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Navy Medicine 1973?
Thomas B. Magath, Rear Admiral, U. S. Naval Reserve, Medical Corps (Retired)— Peeping into the Navy of 1973, or at least into the minds of the leading naval officers of today in the January 1963 Proceedings, was a refreshing and stimulating experience. I was disappointed, however, not to have found reference to the medical department of the future U. S. Navy.
Important as arms and armaments are, the health and sanitation of the naval forces will always play an important, and at times, determinative role in the success or failure of the armed forces. The past record of the Navy Medical Corps is replete with evidence of its important role in maintaining a fleet in being, both ashore and afloat. Since the outfitting of the first U. S. Navy vessels in 1775, surgeons and their mates have played their roles in keeping the Navy fit and fighting, and the next ten years will be no exception. The curing of scurvy, successfully treated and prevented by Ur. James Lind, Surgeon of the Royal Navy in 1747, marked the first great contribution to naval medicine, but the treatment of Navy personnel subjected to radiation from nuclear explosion will be one of the most important problems confronting the present and future naval medical officer. Indeed, had not physicians been at work on radiation hazards to man for many years, it is doubtful if our atomic and hydrogen armaments and nuclear propulsion ships would now be in existence.
But what will happen to the Medical Department of the future? There are certainly two definite possibilities for expanded services in the Medical Department. The first is the inclusion of sanitary engineers in the Medical Allied Sciences Section of the Medical Service Corps. The duties of such officers are so essential to the sanitary control of ships and stations that these officers should be an integral part of the medical operation. All states have these officers in their Departments of Health as an essential part of their medical services. In World War II, action was sometimes delayed or even failed because sanitary engineers were lacking. The Bureau of Yards and Docks quite understandably did not have the interest in sanitary engineers it had in other types of engineers.
Another potential growth area is in medical radiation physics. A beginning has been made, but there are not yet enough radiation physicists in the medical department. Here is a need that should be recognized and filled.
It is my opinion that during the next decade a renewed and serious effort will be directed by civilian and some military laymen to consolidate the medical and allied services in the separate services into a single medical department. But medicine is not the same in the various branches of the armed services. To be sure there are many common problems, but there are also radically different ones. The peculiar problems of sanitation in a ship at sea for 30 days or more are quite different from those of an Army Regimental Surgeon. As long as commands are kept separate, the various staffs should be kept separate also. Procedures and ways of accomplishing the same type of mission will of necessity be different. Most important, however, are loyalties and morale. “To belong,” is essential for the best efforts of all men, and hence it will be necessary to keep a medical department as an integral part of a command. I am
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
Richard Mowrey
Navy surgeons operate in the sick bay of the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65). If the Navy Medical Corps can preserve its autonomy in the future, it will continue to offer the Fleet vital contributions—which have ranged during its history from the remedying of malnutrition to the study of radiation hazards on nuclear-powered ships.
not at all pleased with some who feel they may postpone or prevent the one uniform idea from becoming a reality by feeding the medical department to the unification wolves. Unless all branches of the armed services are consolidated into one command, the medical staff should be a part of command structure. This principle applies to all staff divisions, chaplains, nurses, dentists, hospital corps, supply, etc.
If further consolidation of medical personnel is desired in the armed services, it would be better to preserve each service corps but to set up a freer exchange of personnel than exists. This could be effectively accomplished through a system of joint medical councils. One council should be composed of the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and the Assistant Surgeons General of the other two services. This would result in bringing the various medical specialists in closer touch with each other, as for example all flight surgeons of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. This would naturally lead to more use of common facilities and a broadening of knowledge with an exchange of ideas. This type of consolidation has been worked out magnificently in the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Here all services contribute their share of personnel and know-how, resulting in outstanding contributions to our knowledge of pathology. Each
officer and man preserves his identity of uniform and, I am sure, his loyalty to his service.
In the next decade we know that methods of transporting the sick and injured will be greatly accelerated. Fast hospital jets will bring seagoing patients to shore-based hospitals and fast helicopters will transport them to hospital ships. Fewer and smaller hospitals in forward areas will be necessary, so that the ill and wounded will receive prompter definitive treatment at larger medical centers, hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Evacuation helicopters and hydrofoils will take patients from all ships so that sick bays will tend to be smaller, since the number of physicians at sea will be less. This will reduce the need for many physicians owing to their concentration in larger centers. Fast, specialized ships will be relieved of giving so much space to sick bays. Medical care is always better in larger centers, which is one of the main reasons for having hospital ships. One may well envision ships of the future with only strictly emergency facilities for the sick and injured and a program of fast evacuation from the Fleet and even the forward areas. With fast, modern transportation and our knowledge of how to care for patients en route, there is no reason why naval medical care during many phases of combat could not experience a radical improvement during the next decade.
It is my opinion that we could now abandon the so-called “mobile hospital,” so well and effectively organized during World War II, in favor of rapid evacuation by plane and specialized evacuation ship. At best these hospitals were expensive in cost and personnel for what they were able to accomplish. With the slow type of evacuation then available, their development was justified. Now I believe this situation has definitely changed and that the change will be more apparent as the decade unfolds.
True hospital planes and hydrofoils for evacuation need to be designed and worked out in detail during this era of relative peace. It should not be necessary in 1973 to improvise such planes and ships by converting transports for the purpose, as had to be done in the last great war. These planes will need to be as different from other aircraft types as hospital ships are from fighting ships. Pilots
should have special indoctrination in the specific missions of these planes.
There will be many medical discoveries of importance in the next decade, and certainly the Navy Medical Corps, if it can preserve its autonomy, will continue to contribute to these discoveries and utilize them to the benefit of the entire Navy and of the other Armed Services of the United States as well.
"The American Landing in Lebanon” "Orders Firm But Flexible”
(See pages 64-79 and 80-89, October 1962 Proceedings)
J. L. Holloway, Jr.,. Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I read the articles “The American Landing in Lebanon” by Ambassador Robert McClintock, and, “Orders Firm but Flexible” by Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Hadd, U. S. Marine Corps. Written from different levels of observation and different viewpoints, they complement one another exceedingly well and, in my opinion, are splendid as well as factual.
In view of President Eisenhower’s announcement scheduled for 0900 Washington time co-ordinated with 1500 Lebanon time, H- hour on 15 July 1958, it seems to me the actions of Colonel Hadd and Commodore McCrea, described on page 88 of Colonel Hadd’s article, were correct. Theirs were not easy decisions, but were, in my opinion, the only possible ones.
I had left London at about 1200 local time that same date, having taken just enough time to assemble the first staff echelons and re-emplane after return from Selection Board duty in Washington; I arrived at Beirut 0400 local time on the 16th. And as set forth by Colonel Hadd on page 86, I that forenoon resolved with General Chehab the continued forward movement of Colonel Hadd’s BLT from the airport to the dock area. Ambassador McClintock interpreted and effectively furthered our conversation at this conference.
I asked General Chehab to ride with the Ambassador and me in the Ambassador’s car, in which I preceded the Marine column through the Lebanese tank and artillery concentration at Watermelon Circle. General Chehab then left us, and we patrolled the route in the Ambassador’s car to close up
elements of our column—my first and last experience in field officer grade with land forces. Having come ashore hurriedly by helicopter, my only immediate staff was my flag commander. Toward the end of the movement, the Ambassador, Commander Sherman, and I moved ahead again and at the Dock Yard divided and led the different echelons to their respective billeting areas as recommended by the Ambassador, who was completely familiar with the layout. (See Time, 4 August 1958.)
In view of the foregoing, I believe my good friend Rob McClintock will, in retrospect, agree that the American diplomatic arm ashore did not alone resolve the critical situation vis-a-vis the artillery/tank road blocks in the forenoon of the 16th. (See page 79 of his fine article.) There was no high command vacuum from 0400 the 16th, even though my staff support at the point of contact ashore and at the moment was pretty thin.
The mutual support and loyalty on the part of all American arms, diplomatic, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, was superb. We were indeed a band of brothers, and the operation, as the closing episode of a career of over 40 years in the Navy is a source of lasting satisfaction. And I hope some future writer and historian will more fully develop the magnificent and timely part played by the Composite Air Strike Force, Adana-based, under Major General Henry Vicello, U. S. Air Force, the magnificent air lift of Army Force Alfa from Germany, and the impressive leadership and command vouchsafed the land force by Major General (now General) Paul Adams, U. S. Army.
The proof of the pudding is the eating. The operation would appear to stand as an unqualified success. Of course complications did, and in the future will, arise. These cannot always be anticipated and must be resolved on the spot, but not at the expense of deviating from the fundamental objectives and purpose given us by the highest authority, in our situation, the President.
In conclusion, and being retired with “no number to make,” I can say with good grace that no one could have had more perceptive, loyal, and understanding, immediate superiors than I had in the CNO, and in the JCS and its Joint Staff.
John R. Binns—The accounts of the Lebanon landing by Ambassador McClintock and Colonel Hadd provide a fascinating example of conflicting political and military values in the employment of armed forces to achieve limited political objectives. Both articles offer thoughtful analyses and useful conclusions on a timely subject.
The argument must, however, go to Ambassador McClintock, for the objectives of the landing were political—to view it in any other context is an exercise in futility. In such operations it seems axiomatic that military expediency be sacrificed to existing political considerations. It might be noted here that the most frequent criticism of our conduct of World War II and the Korean action has been directed at our failure to consider or realize fully the political implications of sound military decisions. If the supremacy of the political consideration in such actions is accepted, Colonel Hadd’s conclusion that the military commander must have sole authority regarding troop employment is indefensible. The military commander must function as the advisor of the responsible political authority, with the final decisive power resting with the political authority.
No one would dispute the fact that militarily Colonel Hadd and Captain McCrea had valid reasons for denying Ambassador McClintock’s requests, but it is equally undeniable that their actions might well have caused the landing to be opposed or resulted in the death of President Chamoun. Accordingly, the most important point in either article is Ambassador McClintock’s call for greater command flexibility. The unstated corollary to his recommendation is the necessity of command presence. It is of at least equal importance; in fact, it is doubtful if necessary flexibility can be assured without it. The conduct of the Lebanon operation subsequent to Admiral Holloway’s arrival certainly seems to demonstrate the need for the commander being on the scene.
Self-evident is the need for diplomats with a greater understanding of the tactical and logistical military problems involved in operations of this type, as well as a greater appreciation of the political considerations on the part of the military.
The most significant factors and the obvious
corrective actions may be summarized as follows:
(1) Complete comprehension and acceptance of political predominance in any such undertakings. This should be spelled out clearly in operational orders and in other pertinent directives.
(2)Greater flexibility in military planning and execution, which can be assured only by the presence of the military commander.
(3) Greater mutual understanding of political and military problems on the part of diplomats and military officers. While there will never be complete agreement on these problems, there are many paths to improvement: increased exchange of military and Foreign Service officers; improved interdepartmental liaison; expanded joint attendance at the war colleges and the Foreign Service Institute; increased postgraduate education in international affairs for military officers; continued improvement of service academy curricula; and the continued discussion of these problems in such forums as the Proceedings.
Robert Tepper, Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve—I think your articles, which I feel were excellent, should stimulate thinking in the military on the problems involved in the use of military forces to achieve political objectives. Your decision to publish the articles in the Proceedings is, I think, well advised since it will give an opportunity for our uniformed colleagues to focus their thoughts on the problems involved in this type of operation. It would be a good idea if the Foreign Service Journal would publish the articles so our Foreign Service colleagues could also become more aware of the problems involved in a military operation which involves support of political objectives.
As both writers pointed out, the essential problem seems to be one of co-ordination. From the experience of two years in the Foreign Service and seven years naval service, I have the strong impression that the American Ambassador and personal representative of the President should have been cloaked with the supreme power of decision in this case, and that that fact should have been made manifestly clear to all the appropriate military echelons of command. The way I see it, the Ambassador should have been designated “theater commander.”
As I pondered the problem after reading the article (it is very easy to have 20-20 hindsight), I wondered if headquarters for the operation could not have been set up in the Embassy even prior to the landing. This would have meant: (1) establishment of effective communications equipment in the Embassy to “talk” to and co-ordinate activities of all U. S. elements; (2) provision for guarding the Embassy by ordering a Marine platoon to the Embassy before or coincident with the landing, complete with the necessary hardware to insure the operation of the Embassy as an effective “command post”; (3) ordering of the senior military man to work out of the Embassy under the Ambassador’s guidance and preferably under his command.
I think there is a lot of new ground to be broken on problems of this type by both the Foreign Service and the military. It seems that now is the time to work out these coordination problems (at least in principle), and not wait until the situation and requirements
for immediate action are thrust upon us.
I hope your articles prompt State and Pentagon people to focus their thoughts on the problem. However, I feel it will require a National Security Council directive allocating and outlining responsibility, authority, and procedures. This, in turn, should be effectively implemented by Defense Department and State Department directives to get things rolling in the right direction.
"The Amphibious Assault—Fast,
Flexible, and Powerful”
(See pages 46-57, October 1962 Proceedings)
Joseph Alexander, First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps—I disagree with Captain Bill’s contention that an amphibious assault would be improved by the utilization of LSTs in the initial wave. Having LSTs beach prior to offloading their LVTs would be an unwarranted violation of a basic principle of naval leadership: Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities. Further, this practice would serve to defeat the purpose of a commonly misunderstood but most valuable combat vehicle, the Landing Vehicle Tanks.
The Marine LVT is by no means perfect. It is expensive, uncomfortable, and prone to a multitude of mechanical ailments. But there is no craft better qualified to carry the assault waves from the ships to their inland objectives. The LVT is amphibious in the truest sense of the word and as such is ideally suited for the fine art of amphibious warfare as practiced by the Navy-Marine team. To employ LVTs via the “direct delivery” technique suggested by Captain Bill would be to negate their capabilities. They would become mere armored personnel carriers, and half their value would be wasted.
The Captain argues that “direct delivery” would prevent high fuel consumption by the LVTs. The fuel capacity of LVTs, however, is ample enough to cancel the argument. For example, an LVT can negotiate a 4,000-yard run to the beach and still retain enough gas in its cells for an additional 175 miles of travel overland.
Moreover, “direct delivery” against a defended beach is tactically unsound. The
Outspoken rebuttals are offered on this and the following page to the argument advanced by Captain Bill in his October 1962 article, "The Amphibious Assault — Fast, Flexible, and Powerful,” that amphibious warfare doctrine should include the concept of beaching LSTs for the debarking of LVTs.
LST would indeed be a vulnerable target in this attempt, particularly when compared to her cargo of 17 smaller, low-silhouetted LVTs. Experience has shown that of all assault formations the column is the least desirable when reaching the objective. The 17 LVTs could be picked off easily as they emerged, one by one, onto the beach. Worse yet, consider the effect of a high-powered, direct-fire weapon firing an AP round point blank down the axis of the tank deck: the LVTs would be “holed” like fish on a string. And remember, it would only take one incidental round to jam the ramp or disable the first LVT, thus bottling up the entire load.
The Captain mentioned the sand bars and coral reefs to be found fringing landing beaches in many parts of the world. The proper employment of LVTs was learned the hard way on such obstacles 19 years ago at Betio, Gilbert Islands. The LVT is designed to negotiate offshore obstacles, and to carry the fight to the enemy at any point inland. When properly employed, these versatile combat vehicles will epitomize the naval service’s assault from the sea: amphibious, mobile, adaptable—and devastating.
John Sherman Baker, Ensign, U. S. Navy —While Captain Bill’s article is of unquestionable importance from the standpoint that it stresses the fact that we cannot afford to remain complacent with our World War II vintage amphibious operational doctrines, I feel that one of his statements is subject to some question.
In defense of his LST/LVT assault, Captain Bill states “that the LST is no more vulnerable when beached for a few minutes than when it is anchored 4,000 yards off the beach for a few hours.” Assuming the validity of the corollary that strict air supremacy must be maintained during the assault, then it would appear that the LST would be under the same danger from air attack in either position. Ideally, this danger would be non-existent. Therefore, the question of whether or not Captain Bill’s LST/LVT assault would be practical will be decided by the balance between possible losses to enemy fire of a nature other than airborne and what may be gained by the more expeditious arrival of troops on the beach.
The LST will be under fire, while near the beach, from a much greater collection of enemy weapons than she would if offshore. It would be senseless to attempt to hit an LST which is 4,000 yards off the beach with antitank weapons similar to our 3.5-inch rockets (bazookas) or 106-mm. recoilless rifles, or even with concentrated small arms fire. Yet with the LST on the beach, the range for these weapons has been narrowed drastically. The damage that a single, well-placed round from a bazooka or recoilless rifle could do to an LST’s bridge, ramp mechanism, unarmored gun mounts, or even to her hull is well worth consideration. It is even possible that small arms fire, which would by then be highly concentrated upon the beaching LST, could have a tremendous effect upon the crew of the LST. Suppose the LST’s bow ramp or ramp machinery were jammed by a single shot from an anti-tank weapon? Or suppose the leading LVT is hit and stopped in the mouth of the LST? Then the LVTs (at a premium anyway) are lost, at least as far as the initial assault is concerned.
All of this is neglecting the possibility that the LST will not be able to get off the beach, even with heavy bow ballasting. Having the LST broach to in rough water or merely be unstable to get off the beach would be a serious loss.
If the enemy has any artillery emplacements at all, the LST will be sure to come under their fire, even during the latter stages of her approach to the beach. Once on the beach, it would be a relatively easy matter for enemy call-fire to bracket the ship.
The last objection might be that the LVTs, having successfully landed, would have no “safe” lanes across the beach which had been swept for anti-vehicle mines. Thus they would be forced to roll on to cover across a broad beach, .which could be suicidal in the event that the beach had been well-mined.
The acceptability of Captain Bill’s proposal would hinge, it seems to me, upon a calculated value judgment as to whether or not the advantages gained by the speed and surprise of this form of attack outweigh the far greater jeopardy into which the LSTs and LVTs will be placed. In any event, I feel that the LSTs will be under far greater danger for five minutes on the beach than for several hours anchored further out.
"Limited War and the Striking Fleets”
(See pages 53—59, February 1963 Proceedings)
Andrew Subbiondo, Jr.—Lieutenant
Commander Gormley’s article points out the need for additional naval and amphibious forces to guard Western interests in peripheral areas. Unfortunately, additional striking forces in the quantity suggested are economically unfeasible. The extra striking forces might almost double the outlay on operating naval forces.
Might it not be better to concentrate our efforts on the Indian Ocean area where the most serious gap in our limited war capabilities exists? Units of the First and Second Fleets could maintain a limited patrol in South Atlantic/Southeastern Pacific waters to be reinforced in case of emergency. This is not an ideal solution, but it may be the only practical one.
The Indian Ocean fleet would prove useful in light of many crises that have occurred in and around these waters: the Kashmir conflict, the Muscat-Oman insurrection of 1957, the Middle East (Lebanon-Iraq) crises of 1958, and the disturbances in Angola, Yemen, Goa, and Kuwait. The fleet could consist of one or two carriers (CVSs with light jet air groups), escorts, and amphibious shipping, including an assault carrier. This would raise the CVA requirement to about 20 (including CVSs employed as attack carriers). On the contrary, Lieutenant Commander Gormley’s striking forces would raise this requirement to about 22-25 ships which would seriously drain our hunter-killer forces of carriers. We cannot permit our offensive ASW capacity to deteriorate, nor can we maintain these units in “ready- reserve” in light of the nuclear missile submarine’s capabilities. ASW capability is useless without highly trained units.
It would probably be desirable to obtain a base in the Indian Ocean area as a matter of convenience—just as the Sixth Fleet, though self-sufficient, utilizes bases at Naples, Italy, and Rota, Spain.
Useful and, let us hope, politically reliable base sites might be obtained at Karachi or Singapore. These bases would cut down on the number of auxiliaries needed to support a force in the Indian Ocean area.
Finally, in this area we can profit from both the experience and the aid of our allies, especially Britain, who could supply bases and forces to back up our own Indian Ocean force.
"The Lessons of Mine Warfare”
(See pages 32-37, December 1962 Proceedings)
Gordon M. Hogg, Jr., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.—It was interesting to see that the mine explosion picture chosen to accompany Captain Hoblitzell’s timely article was one I used (or closely resembles the one I used) as a starting shock in a mine warfare lecture I gave to several classes at the Naval Intelligence School from 1952 to 1954. It had the desired effect at that time.
What bothered me then, fairly fresh from the Cinampo, Korea, sweep (Wonsan was not the only place where mines were laid) was that an important subject like mine warfare rated only a one-hour treatment by the most junior member of the instructor staff. It would not have surprised me in 1948 when I joined one of the three AMSs, forerunners of the MSCs, based at Pearl Harbor. That was probably the nadir of our mine-consciousness. In our ship we were fortunate, but the two sweepers in Guam had to fight with their operational boss to get time in to run off required sweeping exercises, time taken from their normal chores of towing targets or carrying ordnance to be disposed of in proper dumping depths. One of these ships later paid for her lack of training in fundamentals by losing about 20 of her company of 33 upon hitting a mine off the east coast of Korea. All bridge personnel, under the awning which had served to make the Guamanian sun more tolerable, were casualties, as were all others who, contrary to sound minesweeping doctrine, were below decks at the time of the blast. Needless to say, our own bridge awning was deep-sixed before we left Pearl Harbor for Korea.
By 1952-54 after the loss of several minesweepers and damage to other ships, plus the embarrassment the Wonsan invasion fleet suffered steaming in circles for eight days waiting to make their landing, one would have thought that mine warfare would have been given tremendous emphasis. It is true that the mine force organizations which had been allowed to wither away and die in
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the brief five years between the Japanese surrender and the Korean War were hastily revived. It is also true that the lack of foresight in letting the minesweeper force dwindle to an ineffectual handful of ships was atoned for by a crash building program which resulted in our improved MSCs and new MSOs. But, in this same period, and after we had a larger minesweeper force, it was disheartening to learn that no sweepers had been sent to replace the three which had been hastily moved from Pearl Harbor to Korea when things looked blackest for our side. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of that area and of mine warfare can appreciate what an easy job it would be to bottle up any units which happened to be there with a relatively few well-placed mines. Given the speed of advance of even the big MSOs, it takes little mathematical prowess to calculate that just the beginning of the elimination of the threat to a successful sortie would consume precious days, to which would have to be added the eight or 10 days required before the sweep
commander could declare the channel safe for transit.
The moored mines laid in Korea were not only laid by Russian-taught North Korean fishermen, but were Russian-made mines. What is worse, from the standpoint of the effort required to counter them, is that they were, for the most part, the simplest contact mines of the type used early in World War II. The few thousand mines furnished the North Koreans were less than a drop in the bucket as far as the Russian stockpile is concerned—a stockpile which undoubtedly contains the most sophisticated of the influence types which make countermeasures planners lie awake at night, and a stockpile which has continued to grow since the end of World War II.
We have now re-established our mine forces, which are equipped with the best in mine countermeasure ships manned by dedicated officers and enlisted men. In addition, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact Program, we have furnished our allies all over the world with the ships and equipment to counter the threat posed by mines. As Captain Hoblitzell indicates, though, we must still educate the leaders in our Navy to a real appreciation of the menace. A mine force commander worth his salt should not sit still for the two-hour or three-hour pre-dawn sweep which is too often included in training exercise op-orders. It is not possible to make the rest of the Navy mine-conscious if the people who know better go along with promoting the fiction that the sweepers can make things safe for the others in such a brief span of time. Ask the Wonsan invasion commander how long it takes to sweep. Ask the commander of the mine forces there whether he was biting his nails as the first heavies went in—hoping that the enemy had not thrown in delayed-arming mines and that he had had his boys run off enough ship counts on the influence mines.
There is no denying that mine warfare is about as unglamorous as warfare can be. Only the fool, however, will neglect it or give it short shrift in preference for the more glamorous types in view of the historically- demonstrated penchant for sea mines on the part of the Soviet Union.
It is encouraging to read that U. S. naval officers no longer avoid mine warfare experience. It is to be hoped that they seek it not only for the opportunity that it offers for early command with its concomitant enhanced promotion prospects, but also because they realize that it is an important field about which it behooves every naval officer to know much more.
Charles G. McIlwraith, Captain, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The outstanding feature of offensive mine warfare is that a nominal effort by the offensive can force a very large expenditure of effort by the defensive. This can be illustrated by my own experience. From June 1942 to March 1943, I was liaison officer for minesweeping in London. During that time very few mines were laid by the Germans, far fewer than 100. But those few mines, plus the fact that there might be many more at any time, forced the British to operate more than 500 sweepers, at great expense in manpower and supplies.
Again, consider that fewer than 40 German mines were laid in U. S. and Caribbean waters. The possibility of a serious mine attack at any time forced us to operate a large fleet of sweepers for months on end.
It is a sobering reflection that in any future war we are almost certain to be on the defensive in this respect. It brings to mind the remark of Admiral Lord St. Vincent when Robert Fulton was trying with some success to interest the Prime Minister, William Pitt, in his mines. “Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage a mode of warfare which those who commanded' the sea did not want, and which, if successful, would at once deprive them of it.”
"British Submarine Operations in World War II”
(See pages 72-81, March 1963 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—Lieutenant Commander Gilbert’s description of British submarine operations was a good condensation of the innumerable exploits of His Majesty’s submarines in World War II.
Even such a brief account, however, should have found space for one unique exploit. British submarines sank 15 German U-boats, 18 Italian submarines, and two Japanese underseas craft during the war. In all these cases, save one, the victims were caught on the surface.
The one notable exception occurred on 9 February 1945 when HMS Venturer, commanded by Lieutenant J. S. Launders, was operating submerged off the coast of Norway and picked up the sound of another submarine’s machinery. A quick periscope search of the bearing indicated by the hydrophones revealed another periscope cutting through the water.
For two hours and forty-five minutes, the Venturer stalked the U-boat until the two submerged boats were 2,000 yards apart. Then Lieutenant Launders fired four torpedoes using sound bearings, obtaining at least one hit. Upon surfacing, the Venturer spotted debris and wreckage from the U-864. This was the Venturer’s second U-boat kill, for, three months before, she had torpedoed U-771 on the surface.
This second kill, however, was the first known kill of one submarine by another with both submerged throughout the encounter. It is interesting to note that the primary mission of British and American submarines today—both nuclear and conventional—is antisubmarine warfare.
John S. Tidmarsh—Commander Gilbert wrote of the successful attack of HMS Salmon on the U-33 in the “first submarine-versus- submarine attack of the war.” This attack on 4 December 1939, however, was not the first such attack of the war.
The early efforts of the British to establish an effective Scotland-Norway patrol line to catch German submarines attempting to slip out into the Atlantic began ominously. The initial inexperience of British submarine commanders in identifying silhouettes and the failure of boats to stay in their narrowly defined patrol areas led to the first British antisubmarine operations being carried out against friendly submarines. On 10 September 1939, one of these attacks led to the sinking of the O-class submarine HMS Oxley by HMS Triton. Neither of these submarines was in her assigned patrol area.
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