This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
"The Painful Development of a Professional Navy”
(See pages 78-89, May 1966 Proceedings)
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, (Retired)—Captain Craven’s extremely interesting and timely article brings to mind a lecture entitled “Case Study of Innovation,” which was delivered by Professor Elting E. Morison in 1950 at the California Institute of Technology.
It tells in detail the story of the opposition encountered about 1901 by then-Lieutenant W. S. Sims in his efforts to introduce in the U. S. Navy the radical improvements in gunnery which had been developed in the Royal Navy by Captain Percy Scott on the China Station. It was only by Sims’ temerity in bypassing official channels and directly addressing President Theodore Roosevelt that he got action. It seems that “resistance to change” is not an unusual trait among naval officers.
Captain Craven believes that the failure of the U. S. Navy to develop as he feels it should have was primarily due to (1) faulty organization in the Navy Department (the bureau system and reliance on the General Board as a ship characteristic agency), (2) the lack of specialization among sea-going officers (abolition of the Engineer Corps), and (3) the competitions. There is much truth in his claims.
Much of the improvement in Navy Department organization recommended by Captain Craven appears to have been accomplished by recently inaugurated changes in the bureau system.
Having had personal connection with the competitions, I would be the first to admit that they had their faults and produced many artificial procedures such as dismantling of power hoists in turrets in favor of the increased speed which could be attained by hand loading the few rounds required for the so-called Short Range Battle Practice. The value of the competitions, very important during the period under discussion, was the advantage that they provided an incentive to excel, both among officers and enlisted men, which otherwise would have been lacking.
The Office of Fleet Training conscientiously endeavored to design rules which would induce realistic battle procedures in the competitions in order to attain high scores. This was a difficult problem, but, in some cases, was quite effective. The Short Range Battle Practice was the worst stumbling block because its inherently artificial methods of loading and fire control, once the practice was completed, had to be thrown overboard in favor of real battle training. But all efforts to modify or abolish it went for naught, for it was a sine qua non to the old timers brought up in the early Sims days. They insisted on seeing pictures of target screens with the heads of the gun crews sticking through the holes made by their hits. However, in such a practice operation the value of the effort expended in maintaining material in topnotch condition should not be overlooked.
Similarly, the engineering competition induced efficient maintenance and better fuel economy—a valuable feature in increasing steaming radii. Captain Craven mentions the attention devoted to smoke prevention. This was an important factor in the days prior to air scouting.
As to matters of personnel, it was not long after the abolition of the Engineer Corps that it became necessary to train engineer specialists and designate them as “engineers only,” ineligible to handle ordinary line duties. There appears to have been no good reason for the amalgamization of the Construction Corps with the line other than the desire of many officers of the former to be identified with the latter. It would have been desirable, as Captain Craven points out, to have constructors at sea as damage control officers, for their special knowledge should result in more efficient damage control, and their seagoing experience would be of value in producing better ship design.
It appears that further specialization is necessary in this modern age. I heartily agree with the five proposals listed in Captain Craven’s article (page 89) and hope that they will receive careful consideration.
I am firmly of the opinion that each specialist branch (including the Waves) should have its own sleeve device, to be worn with Pride. By all means let the wearing of the star be reserved, as it once was, for the seaman, to denote his qualification, according to his rank, to handle a boat, a ship, or a force of ships.
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (President, Naval War College)— Captain Craven’s article is excellent, but I feel I should point out some facts which are often overlooked when one reviews the mistakes of the past. It is true, inertia is not only a Property of matter, but is a characteristic of People, and U. S. naval history is full of examples. The latest is that at long last the technical bureaus have gone the way of the sail. Both survived for more than a century. Ten years ago it was apparent that the bureaus had outlived their usefulness and "'ould have to go.
However, we should not lose sight of all the advances and accomplishments that in many cases far outweigh some of the situations criticized by Captain Craven.
Our best examples can be found in naval aviation. It was this progress that bore the Seeds of victory in World War II. Officers such as John H. Towers, Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Marc A. Mitscher, and many others ^ho fought the “Jutland” school and the classical battle line approach of the mid- 1530s, are but a few of the names that come 1° mind.
Throughout the history of the U. S. Navy there have always been the “rebels” who disagreed with the “establishment.” Much of °Ur progress has resulted from the efforts of the “rebels.” It does show that there have always been the Hyman Rickovers and the Bradley Fiskes as well as the Victor Blues of the then-Bureau of Navigation. Victor Blue and ^Ibert Winterhalter, Aid for Material, routinely opposed the recommendations of the General Board and Bradley A. Fiske. As a fatter of record, with Rear Admiral William Benson’s appointment as the first Chief of Naval Operations in May 1915, Rear Ad-
miral Fiske’s last hopes of influencing the Navy Department vanished and he retired while Aid for Operations. Until the Congressional investigation of 1920, professional criticism of naval policy, while not silenced, lacked focus. Admiral Fiske should have been Chief of Naval Operations. Secretary of the Navy Joseph Daniels not only did not believe in the concept of the Chief of Naval Operations, but actually thought Admiral Fiske incompetent; it would have been a different story and a different Navy if he had been the Chief of Naval Operations.
Thus, I must disagree with the article, in part, in that I believe Secretary Daniels must bear some of the responsibilities for the conditions described in the article. One has only to read the history of Admiral Fiske to see what a tremendous naval officer he was; his imagination and technical knowledge were unsurpassed.
When one is in a mea culpa mood, one often gets completely involved in the material errors made. The capital assets of the Navy are its officers and enlisted men. Wise use of these assets is a must. Captain Craven has posed some good questions regarding the management of these assets in relation to the technical personnel of the Navy and the line officer. I am sure they will have to be faced in the future to insure avoiding these same mistakes. This is particularly true in regard to the adequate professional education of our officers, f believe firmly that our line officers must possess technical competence and so must be educated technically.
This is another area of disagreement with Captain Craven. It does not make sense in this highly complex era to pretend that a line officer can be called a professional naval officer without possessing adequate technical competence. It is in the area of the definition of adequacy that most arguments arise.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
" 'Professionalism’ A Wardroom Debate”
(See pages 72-77, May 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. A. Carter, U. S. Navy—Commander Strong’s article reminds me of an art critic friend of mine whose favorite statement is, “Just because you like da Vinci doesn’t mean you can’t find Picasso equally admirable ... or vice versa.”
There need be no real conflict between tradition and progress. I suppose that there are some who may find that all links with the past are useless, and some who believe that anything developed since high-collared blues went out is rank heresy. To me there is something comforting about the fact that nuclear- powered ships with “gee whiz” weapons systems still use boatswain’s calls (yes, calls) and are manned by men in the most distinctive and gloriously impractical uniform this side of the Athenian Palace Guard.
Certainly, there are “fuddy-duddies” in the Navy; but there are also doctors who do not keep up with the advances in medical science, and businessmen who never look beyond the financial pages.
Conservatism would seem to be almost an inherent human trait. It is only when “It won’t work, it’s never been tried” becomes a way of life that it becomes harmful.
I submit that a “fundamental change in the nature of the profession” is not at all necessary. We are quick to blame the “system” for the shortcomings of those involved in it. The individual officer must, of course, expand his knowledge to keep abreast of the latest developments in the many fields of study which affect his profession. However, I do not believe that this need for expanded knowledge necessitates any basic change in our “long cherished . . . traditional professional values.”
Nothing in the traditional professional values of the naval service forms a basis for a charge of anti-intellectualism. We need look no further than a well-known letter which begins“It is by nomeans enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner ...” to find a firm basis in U. S. naval history for a contrary view.
The frigate captain on detached duties had to be able to cope with the intricacies of diplomacy in a day when advice from the “home office” was not so easy to come by. If
technology in the past was less advanced, the commander still faced problems beyond his ken or control. A contrary wind must have caused our frigate captain as much anxiety as a report that the Mk-671 whatever has tribbled and the permoactuator has dis- combobulated causes today’s skipper.
While modern technology has posed new Problems, it has helped to solve others. Nuclear propulsion has all but eliminated the nagging problem of fuel consumption which, *f We are to believe naval history, had dominated the commander’s bete noir locker since the advent of steam propulsion.
Further, I cannot see the reason for conflict between the “technician” and “operator.” It is probably an ancient feud. I can imagine the World’s first line officer complaining about the poor handling characteristics of his hollow log, and the original naval architect trying to convince him it would work better if he used both hands on the paddle.
We need both operator and technician and would also seem that they do not necessarily bave to be the same person. In my home town, there was a piano tuner who could not play Chopsticks” and a musical genius who could n°t unlock the keyboard cover. Together, they made beautiful music.
A line officer does not have to know all about the design and detailed maintenance Procedures of every piece of equipment aboard his ship to be an excellent command- lng officer; nor does the engineer have to be a legendary ship handler. Each must know enough about the other’s job to be able to communicate, and to develop an area of Mutual respect and understanding.
We must be “competent mariners,” or dentists, or engineers, or whatever. But we roust be a great deal more: We must be, above aH else, professional naval officers. The supply officer who believes that the Navy exists Ibr neatly filed requisitions is not a “professorial”; neither is the line officer who restricts his reading to Knight, Dutton, and Allied actical Publications.
The true “pro” must be a master in his °Wn field and something more. All of us—unrestricted line, specialist, staff corps officer, aod limited duty officer alike—share a com- roon bond and a common goal: the bond is the Navy; the goal is fleet readiness.
"The Pentagon’s Whiz Kids”
(See pages 52-60, April 1966,
and pages 114-117, July 1966 Proceedings)
Robert W. Berry (Formerly attached to the office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense from 1956 to 1960, Mr. Berry is now legal counsel for a large electronics firm.)—Like so many critics of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Colonel Stillman indicates only partial knowledge of that office.
One infers from his discussion of the executive training program that this is an innovation by Secretary of Defense McNamara. I would point out that the executive training program was started in 1954 and since that time has annually brought into government service young men and women with advanced degrees. Many of these are still in the government. For example, Dr. Timothy Stanley, who is charged with NATO force structure problems, came into the program in 1954; R. Tenney Johnson, Deputy General Counsel of the Department of the Army, is an executive trainee; and Dr. Lee Huff, Director, Behavior Sciences, Advanced Research Project Agency. To suggest that this situation was initiated during the McNamara administration is to err.
For many years the Army has sent to graduate school young career officers who, following receipt of their M.A.’s or Ph.D.’s instruct at the Military Academy and then return to troop duty. Many of these men are Princeton, Yale, or Harvard graduates. Examples of these are Colonel Sid Berry, U. S. Army, who was Military Assistant to Secretary McNamara, and Lieutenant Colonel Abbott Greenleaf, U. S. Air Force, who is now Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance. These men certainly can and do compete with their civilian counterparts because they, too, are experts in civilian subjects such as economics, political science, and political philosophy. The Army and Air Force have for many years had this program.
The recent adverse publicity concerning the Naval Academy suggests that the Navy would do well to follow the same procedure as the Army and the Air Force. Not only would the Naval Academy benefit, but the entire Navy would as the officers, having obtained
Acquiring meaningful data from the seas
Mmt
OCEANOGRAPHIC PROJECTS DIVISION
ALPINE
GEOPHYSICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. 65 OAK ST., NORWOOD, N.J. 07648, USA (201) 768-8000 Cable: ALPGEO Telex: 125046
An Equal Opportunity Employer
J
graduate degrees in non-scientific areas, would be far better equipped to assume positions of responsibility in the Department of the Navy and at higher levels. Unhappily, in my experience, the Navy has not only discouraged this at graduate level but has even discouraged concern for civilian/militarv problems at the midshipman level. In 1960 a young first class midshipman solicited my help in writing a senior paper on the organization of the Department of Defense. He knew that I had been active in the 1958 reorganization and he wanted to focus on this aspect. Subsequently, I discovered that he had not been permitted to write his paper in this area because he had been advised that this subject was not a proper concern for midshipmen. I found this to be then and I still find it to be most disquieting.
The military departments might reassess the requirements for leadership. The civilian, for a variety of reasons, has had to become a military expert. Too few in the military have concerned themselves with civilian matters. In the second half of the 20th century, politics, economics, and military philosophy have a tendency to shade in each other, and the government official cannot be limited in his scope; neither can the military.
Robert J. Boyd and Herman S. Wolk (History and Research Division, Strategic Air Command)—Colonel Stillman regrettably exhibits faulty reasoning and a fairly large dose of misinformation. His essay is well below the quality one has come to expect in the Proceedings. A subject of this importance requires more precision and depth than Colonel Stillman has provided. The following points seem pertinent:
1. The fact that Secretary of War Henry L- Stimson and his small staff were older men with no “impressive academic backgrounds” does not by itself lead to the conclusion that “development of War Department policy was virtually under military control.”
2. Military officers in their “late twenties and early thirties” did not dominate “the vital operations and policy posts within the Pentagon” at the close of World War II.
3. Military influence was not at its zenith at the end of World War II solely because of the popularity and power of the uniform. Men
such as Generals of the Army George Marshall and Douglas MacArthur would have been prominent in any generation and were appointed to high positions primarily because they were great and gifted men. The concern over military prominence should be tempered by reference to the nation’s history and citizen-soldiers such as Washington, Hamilton, Jackson, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Harrison, McKinley, and Theodore Roosevelt; and professional soldiers such as Grant, Zachary Taylor, Scott, Hancock, Eisenhower, Marshall, and Maxwell Taylor.
4. Harold Lasswell’s hypothesis was hardly taken seriously at the time it was formulated. He too, referred to societies other than those of the Western World.
5. It is not clear—either in Colonel Still- roan’s article or in the available evidence— that the military were dealt a devastating blow in the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961.
6. Academic credentials have little to do with the possession of an alert mind and bright Vv't, nor does military service necessarily produce slower and less articulate intellects than do civilian academic institutions.
7. The ditty purported to have been composed recently by “an anonymous general officer in the Pentagon” under pressure of the ^hiz Kids is, in similar form, almost as old as die American military itself.
8- Professor Kissinger’s Necessity for Choice (1961) is not an example of the “countless tomes written in the 1950s.” Colonel Stillman ls Probably thinking of Professor Kissinger’s earlier work entitled Nuclear Weapons & F°reign Policy (1957).
9- Colonel Stillman, in advancing his reasons for the decline of the military in power, uas failed to mention the most important rea- s°n of all which is technological—the advent °f nuclear weapons. The civilian hierarchy needed none of the reasons he mentions in 0rder to dominate in fact the military; the existence of nuclear weapons was reason enough. Civilian dominance became a neces- SltV and it flowed primarily from the tech- Uological revolution.
Iffi General Taylor’s regrouping had a Sreat deal more to do with policy than the system itself. General Taylor had existed ^Uhin “the system” for a very long time prior to his retirement.
11. “Emphasis on authority, organization, and sameness” is hardly the reason (or even one of the reasons) why Messrs. McNamara, Bundy, and Kennedy left military service.
12. Contrary to Colonel Stillman’s thesis, a good case can be made that today the civilians are the conservatives and the military the progressives, especially as far as weapons development is concerned.
13. The inference that “World War II warriors” have had few if any new ideas is one of those pleasant myths that has been perpetuated far too long.
14. “The LeMays” can hardly be blamed for establishing the national policy of overwhelming strategic nuclear deterrence. This would have been news to Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John Foster Dulles.
15. In general, Colonel Stillman’s stress on youth and academic credentials is as overdone as the more sensational press releases on the subject of the past five or six years. The major reasons for the shift that he treats in a superficial manner have to do with international political affairs and the military technological revolution. Unfortunately, Colonel Stillman has not addressed himself to these matters at all. He has advanced some relevant points, but many of his examples are trite at best and outright foolishness at the worst.
Colonel Richard J. Stillman, U. S. Army (Retired)—Messrs. Boyd and Wolk are correct that my date was wrong in regard to the publication of Professor Kissinger’s Necessity of Choice. The book was published in 1961, not the late 1950s. But while they were right about a date, they did seem to miss the point of my article. Like a blasting shotgun in the hands of a novice, their critique hit everything but the target, namely my theme.
My theme was simply that a power revolution has taken place in the Pentagon: The civilians have replaced the military. And, this revolution has taken place because the military were unable to address themselves to the rapidly changing world while the “Whiz Kids”—for better or for worse—were able to offer new solutions to new problems. The military were still fighting World War II battles with World War II ideas—antiquated for the Vietnamese environment. The soldiers, sailors, and airmen fumbled the ball and the
“Whiz Kids” were there to pick it up.
If Messrs. Boyd and Wolk did not attack my theme, what did they criticize? First, they cited the examples which I used to support my arguments. These historians did not like the ditty by the nameless general claiming he had little decision making power (point No. 7). This ditty is really mild compared to what some of our senior officers have said about the “Whiz Kids.” But these comments cannot be printed in the Proceedings.
Messrs. Boyd and Wolk did not like my implication that the military was thought poorly of by the Kennedy Administration after the Bay of Pigs fiasco (point No. 5). One can read what either Mr. Schlesinger or Mr. Sorensen have written recently on this subject to find out how much praise the Joint Chiefs of Staff received from the President in April of 1961 for their Bay of Pigs recommendations.
The SAC historians criticized my essay for not writing about things which I never intended to write about. Technical revolution and international affairs which they desired to know about are not in the scope of my article (points No. 9 and 15). Their impacts on the military profession have indeed revolutionized the armed services, but they have not been central to the internal power shift within the Pentagon. As I emphasized, the change was in generations, ideas, and power rather than technology and international affairs. It was a revolution in terms of human beings rather than in the innovations in science.
Further, Messrs. Boyd and Wolk said I failed to point out where the military have offered new ideas (points No. 12 and 13). Granted, the military leaders have not been vegetables. I did not say they were. They have been thinking, but compared to the “Whiz Kids” they have done too little, too late, and in the wrong places. For the most part, they have filled the role of the routineers and conservatives rather than creators, and this is why the “McNamaras” run the Department of Defense today.
Finally, Messrs. Boyd and Wolk implied that I was anti-military in my statements and that I was spitefully attacking the military profession (point No. 14). To the contrary, my article was meant to foster discussion and improve the armed forces, in short to redress what I felt to be the imbalance of power between the military and the civilians in Washington and to reduce the spirit of ill-will between them. I tried to offer some solutions to this problem. I believe that if our intellectuals are given a more important place in the service, if our military educational institutions are improved, if we learn to welcome fresh views instead of fighting them, and if we pay the military more to attract the kind of persons we need in this honorable profession, we can go a long way to correct the existing imbalance of power.
But Messrs. Boyd and Wolk did not condemn me for saying this. If they wished to criticize my article, I believe they could have been more effective in attacking it on these grounds. They could have more solidly founded their arguments on my lack of development of precisely these themes—how to redress the imbalance of power. What is the scope of military influence and of civilian control in a democratic nation like our own? How can we reconcile the necessary authoritarian nature of the armed forces with the libertarian ideals which our country strongly cherishes? Is a “McNamara” too strong today, like President Truman thought General MacArthur was too strong 15 years ago? What is the role of the soldier in America? My article did not answer these important questions, but only served to sharpen discussion about them. My essay only developed the problem, it did not pretend to solve it. These SAC historians seemed to miss its point as well as a good chance to make their discipline constructively come to grips with these tough and arresting problems.
I offer an invitation to these two men of SAC to sally forth from their underground bunkers to find out what the 1960s are like and the problems they confront.
"Chester William Nimitz, 1885-1966”
(See pages 30-55, July 1966 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral W. S. Anderson, U. S. Navy, (Retired)—Professor Potter’s excellent biography of Fleet Admiral Nimitz accurately observes that on being relieved as Chief of Naval Operations in December 1947, Admiral Nimitz might have gone into business. However, the opportunity to leave the Navy for
the more lucrative business world had been presented to Nimitz before, 32 years earlier when he was a lieutenant.
About 1914, the U. S. Navy decided to manufacture and install diesel engines in a ship, the first marine installation of a diesel in this hemisphere. Nimitz, then a lieutenant, Was ordered to Germany to learn how such engines were built. On his return he was ordered to the Brooklyn Navy Yard to supervise the manufacture of the diesel engines and their installation in the Maumee (AO-2).
The then-Lieutenant Nimitz and I occupied the same office in the Machinery Division of the Navy Yard. I was also a lieutenant, and was on duty there as the ordnance superintendent, which meant that I was in charge of all ordnance work conducted in the Yard. Being together in the same office, we could not help overhearing what went on at each other’s desk.
It is pertinent to state here that as lieutenants we were both receiving as Navy pay the sum of 240 dollars a month, plus 48 dollars as commutation of quarters. This latter sum did not adequately cover the cost of our apartments.
One day in 1915 a man came into our office and introduced himself as representing a company in St. Louis which was trying to manufacture diesel engines. As the conversation developed, I inferred that they were hav- lng some problems in this work. Finally, it became plain that they wanted to employ Nimitz. This would of course have meant his resignation from the Navy. The man made Nimitz a definite offer of 25,000 dollars a year and a five-year contract. This was when a dollar was a real dollar and we were not pay- lng income taxes!
Knowing how valuable Nimitz was to the Navy, I was gravely disturbed, but to my §reat relief Nimitz slowly replied, “No thank you, I do not want to leave the Navy.” This 'vas indeed wonderful to hear. There was some further talk, and the man became more persuasive: “At any rate, money is no obstacle to Us. Write your own ticket.” By this time I was terribly concerned. Nimitz could have said, 'That will be 40,000 dollars a year and a ten- year contract.” After a brief pause Nimitz reiterated, “No, I don’t want to leave the Navy.” The man from St. Louis departed.
I then hurried over to Nimitz and said, “Chester, I couldn’t help hearing what went on. I’m the only one here to represent the Navy. That was wonderful of you. Thank God you refused that offer. We need you!”
Walter H. Gage, Jr.—Congratulations to the Proceedings and Professor Potter for a fine tribute to Fleet Admiral Nimitz.
There appears to be a discrepancy in the description of photograph 1 on page 42 of the article. The caption for the photo (shown below) reads: “being sworn in as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in Washington, D. C. on 17 December 1941, by Admiral E. J. King.” I am quite certain that this photograph shows Admiral Nimitz and Admiral King on the quarterdeck of the battleship Pennsylvania (BB-38), beneath the gun barrels of turret No. 4, in early April 1942, while berthed at Pier 7 in San Francisco.
"Our Icebreakers Are Not Good Enough”
(See pages 60-69, February 1966,
and pages 122-123, July 1966 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral C. W. Thomas, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Captain McDonald calls justifiable attention to the inadequacy of U. S. icebreakers to support modern breaking and escort demands. Captain McDonald’s thesis is the Wind-class icebreakers have served a useful purpose, but today larger and more powerful icebreakers are needed. He states, “At a risk of incurring the wrath of Wind- class personnel who seem extraordinarily loyal whenever the larger Glacier is mentioned, it must be stated that her added power and space, improved engine and rudder control facilities within her hollow foremast at the aloft conning station and permanent helicopter facilities make the Glacier a better icebreaker in almost every respect.”
I doubt that Captain McDonald is aware that the Glacier, with her scantlings, power, lack of a bow propeller, and helicopter facilities, is the product of recommendations made to the Navy by a Coast Guard officer who
A veteran Wind-class icebreaker officer proposed many of the advanced features of the larger Glacier (now WAGB-4), according to a contributor to the forum. Below is the Wind-class icebreaker Atka (now WAGB-280), one of seven ships of this design currently in U. S. Coast Guard service.
served in the Wind-class ships. It must be borne in mind that the Wind Class was built to satisfy a World War II requirement for icebreaking and the escort of Liberty ships and smaller vessels in Greenland waters. The escort of larger ships was not in the minds of Wind Class designers.
Serious consideration should be given Captain McDonald’s suggestions together with recommendations made by Coast Guard officers. Since recommendations these are documented,* this discussion will be limited to other factors.
As important as the material capability of an icebreaker is her ability to employ this capability to the maximum effect. This involves ship control. Very little progress has been made in this area (except for power steering and bridge engine controls) since the first icebreaker slid down the ways at a shipyard in Hamburg, Germany, in 1849.
Considering first material needs, one is appalled by the large number of officers and enlisted men on the bridge of an icebreaker which is flying the flag of a force commander. To improve force and ship control, one can envision a polarized “bubble” located on the %ing bridge. This would contain side-by-side seat positions, one for the flag watch officer and one for the officer of the deck. These Positions would each have an automobile- b'pe-steering wheel by which the officer controlling the movements of the ship (normally the OOD) would steer. Ship propulsion control would be exercised by levers within easy reach of the ship-control positions. Thus, bae time-lag between verbal orders and response, often critical in ice escort, would be
mduced.
Above the lookout glass in the “bubble” Would be a screen on which televised informa- |lQn is projected. Television cameras would be °cated near the fore trunk, on the stern Center-line, and on the quarters. These cameras would be capable of being trained r°m control positions. The ship’s helicopters Would also be capable of television transmissions to control stations. Information on lce formations ahead of the ship to a distance 10 to 15 miles would be particularly useful
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and °reign Commerce, U. S. Senate, 58th Congress, 2nd ^don, on S-3657 (Atomic Icebreaker).
to the flag watch officer. This is consonant with the old adage “the OOD is his own best lookout.”
All televised information would also be piped to the navigating bridge and CIC, to be available to the force commander and commanding officer and for incorporating into a permanent record of ice conditions.
Different space requirements exist for nearly every expedition involving icebreakers. Except for living spaces, with the emphasis on scientific areas, bolted bulkheads would provide flexibility. These bulkheads could be shifted by the crew to compartment space where watertight integrity is not required.
In order to achieve maximum personnel competence, a certain degree of scientific acumen is desirable. Of course, nothing can substitute for experience and a psychological attitude which attends a good ice pilot. But all things being equal, the ice navigator who is a scientist has an advantage.
First, a knowledge of oceanography carries an appreciation of the Coriolis vector, so often neglected by icebreaker officers. It is this force that causes ice to drift to the right in the Northern Hemisphere and to the left in the Southern Hemisphere. Its magnitude is a function of latitude and depth. To be able to mentally integrate and resolve vectors has obvious advantage. For example, it is not uncommon for icebreaker skippers to break a channel into the wind. Then they are puzzled because the ice fails to move out. It cannot move out: the Coriolis force holds it against a side of the channel.
Cryology involving ice morphology, its physical, chemical crystallographic properties, tensil strengths, stress-rupture behavior, etc.—all as a function of temperature, depth, and pressure—can be of significant value to an icebreaker officer. As an example, ice crystals have a definite mode in orientation. Geometric growth selection involves such factors as proximity of land, prevailing wind, and current. Knowing the probable orientation of the optic axes in accordance with these factors, slippage and cleavage planes can be deduced. In an embayment, cleavage planes are perpendicular to the axis of the body of water. It is therefore not difficult to break a “V” and thus allow broken ice to escape.
A knowledge of ice-pack morphology is of
particular use to a flag watch officer. If he judges a hummock the column is approaching to be caused by compression of new ice, he can safely maintain course and speed, but not if the above-water part of the hummock is isostatically balanced by underwater roots of old ice.
As flag captain in the van icebreaker of a task group, I almost severely damaged an attack cargo ship and an icebreaker. With an eight-knot speed of advance, some hummocks ahead were judged to be new pressure hummocks. They were not; they were old hummocks. They slowed the icebreaker to a halt. The ships astern continued to plunge on. The TBS failed to function, the emergency flag was frozen, the whistle was frozen, and the signal searchlight was frozen. The ship could not be rocked through the ridges. The JOOD rushed the fantail and gestured wildly. Fortunately, the attack cargo ship astern guessed our plight and reversed her engines. By rocking her rudder the icebreaker began forging slowly ahead. She gathered speed as she passed the hummocks and the bow of the cargo ship missed the icebreaker’s stern by inches. A knowledge of pack morphology would have prevented this near-accident.
How might the prospective icebreaker officers learn these things? They could be sent to school for a quarter’s work in beginning physical oceanography, crystallography or optical mineralogy, micro-meteorology and geomorphology. (It is presumed they have had college physics.) In addition to improving our icebreaking competence, such a program would open up a new and exciting field of interest for officers.
"Dreadnought”
(See pages 131-133, May 1965; pages 120-121, January 1966; and pages 123-124, June 1966 Proceedings)
Commander A. B. Sainsbury, Royal Naval Reserve—It would be interesting to know how Vice Admiral Ruge would define the handing over for the internment of ten battleships, five battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, and 50 destroyers except in terms that are synonymous with surrender. The Oxford dictionary’s definition of “surrender” is to “hand over, give into another’s power or control.”
The hard fact is that the control or effective use of all these ships—not to mention the 11- boa ts—was given up in November 1918, and if that is not to say that they were surrendered then the pen is mightier than the sword.
It is true that Admiral Beatty’s operation order did not use the word to which Vice Admiral Ruge objects, and refers punctiliously to “handing over for internment.” Equally punctilious was the behavior of the British and American squadrons detailed to meet the German ships arriving to surrender. The only show made was when the crews cheered their Commander-in-Chief, as demonstrations against a defeated foe had been forbidden. Equally true is the fact that Admiral Beatty was in a position to order that when the German ensign was hauled down at sunset that night it was not to be hoisted again without permission. When it was, the German ships were sunk, by German crews but in British waters. This “relinquishing of possession” is also included in the Oxford dictionary’s defi' nition of the word surrender.
Career Retention and the Division Officer
Lieutenant Thomas Chester Grzymala> U. S. Navy—Career retention in today’s Navy is an area of great concern at all echelons iu the chain of command. First-enlistment personnel, re-enlisting upon completion of their initial tour of active duty, and especially those people in the critical technical, rates, have become the keystone of many new innovations and programs in the naval service.
This commentary is directed primarily toward that group of naval officers who play a vital role in the career retention program— the division officer.
The relationship which exists in all the armed forces today between officers and enlisted men can be likened to the relationship which exists between labor and management among our civilian counterparts. Officers play the important role of planning and direction) while our enlisted men play the equally if1' portant role of bringing our plans to fruition through their individual and collective efforts-
The division officer is the vital link between labor and management. He associates with the enlisted men on a day-by-day, hour-by' hour basis. He is the connecting individual who joins the plans originating with his
seniors and the finished product brought to realization by his men. It is with this rela- trvely junior officer that career retention can be developed. Just as senior officers formulate operation orders and their subordinates carry out these orders, so too do our senior officers lay the foundations for career retention and place their trust and confidence in today’s junior officers to build successfully on these foundations and use their ability and ingenu- >ty to produce the finished product.
It is wise for the division officer to re-evaluate the means he uses to achieve this finished Product. Today’s Navy has a wealth of opportunities for the new recruit. Programs such as SCORE and STAR, re-enlistment bonuses, medical care, a liberal retirement Plan, housing for the serviceman and his family, the USAFI education program, and on-the-job as well as formal training are but a few of the many opportunities available to the seaman recruit. The division officer should fully acquaint himself with these many benefits. Virtually each and every naval base and station in the United States has a career information course available. During this five- hay course, the division officer can quickly fnd readily learn what Seaman Recruit Jones ls being offered today. A request from the division officer to his executive officer that he attend this course when feasible is certain to brmg approval. Department heads, executive officers, and commanding officers are more than anxious to enable the division officer to utilize every tool at his disposal in carrying °ut his duties.
Once the division officer is fully aware of "'hat the Navy offers to its people he should n°t be the least bit hesitant to use this knowl- ehge. Briefly mention SCORE at quarters one tr*orning. Tell enough to arouse the men’s cUriosity, but do not give a half-hour detailed bration on each and every facet of SCORE.
. he division officer will find himself answer- Ibg questions from time to time throughout ue day. The young men in his division are Ungry for any knowledge they can acquire, aud the brief mention of SCORE has whetted eir appetites for more information. It is , e division officer’s responsibility to provide em with this information.
The same example holds true for any of the uer Navy programs. Perhaps, when opera
tional schedules and the workload permit, the division officer may find it advantageous to hold a “bull session” with his men. It does not have to be an elaborate, formal seminar. On the small ship the division officer may not even be able to obtain a two-foot square chalkboard on which to write. Counseling a group of young seamen down in the boatswain’s locker or an equally knowledge- hungry group of firemen back in after steering can prove to be a challenging, rewarding experience to their division officer. It certainly will prove profitable to these young men about to embark on their life’s career.
When you go to sea for days or weeks on end for primarily training purposes, don’t you like to know why you are away from your home and family? So too, do the enlisted men. It is here that the division officer must once more serve his men. He should read the effective operation order a few days before the ship gets underway, and then, the day before departure, he should get his men together and let them know what is happening and why.
FAHEY’S EIGHTH EDITION
THE SHIPS
AND
AIRCRAFT
OF THE
U S. FLEET
Compiled and Edited by James C. Fahey
An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member's Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
The enlisted men will have greater pride in
132
themselves and the work they are required to do when they know for what reason they’re called upon to do it.
These are but a few of the ideas the division officer can readily use in his role as the key link between Navy’s labor and management. The division officer’s job is a challenging one. His is a formidable task.
The Military
Communications-Electronics Board
Lieutenant Commander WilliamF. Foster, U. S. Navy—The need for a joint body which could bring to bear the technical expertise of the military services in communications- electronics field was realized as early as 1942. This requirement led to the formation of the Joint Communications Board, forerunner of the present Military Communications- Electronics Board (MCEB) which is a major activity in the vital field.
Membership on the MCEB consists of com- munications-electronics chiefs of the four services, * the Director, Defense Communications Agency (DCA), the Director for Communications-Electronics Joint Staff (j-6), and a representative of the National Security Agency (NSA).
fn December 1962, the Director of the Defense Communication Agency (established in May 1960) became chairman of the MCEB.
Supporting the MCEB principals, as the Board members are called, is a small permanent staff headed by a military officer designated Secretary, MCEB. Through a horizontal organization of ten panels, matters referred to the Board are treated and staff studies prepared. Each panel deals with a specialized area of the communications-electronics field, these panels being: Electronic Warfare, Plans and Policy, Warning and Target Information, Call Signs, Equipment and Standardization, Frequency, Security and Cryptographic, Aids to Navigation, Communications Publications, and Methods and Procedures.
* For Navy, this is Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications)/Director of Naval Communications (Op-94).
Referrals are assigned to the panel within the area of prime responsibility, with other interested panels in co-ordination. In this manner, recommended positions are proposed in working groups, approved by cognizant panels, and forwarded to the MCEB principals for decision. Those actions deemed to require Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration are then placed on the JCS agenda.
Briefly, the mission of the MCEB is to:
• Increase the scope of co-ordination of communications-electronics matters, to include such co-ordination within the Department of Defense, between the Department of Defense and other government agencies, and between the Department of Defense and agencies of foreign governments and alliances.
• Provide guidance and direction for the Department of Defense in those areas of communications-electronics assigned as MCEB responsibility.
e Render advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the military services, and other Department of Defense agencies.
In accomplishing its mission, the MCEB acts in a wide variety of areas which contribute to the smoothness of many of the routine communications-electronics actions. These include frequency management, assignment and promulgation of call signs, address groups and routing indicators, formulation of communications procedures, promulgation and revision of communications publications, establishment of standards for equipment and circuits, and preparation of studies, reports and recommendations spanning the entire field of communications-electronics. The MCEB is a vehicle for solving technical problems or for presenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with completed staff work of a high degree of technical excellence. Communications-electronics officers of all services and member agencies contribute their talents to the multiplicity of matters with which the Board deals.
The Military Communications Electronics Board represents the successful evolution of staff machinery in a technical field to cope with advancing technology.
★