In the summer of 1937 the inevitable finally came to pass in the Far East. Japan struck powerfully and China resisted valiantly; result, the Sino-Japanese undeclared war, which has destroyed the peace of Eastern Asia, disturbed the peace of the entire world, threatened directly to embroil several other nations, and put a severe strain on the diplomacy of the United States.
The world had become so accustomed to intermittent strife in the Far East that at first the implications of the present conflict were not easy to grasp. Would it be a turning point—the end of an era? Would it mark the end of any possibility of unity in China—or the beginning of the downfall of Japan? Was it the first stage of a worldwide conflagration that would destroy civilization as we have come to know it? Or was it just one more of those oriental fracases that flatten out so suddenly and unaccountably?
Even with the war rounding out its first year the future is far from clear. From China there is no sign of anything but continued resistance; and from Japan, even after the considerable military success of the Japanese, come dismal prophecies of 10 years of war.
While we are trying to understand what is happening in the Far East, as well as what may happen, it appears most timely to undertake an examination of the events leading up to the present conflict. The period from the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931, to the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, has been well publicized. It included the Manchurian Campaign, beginning with the Mukden Incident and lasting until the end of the year; the Shanghai hostilities began on January 28, 1932, and ended by the Peace Agreement of May 5, 1932; and the Jehol campaign began on February 23, 1933, and ended by the Tangku Truce. The period between the Tangku Truce and the Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937, has received a rather spotty publicity (for example, the enormous headlines when the Japanese re-enforced their Shanghai landing party in September, 1936—and almost anything might have happened—but apparently nothing did). To this period we should devote most of our attention.
With the signing of the Tangku Truce an uneasy peace settled over Eastern Asia. Manchuria had become Manchukuo the year before and was now enlarged by the addition of Jehol. The League of Nations had decided against recognition of Manchukuo, and Japan had given the required two years’ notice of withdrawal from the League. It had become apparent that the League would take no further action over Manchukuo and Japan was proceeding briskly with the development of the new state and the consolidation of her interests therein. In China, relations between Nanking and Canton, long strained, had not been improved by the complete failure of the southern politicians during their brief exercise of power at Nanking at the beginning of 1932 and by the subsequent loss of Jehol. The communists in the Yangtze Valley, especially with their concentration and strongholds in the “Red Province” of Kiangsi, continued as a menace to the very existence of the government at Nanking. Soviet Russia was an uncertain quantity. Her relations with Japan had been unsatisfactory ever since the Revolution in 1917. With China, her relations were little better; she had fought a small-sized war with Chang Hsueh-liang in Manchuria over the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1929, and her diplomatic relations with Nanking, broken off in 1927, had only recently been resumed.
Let us now examine the principal events between 1933 and 1937.
Sino-Japanese Relations
Following the Tangku Truce, relations between Japan and China were not seriously disturbed, except for the indignation caused by the Amau statement for nearly two years. Japan was eager to establish diplomatic and trade relations between China and Manchukuo, while China, through conciliatory attitude, avoided any action toward recognizing the new state.
The Amau statement, which was issued by a spokesman of the Foreign Office in Tokyo on April 17, 1934, enunciated what has been called the “Hands-Off China Policy,” also “Japan’s Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.” It stated, in effect, that Japan was assuming entire charge of the maintaining of peace in Eastern Asia. In particular, it contained the following sentences:
We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan . . . Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers, even in the name of technical and financial assistance, at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, are bound to acquire political significance . . . Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country’s negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to peace in Eastern Asia. However, the supplying to China of war planes, the building of airdromes in China, and the detailing of military instructors and advisers to China, or the contracting of a loan to provide funds for political uses would obviously tend to alienate friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb the peace and order of Eastern Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.1
Obviously this statement said either too much or too little. It evoked a storm of protest in China, where there was talk of invoking the Nine Power Treaty and diplomatic queries from elsewhere. In a subsequent statement on April 28, the Foreign Minister gave what appeared to be adequate assurance of Japan’s due regard for the “Independence, interests, and integrity of China,” also the “Open Door,” equal opportunity and treaties.
No doubt, the original statement was aimed primarily at the League of Nations, and was partly inspired by Japanese resentment of certain activities of Dr. Rajchman, the League’s technical agent in China. However, its arrogant tone and sweeping provisions raised a diplomatic and journalistic flurry that was slow in subsiding.
Toward the end of 1934 there was increasing friction between the Japanese commander of the Jehol detachment of the Kwantung Army and the local Chinese authorities over the administration of the demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Peiping. The exact nature of the Japanese wishes was not made clear to observers; but the Japanese military expressed continual dissatisfaction over alleged violations of the Tangku Truce.
During January, 1935, minor hostilities between Japanese-Manchukuoan and Chinese troops occurred on the border between Jehol and Chahar. Though several hundred casualties were involved, as well as a rectification of the frontier to Manchu-kuo’s advantage, it was considered to be a “local” affair, and by itself would be unimportant.
1 Naval Institute Proceedings, June, 1934.
Public expressions of good will and desire for friendly relations between the two countries were contained in the speech made by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota on January 22 and the speech in reply made by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ching-wei on February 20.
General Doihara, sometimes called the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” visited Nanking and Canton during March and held lengthy conferences with leading Chinese officials.
In May it was reported that a general state of political and military disorder had been existing for several months in the demilitarized zone in the North and that it was becoming unbearable for the inhabitants. Such measures as the local Chinese authorities took to remedy this condition were not satisfactory to the Japanese military; and the murder in Tientsin on May 2 of two Chinese newspaper men who were friendly to the Japanese precipitated a crisis. The Japanese military presented a series of demands requiring extensive changes among Chinese authorities in the vicinity and the cessation of such activities as they considered anti-Japanese. The negotiations which followed were ended in June by the Ho-Umetsu agreement—the terms of which were not published but which was supposed to have fulfilled the Japanese demands.
For the remainder of 1935, affairs in North China were a series of highhanded actions by the Japanese military and general Sino-Japanese friction. In September came the first definite warning of the “autonomy” movement in the Tada statement. Major General Tada, commanding the Japanese troops in North China, was reported to have made a statement to Japanese newspaper men endorsing the separation of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Shantung provinces from the remainder of China.
In September and October wholesale smuggling from Manchukuo to North China was quite openly going on.
Action in the “autonomy” movement appears to have been precipitated prematurely by the Chinese currency decree which, as of November 4, called in all silver and replaced it by a “managed” currency. This decree was the outcome of a long series of currency difficulties which were generally blamed on the high price of silver which was artificially maintained by the silver policy of the United States. There followed a great rushing to and fro of the Japanese military in North China, who denounced the decree and loudly asserted the necessity for an “autonomous” régime for the five northern provinces. On November 23 one Yin Ju-Keng established an “autonomous” state in East Hopei province, with Japanese protection. On December 18, with Nanking’s reluctant assent, the Hopei-Chahar “autonomous” régime was inaugurated, including the provinces of Hopei and Chahar except Yin Ju-Keng’s state, which remained separate.
On January 21, 1936, Premier Hirota stated his “three points” necessary to “friendly understanding” between China and Japan to the Japanese Parliament, as follows:
The first demand was that China not only suppress anti-Japanese propaganda but accept Japanese guidance and assistance in solving her domestic problems (this by implication requiring also the rejection of such assistance from other powers). The second demand was that China recognize Manchukuo. The third was that China, again assisted by the island empire, take more aggressive steps for the suppression of communism, which Minister Hirota considered of “vital importance not only for China but for the stabilization of Eastern Asia and of the world.”2
2 Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, March, 1936.
Smuggling into and through North China continued throughout 1936. It is well described in the following quotations:
Along with the heavy re-enforcement of its troops in North China, which has again threatened a crisis in China-Japanese relations, the Tokyo government has for many months been using its control over the “autonomous” régimes in the northern provinces to flood China with Japanese goods. Under Japanese pressure the East Hopeh government of Yin Jui-Keng reduced by about three-fourths the tariffs on goods entering the area under its control. Through this open door, as well as by direct smuggling, Japanese goods enter North China and are shipped thence to Chahar, Shantung, and as far south as Shanghai. Attempts of Chinese officials to stop smuggling are condemned as violations of the Tangku Truce, and, on the other hand, in answer to British and American representations, the Japanese deny responsibility for the debacle of Chinese customs enforcement and collections.3
If there was any improvement in the situation towards the end of the year-it was mainly attributable to the fact that the Tientsin and adjacent markets were overstocked with smuggled goods and that owing to the Government’s precautions it was becoming increasingly difficult to dispose of them in other parts of China.4
The 5-province “autonomy” project continued as a vague threat through 1936, though there was no definite action toward putting it into effect.
Anti-Japanese resentment caused a number of “incidents” in various parts of China in 1936. Especially there were murders of Japanese by mob violence in two places widely separated, Chengtu in far- western Szechwan and Pakhoi in southern Kwangtung. A series of murders of Japanese in Shanghai led to a large re-enforcement of the Japanese landing party in the Foreign Settlement late in September, causing considerable apprehension among foreigners.
In November there was an uprising of Mongols, assisted by Manchukuoan troops, against the Chinese government in Suiyuan province in the North. That the movement was heavily tainted with “autonomy” was evident from the amount of Japanese equipment and the number of Japanese prisoners taken by Governor Fu Tso-Yi of Suiyuan in subduing it. Japanese authorities, as usual, disclaimed responsibility.
3 Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1936.
4 Oriental Affairs, January, 1937.
A series of interviews between Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe and Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Chun had commenced in September and lasted until December 5; and there were alarming reports of numerous and far-reaching Japanese demands. However, if the reported demands were actually made, they do not appear to have been pressed; and the official Chinese attitude seems to have been stiffened considerably by resentment over the Suiyuan invasion.
Except for the unsuccessful visit of a Japanese trade mission to China in March there were no important new developments in Sino-Japanese relations during the first half of 1937. The two “autonomous” régimes with the attendant smuggling menace in the North, the vague threat of further “autonomy” movements, and general Chinese apprehension over Japan’s future course, continued to keep these relations in a state of tension.
China
China, while refraining from recognizing Manchukuo, made no attempt to offer a military challenge to the Tangku Truce. Revolts against the Truce by Feng Yu-hsiang and Fang Chen-wu during the summer and fall of 1933 were suppressed.
The anti-communist campaign in Kiang-si province, which had been interrupted by the Jehol campaign, was resumed in October, 1933.
On November 30, 1933, a “People’s Provisional Government” was proclaimed in Foochow, capital of Fukien province. The 19th Route Army was the military nucleus on which it was apparently proposed to assemble all of the political malcontents in South China, with the ultimate object of overthrowing the existing Nanking régime. Its leaders established friendly relations with the communists in Fukien, and there was some possibility that they might have the support of the military leaders in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, who were not on good terms with Nanking. With the interminable anti-communist campaign still in progress in Kiangsi, there was a dangerous prospect that there might be a general state of hostilities south of the Yangtze. However, by skillful political maneuvering the resulting conflict was kept isolated in Fukien. The Nanking forces conducted a campaign by land, sea, and air that resulted in the capture of Amoy on January 10, 1934, and Foochow on January 13. The revolt quickly collapsed; and the 19th Route Army was broken up and distributed among other units in the armies of Nanking and Canton.
Severe fighting in Kiangsi with the communists was reported in June, 1934. By August the invasion of Reds from Kiangsi into neighboring provinces was well under way and the long trek of the Reds to the westward had begun across southern Hunan province. By October, Juiking, the Red capital in Kiangsi, had been captured and the power of the Reds in that province was finally broken. By the end of the year most of the Red strength appeared to be concentrating in Kweichow province in the west. The Red migration was advertised to the world by the brutal kidnap- murder of Mr. and Mrs. Stamm, American missionaries, in southern Anhwei province in December.
During most of 1935 hostilities against the Reds continued in western China. They successively invaded Kweichow, Yunnan and Szechwan provinces, finally assembling in the vicinity of the southwestern part of Kansu province in northwest China. Chiang Kai-shek personally directed a large part of the campaign, and incidentally made a brief but strenuous effort to cleanse the Augean stables of mis-government in Szechwan province. In October the headquarters of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the Generalissimo’s chief assistant in the co-ordination of anticommunist activities, was transferred from Hankow to Sian, the capitol of Shensi province in the Northwest. Though anti-Red operations in the West and Northwest continued, the communists had ceased to be a continual active menace to the middle and lower Yangtze Valley.
Strained relations between Nanking and Canton continued throughout 1934 and 1935. The Canton faction, led by Chen Chi-tang, with the vocal support of Hu Han-min, elder statesman of the Kuomin tang, and the military support of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi of Kwangsi province—all bitter opponents of Chiang Kai-shek—evinced general suspicion and distrust of practically every move made by the Nanking government in both domestic and foreign policy. They suspected even that the troop movements in connection with the suppression of the Fukien Revolt and the anti-communist campaign might result in a military attack by Nanking on their semiautonomous preserve in the southwest. They continually suspected Nanking of “selling out” to the Japanese, and they suspected Chiang of being interested primarily in self-aggrandizement. Also in 1936 there were financial difficulties in the southwest caused by the currency decree of the previous November.
Despite the conciliatory attitude of Nanking, and the death of Hu Han-min on May 12, 1936, the Canton faction finally decided to resort to arms. In June, they invaded Hunan province, with the demand that Nanking forcibly resist Japanese aggression. Nanking mobilized troops to oppose their advance, and after a few weeks of typically Chinese negotiations the revolt ended. Chen Chi-tang proceeded abroad and was replaced by a loyal adherent of Chiang, while Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi withdrew to Kwangsi. While taking no part in the subsequent reconciliation between Nanking and Canton, they did not obstruct it.
On August 11 Chiang arrived in Canton, remaining until Septembr 28. It was his first visit in ten years and one of the most important events in the more recent history of China, though it received surprisingly little attention in the American press. It was important in consolidating the authority of Nanking in Kwangtung province and also in effecting a reconciliation with Kwangsi. At last the southwest provinces were united with the central government. Symbolical of this union was the first through train, early in September, from Hankow to Canton, over the long deferred Canton-Hankow Railway, which had at last been completed.
Throughout 1934, 1935, and 1936 the stature of Chiang Kai-shek as the symbol of Chinese unity steadily increased. He used commendable moderation in dealing with his opponents in the Fukien Revolt and the Kwangtung-Kwangsi revolt; and by his personal participation in the anti-Red campaign he extended the authority and prestige of the Central government in the western provinces. While avoiding any direct participation in negotiations with the Japanese, he appears to have favored a conciliatory attitude. The following extracts from his declaration relating to foreign policy at the Fifth Kuomintang Congress in November, 1935, are important:
So long as the maintenance of peace does not become entirely hopeless, we shall not abandon peace; nor shall we talk lightly of sacrifice unless and until the final crisis comes. . . . Within the limits of non-encroachment on our sovereign rights we shall seek harmonious relations with the various friendly powers; and on the basis of reciprocity and equality, we shall seek economic cooperation with them.5
5Oriental Affairs, January, 1936.
Oriental Affairs had stated in June, 1935: And even today the Nanking Government—the recognized Government of China—exercises no authority whatever over the province of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and but little over the provinces in the extreme West and Northwest of the country.
In marked contrast this same magazine stated in October, 1936:
And only after a succession of civil wars, and the submission last year of Szechuan, and a few weeks ago of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, has Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the real ruler of all China. Even now, of course, his authority over certain areas, particularly Hopeh (Chihli), Suiyuan, Chahar, and Chinese Turkestan is nebulous. But it can truthfully be said that China is nearer being a united nation than at any time since the death of Yuan Shih-kai.
In December, 1936, occurred the kidnapping of Chiang—truly a fantastic episode even for China. He was seized and forcibly detained on December 12 while visiting the headquarters at Sian of Chang Hsueh-liang, the “Young Marshal.” The latter had been ostensibly conducting an anti-Red campaign, but with a suspicious lack of energy and success. The coup was attended by a number of casualties to Chiang’s personal bodyguard as well as painful injuries to himself. The “Young Marshal’s” demands included
hostilities against Japan; a truce with the Chinese communists and efforts to form an alliance with Soviet Russia; reorganization of the Kuomintang and admission of communists to the party; and the replacement of the “dictatorship” by Constitutional Government. These demands were expanded in due course to include liberation of all political offenders, freedom of speech, writing, and meeting, etc.6
There followed a brief, confused period of national and international consternation, practically unanimous condemnation of the rebels, and skillful negotiations by Nanking officials, supervised by the able Madame Chiang. General hostilities between Nanking and Sian were avoided, and Chiang was released on Christmas Day. There were many dark rumors, all officially denied, of ransom paid, a secret deal between Chiang and the communists, etc. At any rate the episode served a useful purpose in displaying the popularity and prestige of Chiang. Also, in the surrender and humiliation of the “Young Marshal” it served to eliminate the worst “problem child” of the Nanking government.
6 Oriental Affairs, January, 1937.
In view of what has happened since, we should take careful note of the olive branch extended by the Chinese communists at the session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Nanking in February, 1937, described in the following paragraphs from the Foreign Policy Bulletin of April 2, 1937:
On that occasion the Chinese communist authorities, apparently willing to subordinate their social and political program to consummation of the united front against Japan, proposed that the Kuomintang stop the civil war, concentrate all the national forces on the task of repelling Japanese invasion, declare a political amnesty, and restore freedom of speech and assembly. In return the communists declared themselves willing to abandon opposition to the Nanking government, further the general program of an anti-Japanese united front, place their army under the immediate direction of Nanking, and institute a democratic system of government in the areas under their control, refraining from confiscation of the property of large landowners.
Stressing their disruptive tactics in the past, the Kuomintang Committee on February 21 sharply refused to effect a reconciliation unless the communists abolished the Red Army and incorporated its soldiery into the Nanking forces, dissolved the Chinese Soviet government, and ceased all communist propaganda. These terms, which were tantamount to voluntary destruction for the Chinese Soviets, were not accompanied by any assurance of a stronger anti-Japanese policy. On the contrary, the Central Executive Committee issued a manifesto on February 22 stating that “if there is still hope for peace we shall still be willing to continue our efforts in working for a preliminary readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect of each other’s territorial integrity”—a sentiment recently echoed in Japan.
Despite this rebuff, negotiations with the communists, about which there were incomplete reports and many rumors, seem to have continued into the summer months.
Japan and Manchukuo
The existing status of the Chinese Eastern Railroad became impossible when Manchuria became Manchukuo: it was quite apparent that a joint Chinese-Russian enterprise could not continue in the Japanese-controlled state. From the outset, in spite of continual friction, Russia had shown no disposition to offer a direct military challenge to Japan’s course of action; and the purchase of the railroad by a Japan-Manchukuo combination appears to have been first suggested by the Soviet authorities to the Japanese ambassadors at Moscow on May 3, 1933. Negotiations which were commenced brought protests from Nanking but Moscow maintained the “realistic” attitude that Manchukuo had acquired the rights previously possessed by China. The negotiations were suspended by the Soviet in September, 1933, on account of the arrest of four soviet employees by Manchukuo authorities. Resumed in February, 1934, they dragged on through the rest of the year, with demands being reduced and offers increased. Final agreement was reached in January, 1935, for the sale of the railroad to Manchukuo, with Japan guaranteeing fulfillment of agreement; and final transfer was made on March 23, 1935. Though negotiations had been greatly prolonged and attended by much diplomatic bickering, it seemed apparent throughout that Russia was as eager to dispose of the railroad as Japan and Manchukuo were to acquire it.
On March 1, 1934, Henry Pu-Yi was crowned as Emperor Kang Teh of Manchukuo, of which he had been “Chin-cheng” (regent or dictator) since the new state was established on March 9, 1932.
In May, 1934, the Central American Republic of Salvador extended recognition to Manchukuo—the first and for a long time the only break in the nonrecognition front.
The future status of the “Open Door” in Manchukuo became apparent during when plans were made to establish an oil monoploy. All sales of oil products were to be handled by the Manchurian Petroleum Company (80 per cent Japanese capital) and these sales were to be directed in such a way as to give the Japanese refineries in Manchukuo preference over foreign companies. Protests to Tokyo over this prospective infringement on treaty rights were unavailing; the Japanese Foreign Office denied responsibility and Manchukuo denied being bound by treaties. The Oil Monopoly law was promulgated on November 14, 1934, and became effective on April 10, 1935.
The approaching doom of the Washington Naval Treaty became imminent during 1934 when “talks” preliminary to a new naval conference were held in London between British and American representatives in June and July and between British, Japanese, and American representatives in October and November. Japan’s dissatisfaction with the naval ratios had been well publicized for a long time; and no one was surprised at her demand for parity, or the formal notice, delivered on December 29, 1934, of her decision to terminate the treaty at the end of 1936.
On March 27, 1935, Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations became effective. No official objection was made to her retention of the mandated islands.
On August 12, 1935, there occurred a startling tragedy in Tokyo. Lieutenant General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, was murdered in his office by Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa. This murder may be described as a dramatic gesture on the part of the more reactionary element of Japanese army officers who were dissatisfied with such constitutional processes as existed in Japan and believed in the exaltation of the military. These officers were products of the school of thought that had already inspired several political assassinations, including that of Premier Inukai on May 15, 1932. It was during the trial by court-martial of Aizawa on February, 1936, that the resentment of this dissatisfied element finally produced a military revolt. On February 26, the rebels, about 1,000 officers and men, assassinated three cabinet officers, also the brother-in-law of Premier Okada, mistaking him for the Premier; and attempted to assassinate several other high officials including Prince Saionji, the last of the “elder statesmen.” The rebels also occupied several of the government buildings in the vicinity of the Imperial Palace. It should be emphasized here that none of the Navy and relatively very few of the Army were involved. By a skillful use of exhortation and a show of force the revolt was suppressed without bloodshed; and the ringleaders were severely punished with numerous executions and long terms of imprisonment—a marked contrast to the leniency previously used in dealing with political assassinations.
On November 25, 1936, it was formally announced, after many rumors, that an anti-communist pact had been signed by Japan and Germany. Though the rumors implied many far-reaching military provisions, the pact as announced was merely an agreement for a combined effort, in which other nations were invited to join, to combat the subversive international activities of the Third International. However, the announcement served to put a further strain on the already unsatisfactory relations between Japan and Russia, and it appears to have inspired little enthusiasm, outside of the military, in Japan.
We should note at this point that throughout 1933, 1934, 1935, and most of 1936, internal politics in Japan may have had some slight effect on the tempo, but no effect whatever on the general course and progress of Japan’s advance in North China. However, at the end of 1936, dissatisfaction over the failure of Sino-Japanese negotiations, and the announcement of the anti-communist pact started a series of political squabbles in Parliament. Bitter denunciations of the government’s policies brought about the downfall, in February, 1937, of the Hirota Cabinet—a “National” Cabinet with a civilian premier which had been formed after the crisis caused by the February Revolt in 1936. The elections of April showed an increased liberal trend in public opinion, and a “milder” foreign policy was predicted for the Konoe Cabinet which came into office on June 4.
After the action of Salvador, there had been no formal diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo; but the development of that state, under Japanese supervision, had continued. The course of events as had been generally predicted, was as follows:
The “Open Door” has become an “exit only” for the financial interests and trade of other nations. Figures cited in another publication (Amerasia for September) show that between 1932 and 1936 Japanese exports to Manchukuo went up from 58 per cent to 77 per cent, and in the same period United States exports decreased from 7.5 to 3.4 per cent, British from 11 to 1, and Chinese from 18 to 7. There has been also a wholesale withdrawal of foreign interests.7
7 Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1937.
Soviet Russia
Without undertaking too lengthy a discussion of soviet affairs, we must take notice of Russia’s status as an Asiatic power of considerable importance, and her position relative to Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Outer Mongolia; and discuss the events in her recent history that have affected the Far Eastern crisis.
We have already noted Russia’s willing liquidation of her interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway across Northern Manchukuo. Diplomatic relations between Nanking and Moscow, which had been severed incident to Nanking’s break with the communists in 1927, were formally resumed in December, 1932, and a new Russian Ambassador, Bogomoloff, arrived in Nanking in May, 1933.
By entering the League of Nations on September 18, 1934, and accepting a permanent seat in the Council of the League, Russia regularized her international position and commenced to take a more active part in the diplomatic affairs of the world in general and Europe in particular.
During 1935, an unsuccessful attempt was made by Manchukuo to settle border difficulties, and incidentally to establish trade and diplomatic relations, with Outer Mongolia.
Russia has maintained a sort of suzerainty over Outer Mongolia since the “People’s Revolutionary Government of Mongolia” came into existence in 1921. This relationship is best described in the April, 1936, issue of Oriental A fairs as follows:
According to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924 Russia “recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty there.” Logically, therefore, if Japan or Manchukuo desire to enter into closer relations with Outer Mongolia, it should be through China that they make their approach. But as a matter of practical politics this is impossible. The Chinese Government is not even officially represented in the territory which is supposed to be an integral part of the Republic. It exercises no authority therein, and like the rest of the world, with the exception of Soviet Russia, has no diplomatic contact with the Outer Mongolian Government. The latter maintains the fiction that it is an independent Republic. . . . Outer Mongolia, however, has virtually submitted to a trade monopoly with Soviet Russia, and, while claiming to be an independent State, refuses to have official relations with any government other than that of Moscow.
The same article quotes the statement made by Stalin to Mr. Roy Howard, American publisher, on March 1, 1936: “If Japan ventures to attack the Mongolian People’s Republic, seeking to destroy its independence, we will have to assist the Mongolian National Republic.” On March 12, a pact of mutual assistance was signed by Russia and Outer Mongolia, each promising to come to the assistance of the other if attacked. A diplomatic protest from China brought only a comforting reply from Russia.
From 1933 to 1937 the relations of Russia with Japan and Manchukuo were almost continually strained. There was an endless series of border incidents and mutual recriminations; and tension was aggravated by Japanese apprehension in regard to the communist menace.
The Japanese Government is bitterly opposed to, and genuinely apprehensive of, the spread of communism in the Far East. The fear of sovietization of Northwestern and Northern China has become almost an obsession in Japanese military circles, especially since the establishment of Manchukuo. And this fear is unquestionably the key to much that has recently been happening in North China. The moves and demands made by Japanese militarists are designed primarily to strengthen Japan’s military position on the Mainland in the event of a Russo-Japanese conflict.8
During the latter half of 1936 and the first half of 1937 the “blood purge” of Trotskyists and other alleged traitors occupied most of Russia’s attention, and caused such an internal demoralization that her prestige in the affairs of both Europe and Asia was considerably diminished. Her weakness in the Far East became apparent during the settlement of a dangerous border conflict that developed on the Amur River in June, 1937. Though a peaceful settlement was achieved, the fact that Russian forces had suffered the more damage left the score in favor of Japan and Manchukuo.
8 Oriental Affairs, February, 1936.
Summary
We can now summarize the developments that marked the differences between the Far Eastern situation of July, 1937, and that of May, 1933.
Soviet Russia remained an uncertain quantity, a potential menace to both China and Japan. Her increased diplomatic activity in Europe seemed to lessen her interest, for the time being, in Asia; and her increasing domestic troubles made any external action on her part less likely. However, the possibilities of her future course as an Asiatic power cannot be ignored.
The Western Powers, after the announcement of the nonrecognition policy, made no further effort toward interfering with the course of events in Eastern Asia. They appear to have “kept the record straight” by an appropriate number of diplomatic queries and protests; but it has been apparent throughout that they would do nothing further than this, in view of the succession of crises in Europe.
The “State” of Manchukuo, with the addition of Jehol, had become the Empire of Manchukuo; the Russian sphere of influence had been eliminated from its northern part, and such foreign interests as remained had been “pushed around” to an extent indicating that their complete elimination was only a question of time.
Japan, her withdrawal from the League of Nations completed, had terminated the Washington Naval Treaty—incidentally leaving the world in grave doubt as to what, if anything, remained of the Washington treaty structure. Beginning with the Ho-Umetsu agreement in June, 1935, there was a steadily increasing process of Japanese encroachment in North China, undoubtedly aiming at a commercial domination, to be accompanied if necessary by a political and military domination, of the five northern provinces. This encroachment was apparently engineered by the Japanese military on the continent; but such opposition as existed among Japanese politicians was sufficient only to retard but not to change the process. By the anti-communist agreement with Germany in 1936, Japan was removed one step—of uncertain length—from complete isolation.
China made amazing progress toward unity by extending the power of the Central Government over the southern and western provinces and by segregating the communist menace in the west and northwest. While resenting the Japanese encroachment in the north, Nanking maintained a conciliatory attitude; it seemed that only the attempted alienation of Chinese territory would cause a forcible resistance. The progress of unification was accompanied by increasing resentment of Japan’s course.
Having noted the general aspect of the China of 1937, we must compare it, by retrospect, with the China of previous crises:
In the summer of 1931:
On July 21 the Canton Government issued an order for a “punitive expedition” against Nanking. On August 5, the vanguards of the Kwangsi troops entered Hunan.
Seeing that a peaceful settlement was impossible General Chiang ordered the mobilization of troops against the Canton leaders. The situation became so threatening that it was generally believed that another civil war on a gigantic scale was inevitable. Then came the fateful evening of September 18 when the Japanese troops occupied Mukden and later placed all important centers in Liaoning under Japanese military occupation.9
In January 1932:
It may be remembered that this Cantonese force (the Ninteenth Route Army) was brought north at the end of 1931 when control of the Nanking Government was transferred to the anti-Chiang Kai-shek clique, consisting mainly of Cantonese. The Army was quartered in the vicinity of Shanghai, and along the Nanking- Shanghai Railway to ensure the safety of the Southern politicians. When the new government found itself unable to function, and General Chiang and his adherents returned to power, he intended to remove the Ninteenth Route Army, and it is believed that orders had actually been issued for its transfer, and if necessary its forcible disarming, when the clash occurred between it and the Japanese at the end of January, 1932. Overnight, so to speak, the members of the Nineteenth Route Army found themselves regarded as national heroes, and with public encouragement and support they continued to offer resistance to the Japanese until the late General Shirakawa effected a landing at Liuho, and turned their flank by a cross-country march.10
9 China Yearbook, 1931-32.
10 Oriental A fairs, December, 1933.
In February, 1933:
Finally the Japanese marched into Jehol. Chang Hsueh-liang, and his opium-trading henchman Tang Yu-lin, had not withstood the Japanese and Manchukuoan troops. There had been proclamations and manifestoes, but there had been no fighting. . . In Chahar the wily Christian, Feng Yu-hsiang, was preparing for a rush on Peking; in Shantung the aggressive, Leftist Han Fu-Chu, watched warily for an opportunity to enlarge his feudal fief to include all of North China. In Peking itself sat aged politicians of another era who hoped to assume civilian responsibilities and then to make a deal with the Japanese. Submerged in filthy politics was a movement to reestablish the Monarchy in China and to place upon the Dragon Throne none other than Henry Pu-yi, Chief Executive of Manchukuo.11
It was indeed a different China that faced Japan in July, 1937, as the events of the past year have shown.
Conclusion
A skillful Japanese apologist can make a plausible case for what happened to Korea in 1910 and to Manchuria in 1931—or even to Jehol in 1933. But it is submitted herewith that the Japanese program in North China, in preparation from May, 1933, to May, 1935, and openly conducted from June, 1935, to July, 1937, indicated nothing less than an imminent progressive dismemberment of China. The government of China, newly unified, still unprepared, and with scant prospect of assistance from Soviet Russia or the Western Powers, was given its choice between two dismal alternatives—to fight or to perish.
Any detailed discussion of events since July 7, 1937, is beyond the scope of this article. But we should at least point out that this conflict has continued as what it early appeared to be, and what it inevitably had to be—a combat à l’outrance between Japanese military aggression and Chinese unity under Chiang Kai-shek—the only kind of unity that China has experienced since the last post-revolutionary flicker of the Monarchy under Yuan Shih-kai.
11 Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia.