Since its initial inception in 1869, the St. Lawrence Seaway project has been a continuous controversial issue. Its purpose is of a twofold nature: first, as a deep water navigational channel from the Atlantic Ocean to the heart of the midwest, the Great Lakes; and secondly, as a hydroelectric power project.
Both of these aspects are pertinent ones to the naval service, although in the final analysis the hydroelectric power project comes after the deep waterway plan in naval interest.
During World War II, interest in the Seaway was revived with new vigor in the interests of national defense, although it had been presented in Congress for legislative action many times before. President Roosevelt in 1941 stated that the St. Lawrence Project was of vital interest to the United States and its war efforts. The fact that the hydroelectric power from the proposed project would yield 2,200,000 horsepower is undeniable; it would be cheaply and efficiently produced by the potential—and as yet unharnessed—power of the St. Lawrence River in the vicinity of Massena, New York. Increased wartime demands for electric power placed severe strains upon our existing power plants in the United Slates, for with an “all out war effort,” electric power is greatly in demand. Also, by reason of the limited capacity in draft and breadth of the present St. Lawrence canals, only partial use could be made of our shipyard facilities in the Great Lakes.
Shipyards are but a component part of the ship-building industry, and their function is primarily the performance of final assembly, repair, and outfitting, whether it be a merchant or fighting ship. The process of ship design is centered, for naval needs, in the naval architecture section of the Bureau of Ships. During World War II, there were situated on the Great Lakes sixty-three shipyards, and of these, thirteen are capable of constructing naval combatant vessels of three hundred feet length and over. With respect to the thirteen larger shipyards, four are situated on Lake Michigan, four on Lake Superior, two on Lake Erie, and the remaining three on Lake Huron. Perhaps the most significant of these were the Manitowoc, Wisconsin, shipyards, which produced fleet- type submarines, and the Bay City, Michigan, shipyards, which produced destroyer escorts and fast destroyer-type troop transports.
In analyzing naval construction and contracting, thought must be given to the designed draft of the vessels, since this is the limiting factor in ship construction on the Great Lakes at present. Assuming, for the purposes of illustration, that naval combatant construction would be limited to vessels not over the size of a cruiser, the comparative drafts in a semi-loaded condition are as follows: submarines, fourteen feet; destroyers, twelve feet; destroyer escorts, ten feet; landing craft of seaworthy size (LCI’s and larger), fourteen feet; and cruisers, twenty feet. The newest class cruisers, Des Moines and Newport News, draw approximately twenty-two feet, while escort carriers draw twenty-five feet.
According to Maritime Commission statistics, sixty per cent of the raw materials and fabricated parts entering into our national shipbuilding program originated in the Great Lakes area, but only three per cent of the finished ships were built in the Great Lakes basin. Thus, excluding for the present the asset of security, it becomes apparent that we have a twofold advantage of construction in the interior: first, proximity to the requisite raw materials, and second, construction in a region where there is an abundance of skilled labor.
During World War I, the only naval vessels constructed on the Great Lakes were the now famous “Eagle” boats—subchasers— made by Henry Ford. Construction was limited to this type of vessel principally because in that war the U. S. Navy functioned as a logistical support unit rather than as an offensive arm of the armed forces of the United States. Yet this principle of logistical support was evidenced strongly by the production of merchant hulls on the Great Lakes; and those operating shipyards on the Lakes constructed and delivered merchant ships more rapidly than did the coastal shipyards, despite the existing obstacles of the shallow St. Lawrence Canals.
In 1941, preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Rear Admiral George H. Rock, C. C., U. S. Navy (Retired), former Chief Constructor for the U. S. Navy, undertook a thorough inspection tour of the principal shipyards and naval construction sites on the Great Lakes and subsequently made an official report to the Department of Commerce of the government.
In his authoritative opinion, at least two of the then existing shipyards on the Great Lakes were capable of building 10,000-ton, 8-inch gun cruisers, and, of course, smaller cruisers. On this basis we may justly assume that the majority of future combatant naval vessels now planned could be constructed on the Lakes. There was no practical limit, at the time, as to the number of smaller type combatant vessels which could be completed, within the limitations of the shipyards then existent. It should be borne in mind that large-scale amphibious warfare was not contemplated in 1941; yet a comparative analysis could be made at this point between the predicted capabilities and the actual output of the thirteen larger shipyards. A limited number of destroyer types were planned for contract letting in the Great Lakes basin, with smaller patrol vessels supplementing the naval construction bill. Actual output of naval vessels far exceeded any plans, and while a total of 1,063 vessels, combatant and auxiliary types, were built under the Lakes program of naval construction, they ranged in size from subchasers to destroyers and submarines. Tabulation of the figures
Submarines
Fast Troop Transports 29
Destroyer Escorts 11
Landing Ships, Tank 17
Landing Ships, Mechanized 380
Landing Craft, Tank 44
Landing Craft, Infantry Light 47
As a point of further interest, during World War II Canadian naval construction on the Great Lakes was limited to the production of corvettes, steel and wooden minesweepers, motor patrol boats, and assorted auxiliary craft, all of which steamed under their own power through the existing St. Lawrence channel to the Atlantic Ocean.
Senate Joint Resolution 111, House Joint Resolution 192, and House Joint Resolution 194 were the resolutions in the Eightieth Congress, and now in the Eighty-First Congress, calling for approval of the agreement entered into between the United States and Canada in 1941 for the construction of the St. Lawrence project. These resolutions differ principally from resolutions for this purpose which were considered in previous Congresses in that they agree to the principle of making the navigation phase of the project self-liquidating, through the imposition of reasonable lolls. It is difficult to see how members of Congress, or anyone else, can be expected to form a reliable and soundly based opinion as to whether the St. Lawrence project would be self-liquidating in fact, when faced by so many unanswered questions which involve essential and variable factors. These questions could and should be resolved conclusively before Congress is asked to pass judgment on a project of such magnitude and importance.
The United States now commands the approaches to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River from military, naval, and air bases acquired from Canada, and constructed by the United States during World War II. The wide reaches of the St. Lawrence Gulf necessitate the consideration of the submarine menace. During World War II, six merchant ships were sunk by enemy submarines there, whereas no enemy submarines were destroyed or effectively damaged to prevent further operations, owing mainly to the tactical advantages enjoyed by submarines operating in these waters. No appreciable antisubmarine measures were employed in the Gulf, thus making the waters even more favorable for submarine operations.
Had the St. Lawrence Seaway been completed before World War II, there is little doubt that combatant ships of the destroyer, cruiser, and escort carrier classes, and Liberty-type merchant vessels could have been constructed in the relatively secure Great Lakes area. Consideration should also be given to the logistical support element. Supplies in expedited transit are the cornerstone of the vast Service force necessary to give the fighting force its logistical mobility. Ships could have been loaded in the Great Lakes at the scene of high output production with supplies, munitions, and war armament. They could then have proceeded in convoy from the semi-sheltered waters of the St. Lawrence River and Gulf to Europe by a route 1,000 miles shorter in the open sea, thus reducing the passage and accompanying submarine hazards en route by one third. This factor in itself makes the St. Lawrence Seaway a strategic route, as it is on the Great Circle route to Northern Europe.
Much speculation has been made as to the supposed relative security of the Great Lakes considering their northern location in proximity to the polar regions. Here the assumption is made that any attack against the United States will be in the form of an air attack via the North Pole. But this same principle already applies to the dense industrial region of the Great Lakes and northeast central portions of the United States. By virtue of that vulnerability, already existent, greater precautions in defense against an air attack must necessarily be made, with or without the existence of the proposed seaway. The defense goals of the Dominion of Canada and the United States are common in this respect, and to this end these two countries are negotiating treaties, among which one calls for a vast and complete early warning radar system surrounding the entire North American continent. The radar network would be maintained at an operational level consistent with our grand strategy and national policy.
The three coasts (Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico) of the United States are even more vulnerable to air attack directly from sea, while the middle west region has the inherent advantage of geographical location, with obvious gain in time to effect a suitable counter-offensive air attack, the time element being that of time-of-transit-in- flight for the attacking air forces, between the first or initial point of detection and the middle west region, at least eleven hundred miles in all directions.
“Dispersion of industry,” according to testimony of the Under Secretary of War, “is a desirable protective measure against the type of air warfare which we can reasonably expect in any future war. The point has been made that the development of this project would tend to relieve the industrial congestion along the Eastern seaboard. On the other hand, there is already a large amount of industry now in the Great Lakes region, and, with the polar concept of a possible air attack this region is much more vulnerable than it has been in the past—excluding the application of a radar guard system. It is, therefore, difficult to say with any definite assurance whether from the standpoint of industrial vulnerability this project would be advantageous or disadvantageous. The inclination of military experts is to believe that it would have more advantages than disadvantages, largely because it may have the effect of spreading industry more uniformly throughout the entire Great Lakes Region.”
Again we might consider the aspect of vulnerability, since it is argued that one well placed bomb could nullify the strategic value of the seaway. If this be the yardstick of strategic value, we should likewise question the vulnerability of the Panama Canal, the Port of New York, or any other of the multitudinous key strategic installations which would naturally become primary targets in any future conflict in which we may be embroiled. That an air attack could possibly render the seaway impotent is further argument for its construction, since we must have a high degree of flexibility of transportation within our continental limits. On this basis it is mandatory that we have unrestricted use of the vast system of inland waterways which are available in the Great Lakes region. This includes the development of all possible paths of egress from the Lakes and is consistent with the geopolitical concept of utilizing to the maxima the inland waterways.
In any analytical approach, it is incumbent upon us to know intimately the contents, or plan of the subject, and in this case, the geographical aspects.
The Gulf of St. Lawrence, the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lakes provide a continuous, but now restricted, waterway extending from the Atlantic Ocean into the heart of the continent. From the Strait of Belle Isle, between Newfoundland and Labrador, at the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the sailing distance to Duluth, Minnesota, at the westernmost end of Lake Superior, is about 2,340 miles, and to Chicago, at the southern end of Lake Michigan, approximately 2,250 miles. From Montreal, which is at the head of deep-draft ocean navigation on the St. Lawrence River, the sailing distance to Duluth is 1,330 miles, and to Chicago, 1,240 miles. Of those two last mentioned distances, 975 miles of the Montreal- Duluth run and 950 of the Montreal-Chicago run are in the open waters of the Great Lakes, providing unrestricted navigation.
Between Ogdensburg, New York, Prescott, Ontario, and Montreal, Quebec, there lie the only major obstructions to seagoing vessels navigating to the westernmost reaches of the Great Lakes. Yet these obstructions all lie within a distance of 119 miles. Therefore, the principal objective of the project is to improve the existing channels between Prescott and Montreal and to admit deep-draft oceangoing vessels, thereby affording uninterrupted passage from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes, and vice versa. This is to be accomplished by the construction of dams, locks, and canals at the International Rapids the Soulanges Rapids, and Lachine Rapids, with the requisite dredging of the connecting channels where necessary. The initial draft would be twenty-seven feet, with locks thirty feet deep over the sills, in order to compensate for the 224-foot differential level between Lake Ontario and Montreal. Seaward from Montreal there are 1,000 miles of unrestricted navigable waters to the Atlantic Ocean.
Completed rapidly in 1943 as an emergency measure, the MacArthur Lock, connecting Lakes Superior and Huron, is located at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, on St. Mary’s River. Constructed wholly by the United States, it is 800 feet in length, 80 feet in breadth, and 31 feet in depth, while the approach channels are 27 feet deep. The Welland Ship Canal, circumventing Niagara Falls and its 323-foot water differential', was completed by the Canadian government in 1933, and has a limiting depth of 25 feet. Present over-all limiting depths are of the order of 14 feet in the locks of the International Rapids and Lachine sections of the river. It is in the International Rapids section, 46 miles in length, that the major navigation and hydroelectric power developments are proposed. Near Massena, New York, would be located the two dams, with Barnhart Island in midstream straddling the international boundary. The power output would be 2,200,000 horsepower, equally divided between the United States and Canada.
A great percentage of oppositional argument has been based upon the unfavorable climatic conditions of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin. The project lies farther north than any other American waterway development proposed to date; so far north that many of its opponents refer to it as the St. Lawrence leeway, rather than Seaway. Based upon a compilation of authoritative reports taken over a number of years, the seaway will be closed to shipping by ice for a period of four months and ten days per year, or 36 per cent of the time. The construction of ships on the Great Lakes would necessarily have to be regulated to suit the closed winter season, but this is a known condition and can be met accordingly. It is of interest to note that the closed season will in no way affect the output of the hydroelectric power plant, as there is a constant year-round flow of water through the seaway and river despite the ice fields. Icebreakers have been employed in the past to keep a clear channel, but have not proved themselves successful. It is a costly, dangerous operation which yields poor results, as the icebreaking ships need to be both numerous and powerful in order to maintain clearance through the thick, rapidly forming ice fields during the closed season.
Varying degrees of favorable support for the St. Lawrence Seaway project as a factor of national security have been expressed by the Secretaries of State, Army, and Navy, based mainly upon a letter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written in 1946. In examining this letter, originated by flag-rank naval officers—the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time were Fleet Admirals Leahy and Nimitz, and Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz—three main points are to be noted: first, the Seaway would make available shipbuilding and ship repair facilities in a relatively secure area, capable of expansion and of conversion for handling deep sea vessels, which could be used to supplement coastal shipyards; secondly, the Seaway would be an imperative factor in the problem of logistics in a period of national emergency; third, the Seaway would result in a large source of cheap dependable electric power, generated without the use of critical combustibles.
Thus additional power is a vital strategic asset in the north central industrial area, which, during the last war, was a power deficit area.
Vice Admiral Russell Wilson, U. S. Navy (Retired), formerly Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander to Fleet Admiral Ernest King, and Naval Advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out in hearings before a Subcommittee on the St. Lawrence Seaway of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the submarines built at Manitowoc, Wisconsin, on Lake Michigan were put in cradles, the equivalent of floating dry- docks, then “floated down the Chicago Canal, Illinois River, and the Mississippi River for almost two thousand miles. That took labor, money, and time, more than if they could have gone down the St. Lawrence under their own power.” Here we must take note of the appalling fact that the canals through Illinois to the navigable Mississippi River have a limiting draft of only nine feet. Yet this was, at the time, the most expeditious manner in which the sorely needed submarines could reach the sea. While without the confines of the subject under consideration, so as to be in accordance with the principle of development of all possible paths of egress to the sea, the Lake Michigan-Mississippi River canals should likewise be improved beyond their present conditions of limiting ship-size and tonnage-handling capacities.
In a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley of the same committee, Mr. F. B. Wilby, Chairman of the Power Authority of the State of New York, lists the following principal agencies of the government as having recommended the Seaway project: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Departments of State, Army, and Navy, the U. S. Maritime Commission, and the United States-Canadian Joint Board on Defense. There is, however, no indication of the degree of support.
While vast power plants such as the proposed hydroelectric plant of the St. Lawrence are tempting targets for attacking air forces, those very plants are a necessity in producing the required large blocks of power for the production of atomic energy in nuclear research and development. Hydroelectric power plants are initially costly in construction, but once in operation they have no fuel costs; whereas the conventional, steam-generating turbine-electric power plants are limited in size and do have relatively high operating costs owing to the coal or fuel oil necessary for production of the required large blocks of electric power.
The seaway, locks, and power plant, in the opinion of the War Department, could be adequately and safely defended, much like any other strategic assets we already possess. In summarizing their considerations, the Joints Chiefs of Staff say that “the St. Lawrence project, had it been completed, would have been of material assistance in prosecuting the war, and it would be in the interests of national security to complete projects such as this, which would have distinct military advantages and would materially increase the industrial and transportation potential of the United States.” This undoubtedly should be accepted as the most conclusive statement which could be made on the project in establishing the value of the St. Lawrence project for the security and defense of this nation and the neighboring Dominion of Canada.
While the economical aspects are beyond the scope of this analysis, there are two primary schools of thought. The opponents of the project base their objections upon the excessively high cost of initial construction (about 720 million dollars) and continual maintenance, plus the seemingly narrowminded idea that its completion would be injurious to the existing modes of transportation through competition of lowered rates. On the other hand the proponents of the Seaway argue that the tolls levied on commercial bottoms and the receipts on the cheaply produced hydroelectric power will make the cost self-effacing over a period of years.
Little difficulty exists in the phase of ship armament on the Great Lakes. Following the War of 1812 and the subsequent Treaty of Ghent in 1814, the Rush-Bagot executive agreement was evolved in 1817 for mutual disarmament of all naval vessels in the Great Lakes. But this unfavorable condition of restricted armament was remedied in part by executive agreements between the United States and Canada in 1941 and again in 1946. It may justifiably be assumed that the entire disarmament clause of the Rush-Bagot agreement could be nullified by the two countries with no stumbling blocks to be encountered in effecting its abrogation.
By the Treaties of 1854 and 1871 with Canada, the United States has reserved and is granted an equal right with Canada in the navigation of the St. Lawrence through its entire course to the sea.
The underlying theme of those advocating the proposed Seaway is self-evident; that is, the over-all economic and industrial advantage to the United States and to this continent which would follow upon the development of one of the world’s greatest inland waterways and one of the world’s largest sources of cheap and dependable power, surely the one largest block of hydroelectric power on the North American continent.
The role of the Navy is determined by high-level policy and grand strategy. Naval construction is closely allied with these principles in that strategy is based upon forces available; further, that availability is the criterion of new construction and demands great flexibility in the numbers and types of units of the fighting forces to be constructed.
The strength of the United States lies in its natural resources and the indefatigable spirit of its citizens in time of duress. It is the development of this power, both potential and existent, which has enabled us to defend ourselves successfully. The St. Lawrence Seaway could aid immeasurably in the development of that power.