The glorious achievements of our submarines in the last war are now known to the world, but few know how our submarine force was prepared for war- This article is written with the hope of pointing out, to those interested, how such high morale and thorough readiness for war were accomplished.
The submarine force comprised a very small part of our Navy, and some of the methods used and the steps taken in this force may not seem adaptable to the whole Navy, or even to a major force, but the principles involved will apply.
When I assumed command of the Submarines Pacific, in January 1941, war was imminent, and I expected it sooner than it actually came. The staff of the submarine force consisted of experienced submarine officers so that little organization and orientation was required. It was realized that there was no time to waste and that work had to be done quickly and thoroughly. The officers of the staff worked together without friction and practically all decisions were made after full consultation.
Peacetime methods for training submarines were found to be inadequate due, mainly, to what the high command considered necessary as safety precautions. One of the first steps taken was to suspend the Rules for Target Practice and Engineering Competition and to increase the firing of torpedoes under war conditions, as nearly as they could be simulated. Torpedo firing became routine, the commanding officers using their own judgement as far as the details of firing were concerned. Stress was put upon the attacks being unseen by the target group and upon the torpedoes being fired to hit. All targets were screened by surface craft and, when possible, by aircraft.
As early as March, 1941, the torpedo overhaul facilities of the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, were found to be inadequate and strong requests for a new torpedo and mine overhaul shop were made but were disapproved. At this time the Submarine Base was doing the torpedo work for cruisers, submarines and Naval Aircraft. The torpedo overhaul shop was working twenty-four hours a day in three shifts.
In time of peace submarines seldom dived deeper than one hundred feet, and submarine personnel had formed an erroneous idea that one hundred feet was deep enough for all practical purposes. Also, submarine personnel were skeptical about the effectiveness of airplanes in anti-submarine warfare and had to be convinced. The Commander Submarines and the members of the staff flew over operating submarines frequently, and submarine commanding officers were required to do so when this could be arranged. Under good conditions submerged submarines could be seen at one hundred and twenty-five feet, but some officers thought that this was a freak performance. All doubts were answered when the planes were armed with small fire-cracker bombs which were sprinkled upon submarines when they were sighted. In addition to hearing these small bombs explode near them, several submarine crews found some of these bombs on deck when their ships surfaced. Respect for airplanes was thus firmly established.
In peacetime submarines went to test depth (250 to 300 feet, according to the design of the ships) after a major overhaul, or about once every two or three years, and when one went to test depth an occasion was made of the event. Therefore, orders were issued requiring submarines always to dive to at least one hundred feet, there get their trim before proceeding with any operation, and to dive to test depth at least once during every trip outside of Pearl Harbor. This deep diving opened a new field for submarines. In addition to overcoming the normal distrust of operating in the dark, it showed us how much there was for us to learn about the element in which we operated. “Temperature gradient,” “batho-thermograph,” “sonar conditions,” became new terms in the submarine vocabulary. Evasion tactics expanded. Weaknesses in the piping and fittings of the submarines were discovered and corrected. Officers developed confidence and skill in obtaining and maintaining trim while changing depth rapidly and maneuvering violently, of vital importance in successful evasion of enemy attack.
By June, 1941, torpedo firing had to be curtailed due to lack of torpedo overhaul capacity, but other important activities were speeded up. Submarines were sent on practice patrols to test material and personnel. The first two or three of these patrols showed that our submarines lacked water-making capacity to remain on patrol for more than one month under average war conditions. This led to the design and installation of special stills, a project that was completed just as the war arrived. It was also learned that the proper stowage of supplies upon a submarine is an art of vital importance and that estimating and planning the supplies necessary for a patrol have to be most carefully done. One submarine, on patrol when war came, returned after forty-five days with her crew so hungry that their tales of woe impressed the whole force and, thereafter, no submarine left the base without a full load of supplies properly stowed. An entirely new philosophy was developed for keeping the fuel account. The peacetime method developed under the Engineering Competition just would not do. What became standard practice was, roughly, to figure how much fuel would be required to get home, add twenty-five per cent, and then make sure that this amount was kept available.
As early as April a study of the effects of submarine duty upon personnel was started. The practice patrols furnished much valuable data, the very first such patrol teaching much about the selection and preparation of food.
Evasive tactics, which had always been neglected, had to be developed. This activity fitted in well with the Destroyer Force operations, and every commanding officer received practice in evading a destroyer division sent to hunt his submarine. In addition to the two attack teachers already installed at the submarine base, there was installed one destroyer versus submarine device. All three were kept in use continuously. Every opportunity was taken for attack upon vessels of the fleet, especially for attacks upon the screened battleships, and as many torpedoes were fired as the limited overhaul capacity would permit. Another request for a torpedo overhaul shop was disapproved, and this shop was not built until well after the war started.
During the year before the war the personnel situation in the fleet was not good. There simply were n6t enough men to man the ships and to furnish crews for new construction. From time to time drafts of recruits were allotted to the various forces, but recruits could not make up for the experienced personnel sent to new construction and other special details. The decision was made that each force would have to train and rate its own petty officers. In submarines the necessarily high percentage of rated men made adherence to this policy impracticable. To the disgust of some of the other force commanders the policy was modified for the submarines, which received petty officers, from time to time, for submarine training.
As mentioned above, a study was made of the effects of submarine duty upon personnel. The quality of the submarine personnel was superb, and it was essential that this most valuable personnel should be given such care that it would not be used up during the early days of what was recognized as a long war. Information was gathered from all available sources, particularly from the experiences of the British, German, and Italian navies. Much help in psychiatry and psychology was received from various medical officers especially from the late Captain E. A. M. Gendreau, Medical Corps, the fleet medical officer.
Early in our study we found that the most important step in preparing men for the strain of war was the building of the highest possible morale. With this is mind, the Commander Submarines began, early in the summer, addressing the officers of the Submarine Force assembled at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor. In general, they were told that war was almost here, that it was vital to establish and sustain the highest morale, that they were blessed with the most carefully selected personnel in the world and that they must prove themselves worthy to lead such men, that our ships had morale built into them and were the finest submarines ever built, that our Navy had always been able to rely upon the remarkable initiative of its trained men, that in war they must learn to delegate authority and responsibility to a greater extent than had ever been done in peacetime, that all hands must develop an alertness far beyond what they had known, that they must build in their men a war psychology, that in peace our first consideration had always been the lives and safety of our officers and men but in war the lives of personnel are of secondary importance—the first responsibility being the preservation of the fighting power of their ships—that officers must teach themselves and their men not to worry, that they must be alert to foresee possible mental breakdown in their men, etc., etc. These talks were well received and led to much healthy and valuable discussion among both officers and men.
Our study broadened as it progressed. Already new construction was making deep inroads upon submarine crews, and it was realized that the building program would be greatly increased. Any plans made would have to be very elastic.
The general conclusions of our study were about as follows:
Men could stand up under war conditions in submarines, without serious loss of efficiency, for a limited length of time, that is, if the patrols were not too long. The “too long” must be determined early in the war.
Men could stand such patrols time after time if they were properly rested between patrols. Submarine duty is harder upon personnel than duty in any other type of vessel and is very confining, the majority of the crew never getting on deck during a patrol. Therefore, the decision in regard to what constituted “proper” rest was gone into very thoroughly. Crews returning from patrol should have a complete change of environment but should be kept together. It was decided to allow at least three weeks’ rest between patrols as this was the minimum period in which a ship could be refitted for another patrol.
In submarines men tend to lose their appetites and to become constipated; they must be given special foods and extra rations of vitamins, the choice of foods being of particular importance. During practice patrols, ships experimented with many dried and preserved foods and a fairly efficient choice had been reached by the time war came. For instance, preserved fruits were found to be very valuable because they whetted the appetites and combatted both constipation and dehydration. Later in the war, fun was poked at the submarines because of their ice-cream-making machines, but these machines were most valuable, nor mere luxuries.
As men in submarines under the strain of war reach a certain degree of tiredness they lose their personal efficiency, the persons concerned being unaware of this loss and unable to prevent it. Men, properly rested between times, can be brought to the point of this loss of efficiency time after time, but if they are carried much beyond this point, even once, they can seldom be brought back.
Careful observation of each officer and man in submarines is necessary in order to pick up potential cases of mental breakdown. Such observation was carried out during the recuperation of the crews, without the knowledge of the men concerned, as far as possible. The officers received the most careful scrutiny from their squadron and division commanders. Observation of the enlisted men became second nature to the officers of the submarines and, due to the confined and intimate life in a submarine, very few mistakes were made and many many fine men were saved for our Navy.
It was planned to have officers make no more than three consecutive patrols, and enlisted men no more than four, without a rest of at least a full patrol period of two months. This ideal was not attained, hut it was striven for.
In time of peace a minimum of eighteen months’ service upon an active submarine was required before an officer or man could qualify for submarines. In war, submarines left for patrol with crews of from twenty-five to fifty per cent of inexperienced men and about fifty per cent of unqualified officers. The inexperienced officers and men had received courses of instruction in submarines but had not served on board submarines. During patrols such inexperienced personnel received regular instruction from qualified officers and men and were required to sketch lines, operate all machinery, valves, etc., and to learn the ship completely. Some were able to qualify after one patrol, and those unable to qualify after three patrols were generally sent to general service.
By the time that war came it had been determined that war patrols could be longer than forty-five days. When the first submarines returned from actual war patrols of fifty-four to fifty-six days, it was clear that patrols should not be longer than sixty days.
In September reserve crews were organized. The submarines were organized into divisions of six ships each, two divisions to a squadron, with a submarine tender assigned to each squadron, as far as possible. Two reserve crews for each division were organized as plans called for keeping two ships of each division on patrol at all times. The ideal was to have reserve crews complete and capable of taking a submarine on patrol. This ideal was never attained, but the point was soon reached where a reserve crew took over a submarine upon her return from patrol and manned her for the first two weeks of her three weeks’ refit. This system of reserve crews worked well throughout the war.
When war came a search was made for a place suitable for the recuperation of the crews of submarines returning from patrol. A request was made that the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, which was to be closed for the duration of the war, be taken over for the purpose, as this was the best available place.
The arguments for this were strong and were ably supported by the Fleet Medical Officer, but the decisive influence was that of Admiral Halsey whose aviators would need the same sort of care that was planned for submarine personnel. Before the hotel could be taken over there was a new Commander-in-Chief and the whole argument had to be given again. The idea of extra care for special personnel was new to our Navy. However, the hotel was ready to receive the crews of the first submarines returning from war patrols.
A detail of enlisted men, under a qualified submarine officer, manned the hotel, the visiting personnel having no responsibility other than the making of their own beds. A junior officer of the Supply Corps ran the mess and the food was more than satisfactory. A medical officer was assigned to the hotel as the personnel there amounted to several hundred and traffic to and from the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor was difficult, especially at night during the black-out.
There was no reveille. In fact, none but the necessary restrictions were put upon the personnel and all facilities were furnished for their welfare. The hotel got off to a good start and, due mostly to the good judgment and tact of the officer-in-charge, an excellent level of behavior was established and maintained throughout the war. In the afternoon the bar was open and soft drinks and beer could be obtained. Music was furnished and, under the auspices of the U.S.O., many of the young ladies of Honolulu danced with the officers and men at the hotel.
The general procedure was about as follows:
When a submarine returned from a patrol, a reserve crew took over the ship and the ship’s company was sent to the hotel to stay for twelve to fourteen days. During the first week at the hotel any member of the crew who wished to visit the Submarine Base was required to obtain special permission to do so from his commanding officer. Few such requests were submitted or granted. At the end of their stay at the hotel, the officers and men returned to their ship, made final preparations for sea, and left on patrol, looking forward to another visit to the hotel upon their return. Aviation personnel and occasionally personnel from other forces, when space was available, used the hotel for recuperation. The cost to the government was a very low price to pay for the great benefit received by the valuable and almost unreplaceable personnel concerned.
Comments at the hotel furnished a good measure of its success. One liked the movies best; another the swimming; others the dancing; all enjoyed the freedom from restraint. One young sailor was heard to say that the best of all was the card upon the door of his room stating that the price of the room was forty dollars per day. He swiped this card and sent it home to his mother. We were more than glad to replace any cards that disappeared.
The first lease upon the Royal Hawaiian Hotel expired on July 1, 1942, and the decision to renew had to be made by May 1, 1942. Even at this early date the great value of the hotel as a recuperation center was so well established that the renewal of the lease followed as a matter of course. Throughout the war recuperation centers for submarine personnel were established at various bases, and these centers followed the example set at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.
This meticulous care of personnel was a strong factor in maintaining the superb morale of the Submarine Force throughout the war. Despite such calamities as the sinking of several of our submarines by our own forces, torpedoes that too often wouldn’t explode when they hit enemy hulls, and guns that wouldn’t shoot—factors beyond the control of the operating personnel—the officers and men of the submarines, in spite of heavy losses in action, carried on to set traditions of which our Navy will ever be proud.
Before a submarine left on patrol her commanding officer had a personal interview with the Commander Submarines, who preached aggressiveness but warned against rashness and discouraged the use of guns against any but a helpless target. In case of any injury to his ship the commanding officer was not to hesitate to return from patrol. It was considered very important to avoid heavy losses at the outset of the war.
A submarine returning from patrol was received with ceremony. Praise was lavished for all aggressiveness, and if the patrol had been aggressive and ships had been sunk the commanding officer was recommended for a medal. At that time the only medal available was the Navy Cross, and some of these medals were awarded for performances not up to the standard required later in the war. However, the award of these medals for successful actions by pioneer submariners, in waters thousands of miles beyond the support of our own forces, did much to establish high morale—which is the purpose for which medals are intended.
When a commanding officer was awarded a Navy Cross, each officer and man of his crew received a letter of commendation from the Commander Submarines Pacific. These letters were highly appreciated, especially by the enlisted men, most of whom sent them home. Later in the war when the Patrol Pin was authorized for the crew of a submarine making a successful patrol, letters of commendation were not necessary.
Careful study was made of each patrol, and advantage was taken of any outstanding decision or performance to impress all commanding officers. For instance, the Plunger, one of the first ships to be sent to the shores of Japan, was lying to at night off the entrance to Tokio Bay charging her battery when she was almost caught on the surface by an enemy destroyer. The officer- of-the-deck and the lookouts had not then achieved the alertness that later became standard in submarines. The commanding officer dived at once to the lest depth of his ship, receiving eight depth-charges all around him on the way down. Three more depth- charge attacks did not seriously disturb him as all the charges exploded well above his ship. Much was made of this performance to support the doctrine that for a submarine being depth-charged the best place is down, and down deep.
During the period of preparation for war, many special lines of training were given the crews. One of the more elaborate lines was the training of night lookouts, for which a large lay-out was necessary. Experience in this training led to the discovery that certain vitamins helped night vision and that lookouts should have a period of preparation in a dim red light or with red goggles on before they went on watch. We also found that our mess boys were frequently the best lookouts. The training was carried to intricate detail, such as clearing the bridge, which was found to be a necessary drill. Officers drilled tirelessly at their torpedo control instruments.
When the war started the submarines at once demonstrated their efficiency in-destructive patrols and in reconnaissance. The first submarines sent on patrol sank ships off the coast of Japan and in the Caroline- Marshall area, these latter sending in important information used by Admiral Halsey in the first raid of the war.
The submarines were outstanding during the war in the low percentage of what the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery calls “disease of the mind,” their percentage being about one-third that of the next best type of ship. This can be attributed to the careful selection of personnel and the high morale in submarines.
In all literature upon the building of esprit de corps and high morale, stress is placed upon the importance of officers knowing their men, knowing their personalities as well as their capabilities. In American submarines, with the inescapable intimacy of life on board, this principle is firmly established. A movie director working with submarines asked a group of men why they were so enthusiastic about submarines, which to him seemed the least desirable class of ship to serve upon. One sailor answered, “Well, on a submarine your skipper knows you. He knows your name, even your nickname, and all about you. Hell, he could even give my wife some pointers.”