One of the prime bulwarks of the democratic way of life is the continued existence of a free press. For this very real privilege the American people have fought in war after war, whether or not they were conscious at the time that freedom of access to public information was at stake.
We have emerged from another cosmic war in which a free press and the American people’s freedom of access to news were periled as never before, because had our enemies overcome us our free press would have been replaced promptly with a dictated propaganda machine. People would hear only what the new rulers wanted them to hear, and the thought of what would have happened to the mental processes of successive generations of our children is enough to sicken us.
It is here that certain distinctions arise concerning the interrelation of five words— “free press,” and “public relations,” and “propaganda”—all of them common enough to the average person, and all of them generally misunderstood or subject to misconceptions. They may seem to have little bearing upon naval matters, present or future, but let us see whether or not they do.
When we speak of a “free press,” we are really speaking of a hydra which comprises many more elements than merely newspapers. In a realistic sense, we mean all the sources of public information through which the public gains its knowledge of events; to name a few: the radio, television, movies and newsreels, magazines, pictorial media, advertising, trade publications, syndicated photographs and features, billboards, direct- by-mail matter, press wire services, etc.
Through reading, seeing, and hearing these diverse factors the public gains its impressions and opinions. And it must be apparent how vital to good government and the principles of American democracy is the judgment of those responsible for creating and disseminating these factors. Without level-headed direction at the source, information is likely to get out of hand and be twisted either innocently or by intent to serve the purposes of special interests.
When we speak of “public relations” we are again not always specific or clear in our meaning. To many individuals, the public relations specialist is a high-pressure pleader of causes he is hired to promote, a man who gives slight attention to anything but getting his “story” before the public at the least possible cost to his client. This is true in many cases, but there is a rising tide of emphasis upon ethics in the field of nonmilitary public relations because it is a well-known fact that the American people will not forever accept blarney and mere showmanship in place of truth. It is obvious, too, that the practice of public relations technique utilizes all the factors of a free press listed above.
During the war the public relations departments of the military services emerged as able aids to the prosecution of the war. Their worth is recognized by the overwhelming majority of senior officers in whose hands rests responsibility for dissemination of authorized information; and not a few junior officers realize the importance of public relations departments in “getting the news across.”
When we come to “propaganda” it is natural to get a bad taste in one’s mouth, recalling that the word produces a conditioned reflex in terms of Goebbels, Tokyo Rose, Lord Haw-Haw, and the other Axis propagandists whose malicious lies disgusted Americans. Without resorting to Webster definitions, however, it is logical to assume that there can be good propaganda as well as bad, beneficial propaganda in behalf of righteous causes in opposition to that fostering the causes of evil.
From this brief interpretation of these five interrelated words, it may be seen that all of them are closely allied to commonly accepted peacetime objectives of the Navy: namely, the preservation of naval forces and a naval establishment second to none; the attraction of suitable and capable young men to naval careers; maintenance of public pride in the Navy’s past and future accomplishments; and the continuance of public interest in the Navy as a fighting force.
Therefore it becomes apparent that building upon the foundations already established, the post-war Navy public relations structure should be closely co-ordinated with these and other objectives. The American people should not be allowed to forget the Navy just because it has ceased to be an offensive weapon and has become a less visible and lesser known instrument of protection. History has a way of repeating itself, and history has proved that when wars have ceased the forces which prosecuted war are generally forgotten by the general public—the tax-paying public which supports them.
This problem is complicated by several factors inherent in the beginning of any peacetime era—a period, incidentally, when general trends for or against proposals are quickly set. First of all, the public is tired of hearing about war; it wants to hear about peace—the blue horizons. And that trend is already evident in American thinking. Secondly, the discharged service men themselves —men who might be expected to have a clearer view of future necessities—are bound to be concerned with personal re-establishment rather than peacetime military needs and methodology. Third, military reconversion itself is not productive of news material with the glamor of war news, and hence is back-page stuff. And fourth, the whole direction of post-war economy as it concerns military appropriations is toward reduction of expenditures which may in any way be interpreted as nonessential. In this limbo the need for a strong public relations structure throughout the naval establishment is likely to be overlooked or, if recognized, made ineffectual through limited funds and personnel.
But during these war years certain beginnings have been made which might react favorably, both inside and outside the Navy, toward continuing a strong and well-balanced naval public relations policy: (a) a navy public relations structure does exist in the Naval Districts and in most of the larger commands afloat and ashore; (b) officer and enlisted personnel assigned to public relations duty have familiarized themselves with primary elements of constant Navy policy; (c) the press and other elements listed heretofore in this article have become accustomed to obtaining their information from official Navy sources (i.e., public relations departments) rather than from outside sources or hearsay; (d) the Navy occupies a unique place in the public mind and consciousness, and therefore can more easily maintain this position; (e) many naval personnel have contributed to national publications and have taken part in programs reaching the public, thereby gaining favorable attention for the Navy among millions of citizens.
The question now poses itself: What are the elements of a public relations policy for the peacetime Navy? The writer does not pretend to suggest such a plan, yet certain general elements come to mind which might have a bearing on its formulation. And these might suggest others that are pertinent to the subject. Let us examine a few of them in brief outline form:
(1) The initial problem in any program, once it is decided upon, is adequate trained personnel. As already stated, our wartime Navy possessed large numbers of well-indoctrinated public relations officers and enlisted personnel. The great majority of these, however, are reservists and will largely be discharged as demobilization proceeds. If they had civilian experience in such professions as corporate public relations, advertising, and newspaper work—the sources of trained “PR” men—they were mostly well- paid and would have little financial incentive to remain in the peacetime Navy. Where, then, will the peacetime Navy find the men for the job?
From three sources, in the writer’s opinion: primarily from within the ranks of regular Navy officers; secondarily by attracting capable reserve officers to regular Navy public relations careers; and lastly by commissioning trained public relations men from civilian life on a gradual scale to meet needs.
It is recommended that all midshipmen attending the Naval Academy be given a Public Relations course as part of their professional training; thus recognition of the subject’s importance will remain as they progress through the gradations of command. They should, perhaps, be rotated in temporary public relations berths to gain practical experience in meeting and dealing with the public and information media.
Attention should be given now to retaining the services of reserve officers having sound pre-war public relations experience, particularly those who performed administrative functions in advertising agencies and firms of public relations counselors. These men are conversant with all methods and materials of public approach, and could greatly facilitate the Navy’s program from the standpoints of personal contacts and professional experience.
To supplement the two groups above, older men from the same civilian backgrounds who wished to devote their remaining productive years to the nation’s service instead of retirement might be tendered commissions appropriate to their qualifications, and retained in specialized public relations duties.
These three groups, if their numbers were adequate, ought to provide the peacetime Navy with a strong and efficient public relations structure.
(2) We have perhaps put the cart before the horse in talking of personnel before appropriations for their support, but at least we now have part of the personnel while appropriations are still in the peacetime offing.
It is evident, however, that without proper financial support starting with the first peacetime fiscal year, no comprehensive Navy public relations structure is possible. Where must the demand for proper appropriations come from? Certainly not from the public, which knows little of such things; and it is unlikely that it will come from Congress. The answer is: from within the naval establishment itself, from the sectors of command where such recommendations originate. Without recognition here, without support here, any peacetime PR program is likely to degenerate to a point where handing out “canned” news releases is the only function of the public relations officer.
(3) What is meant by a “public relations structure”? The wartime and peacetime concepts are different, both in size and constant objectives. The Navy’s peacetime public relations program may be comprised of these elements: smaller numbers of personnel, but with a higher general level of specialized ability; smaller appropriations, of course, but in direct ratio to the Navy’s over-all magnitude; new apportionments of personnel on a more uniform scale throughout commands; emphasis on old and new objectives of naval policy as it concerns the public; and a new understanding of the part public relations play in maintaining support, both material and moral, for the Navy whatever the course of future events.
All of these contribute to the formation of the structure itself. For without recognition, direction, financial support, and flexible planning—backed by a pool of trained officers and men—no public relations structure is possible.
(4) Peacetime objectives are not necessarily the reverse of wartime objectives; certainly not when one considers the direction of already evident trends. Whether or not compulsory military training becomes law, the Navy’s man-power strength must be maintained. That implies continued recruiting, but on a scale far larger than between 1918 and 1941. And recruiting immediately involves public relations structure and policy.
Speaking for a moment as a pre-war civilian who saw many a poster in front of my home town post office, it is clear to me that mere “advertising” for “red-blooded young Americans” to “join the Navy and see the world” will not accomplish much in peacetime America. The motivating forces within the individual must be different: not for adventure, certainly not for modest Navy pay in a world bent on personal prosperity, and not even for undefined patriotic reasons. The “story” here must not fall into easy ruts; it must deal with realities emanating from these war years and directed to a new generation.
No one will deny that the Navy is “our first line of defense.” But more exactly, is it not also our first line of offense? America must not be caught short again, and that ought to be told to every young American. He should be told, frankly, that a naval career means real sacrifices—but it offers the deep inner satisfaction of knowing that one is working for and protecting one’s country. No list of “free” uniforms, services, or meals is likely to attract a boy who can, very possibly, go into a factory and earn weekly what a bluejacket is paid monthly.
(5) Maintaining a “garaged” Navy, ready for action on short notice, also involves intelligent public relations policy. Both for the benefit of other nations and our own people, it should be frequently taken out of wraps and its latent power exhibited. People should be shown that it is kept in condition for their protection and their children’s—and that it costs money to maintain it and the personnel to man it, if need be. The same applies to activities at new advanced bases; they should be kept in the public eye and not allowed to become only distant outposts on romantic tropic isles. The men who know differently will soon be the fathers of a new generation susceptible to the same somnolence that they themselves became prey to.
(6) Lastly, but perhaps most important, a close bond between the peacetime Navy and the public should be maintained. Here the distinction between “public relations” and “propaganda” will raise problems. Public relations must go beyond mere release of news: it should create news, foster ideas, get across in simple, easily understandable language what top command desires to say. Whole new vistas of transmission are open: television, visual instruction in schools, short movie features, and a greater American readership than ever before—all receptive to promoting ideas clearly formulated in advance.
In conclusion, any experienced public relations officer knows that top command cannot concern itself exclusively with public relations; but it is a vital secondary consideration in direct alliance with most naval functions. It is therefore important now and in the future, and it needs understanding. If the American people had really understood the need for strong advanced bases and the world’s greatest Navy ten years before Pearl Harbor, public apathy might not have cost us so dearly.
I consider it to be one of the most important functions I have—to have the Navy adequately and accurately portrayed to the public. This Navy of ours belongs to the public, and what it is doing for the defense of the public, with a very few reservations, should be made known to the public.—The late Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox in an address to Public Relations Officers.