No comparable period since 1916 has been so replete with naval action as the first half of 1941. True, it has seen nothing on the scale of Jutland; but it has produced the Battle of Cape Matapan, the intense and prolonged air attacks on ships near Crete and Malta, the Bismarck's raid, and numerous minor engagements. The result is a sufficiently clear factual basis to warrant writing the familiar Q.E.D. below many interesting peacetime theories which formerly were viewed with suspicion because they had not then been demonstrated in battle. From these conclusions, corollaries of further value and far-reaching effect can be derived. Accordingly, this article reviews those theories with their supporting facts, and applies the conclusions to the problems now confronting the U. S. Navy.
Theorem #1. —For scouting in any weather which permits flying, the airplane is incomparably superior to the cruiser.
The initial discovery of the Bismarck at Bergen, the subsequent disclosure of her departure, and her relocation 550 miles west of Land’s End were the work of airplanes. Furthermore, nearly all the British scouting incidental to the battle of Cape Matapan was done by planes; in fact, the projected Italian raid might have been successful, but for the timely warning furnished by aircraft. Finally, the greatest single factor in limiting the activities of German surface raiders has been the control exercised by shore-based patrol planes and carrier-based scouting planes.
Q.E.D.
This affects us in several ways: the improved means of locating raiders makes for a tighter control of the sea with greater economy of force and resultant increase in the value of that control; the reduction in the number of warships required for control purposes enables a greater proportion of our surface strength to be concentrated with the fleet, thus adding to its offensive power; and the utility of the heavy cruiser, as well as the number of this type required, is reduced.
Theorem #2. —The airplane affords so effective a means of overtaking and disabling fast surface vessels that a high designed speed is now useless for avoiding attack and unnecessary for destroying fast enemy ships.
The crippling by torpedo planes of the Bismarck, the Pola, and a battleship of the Littorio class affords ample proof.
Q.E.D.
This means that the nuisance value of hit-and-run navies and of such freak types as the supercruiser is sharply reduced. The importance of the aircraft carrier, however, is so greatly increased that authorization should be sought to build more carriers instead of the proposed large cruisers.
The value of our newly developed bases, the possibility of using British bases in campaigns waged with the Empire as our ally, the potentialities opened up by the seaplane tender, and the growing range of aircraft—all these support a significant conclusion. It is that planes based on shore and on tenders can be used not only to control ever widening areas of the sea but also to reinforce the Fleet Air Force in some blue-water naval battles. Consequently, except during a major land war, the Navy has far greater need for a strong G.H.Q. Air Force than has the Army.
Another important corollary is that the reduced value of speed in surface vessels permits a transfer of emphasis in future designs from mobility to armament and protection. As a result, the individual ships and the fleet as a whole, will have more offensive strength.
Finally, the airplane affords a new and more effective means of harrying a beaten and retreating fleet. No matter how fast that fleet may be, it can neither outrun nor hide from our aircraft. Under some conditions the Fleet Air Force can attack that fleet all the way back to its base, and even in its base. In short, the airplane facilitates the turning of an initial tactical success into an annihilating and conclusive victory.
Theorem #3. —No fleet now in existence has the anti-aircraft strength needed to enable it to function with maximum effectiveness.
This has been so apparent in every campaign of the present war that detailed proof is unnecessary.
Q.E.D.
Although the United States and British navies have gone farther than their rivals in making good this lack of anti-aircraft strength, they, as the leading sea powers, are more handicapped by it than are the weaker navies which do not attempt to control the sea. This deficiency, moreover, will be felt more keenly in offensive operations than it has been on the defensive; for example, the demonstrated vulnerability of aircraft carriers will not permit their free employment until they are provided with a practically air-tight defense. Furthermore, surface vessels clearing the way for and supporting a landing will afford attractive targets for bombers. The same thing applies to a landing force embarked in boats. Since our own air force will be needed for attacking shore targets, enemy aircraft should be dealt with by gunfire. Finally, no fleet can be said to be capable of a sustained offensive unless it is prepared to offer decisive battle in waters under the nominal control of hostile shore- based aircraft. This, it cannot do without a satisfactory gun defense against airplanes. In short, an offensive campaign against a well-armed foe is impossible without adequate anti-aircraft strength.
Theorem #4. —Anti-aircraft strength in the degree required can be provided.
Even in the present half-developed state of such defense, the British are able to escort convoys through the Mediterranean in the teeth of every form of attack. Their losses, although not prohibitive, should be greatly reduced when the designs of destroyers and merchant vessels are altered, and anti-aircraft cruisers become available in sufficient numbers.
An even more severe test was afforded by the sweep of British warships around Crete during the height of the campaign against that island. This was especially noteworthy because they were without any air support whatever. The New York Times of May 28, 1941, stated that the Luftwaffe attacked these vessels almost continuously for 14 hours with as many as 100 dive bombers in a single wave; it sank 4 destroyers and 2 cruisers, one of which turned turtle before sinking; a British observer tallied 186 near misses within two hours; some of the guns were fired until they were red hot; and one cruiser shot down 3 out of 5 dive bombers which were attacking together.
If this ratio of destruction of dive bombers could be attained consistently, their attacks would soon cease. New weapons, now' being produced in quantity, should make the outstanding performance of today the standard of tomorrow. Furthermore, an increase in the number, fire power, and ruggedness of anti-aircraft cruisers, with the mounting of stronger anti-aircraft batteries in other types, should take care of the medium altitude bomber. These steps will also prevent the overworking of guns and crews, which must have reduced efficiency in this case. The outstanding technical problem is the development of weapons and fire-control instruments capable of coping with the new extreme altitude bombers. Until this problem is solved, fighter planes must be relied upon. Although the anti-aircraft strength required does not now exist, progress already made indicates justification for writing.
Q.E.D.
In this connection, one great advantage which a fleet has over an army should be recalled. Suppose that an army were able to concentrate within an area of a few square miles not only all possible objectives for the opposing air force but also all its own anti-aircraft batteries. The enemy planes would then be compelled to face the entire anti-aircraft gun power of that army in every attack. Such an army would consider itself incredibly fortunate; yet any properly concentrated fleet which advances into waters normally controlled by enemy sea and air forces creates for itself that very situation.
Besides the need for altering the designs of each type, adding anti-aircraft cruisers, and continuing to improve weapons, fire- control instruments, and training, there is one distinct lesson from the fighting around Crete which merits attention. The turning turtle of the anti-aircraft cruiser Fiji and the staggering number of near- misses re-emphasize the desirability of underwater protection in all types where it is practicable. If the speed of future battleships permits the building of 26-knot antiaircraft cruisers, it should be possible to design one of 10,000 tons with a more powerful armament, thicker armor, and a rugged hull with sufficient beam to permit reasonable underwater protection. If it can be built with a tunnel stem, so much the better.
Theorem #5. —Adequately protected guns are the only guns worth mounting.
The Hood and the Bismarck had equal main armaments, but the Hood lacked the protection necessary to maintain her fire under battle conditions. Similarly, the Italian cruiser Colleoni had the same main battery as the British cruiser Sydney, but Italian designers had sacrificed armor to gain speed with the usual disastrous consequences. This theorem was demonstrated in a different way during the Norwegian campaign when the unprotected anti-aircraft gun crews of British vessels were wiped out with fatal result to the ships themselves.
Q.E.D.
The need for adequate protection for all gun positions is now so clearly seen that the only point worth mentioning is the vulnerability of control positions. The absence of hits on the Rodney and the King George V in their engagement with the Bismarck indicates that the German fire control must have been put out of action early in the fight. We do know that the control tower of the Graf Spee was knocked out by a direct hit. Since the elevated position of these controls precludes their protection by heavy armor, should not the overhangs of turrets be enlarged to permit complete fire-control installations for each turret? Then a hit on the main control would not have such disastrous results.
An important corollary in destroyer design also follows. For years the trend has been toward more and bigger guns in these vessels until they are now more powerfully armed than were the early light cruisers. If this type is to be developed primarily as a gun platform, logic demands adequate protection for that fire power; yet if enough armor is added to balance the design, the resulting ship is a small cruiser. Consequently, future destroyers must justify their existence as torpedo carriers if they are to be worth building. In order to warrant the use of 1,600-2,000 tons for this purpose, their torpedo armaments must be increased enormously. This increase would enable them to use torpedoes freely enough to insure the destruction, rather than the mere damaging, of enemy vessels.
Theorem #6. —The only mobility worth its cost is that which is sufficiently protected to be maintained under average battle conditions.
The Bismarck, for example, had a designed speed of 30 knots or better, but successive attacks reduced this to zero. If she had been able to maintain a conservative 20 knots from first to last, she would have been far better off. Inadequate armor forward enabled a single hit to reduce her speed, while weak anti-aircraft batteries and the absence of protection for her rudder and propellers enabled torpedo planes to seal her fate.
This same inability to cope with torpedo planes resulted in the slowing, if not in the sinking, of an Italian battleship of the Littorio class.
Q.E.D.
The need of protection for rudder and propellers was pointed out by Captain A. M. Procter, U. S. Navy, in the Naval Institute Proceedings for February, 1936. To supply it, he advocated building future battleships with tunnel sterns so that the underwater protection would run outboard of the rudder and propellers. He illustrated his idea with the design of a 24-knot, twin- screw, 35,000-ton battleship which was vulnerable to torpedo fire only from astern, the most unlikely angle of attack. Now that this need, which Captain Procter realistically foresaw, has been demonstrated in war, his idea will probably be generally adopted; and the Proceedings will be credited with another “first.”
Just as armament plus protection equals sustained striking power, so designed speed plus protection equals sustained battle speed; and sustained striking power plus sustained battle speed equals offensive strength. This precise combination in the tank has made the armored division the tactical spearhead of the offensive in land warfare. By way of contrast, the present Italian Fleet illustrates the consequences of an inability to understand the functions of armor and of the resultant failure to supply the necessary amount. It all boils down to the fact that the designed speed of every type of naval vessel should be no more than is absolutely necessary for the performance of its functions. Any tonnage expended in competing with foreign navies in speed is worse than wasted, because it deprives the ship of armament and protection which are urgently needed to meet the new conditions.
Theorem #7. —The designed speed of current battleships is too high.
This war is peculiar in that Germany has no battle fleet, while Italy has one of slight value. Consequently, the functions of the capital ship in a war with a power which has a strong battle fleet must be reviewed, if we are to maintain a balanced viewpoint. In such a war, effectiveness in decisive battle is the first requirement. That this depends upon striking and resisting power rather than upon designed speed, was demonstrated at Jutland. Furthermore, utility for supporting landing operations, escorting convoys, or coastal bombardments would not warrant a designed speed higher than 21 knots. Germany, then, must have built the Bismarck to make 30 knots in the belief that such speed would fit her better for raiding convoys; while Britain apparently designed her new battleships for 30 knots to enable them to cope with the big Nazi raiders. Fortunately the Bismarck’s ill- fated dash into the Atlantic afforded a practical test of the thinking on both sides.
First, take the value of high mobility to the British. When the Hood and the Prince of Wales faced the Bismarck, the result was a British disaster; but when the Rodney and the King George V faced the Bismarck, the result was a German disaster. The Rodney simply closed the range to 10,000 yards and blasted the Bismarck’s guns into silence. The superior striking and resisting power of the Rodney was what made the difference between defeat and victory. Since a high designed speed was not worth its cost to the British, its only possible value was to the Germans.
Suppose that Nazi architects had cut the Bismarck’s speed to 21 knots in order to give her stronger main and anti-aircraft batteries, abundant ammunition, better protection for her bow and for all gun and fire-control positions, a tunnel stern, and improved underwater protection. She would then have been better fitted for the situation faced by the actual Bismarck in these respects:
(1) Her more powerful anti-aircraft batteries would have given her a better chance of shooting down the patrol planes which repeatedly revealed her position, and of repelling the attacks of both torpedo planes and destroyers.
(2) Her shorter length and greater beam would have fitted her better for dodging torpedoes and permitted improved underwater protection on the same weight.
(3) Her tunnel stern would have prevented the sweeping loss of mobility and maneuverability which resulted from a torpedo hit on her rudder and propellers.
(4) Her combination of striking and resisting power would have been superior to that of any vessel she encountered.
Since the Bismarck’s raid has deflated the value of high speed for the only tasks of a battleship on which it might conceivably be justified, we may safely write
Q.E.D.
During those days when the Bismarck was loose in the North Atlantic after sinking the Hood, everyone was speculating as to what would stop her. That tense situation showed with dramatic clarity that a battleship with the striking and resisting power necessary to sink her opponent is incomparably valuable; whereas one which lacks that power is merely a gigantic coffin for carrying hundreds of men to the bottom and bringing on a chain of incalculable strategic consequences. What the solid qualities of the Rodney meant at that time, should never be forgotten. The lesson will not be lost on our rivals; and they, too, may be expected to turn out battleships of greater size, lower speed, and maximum striking-resisting power.
A drastic reduction in the designed speed of battleships has the further advantage that it permits corresponding cuts for smaller units of the fleet. They clearly need improved protection if they are to operate throughout an offensive campaign. If additional defensive strength were provided by increasing their displacements instead of reducing their designed speeds, they would lose some of the protection they now derive from their small size and maneuverability. Furthermore, the accompanying increases in time and cost of building, size of complement, and cost of upkeep would be especially undesirable at this crisis when every man-hour in the shipyards, every appropriation, and every man in uniform must be made to produce the very utmost in fighting power.
Theorem #8. —Suitability of destroyers for night fighting deserves greater consideration.
The only times when destroyers counted during the Bismarck’s raid and the Battle of Cape Matapan were at night. Remarkable opportunities for night attacks were, moreover, offered after Jutland; but neither side was prepared to seize them. Even so far back as the Russo-Japanese War, night operations of destroyers exceeded in results their daylight activities.
Q.E.D.
This calls for lower and more distinctive silhouettes, special short-range weapons, light armor, improved maneuverability, and plenty of spare torpedoes to permit unrelenting attacks on the necessarily lavish scale.
Theorem #9. —The offensive in land warfare is not merely again practicable but, against poorly equipped troops, can be executed more swiftly and economically than ever before.
The Germans have demonstrated this so thoroughly that a recital of the evidence would only be tiresome.
Q.E.D.
One of the factors which has produced the British Empire has been the superior strategic mobility of an expeditionary force embarked in ships as compared to that of troops moving overland. This has enabled that great sea power to bring strength to bear against a land power’s weakness—an advantage which was largely nullified during a period when technical developments favored the defensive. Now that the changing tide in weapons again favors the offensive, this traditional advantage is restored; in fact, it is greatly magnified by the demonstration that the advantage of superior material is simply overwhelming. Since a land power cannot possibly provide all possible objectives with weapons to match the best which can be transported with an expeditionary force, this advantage of superior material can be exploited by a new and highly effective form of guerrilla warfare against weakly held outposts. The more an enemy has expanded his territory by conquest, the more vulnerable to it he becomes.
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These conclusions and their corollaries are important in themselves; but they add up to something of far greater moment, a new and vastly more effective form of naval warfare which makes superior sea power more valuable than ever.
Take first the possibilities of our future Fleet Air Force. When the present aircraft carrier building program is completed, those carriers can transport the approximate equivalent of one Nazi Air Fleet. The important difference is that the Fleet Air Force carries with it not only flying fields, hangars, shops, ground personnel, and supplies but also an incomparably powerful anti-aircraft defense in the guns of the entire fleet—all instantly available. This amazing strategic mobility of a fleet-based air force gives it the same advantages relative to a shore-based air force that an expeditionary force embarked in ships has relative to an army moving overland. A correspondingly effective form of guerrilla warfare is thereby made possible for the Fleet Air Force
These two forms of guerrilla warfare, either singly or in combination, enable us to grasp the initiative and to seize advanced bases for further operations. Still more important, they enable us to exert sufficient pressure to compel a weaker and unwilling fleet to fight. This permits breaking away entirely from the naval strategy which almost lost the World War, and a return to the Nelsonic objective of destroying the enemy’s fleet.
A thorough development of this new combination of sea, air, and land power should accomplish in the broader field of world strategy as much as the German development of the tank has done in the restricted field of land tactics. The reason is that this new combination represents that same union of striking power, resisting power, and mobility which rendered impotent opposing armies which lacked both tanks and special weapons and tactics for destroying them. It is no mere rhetorical flourish to say that the boldness, energy, and clarity of thought demonstrated in exploiting this new combination may be the decisive factor in this world crisis.
Recent land campaigns have demonstrated the overwhelming importance of rapid and unrelenting exploitation of an initial success, so that an enemy has no time to recover from one blow before the next one falls. Translated into naval warfare, this means that the momentum of victory must not be lost by protracted delays for repairs between phases of the campaign. This calls for additional protection to eliminate minor damage and minimize major damage, for maximum utilization of fleet repair facilities, and for the rapid relining of guns. Such a campaign also imposes increased strain on personnel. Their health must be safeguarded by providing maximum comfort and ventilation in their living quarters, well-balanced and properly cooked rations, and adequate medical supervision in all types of ships.
Finally, the Germans have shown the value of building up a legend of invincibility by providing a sufficient margin of force to insure an unbroken series of victories.
In view of our closer ties with the British Empire, it is not out of place to add that these attractive potentialities are doubled in any war in which she is our ally. The extent to which the new conditions favor the two great sea powers can better be appreciated by a summary:
(1) The airplane adds to the offensive power of their fleets by (a) enabling them to strike at many objectives formerly beyond their reach; (b) freeing surface vessels from control duty and enabling them to be kept with the main body; (c) permitting lower designed speeds in all warships with resultant increase in their striking and resisting power; (d) reducing the nuisance value of hit- and-run navies and freak types; and (e) permitting a new and effective form of guerrilla warfare.
(2) The potentialities of combined operations are increased by (a) the improved support a landing party can receive from the guns of a more powerful fleet; (b) the continuing support of the Fleet Air Force until air fields are established ashore; (c) technical developments which favor the offensive in land warfare; and (d) the overwhelming advantage of superior weapons combined with strategic mobility to permit superlative weapons to be brought against poor weapons.
(3) A more effective control of the sea is made possible by (a) their unapproached systems of bases; (b) the potentialities opened by the seaplane tender; and (c) their overwhelming strength in aircraft carriers.
(4) The pressure which they can exert to force a weaker and unwilling fleet to seek a decision is increased by (a) guerrilla air warfare or guerrilla land warfare or a combination of them both; (b) more effective control of the sea, and (c) improved ability to seize advanced bases for more relentless exercise of (a) and (b).
(5) When the hostile fleet accepts battle, the chances of annihilating it are increased by (a) greater power of individual warships and higher proportion of them which can be kept with the fleet; (b) ability of Fleet Air Force to strike at weak or isolated enemy units; and (c) improved ability of surface and air forces to harry a beaten and retreating fleet.
(6) Both powers are especially fitted to exploit these opportunities because they have demonstrated marked ability in combining sea and land power as well as sea and air power; consequently, they should do an excellent job of combining all three.
(7) The two powers are uniquely fitted to cooperate effectively in war because (a) they have similarity of outlook, community of interest, mutual respect and confidence, and speak the same language; (b) both powers are unusually free from those ancient and deeply-rooted grudges which breed friction and mistrust; and (c) their navies have previously shown an unmatched ability to work together.
As in all attractive possibilities, there is a qualification. Nearly all these brilliant potentialities are conditioned by the provision of adequate anti-aircraft strength. Until that deficiency is made good, the airplane is fully as much a hindrance as a help. Air power is like steam, water power, dynamite, or any other form of power; until it is brought under control, it is an indiscriminate menace.
For the sake of clarity the new requirements are classified:
(1) Battleships. —Speed can now be cut drastically in order to provide tunnel sterns, more stoutly armored bows, improved underwater protection, shorter turning circles, more powerful anti-aircraft batteries, complete fire-control installations for each turret, and maximum ship- for-ship superiority.
(2) Fleet Air Force. —Strengthen it by (a) building additional large aircraft carriers instead of large cruisers; (b) building small aircraft carriers and more seaplane tenders; (c) developing outlying air bases; and (d) expanding naval equivalent of G.H.Q. Air Force.
(3) Cruisers. —For the present at least, build only anti-aircraft cruisers with special emphasis on a 26-knot, 10,000-ton type with maximum anti-aircraft batteries, abundant ammunition, and, if practicable, a tunnel stem and real underwater protection.
(4) Destroyers. —Transfer emphasis from guns and speed to torpedoes and protection. Pay more attention to habitability and the requirements for night fighting.
In general, the trend is away from speed and toward these things: greater striking and resisting power, improved maneuverability and habitability, more aircraft strength and greater anti-aircraft strength, more torpedoes and stronger underwater protection, improved suitability for combined operations, the elimination of minor hazards and the reduction of major hazards, a tighter control of the sea, a faster tempo in naval warfare, and a return to the Nelsonic ideal of annihilating the enemy’s fleet. The trend is also away from the old idea of building ships with merely a perceptible margin of superiority over new or projected foreign units of the same class; instead the new aim is the very utmost in the qualities most essential to each type in performing its allotted tasks. In other words, designs should no longer be merely competitive; they should be purely functional and should represent the maximum attainable for each function in order to annihilate rather than merely defeat an enemy. Seizing the initiative in design is a vital preliminary to seizing and maintaining the initiative in strategy. If all the foregoing could be expressed in a single sentence, it would be this: The airplane has not rendered sea power obsolete; on the contrary, it has enabled a fleet to do the old things more effectively and to do new things of which Mahan never dreamed.
FEW PROBLEMS are so difficult to solve as this one, for it apparently admits of an infinity of solutions. It is not sufficient, in fact, to place weapons on a war ship: it is further necessary to protect them from the adversary's blows; it is also necessary to protect the ship itself, in such a way that an unfortunate blow may not instantly suppress the weapons by destroying the stability or the buoyancy of their floating platform.
It is no less indispensable to endow that floating platform with qualities of enduring mobility, which enable it to be brought at the right moment to the place of action. —DARRIEUS, War on the Sea.