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A jaunty V-for-Victory, an ever-present cigar, defiant speeches—these are the trademarks by which most people identify Winston S. Churchill. His dynamic leadership during World War II is legend. It is less well known that, during World War I, Churchill played a dominant role in retaining Britain’s rule on the seas.
In keeping with the jocular admonition in Gilbert and Sullivan’s HMS Pinafore, "Stick close to your desks and never go to sea, and you all may be rulers of the Queen’s Navee,” Winston Churchill had no previous naval experience before becoming First Lord of the Admiralty. Graduating eighth in his class of 150 from Sandhurst, and, after a stint as a war correspondent in Cuba, Churchill arrived in Kipling’s India. While there, he was able to accompany the Malakand Field Force to the northwest frontier of India to suppress a revolt of Pathan tribesmen. Lieutenant Churchill’s observations and reflections of the operation were subsequently recorded in his first literary work The Story of the Malakand Field Force 1897: An Episode in Frontier War. It is significant to note that Churchill’s scepticism of Britain’s colonial defense gave rise to the reorientation of its military strategy. Even Prime Minister Robert Salisbury was keenly interested in the book written by the 23-year old subaltern. By 1898, Churchill had secured an assignment with the 21st Lancers and rode in the famous cavalry charge at Omdurman. The two-volume.work that followed, The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan, became, and still is, the prime reference of British military activity in the Sudan. In 1899, Correspondent Churchill captured the headlines with his daring escape from the Boers. Once again, he chronicled the conflict in From London to Ladysmith Via Pretoria and Ian Hamilton’s March. By the time Churchill became Home Secretary in 1910, he had written 14 voluminous works and
had served in Parliament as a member of the House of Commons for a decade. Thus, as Churchill was about to enter a new branch of the military, the world was about to enter a new era in warfare.
The impending world crisis in the early part of the 20th century can be traced to the powder keg in the Balkans, where the rise of Pan-Slavism and the renewal of German militarism posed a threat to the balance of power in Europe. Prior to this time, Britannia ruled the waves but as Churchill noted, "Swiftly, surely, methodically a German Navy was coming into being.” Most people in Britain, including Churchill, believed that Germany did not want a war. By 1911, this "faith in Germany’s good intentions” was shaken when the gunboat Panther steamed into the Moroccan port of Agadir. With this act, Germany hoped to reinforce its territorial claims on the African continent. However, the Kaiser’s plan had adverse effects; it made people reconsider Germany’s military position and its expanded seapower. On the continent, German armies were dominant; thus, its growing navy could indicate only one thing—a challenge to Britain.
While in Parliament, many officials played politics with Britain’s national security, Germany continued to produce additional ships; and each successive year British naval shipbuilding declined. For example, in 1905, Britain built four ships, Germany built two; in 1906, Britain decreased to three, Germany increased to three; and by 1907 for every two ships Britain built, Germany built four. Churchill summarized Germany’s probable reaction to these events with, "Reluctance on our [Britain’s] part to build ships was attributed in Germany to want of national spirit, and as proof that the virile race should advance to replace the effete overcivilized and pacifist society which was no longer capable of sustaining its great place in the world’s affairs.” Indeed, there were those in England who believed that eliminating domestic problems must precede the building of any additional warships. Socialists, like H. G.
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Wells, attempted to minimize the danger presented by Germany’s rising seapower, claiming that domestic strife posed a far greater threat.
Amid the turmoil from within and the threats from without, a crisis erupted within the Admiralty. Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith sought someone who could create a naval staff, someone who would be able to institute naval reforms; in effect, someone who would stand up against the salt-hardened admirals. Obviously First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna could not fulfill these requirements. What about Home Secretary Churchill? Just a few months before, upon learning that as Home Secretary he was responsible for guarding certain naval magazines, Churchill had telephoned the Admiralty and demanded that Marines be sent to protect the ammunition from possible German sabotage. His request was refused. Churchill then "rang up the War Office” and obtained an infantry company to guard the magazines. Was it not Lieutenant Churchill who, 16 years earlier, had observed flaws in Britain’s colonial defense and even criticized generals of long standing for their errors? He had intelligence, obstinate perseverance, and, most of all, courage—he was not afraid to say what he believed. Asquith could not find a better man for First Lord of the Admiralty than 37-year-old Winston Churchill.
On 23 October 1911, Churchill moved his residence to Admiralty House. Churchill would sit in the same oak chair from which the Younger Pitt had dispatched Admiral Nelson on what would become the climax of his glorious naval career in the waters off Trafalgar. The new First Lord had a large chart of the North Sea placed on the wall behind his chair. His reason, "I made a rule to look at my chart once every day when I first entered my room. 1 did this less to keep myself informed, for there were many other channels of information, than in order to inculcate in myself and those working with me a sense of ever-present danger. In this spirit we all worked.”
Preparedness can best describe Churchill’s primary goal as First Lord. He intended to prepare for an attack by Germany as if it were to come the next day. He planned to "raise the Fleet to the highest possible strength and secure that all that strength was immediately ready.” He wanted to create a naval staff as well as to promote greater cooperation between the army and the navy. Many of Churchill’s plans originated from the genius of his friend Lord Fisher (formerly Admiral Sir John Fisher). In fact, at that time, Fisher was as much a symbol of Britain’s navy as was the Dreadnought. In Fisher, Churchill found an unlimited source of knowledge, and later, in 1914, Churchill was able to bring the 74-year-old Fisher out of retirement and back into the Navy as First Sea Lord.
Fisher suggested that the First Lord appoint a naval secretary to inform Churchill on naval matters. Churchill chose David Beatty. It was Beatty, while commanding a Nile gunboat during the Battle of Omdurmafli who had thrown ashore a bottle of champagne to Subaltern Churchill. The First Lord found in Beam1 two excellent qualities. Unlike most naval officers of the time, he "thought of war problems in their unit)' by land, sea, and air.” He also struck Churchill by hi* "profound sagacity of his comments expressed in language singularly free from technical jargon.” Churchill’s announcement of his new Admiralty Board contained two significant changes. Intransigent Admiral Arthur Wilson, who had opposed the creation of s Naval War Staff, was replaced as First Sea Lord by Si( Francis Bridgeman. The second change Churchill effected was the naming of Prince Louis of Battenberg as Second Sea Lord. Although of German birth Prince Louis was entirely loyal to Britain, having joined the Royal Navy in 1868. He was regarded by Churchill as "the ablest officer the Navy possesses.” Thus, b)’ bringing the best naval experts into his staff, Churchill was in a position to take his fight for a revitalized nav)' before the Parliament and the people.
The first decade of the 20th century ushered in * new arms race between Britain and Germany. Churchill observed, however, that the motives for such enterprise* were different. In a public speech he made at Glasglo"’ in February 1912 he warned,
"The purposes of British naval power are essentially defensive. There is a difference between British sea- power and that of the German Empire. The British navy is to us a necessity and from some points of view the German navy is to them in the nature of a luxury. It is existence to us, it is expansion to them. The whole future of our race and Empire, thc whole treasure accumulated during so many cd1' turies of sacrifice and achievement would perish afld be swept utterly away if our naval supremacy wde to be impaired.”
It is significant to note that liberals in Britain react^ as vehemently to Churchill’s speech as did the German* the former claimed that peace would be threatened b) such warlike remarks. The newly-released 1912 Germs11 Naval Bill subsequently reinforced Churchill’s vie**" point.
Essentially, the German Naval Bill placed 80% 0 the German Navy on permanent war status. This woul^ mean that Germany could maintain 25 or perhaps -C fully commissioned battleships all year round. On tbf other hand, Britain could muster only 22 battleship* in home waters, even counting the Atlantic Fleet.
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counter this threat, Churchill, at Fisher’s insistence, declared that Britain would have to build warships at the rate of a two-to-one ratio on all increases of German ships. This would amount to £44 million or a £4- million increase in naval monetary allocation over the previous year. When it became apparent that the increased appropriations request might be turned down, Churchill proposed to the Kaiser a "naval holiday” to decelerate shipbuilding on both sides. One can detect political implications in Churchill’s overture. While he genuinely desired to avert the conflict, Churchill being a realist, had no illusions about the gathering storm. He, therefore, sought to convince
those in Britain who were still oblivious to the Teutonic menace. Few hours elapsed before the Germans dismissed the shipbuilding moratorium idea as a farce. One could rio longer question the intentions of Germany; there seemed to be no solution to the crisis aside from direct naval confrontation.
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At the Admiralty, Churchill and his board diligently ^aluated Britain’s strategic positions. Philip Guedalla noted in Mr. Churchill, "The older man worked morning shifts starting about 4 A.M., greeted his junior’s awakening with a daily letter, and declined through
the afternoon, while the younger partner refreshed by an invariable rest after lunch worked far into the night. The Admiralty lights were always burning; and as Mr. Churchill habitually minuted his papers in red ink, Fisher whose preference was for green named them 'the port and starboard lights.’” As during the Napoleonic Wars, the North Sea and the English Channel were focal points. If Britain could not maintain mastery of the seas in these areas, then the island itself could be subjected to naval bombardment, not to mention actual invasion. With respect to the latter prospect, Churchill drafted five memoranda which he described as, "imaginative exercises couched in a half-serious vein, but
designed to disturb complacency by suggesting weak points in our arrangements and perilous possibilities.” In one, "The Timetable of a Nightmare,” Churchill concocted a fictitious story of a German invasion. British ships were destroyed at sea, British towns were occupied, and even the government in London was under siege. Although many top-ranking military men regarded this story as sensational and alarmist, Churchill believed it would raise "very serious issues” about Britain’s defenses. He stated, "In time of war there is great uncertainty as to what the enemy will do and what will happen next.”
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For Britain, another strategic center of gravity the maintenance of local superiority in the Mediterrf' nean Sea. It was important that Egypt and Malta nd be abandoned since Britain’s traditional policy of "trade routes and military highways to the East” depend^ upon them. Even though to abandon the Meditertf' nean would be "injurious,” the reduction of Britisl1 superiority in home waters would "imperil” the corn1' try. It was on this basis that defense of the English Channel and the North Sea was given top priority an^ that no additional fleets were to be sent to the Med1' terranean.
In the years prior to the war, Churchill spent mo$ than eight months on board the Admiralty yacht & chantress. He recounted, "I visited every dockyard, ship' yard, and naval establishment in the British Isles af^ in the Mediterranean, as well as every important ship I examined for myself every point of strategic impOr tance and every piece of Admiralty property.” Church^ had a keen eye and little escaped his notice, p Churchill gazed from the Enchantress at Britain’s fifS’ line of defense riding serenely at anchor, he suddeid) realized the magnetism of the sea on which these gt'C>[ castles of iron and steel had brought glory to a sm^ insular nation. "For consider these ships,” he observed
"so vast in themselves, yet so small, so easily lost to sight on the surface of the waters. On them floated the might, majesty, dominion, and power of the British Empire. Open the sea-cocks and let them sink beneath the surface and in a few minutes—half an hour at the most—the whole outlook of the world would be changed. The British Empire would dissolve like a dream.” Churchill also appealed to the brave warriors of the sea, "Guard them well, admirals and captains, hardy tars and tall marines; guard them well and guide them true.”
As Arthur Marder noted, "In reality the British Navy at the end of the 19th century had run in a rut for nearly a century. Though numerically a very imposing force, it was in certain respects a drowsy, inefficient, moth-eaten organism.”
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Churchill realized that regardless of the quality of its ships, a navy’s foremost investment is in its men. The First Lord reformed naval justice with changes in summary punishments and with improvements in the internal administration of ships, Naval personnel convicted of offenses were sent to Naval Detention Quarters rather than civil prisons. Other changes were directed towards improvement of naval leadership. If they showed promise, "Young Warrant and Petty Officers could be given educational training ashore and then be sent to sea as officers.” This provided incentives to seamen who realized that their talents could be put to advantage. Also, the fees at the British Naval Schools at Osborne and Dartmouth were reduced, thereby increasing the number of potential officers who might otherwise have been turned away. Churchill sought to tackle the problems of the lower deck, especially the pressing issue of pay. "For sixty years,” Churchill remarked, "no increase had been made in the substantive pay of the British sailor.” Churchill’s desired pay hikes were substantially reduced by cost-conscious treasury officials led by Lloyd George.
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Churchill observed certain deficiencies in the education of officers. He found that, "There was no moment in the career and training of a naval officer, when he was obliged to read a single book about naval war, or pass even the most rudimentary examination in naval history ” Moreover, Churchill cited that the British Navy had not produced any significant contribution to naval literature comparable to Mahan’s works. The First Lord was extremely interested in both military and naval history as reflected both in his reading preferences and the books he wrote. However, Churchill was first to acknowledge that time at sea should be the main qualification (next to that of technical aptitude) for judging officer potential. In essence, the problem in the Navy was, "We had competent administrators,
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brilliant experts of every description, unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine sea-officers, brave and devoted hearts: but at the outset of the conflict,” reminded Churchill, "we had more captains of ships than captains of war.”
Not only did Churchill’s technical improvements strengthen the power and mobility of the fleet, it also provided the British sailor with the confidence that his ships were without equal on the seas. When Churchill became First Lord, several British ships were being equipped with 13.5-inch guns capable of firing a shell of 1,400 pounds. This new caliber was the work of Lord Fisher who believed that the 12-inch gun, firing 850 pound shells, was inadequate. Churchill with an eye to the future, realized that Germany might also be experimenting with higher caliber guns so he "immediately sought to go one size better.” After consultation with Lord Fisher, he proposed that British ships be equipped with 15-inch guns. There, indeed was a risk inherent to his proposal, "no such thing as a modern 15-inch gun existed.” Ships would have
to be enlarged to accommodate the guns, turrets must be repositioned, and the guns themselves must be tested to determine whether they could withstand the stress. If the project failed, the result would be disastrous. Time would not permit correction of any mistakes. The First Lord, therefore, committed the nation on the large gun. His rationale was two-fold. First, "To achieve the supply of this gun was equivalent to a great victory at sea, to shrink from the endeavor was treason to the Empire.” Second, "Risks have to be run in peace as well as in war, and courage in design now may win a battle later on.”
The new gun proved to be a success. A ship mounting eight of the 15-inch guns could fire a broadside of 16,000 pounds. Yet Churchill was not content with merely a gigantic gun platform, he also desired speed. He noted that, at Tsushima, the Japanese were able to defeat the Russians primarily because of their superiority in speed.
Churchill submitted his argument for a Fast Division. "A squadron of ships possessing a definite superiority in speed could be so disposed in the approaching formation of your own fleet as to enable you, whichever way the enemy might deploy, to double the fire after a certain interval upon the head of his line; and also to envelop it and cross it and so force him into a circular movement and bring him to bay once and for all without the hope of escape.” The British War College calculated that a Fast Division must be capable of achieving a speed of 25 knots in order to outmaneuver the German Fleet by 1914 or 1915. This meant a four or five-knot increase over the existing capacity of British battleships. Coal-powered vessels could not provide this increase; however, ships with oil propulsion could.
Churchill enthusiastically stated that, "The advantages conferred by the liquid fuel were inestimable.” Oil not only gave greater speed capacity, but enabled a ship to increase her endurance over coal by 40%. An ancillary advantage of oil was that it could be stored in spare places in the ship (e.g., double hulls) where coal could not be stored. Also, the men required to shovel coal into the furnaces could be replaced by pipes. Churchill mentioned that, "nearly a hundred men were continually occupied in the Lion shoveling coal from one steel chamber to another without ever seeing the light either of day or of the furnace fires.” Thus, a ship’s manpower could be used more efficiently. In like manner, the replenishment of fuel oil was a simpler task than that of coal.
Before Churchill came to the Admiralty, some 56 destroyers and 74 submarines were driven by oil. If an entire fleet were to be dependent solely upon oil, several additional problems would be created. Overseas oil agreements must be negotiated. Cost alone was not the
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sole obstacle. Assuming that such agreements could b( made, the Navy would have to create an oil reserve "large enough to enable it to fight for many months’ without bringing in new cargoes of oil. These reserve would have to be concealed and protected from tb< enemy. Warships must protect the lines of communi; cation from commerce raiders. Furthermore, fleets o' tankers would be needed to convey the fuel from th- oilfields to Britain, as well as from the British reserd to the fleets at sea.
Yet, despite strong opposition from economy minded members of Parliament, the Royal Navy efli barked on a program which would convert the Navj from coal to oil. All ships built in 1912, 1913, an* 1914—submarines, destroyers, light cruisers, fast battle ships—were based on oil (1913 battleships were coal' fueled owing to lack of funds). Oil negotiations web set up with Persia, and Churchill induced Lord Fishd to head the Royal Commission on Oil Supply "to era.0 the nut” on the liquid fuel problem. Finally, a* Anglo-Persian oil agreement secured for Britain th( supply of oil it desperately needed.
Churchill honored his commitment to make th( Royal Navy second to none. The construction of tbl five Queen Elizabeth-chss battleships, "all oil driven each capable of steaming a minimum of twenty-fiv( knots, mounting eight 15-inch guns, and protected b] thirteen inches of armour,” soon proved their word1 under fire. Churchill, however, found greater opposi tion to his desire for faster destroyers. In 1908, th( Royal Navy had built several oil-burning destroyed which could achieve a speed of 33 knots. The Admi ralty, finding the less expensive 27-knot, coal-burninf vessels more cost effective, reverted to coal. Churchfl1 described his dilemma, "I was too late to stop the las1 bevy of these inferior vessels, but I gave directions tC design a new flotilla to realize thirty-five knots spee^ without giving up anything in gun-power, torpedo^ or seaworthiness. I proposed to the Board that if monej ran short we should take sixteen of these rather thaS twenty of the others. Building slow destroyers! On( might as well breed slow racehorses.”
Churchill’s activities to improve the Royal Nav) were not limited solely to the surface of the seas. H1 did not overlook the importance of submarines. Re calling that period, Commander J. H. Owen, R.N> remarked in a letter to Vice Admiral Gretton that' "Churchill made us young submariners or flying peopb feel we were useful sailors, not just children playing with toys, as some big-ship people seemed to think.’ Lord Fisher desperately attempted to warn those wN controlled Britain’s fate of the danger presented ‘bj German commerce-raiding submarines. Unfortunately1 his appeals fell on deaf ears. Vice Admiral Grettob
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maintained that, "Nothing was done to prepare for U-boat attacks against merchant shipping, and I think that this is the only serious failure of which Churchill can be accused in his judgement of the shape of the warfare ahead.” This opinion may indeed be correct, yet it is possible that Churchill was not guilty of neglect as much as he was short of funds. Addressing the committee on Imperial Defense on 11 July 1912 Churchill stated, "If there ever was a vessel in the world whose services to the defense will be great, and which is a characteristic weapon for the defense, it is the submarine.” The First Lord, displaying great interests in the submarine, decided to see for himself and proceeded to board one at his earliest opportunity. He virtually scoured every compartment of the boat "asking why, wherefore, and how everything was done.” Lloyd George, learning of Churchill’s unbounded enthusiasm for the Navy commented that the First Lord had become "a water creature.”
Churchill must be given credit for providing the British Navy with wings by founding the Royal Naval Air Service. When he arrived at the Admiralty, there was scarcely a handful of planes and pilots belonging to the Navy. Up until 1912, the Royal Flying Corps (of the War Office) was responsible for the aerial defense of Britain.* Churchill deemed it necessary to form the R.N.A.S. for aerial protection of naval harbors and oil depots, not to mention "to provide general strengthening of Britain’s inadequate aviation.” He also realized that seaplanes could play an invaluable role in reconnaissance at sea. Seaplanes could sight hostile vessels "at enormous distances while remaining out of possible range, and would not be subjected to rifle and artillery fire from concealed positions on the ground as are land airplanes.”
Churchill disagreed with Lord Fisher and Admiral Jellicoe who favored airships, i.e., Zeppelins. The First Lord rated the weapon much lower than most officials, since he believed that this "enormous bladder of combustible and explosive gas would prove easily destructible.” The only advantage of such craft would be as "little Blimps for teasing submarines.” Churchill had the Zeppelin program scrapped and the funds allotted to airplanes. When he left the Admiralty in 1915, his policy was' reversed. Almost £40 million were, in Churchill’s word, "squandered” on Zeppelins rather than "equipping the fleet with aerial observation by flying aeroplanes off warships or properly constructed carriers.”
Technological advances rapidly converted the airplane from a reconnaissance vehicle to an offensive
weapon. Bomb-dropping was practiced and machine guns were adapted for aerial use. In 1913, the first torpedo was dropped from a British plane and night flying was tested for the first time. Just prior to the outbreak of the war there were in the R.N.A.S.: 39 airplanes, 52 seaplanes, 17 airships, and 120 pilots. Churchill did not remain a ground-based observer for long. He learned to fly partly because he sought to encourage young officers to do so, and partly because he was also eager to experience danger, first hand. "In those days,” writes Rene Kraus, "every flight was a gamble with life and death.” Kraus recounted a story about the First Lord who one day invited a young officer to fly with him. "The young man accepted. When they returned safe and sound, he did admit having spent the morning making his will.” The officer was no coward, for later during the war he won the Victoria Cross. Despite the protests of his friends and cabinet officials that he should not endanger himself, Churchill refused to quit flying until one of his former instructors was killed in a plane crash. (Churchill resumed flying in 1917 when, as Minister of Munitions, he made frequent visits to France.)
*See N. W. Emmott, "R.A.F.—The Impossible Dream,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings December 1969, pp. 26-39.
I
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the ensuing Austrian ultimatum, consolidated the questionable alliances set up a decade before and finally drew the great European powers toward war. Two days later Churchill decided to replace the Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet Sir George Callaghan with Sir John Jellicoe. Churchill felt that Callaghan would not be able to meet the strains of war. Although Callaghan was to be relieved of his command in October 1914, many Admiralty officials, including Churchill’s Secretary Admiral Beatty, believed that a change would have a detrimental effect on the fleet. Nonetheless, Churchill concurred with Lord Fisher that, "Everything revolved round Jellicoe.”
The British Cabinet, which Churchill called "overwhelmingly pacific,” was reluctant to become involved in a European war. However, the German invasion of Belgium silenced any second thoughts in the Cabinet. Traditionally, British security depended upon a neutral Belgium, thus Britain had no alternative but to intervene in order to ensure its own survival. On 4 August 1914 (almost three years after Churchill became First Lord), at 2300, the Admiralty dispatched to all His Majesty’s Ships and Naval Establishments the following historic signal, "Commence Hostilities Against Germany.”
Naval warfare entered a new era with the Admiralty’s laconic message. The whole fury and might of the Teutonic war machine was thrown upon Britain. Few people could anticipate its outcome or its influence on future wars. Since Churchill was a pragmatist, he was not preoccupied with delusions of peace, as was Lloyd George, when Germany was developing her seapowcr. Churchill was a student of history and, having read Mahan’s works, he could see similarities between Germany’s challenge to Britain in the 20th century and France’s challenge to Britain two centuries before. In each case seapower was the key to Britain’s survival. For the enemy to defeat Britain, it had to be able to achieve mastery of the seas. William Pitt the younger knew this; so did Churchill.
Churchill’s initiation of the 15-inch gun, the Fast Division, and oil propulsion all stood their test under fire. Too, at the Falklands, a British squadron avenging the defeat at Coronel, remained beyond the range of the Germans and pounded the enemy into oblivion; both of the famous German cruisers Schamhorst and
Gneisenau were sunk. At Jutland, the speed and fi(( power of the 5 th Battle Squadron were without eqU' Churchill’s greatest contribution to the Royal Ns' was his successful effort to convert it from coal to ^ The tactical advantages conferred by oil were so g[C! that by the end of the Great War, all the fleets of & Allied powers were using oil. Within a short tie1 coal-fueled ships were placed in the same category 1 stone axes and crossbows.
Churchill, however, was a war ahead of his time ^ respect to the importance of naval aviation. Ameri<7 victories in World War II illustrated the value ‘ mobile sea-based planes.
Winston Churchill, as well as most naval authority did not foresee that the emphasis placed on the Dre& nought, Britain’s symbol of naval supremacy, would ^ superceded by the aircraft carrier. Jutland was the I3' great sea battle fought solely by warships, and like d Battle of Trafalgar, it marked the passing of an ef'
Churchill was clearly an innovator. Possibly his rdJ tive youth—Fisher was 71, Kitchener was 62, and JeL coe was 53—contributed to this condition. The Lw Sketch once described Churchill as, "a much mO" versatile person than Pitt ever was and with all he V done is still on the right side of thirty-eight.”
Churchill was an able administrator with unequal!1 historical perspective and uncanny foresight. Above $ he had the power to instill confidence and dedicate in others. Churchill’s role in Britain’s preparation f the conflict was unquestionably a major one. As - Winston’s son, Randolph, eloquently stated, "If his li'1 had ended in 1914 in his fortieth year, we can be su* that he would not have been denied a page in histof and that his epitaph would have been 'When V?* Came, the Fleet was Ready,’” Perhaps an even mo|i fitting tribute was paid to Churchill when on 3 S£f tember 1939, when he returned to the Admiralty 1 First Lord, the signal was flashed to the fleet, "Winst^ is back.”
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Ensign Kryske is presently serving as Missile Officer and Gunnery A^' ant in the USS Parsons (DDG-33) homeported in Yokosuka, Japan * is the author of "NROTC at UCLA: The Colors Still Fly,” which appr^ in the Proceedings in December 1971. He wrote "Ruler of the Queen’s . . .” while a midshipman 2/c at UCLA.