au Prince. This officer was informed of the entry of the American forces and their purpose and was persuaded to accompany the commander of the landing force—Captain Van Orden—in an endeavor to prevent any further hostilities. The landing force had now passed beyond the foreign colony and resistance had practically ceased upon the arrival of the line at the Rue des Casernes. As it was now quite late, it was thought best to secure what had been covered and go into bivouac for the night. The twelfth company of marines was accordingly sent to guard the foreign legations and colony. The marine detachment of the Washington, however, proceeded on to the northern part of the city and went into bivouac at the Valliere market. The seaman battalion was sent to the same place. No resistance was encountered in these moves. Captain Van Orden and General Robin during the night visited different parts of the city; and together quieted the Haitian soldiers and otherwise prevented further firing and disorder.
The next day the Washington moved to the position off Fort Islet and the city was further secured: patrols were established, Haitians disarmed, armed bodies prevented from entering from the country, and arms and ammunition confiscated. During the few days following similar measures were taken for increased security. The marine guard from Guantanamo reinforced the landing force on July 29.
In this manner was Port au Prince occupied and military control assumed. That serious resistance was not encountered, was due to the prompt landing, the rapid and definitely directed advance, which did not allow the Haitians sufficient time to prepare or to concentrate and gather their courage, and to the
personal efforts of Captain Van Orden in visiting the Haitian detachments and securing the co-operation of their general. Some effect was also obtained by a previous warning, prior to the landing, carried to the Haitian leading men by Captain E.L. Beach, U.S.N., and Lieutenant J.N. Ferguson, U.S.N., to refrain from hostile acts and to all foreigners to keep within doors and show the flags of their nationalities. With the exception of some sniping on the night of July 29-30, some little unrest at times, and some other minor disturbances, Port au Prince remained orderly and quiet thenceforth.
At 10 P, M., July 28 a despatch was received from the Navy Department stating that the State Department desired that forces be landed at Port au Prince for the protection of foreign interests.
On July 29, after the city was occupied. Captain E.L. Beach, U.S.N., was sent ashore to assume the chief military functions and such civil functions as conditions might warrant.
On July 30 the French cruiser Des Cartes arrived at Port au Prince.
Efforts to Bring General Peace
Although there was now no government in Haiti, the fighting between the ex-government and revolutionary forces in the north continued. It was therefore thought highly desirable to take such means as were available to stop this fighting and to get the principal Haitian leaders to Port au Prince for a conference with the American officers, with a view of forming a new government. The Haitian Congress, which elects the President, was in session at this time and became anxious to proceed with the election. It was, however, restrained, pending conference with the Haitian leaders and the quieting of the excitement. To bring about a cessation of the fighting in the north, a commission was formed by Rear Admiral Caperton of four prominent Haitians, the archbishop of the Catholic Church, and an officer of the admiral's staff to act as chairman and the United States representative. This commission proceeded to North Haiti and consulted with the leaders of the opposing forces at their headquarters.
While this commission was at Cape Haitian, the ex-government commanding general, Probus Blot, deserted his troops and went to Santo Domingo. Upon this, disorder broke out in Cape Haitian and the Bobo troops attempted to enter. The ships present, which now consisted of the Nashville and Eagle under the command of Commander P.N. Olmstead, U.S.N., immediately landed their troops; occupied the position on the Petite Anse Road to prevent the entry of Bobo's forces (Position A, Sketch 1); contained in the property of the church and on the Haitian gunboat, Nord Alexis, the ex-government forces, which without a leader had sought refuge there; opened fire with the Eagle's guns ahead of the Bobo troops, who were advancing along the Petite Anse Road into the town, and drove them back; established guards and patrols; seized all arms and ammunition; and thus in the course of a few hours had effectively occupied Cape Haitian without loss of life or unusual disturbance. The action of Commander Olmstead at this time was most opportune. By its rapidity and definite direction, he had seized the second city of Haiti in the midst of the contending factions and thus prevented to a large extent serious disturbances in that area.
Upon the desertion of Blot the ex-government faction dissolved, with the exception of the ex-government troops under General Bourand, who were still holding Ouanaminthe and the frontier in that vicinity. Bourand was therefore the principal leader remaining in arms against Bobo.
The Caperton commission induced all factions to cease fighting; and persuaded Bobo, twenty-six of his generals, and Bourand, to return with it to Port au Prince for a conference with the Admiral. The leaders agreed to hold their troops in the positions then held, pending the results of the conference. Upon arrival at Port au Prince the rival leaders were informed that they would not be allowed to become factors in the political situation as long as they had troops under their command. Accordingly, both Bobo and Bourand sent telegrams to their various chiefs to proceed to Cape Haitian and turn in their arms to the American forces there.
On August 4 the second marine regiment arrived at Port au Prince on the Connecticut and the commanding officer of the regiment. Colonel Eli K. Cole, U.S.M.C, assumed the military duties on shore at that place.
Every effort was made to disarm and disband all Haitian soldiers who could be rounded up. The ex-government forces, which were captured by the Nashville and Eagle at Cape Haitian, were sent to Port au Prince; and there paid off and disbanded to the number of seven hundred and sixty-six. All men under arms not within the American lines were offered a fair price for their rifles, if they would come in and surrender them to the American forces. In this way several thousand rifles were obtained, and, in addition, other war material was seized. The Connecticut, after landing the second regiment at Port au Prince, proceeded to Cape Haitian and on August 6 reinforced the Nashville and Eagle at that place. It was found necessary at this time to take action against revolutionary activity, which still survived in the form of "revolutionary committees" in Port au Prince and Cape Haitian. These committees were accordingly dissolved and informed that further activity on their part would not be permitted.
The Formation of the New Government
With the arrival of the principal leaders in Port au Prince and the establishment of more quiet and peaceful conditions, the election of the president by the Congress was allowed to proceed. It soon developed that the principal candidates were Bobo and Sudre Dartiguenave—the president of the senate. Bobo's support depended entirely on his ability to control armed forces and their time-immemorial power of exerting military pressure on the Congress. In order to prevent further military intimidation of this nature. Port au Prince was combed to clear from the town all ex-soldiers and especially the Cacos, who were in the town upon our entry to the number of about fourteen hundred. These Cacos were the lawless bandits of the north, who were the mainstay of all revolutionary armies. They possessed the greatest fighting ability of any class of Haitians; and, by their military organization, when bought by the various revolutionary leaders, had been the controlling factor in Haitian politics for many years. To them and the unscrupulous leader who hired them, had been due the constant turmoil of revolution in the country. With Port au Prince carefully guarded against outbreak, the election was held on August 12. Dartiguenave was elected president. Bobo left the country and went to Jamaica. Bourand accepted the situation and retired to private life. Instructions were soon received from Washington to support the Dartiguenave government.
Preliminary Treaty Negotiations
It was early recognized that the time was most opportune to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations, relative to the United States control of customs, finances, and other matters, which had been pressed diplomatically, off and on, with Haiti for many years previous, without success. The sentiment of the Haitians and the situation in this respect were carefully estimated; and, as a result, the State Department was urged to renew its efforts along these lines at this time. The State Department accordingly, through the American Charge d'Affaires, Mr. R.B. Davis, submitted to the Haitian government a preliminary draft of a treaty on August 17. This treaty provided for direct American control of customs, supervision in an advisory capacity of all government finances, the organization of an American officered constabulary which should be the sole military force in Haiti, and have the sole charge of all military material and its traffic, and the right of American intervention to suppress trouble and to enforce the provisions of the treaty.
The Consolidation of United States Control
On August 15 the first regiment of marines arrived at Port au Prince on the Tennessee, thus forming an expeditionary force of two regiments (four battalions) of marines, under the command of Colonel L.W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C. One battalion of the first regiment was sent to reinforce the troops at Cape Haitian and the remainder was landed at Port au Prince. These troops were afterwards reinforced by a battalion of marine field artillery. In order to insure the food supply to Port au Prince and to make more secure the American position, the towns of St. Marc, Petionville, and Leogane were occupied as advanced posts.
On August 19 orders were received from the Navy Department to assume charge of all custom houses at the maritime ports of entry of Haiti, except Mole St. Nicolas, Aquin, and Fort Liberte. It was further directed that all revenues thus accruing be collected and applied to the organization of a constabulary, to the carrying on of public works to provide employment for the destitute, and to support the Dartiguenave government; and that the remainder be held in trust for the Haitian people. In accordance with these orders all the ports of entry mentioned were occupied. A company of marines and a gunboat seized each port and paymasters of the navy assumed the duties of collectors of customs and captains of the port. By acting in each case promptly and with sufficient force to overwhelm at its inception any resistance, all the ports were occupied without loss of life. In this manner the ports of Jacmel, Les Cayes, Jeremie, Miragoane, Petite. Goave, Gonaives, and Port de Paix, in addition to those already held, were occupied. These ports extend along a coast line over five hundred and fifty miles in length. Aquin and Fort Liberte were occupied later. The order covering these operations is attached (Fig. 3).
Paymaster Charles Conard, U.S.N., was appointed administrator of customs and fiscal officer. Under him were organized and administered the custom service and the fiscal administration. This latter developed into one of the most difficult and exacting of the duties performed in Haiti, as American control of finances finally expanded to embrace the whole Haitian financial system—probably unrivaled in its complexity and disorganized condition.
The Fall of the Cacos
After the elimination of Bobo and Bourand, their troops, feeling that they had been deserted, not having obtained their pay, and now being shut out of the ports of entry where they had heretofore looted the customs receipts, defied the orders of their chiefs to disband at Cape Haitian and began robbing and pillaging. These forces closed in on Cape Haitian and Gonaives in particular, and cut off the food supply and in the latter town the water supply also. Many acts of depredation against foreign property, the farmers, and the market women were committed. These forces consisted mostly of Cacos, who after the departure of the chief leaders, broke up into small bands under local chiefs. Continuous effort was made from August 3 to induce these bands to come within the American lines, receive pay due them for their former service as soldiers, and deposit their arms. Various conferences with different chiefs were held by American officers and representatives of the Haitian government with this end in view. An attempt was made to induce the National Railroad of Haiti—an American corporation—to begin new construction work on its road under military protection with a view of inducing the Cacos to go to work. But all this was of no avail. The marauding and banditry continued. By the middle of September the Cacos became so annoying and their blocking of the food supply to Cape Haitian and Gonaives so serious, that more stringent action became necessary.
The commander of the expeditionary force—Colonel Waller—accordingly made a reconnaissance along the Cape Haitian-Grande Riviere Railroad (Sketch 3), and consulted with various Caco chiefs. As a result the railroad was opened and the famine conditions in Cape Haitian relieved. The same action was taken at Gonaives; and the railroad from Gonaives to Ennery was opened, but not without resistance from the Cacos, who opened fire on our troops and attempted to tear up the railroad. They were dispersed with a number killed and wounded. In order to insure no further molestation of the food and water supply to these two towns, orders were issued to keep the railroads and the roads entering them continuously open. The coffee crop in transit to these ports, which is the largest source of income to the industrious portion of the inhabitants, was also being held up by the Cacos; and the importance of securing free access for this crop added to the necessity of this move. The railroads were accordingly kept open from this time on and patrols were sent out on the main roads.
On September 26 two American patrols were attacked on the Haut du Cap-Cape Haitian and the Petite Anse-Cape Haitian Roads. Reenforcements were sent to these patrols from Cape Haitian and the Cacos were driven away with a loss of fifty killed and a large number wounded. The American forces suffered ten men wounded. On this same day another engagement between the Cacos and a patrol occurred at Petite Riviere de L'Artibonite. The Americans lost one man killed, no wounded. The Cacos lost three men killed and nine wounded.
In order to keep peace and order more effectively and to control the situation, martial law was declared by Rear Admiral Caperton in Port au Prince on September 3; and extended to all places occupied by American troops on September 20. This had a most salutary effect for betterment of conditions and made more definite the status of the forces on shore.
Efforts were continued to induce the Cacos to surrender their arms and disband by the offer of their pay and the granting of amnesty by the Haitian government. On September 28 a written agreement was finally reached in which the Cacos agreed to surrender their arms on definite dates to the American forces and to submit to the authority of the Haitian government. The Cacos in return were to receive 50,000 gourdes for each 1,000 soldiers with serviceable rifles. It was further agreed that any Cacos found in arms, after the dates on which the arms were to be turned in, were to be treated as bandits. Although bound by this agreement, the Cacos by dilatory and delaying action completely evaded its terms—comparatively few arms were surrendered and marauding and pillaging broke out afresh. This was probably due to the weak hold the big chiefs had on the smaller ones, the inclination of the Cacos to live by pillage rather than by peaceful work, and the agitation of irresponsible persons who for one reason or another were opposed to the Dartiguenave government and the American occupation. Toward the end of October sniping against the American patrols grew worse and finally culminated in an attack on the American forces at Le Trou ( Sketch 3 ). The Cacos were repulsed in this attack with six killed. The Americans had one man wounded.
These occurrences necessitated systematic operations to clear North Haiti of the Caco bandits. The area occupied by them at this time was in the northeast corner of Haiti, contained within the line Cape Haitien-Dondon-St. Raphael-Pignon-Carice-Ouanaminthe-mouth of Massacre River-Cape Haitien—about seven hundred square miles (Sketch 3). The plan adopted was to divide this area into two parts, separated by the line of the Grande Riviere; to clear first the eastern part and then the western, using the railroad for communication and supply purposes. The eastern part was to be entered from the north and from the south, while forces held the line of the railroad and the Grande Riviere as far south as Bahon, and the border and eastern side as far south as Valliers. In this manner Forts Capois, Berthol, and Selon—important Caco strongholds—would be attacked. Then the western part would be cleared, including Fort Riviere, the most difficult of all strongholds, due to its strength and inaccessible position on the top of a mountain over twenty-five hundred feet high.
A force of about one thousand marines and seamen were collected in the north and under the command of Colonel Waller began these operations on November 1. By the fourteenth, after continuous skirmishing with the Cacos, Forts Capois, Berthol, Selon, and the neighboring strongholds were captured and the districts in their vicinity cleared. In these fights the Cacos would not stand, but with their superior knowledge of the trails managed to escape each time. It was soon learned that what was left of organized resistance was gathering at Fort Riviere. It was therefore recognized that if the Cacos at this place could be forced to stand, the campaign could be brought to a definite conclusion in one blow.
The location and approaches of Fort Riviere were accordingly thoroughly reconnoitered. The plan was to drive in the various Caco outposts and to advance simultaneously on the fort from four directions: one column from the northward via Dondon, another from the westward and southward via San Raphael, one from the eastward, and one from east and southeast via Bahon. In addition other troops closed the remaining routes of escape. The movement was executed as planned. On November 17, after a spirited engagement involving ten minutes of hand to hand conflict, Fort Riviere was captured and the last organized resistance and the reign of the Cacos destroyed.
This little campaign lasted less than three weeks—from November 1 to November 17. During that time over five hundred square miles of country were covered. This country is of a most difficult and mountainous character, covered with thick tropical growth, and pierced almost solely by rough foot trails. The men marched and fought continuously, sometimes covering twenty miles a day and most of it hard mountain climbing. Bluejackets, clad in khaki, vied with marines in their efforts; and after a few days seasoning became good "hikers". The American losses amounted to only one officer and one man wounded. That there were not more is a monument to the discipline and training of the personnel. The success of the plan was in a great measure due to the efficiency of supply and communication organized by the marines, and to the "spirit of the offensive," which drove the troops after the Cacos wherever they could be found.
Completion of the Treaty Negotiations and Reconstruction
With the capture of Fort Riviere all trouble in North Haiti ceased, and peace was brought to the entire country. By the end of 1915, Haiti throughout was quiet; peaceful pursuits were being resumed; farms, houses, and villages were being rebuilt; sections, of late years depopulated, reinhabited; and the general aspect of the country was one of returning prosperity. American troops continued to patrol all districts, but were gradually finding helpful aid in the newly organized constabulary, which, under the training and guidance of marine officers, amounted on February 1, 1916, to thirteen hundred well equipped men. Outside of the usual petty thievery and minor conspiracy, no further disturbance was anticipated.
From August 17 the treaty negotiations continued, with many "pourparlers" and discussions. On September 16 the treaty, substantially as submitted by the United States, was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two governments and on October 6 and on November 11 ratified by the two chambers of the Haitian Congress. Upon signing the treaty the Dartiguenave government was recognized by the United States. On November 29 a "modus Vivendi," placing the treaty into full working effect pending ratification by the United States Senate, was signed; and on December 6 a commission of Haitians proceeded to Washington to arrange details for its operation.
It was thus by these military operations with the attendant martial law, the seizure of control of all Haitian finances, and the successful accomplishment of the treaty negotiations, that a century of bloodshed was brought to an end and Haiti was placed under the virtual protectorate of the United States. The United States assumed, by these acts, the responsibility of insuring that its own important interests in this area and the interests of other nations and humanity in general would be henceforth served in peace and profit.