One of these days Soviet Russia will unveil a nuclear-powered guided missile submarine. The NATO military experts then will have to sit down and figure out when the first will be followed by a fleet. If the Soviets replace a significant number of their conventional boats with nuclear-powered ones in the next few years, they will have seriously reduced the deterrent to war possessed by the North Atlantic countries.
The NATO military commanders have a big enough problem as it is in trying to plan how to meet the threat of the huge force of 450-500 conventional Soviet U-boats. They look at the dwindling numbers of antisubmarine units in NATO and shudder when they recall the immense effort that was needed to stop the German undersea fleet which numbered only some 440 boats at Hitler’s U-boat peak in World War II.
The NATO commanders would have to have ASW forces four times over. They would need units to screen striking forces launching attacks at the sources of Soviet naval power. They would need them to blockade the passage of Soviet submarines into the Atlantic and the Mediterranean through the narrow passages from the Norwegian, Greenland, Baltic, and Black Seas. ASW forces would be needed in great numbers to protect the military and merchant ship convoys that would stream overseas from North America to Europe. And last, but not least, they would need the same type forces to protect North America and Europe from attack by guided missile submarines.
While the history-making cruise of the Nautilus under the polar cap points the way for a powerful addition to our offensive military strength when the Polaris-carrying submarine is completed, naval experts realize that the Arctic route can be a two-way street. If the Soviets needed a nudge to expedite their nuclear building program, the Nautilus accomplishment would have served the purpose.
The Soviet submarine threat is real enough today, without considering the future. About one half of her boats are long range. And over 150 of them are of large classes, easily converted to guided missile carrying. As the Soviet Navy buildup became more and more evident, the NATO nations showed concern and by 1955 a very high priority was assigned to antisubmarine warfare, resulting in more funds being made available.
In the United States, this upswing in concern over ASW coincided with the advancement of Admiral Arleigh Burke as Chief of Naval Operations. Fresh from command of the 200-ship Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Force, Admiral Burke had first-hand knowledge that the destroyers—and their sonars and ASW weapons—in his force were preponderantly middle-aged. By early 1955, only six of the destroyer types were post-World War II construction.
However, between 1955 and 1958, the ASW picture has brightened, at least from the quality standpoint. Quantity is another story. Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, has urged the eight nations that would contribute forces to his international ocean command in wartime not to decrease the number of ASVV units in their navies and maritime air forces. In addition, he has pressed for maximum quality.
NATO ASW Assets
Traditionally, military commanders have to do the best they can in their planning with whatever forces assigned to them. This being the case, an examination of just what the ASW assets are in the NATO nations’ navies is in order.
First, they have in all about a total of 450 antisubmarine surface ships and about 150 submarines. These figures and the following do not include the units in the U. S. Pacific fleet. They do include, however, all the rest of the non-U. S. units, even though they may be deployed to the Pacific, in the Indian Ocean, or other areas out of commuting distance to the Atlantic or Mediterranean.
In the Atlantic, the U. S. has five aircraft carriers that are being used for ASW duties. The United Kingdom has four carriers in service this year and will, in the future, have two available for the home fleet, while two others will be “east of Suez.” The Home Fleet carriers will probably be ASW ships. The French maintain three carriers in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, while the Canadians and the Dutch each have one.
As far as quality goes, the ASW carriers are very good. A few are new and the large majority are recent conversions and fully adequate to do the job. France has two new ones, the Clemenceau and the Foch, each 22,000 tons. HMCS Bonaventure was modernized and joined the Canadian fleet in late 1957. The 18,000-ton Netherlands carrier HNMS Karel Doorman was renovated and went into service last year.
ASW Carrier Aircraft
Both the United States and Canada operate the familiar S2F Tracker from their ASW carriers. The heavy Tracker, with her 69-ft. wingspan, has hunter-killer capabilities during the relatively long time she can stay aloft. The Italian Navy has reportedly purchased some of these for land-based use.
The turbo-prop Fairey Gannet has been the Royal Navy’s prime ASW carrier-based plane, but is now being replaced by helicopters. The twin-engine, midwing monoplane has a 54-ft. wing-span. It went into service earlier than the Tracker. The two planes have comparable ASW capabilities.
In France, the Avenger is now being used. However, this year the Breguet 1050 Alize (Tradewind) will go into service. It has been flown in tests from a British carrier, since none of the French ships can handle it yet. There has been fine Anglo-French co-operation in the development of this plane. The turbo-prop Alize is powered by a single Rolls Royce engine, similar to the type of the Viscount 806’s. The Alize has a top speed of about 250 mph and patrols at speeds as low as 140. Wingspan is 50 feet. It has about four hours’ endurance.
The Dutch also use the Avenger although it is reported that consideration is being given to using a heavier U. S. aircraft to fly from the Doorman.
In all, the NATO ASW carriers could embark between 400 and 500 aircraft for ASW operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
ASW Helicopters
The carrier-borne ASW helicopter picture is still fuzzy. Almost all of the NATO nations that have carriers are working with helicopters, trying to fit their present capabilities and their limitations in with the fixed-wing type plane. The U. S. Navy standard type is the HSS. Considerable tests have been made of these squadrons embarked in ASW exercises off the Atlantic coast. The future of the helicopter in the U. S. Navy for ASW purposes probably depends on just how reliable is the new stabilization system designed by Sperry. It has been fully flight-tested by the U. S. Navy. The system reportedly stabilizes in all four axes: pitch, roll, heading, and altitude. The Navy is also working with a new twin-gas turbine engine helicopter, the Sikorsky' HSS- 2, which carries a big payload of detection equipment and weapons. The French have the roto-jet Alouette II, which also has ASW possibilities, since it can carry five persons.
The British expect that the sonar-dunking helicopter will replace the Gannet aboard carriers in the Royal Navy. The Whirlwind is now in use, and the first Wessex was built last summer. The Wessex has a turbine engine and is expected to give excellent performance.
In addition to those designed to fly from carriers, some helicopters are being experimented with to operate from ASW surface ships as well as from merchant ships. This would extend the former’s sonar and kill range and give the latter some measure of individual ASW protection.
ASW Surface Ships
Of the 450 destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, and other ASW ships among the navies of the NATO nations (again excluding U. S. Pacific Fleet ships), many are World War II ships whose usefulness is diminishing. Their hulls will not stand many mere conversions and their size often limits the types of sonar and allied equipment and weapons that can be installed in them.
Three out of every four of these destroyer types, including general purpose DDs, are World War II construction. Most of these are in the U. S. Navy, where the ratio, over-all, is still eleven out of twelve. By this year, however, about half or two-thirds of the old ships will have had the newer type long-range sonars installed or have been converted to escort destroyer types.
The Commander of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet Antisubmarine Defense Force said early in 1958, “And we have some soft spots: For example, most of our basic antisubmarine ships . . . are approaching the end of their useful life. Our shipbuilding program must provide for replacing these ships with modern ones, or we shall soon find ourselves in the position of having a large portion of our fleet composed of obsolete ships.”
By mid-1958, the U. S. Navy had about 25 new frigates (DLs), destroyers, and DEs, out of a total of about 300 destroyer types in both fleets. Many more are programmed for or are actually under construction.
Across the Atlantic, the United Kingdom, despite economic difficulties, has done quite a bit of frigate building and converting destroyers to DDEs. The big Daring-class destroyers are excellent general purpose ships, eminently suitable for fleet screening operations. The sixteen Whitby-class frigates of 2,200 tons and 360-ft. length and the Blackwood-class of 300 ft. and 1,100 tons are every bit as good as any other new escort types in any navy. While the older ships will be replaced in the future, chances for maintaining more, and perhaps as many, in operational service are not good. About half of the 75 Royal Navy ASW types are new construction and more are programmed for.
France has been engaged in a modest but constant building program to replace her World War II ships. The Surcouf-class destroyers are post-Korean construction as are most of the new Le Cow-class DEs, which are similar to the USS Dealey-class. About 45 per cent of the 70-75 French ASW ships have been built since 1945. The Surcouf-class ships have characteristics similar to the Forrest Sherman-class, but have superior ASW armament.
Canada has made her entire Navy an ASW force. The excellent St. Laurent-class escort destroyers appeared in 1955. The first of the companion Restigouche-class ships has just been commissioned. In addition to eight of these ships, Canada has eighteen River-class frigates and eleven escort destroyers that have been modernized.
The Netherlands Navy has one of the greatest proportions of new ASW ships in NATO. Their eight fine new Friesland-class destroyers, displacing 2,476 tons, and four Holland-class DEs make up 50 per cent of their ASW force. Portugal has modestly entered the new construction field, also. The first of a new class of nationally constructed frigates, the Pere Escobar, was completed in 1957. Five Vouga-class DDs are being modernized. The rest of Portugal’s fifteen ships ASW force is World War II vintage.
In northern Europe, Norway’s and Denmark’s navies also have ASW forces, totaling about 22 destroyer types, built during the last war.
In the Mediterranean, Italy has come up fast in ASW. Ten ASW ships, ranging from two 3,500-ton super destroyers, the Impetuoso and the lndomito, four Canopo-class escort destroyers, and four Bergamini-class 1,400-ton frigates have been or are being built. Greece and Turkey also add to the ASW forces with a total of about 28 ships of World War II construction.
NATO Submarines
The submarine picture is brighter in most respects. In the United States, 22 new boats have been built since 1945, and the submariners are getting the biggest chunk of new construction for the next few years. Five of the 22 new submarines are nuclear powered.
The trend in the U. S. Navy as well as those in other NATO countries has been to change the mission of their submarine forces from commerce destroyers to ASW. Early in the game, the Royal Navy observed what high speed boats could do when they tested out late model high speed German U-boats. To give their ASW units training against a high speed opponent, they built two fast peroxide-propelled submarines, starting in 1954. The first fleet-type boat built since World War II, however, was HMS Porpoise which joined the fleet in April of last year. By the year’s end, two others were completed. While conventionally powered, the 290-foot Porpoise has high speed configuration.
In all, the Royal Navy has 42 submarines in active service. Although she has started development of an atomic-powered boat, the United Kingdom will probably get an atomic power plant for a submarine from the United States as a result of recent Congressional action permitting greater exchange of atomic information.
France has built ten new submarines since 1945, giving her a total of about twenty boats, and another six are under construction. Six of the new ones are of the ocean-going Narval- class, 256 feet long, 1,800 tons submerged displacement. The French submariners, too, are getting a lot out of their personnel and submarines. Two stayed underwater for over forty days in May and later last summer.
The Narval-class is rated at eighteen knots underwater speed. Four of the new boats are SSKs, the antisubmarine submarine. The FN Amazone and her sisters have sixteen-knot submerged speed and displace 634 tons underwater. The other six new boats will also be small, slightly larger than the SSKs.
In the ten-boat Netherlands submarine force, there are four new ocean going subs. The Dolfin-class are 240 feet long with seven- teen-knot submerged speed. Denmark also has a new submarine, the Delfinen, first to be built in the Royal Danish Dockyard in seventeen years. She is 177 ft. long with 600 tons surface displacement. Two more are being constructed.
Italy also has started building submarines. The ASW sub Marconi was laid down in mid- 1957. It will be a 1,000-ton boat with ten-knot underwater speed. Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Canada also have smaller groups of submarines, mainly of older types, in varying stages of modernization.
Of the 150 submarines in the navies of the NATO nations, an estimated 25 per cent of them are post-1945 construction. On the other hand, the U. S. boats in the Atlantic fleet are modern and are as good as, if not better than, any conventionally powered submarine on either side of the Iron Curtain.
The cost of developing and building even conventional and particularly nuclear-powered submarines is so great as to be almost prohibitive to all but the strongest national economics. Chances are that the United States will have to keep the lead and bear the brunt of the costs, which rise every year.
ASW Patrol Planes
The long-range ASW patrol plane situation is one that has shown slow progress in past years. In the U. S. Navy, the P2V7 Neptune and P5M Marlin are the mainstays. The latest version of the twin engine Neptune has jet pods to give added speed. A great many of the Neptunes in service are this type and another large order has been made by the U. S. Navy. The first models of the P5M seaplane came to the fleet in 1952. The twin engine plane is slower than the Neptune which was first put into use in 1945. The fast Lockheed Electra will be the U. S. Navy’s new long-range patrol plane.
The Shackleton four-engine, land-based bomber is the RAF’s Coastal Command ASW aircraft. Carrying a crew of ten, the Shackle- ton went into the RAF in 1952-53. Like the Marlin and the Neptune, it has great range, if not great speed. It also is roomy enough to carry a variety of electronics gear and ASW armament.
The rest of the NATO navies, with the exception of Canada, are using Neptunes, Marlins, Lancasters, or even older types such as the PV2, PBY, etc.
Canada has had delivery this past year of the turbo-prop Argus, the only bright spot in the entire patrol plane picture. It is the military version of the Britannia. Boasting long range and 290 mph top speed, the Argus is built to give the plane commander and the crew the space and equipment to make a well- coordinated search and attack as well as give them the berthing and messing facilities necessary for long patrols. It can get out to a contact fast, a necessity in this day of high underwater speeds. The Argus will replace the Lancaster in the Canadian Air Force which will continue to use the Neptunes for medium range patrols. (See page 120.)
The Italian Navy is reportedly also working toward a turbo-prop plane. The Piaggio company has been contracted with to develop a twin engine seaplane for ASW.
In the case of ASW patrol planes, it is not just the quality but also the quantity that bothers the NATO commanders, for it takes a large number of maritime aircraft to cover the Atlantic sea lanes and approaches adequately.
NATO Sonar
Although a lot can be learned from various unclassified sources about ASW units, both material and numbers, when it comes to assessing the quality of sonar equipment for detecting a submarine, not too much has been said because of security. Comparisons are difficult, too, for it depends on whether one is talking about sonar systems, passive sonar for listening, or sonar for attacking.
As for surface ships’ sonar and attack plotting equipment and facilities, the United States and the United Kingdom are probably running neck and neck. The British passive sonar ranges might be a little better on the average, but the U. S. attack sonar and plotting equipment probably is a little more refined. The British, U. S., and Canadian navies have worked closely together in operations, and there has been a considerable exchange of information on equipment, tactics, and training as well as exchange of training facilities for all levels.
In sonar research and development, the Royal Navy has made steady progress as it did during World War II. The U. S. Navy went rather slowly in development for the first years after World War II. Its programs have gradually expanded.
France and Italy have also done considerable research and development, and they and the Dutch and the British have bilaterally assisted each other in some phases. Most of the NATO nations mentioned have made some strides in working toward getting low frequency sonars and educated automatic attack systems installed in their newer ships.
Thus far, patrol aircraft and carrier ASW planes in service have the conventional Magnetic Airborne Detection (MAD) equipment, sonobuoys, radars, and radar direction finders. There are still great areas for improvement in equipment that can be air-borne to pinpoint the submarine and to direct automatically the attack to insure a kill. A recent news magazine report stated that the U. S. Navy is using a gadget to spot a submarine by detecting fumes from its snorkel.
In general, it can be said that a surface ship in the U. S. Navy now can detect a submarine at ranges probably five or six times greater than a similar ship could in World War II. And the automatic plotting and fire control equipment that goes with the new sonar gives the surface ship a better chance for successful attack.
The high speed U. K. boats and the Nautilus types in the U. S. Navy, however, have given the destroyermen of both navies a lot of gray hairs in exercises in recent years. The high speed and enormous endurance of an atomic-powered submarine brings factors into the ASW problem that not too many of the current destroyer types in the NATO sea forces can easily solve.
Co-ordination of all types of ASW forces is the key to coping with the problem, from a detection as well as an attack standpoint. There is a still a lot to be learned in a tactical way in co-ordinating an attack by air, surface, and undersea units. The communications problem alone is immense, as is the identification problem.
NATO ASW Weapons
The advent of the high speed U-boats has given the weapons designers a lot of gray hairs too. It has long been obvious that as the submarine speed curves go up, the kill probability of the surface ships’ or aircraft’s attack goes down. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the surface ship to the sub’s torpedoes increases, too.
In the U. S. Navy, the ASW weapons system for surface ships has ranged from the hedgehog to the complicated Weapon Able. Recently, the far-longer range Rocket Assisted Torpedo (RAT) was given to the first fleet units. The solution to the weapons problem was explored in two initially parallel courses that finally joined with the RAT. Basically, the problem is to get an explosive charge out to the target just as soon as possible after the target is first detected. As the sonar ranges got better over the years, the weapons problem increased in complexity.
Weapon Able, with a range ten times that of the hedgehog, was first installed on five DLs. Then it became the ASW launcher for the Dealey-class DEs and for some of the 2,100- ton escort destroyers. Other DDEs and DEs received the trainable hedgehog. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the Sherman-class destroyers have only the conventional hedgehog. This could be removed, however, and the RAT installed with only little expense, relatively speaking.
In the surface-fired homing torpedo field, the MK 35 came along and then the faster MK 43 and its modification which is in the fleet now. But the problem still persisted, for as in the case of the hedgehog, Weapon Able, and these torpedoes, the attacking ship still had to get in close to the target. Thus the combination of the rocket launcher and the high speed homing torpedo, as in RAT, seems to be an interim answer, at least. What the surface ships still need is a projectile with an atomic warhead with a range of at least ten miles. The Navy Times said that it was in the mill already. It may be that SUBROC, mentioned below, is what they referred to.
The Royal Navy solution to the surface ships’ ASW weapons problem was first the Squid, a mortar-type launcher, propelling a rocket larger than a hedgehog projectile to greater distances. This was provided Canadian and northern European allies. In 1951, this was superseded by Limbo, which gives an even better range to a larger package of explosives. The Canadians installed eight of these mortar-type weapons in a well on the fantail of the St. Laurent DDEs, giving them a potent weapon. The range is about twenty per cent better than Weapon Able, and the weapon itself is reportedly a lot simpler to control and maintain.
France took a slightly different tack and developed the lance roquette which, according to Ministry of Marine news releases, has a variable range up to 1,600 yards. The French Navy also has announced development and installation of a new weapon on later ships of the Surcouf and Le Cow-class. This rapid fire quadruple-tube mortar-type launcher will have a maximum range of almost 3,000 yards. It can, incidentally, also be used as a shore bombardment weapon, having a 6,500-yard range when firing a lighter charge. The Netherlands Friesland-class destroyers also use multi-barrelled launcher.
Italy’s development parallels the above advances in ASW weaponry. Their menon or lanciabas launcher is a multi-charge weapon with a long barrel. Its range is greater than that of Weapon Able. Most of the other navies of the NATO nations use the hedgehog, squid, or depth charges.
In the torpedo field, the British, Canadian, French, and Italian navies have ASW homing torpedoes with speeds about the same or greater than the MK 43. Little can be said about comparative qualities, such as reliability, or effective launching range.
The aircraft flying for the NATO nations generally have the full arsenal of conventional ASW weapons such as homing torpedoes and depth bombs which must be dropped in the vicinity of the target. Again the principal problem is with the high speed, deep-diving submarine.
U. S. ASW planes can carry homing torpedoes and depth charges as can the Shakle- ton and the Gannet. The HSS and Whirlwind helicopters are similarly armed.
The U. S. Navy has two relatively new aerial weapons: Betty, an atomic depth charge, and the Petrel, an air-to-surface rocket, carrying a torpedo. The latter was designed for use against ships, but the manufacturer has said that it can carry an ASW torpedo.[1]
When you start considering submarine vs. submarine, you get into the Buck Rogers area, as far as the future is concerned. Since the submarines can detect one another at great ranges, the one with the “fastest gun” wins. The Bureau of Ordnance has revealed the existence of a fast “wire-guided” torpedo. The Navy recently announced a $65 million contract with Goodyear for research and development for SUBROC, a new ASW missile, including a complete weapons systems. “The new weapon is an underwater guided missile which may be fired from above or below the surface. . . . The missile is propelled through the air by a powerful rocket . . . (which) . . . drops away and warhead continues on to target. It can destroy enemy targets in an area of many square miles. ...”
ASW—Present and Future
“To sum up: Our present anti-submarine forces are effective against modern conventional submarines. We believe that if the showdown came now, we would gain the upper hand—but with current force levels we would take severe losses at sea and suffer damage at home. Under the most favorable circumstances we do not foresee any such thing as an ‘air-tight’ defense against a determined attach in strength.” So evaluated was the U. S. ASW picture by the Commander of the U. S. Anti-Submarine Defense Force early in 1958. It holds true for the rest of NATO, too.
The future of the anti-submarine defense forces of the North Atlantic nations depends on two things: The amount of money put into the national ASW programs and the amount of solid ASW technical and tactical information that is exchanged among nations.
In November, 1957, before the NATO Summit talks, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was host to a NATO ASW Symposium. The naval and air force officers attending were from all but two of the NATO countries that have navies. It was generally agreed that had there been more exchange of research and development information, all of the countries would be farther ahead in their national ASW programs.
Out of that Symposium and further discussions, SACLANT has made some concrete proposals on the subject. The NATO Supreme Commander can only do so much, however. NATO heads of state in December, 1957, took positive steps also in the right direction by . setting up committees to explore pooling scientific research and development and production in the various phases of military need.
At this stage of the game, however, it is basically a national problem. Each nation has certain laws and policies covering what and how much classified information can be given out and to whom. Whether the NATO nations make a series of bilateral agreements among themselves, such as the United States has with many countries, or whether it is made uniform, NATO-wide, is a matter for the national authorities and the NATO Council.
The NATO ASW picture looks just fair today. Despite the warnings of NATO and national naval commanders, national governments have cut down the numbers of patrol squadrons, ASW carriers, and destroyer types in the past few years. Since the Soviets have shown themselves to be very capable technologically, it is the future we really have to worry about. If the money does not exist to have the needed numbers of ships and planes with conventional detection and killer capabilities, then substitutes must be found. The reduced numbers must be given capabilities much greater than those now at sea or in the air.
Vice Admiral H. Page Smith, USN, then Chief of Staff to SACLANT and now Chief of Naval Personnel, summarized the problem and the solution in his opening remarks at the ASW Symposium: “It is economically impossible for the NATO countries to build anti-submarine forces in the ratios that we found necessary during the past wars to defeat Hitler’s U-boats in the Atlantic. We must seek other means to solve the Soviet submarine problems within the bounds of our economy. Foremost of these should be research and development designed to produce major breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare techniques.”
Translating this solution into action is a knotty problem in itself. Admiral Wright took the first big step, proposing to the NATO Council that a SACLANT Antisubmarine Warfare Technical Center be established. To be staffed by naval officers and civilian scientists, this center would become NATO’s primary repository of ASW information, as well as being the co-ordination point for future research in this field. It would be set up at the Italian naval base at La Spezia. Thus, the exchange and co-ordination of ASW technical information would be organized to benefit the NATO ASW forces in the future.
This research program and the healthy ASW ship, submarine, and aircraft building programs now in progress make it evident that the North Atlantic nations and the NATO military organization are looking to the future. The Soviet undersea fleet poses a tremendous threat today. The advent of nuclear-powered submarines in the Red Navy would multiply this threat considerably. Despite this, the NATO ASW situation looks better for the future—than it does right now.
1. All Hands Magazine recently reported that although Petrel is in operational use, it is considered obsolete and production has been suspended.