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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Are TAR Officers Necessary?
Balancing the Nuclear Attack
Preparing for Tomorrow, Today
A Relevant Reserve
Using and Fighting Submarines
The Coast Guard: Quo Vadisl
Self-Confidence—The First Requisite
“Restoring Order” South of the Border
The Empty Cockpit
Wanted: A Fair Press
Wanted: A Professional Press
Wanted: A Responsible Free Press
The Unsellable Dream
Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners
Submarine Tank Carrier
Sailing Under the Ice
The “Unknown” Reserve
Escalation and Naval Strategy
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“Are TAR Officers Necessary?”
(See W. H. Langenberg, pp. 114-118, October 1984 Proceedings)
Commander Adelbert A. Balunek, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The answer to Admiral Langenberg’s question is yes!
The present-day success of the Naval Reserve is attributable, in no small part, to the training and administration of reserves (TAR) officers, and to the tireless efforts by that “retired (then active) TAR captain, now a staff member with the House Committee on Appropriations.” Agreed, the TARs are not ten feet tall. But they stood tall when we needed them in our years of peril, turmoil, and confusion when civilian sailors were organized, reorganized, studied and restudied, analyzed and reanalyzed, and when the Surface Naval Reserve was threatened with virtual extinction when reserve billets were proposed below 55,000.
Referring to pressure on the Navy to get more out of the Naval Reserve, Admiral Langenberg states: “While Congress has generated some impetus for this initiative, most of the progress has been fostered by the Navy.” Not true. If we have learned anything from the 1970s, it is this: The Navy does nothing substantive in the Naval Reserve area unless it is prompted, pushed, ordered, or threatened. (See Commander Walter K. Steiner, page 139, October 1984 issue.) I submit that the threat to reduce naval end strength today—12 years after the announcement of Total Force—is more than “some impetus.”
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn writes on page 72 (October 1984 issue): “The Navy is only now beginning to undertake seriously the long overdue and analytical search for the optimum active/reserve force mix.”
I ascribe no evil or ongoing malice toward the regulars, for they have had their share of important matters to attend to—the wind-down of Vietnam, the allvolunteer force, the reduction of fleet assets, etc. At most, their offense has been neglect. I believe two successive Chiefs of Naval Operations have admitted to “benign neglect”—a term covering many omissions.
*i* sailo^
So, quite naturally, civilian rushed into the vacuum, using theljonal duits, the TARs, and their Pr0 e^ut the associations and sought to carry y dewill of the nation and help the Na ^ spite itself. There were ar^unl0ny. charges and counter-charges, acnventu- accusations, hard feelings, and e ,■ jjill ally the infamous trial balloon ' the TARs.” . and
The TARs survived that assaUberg’s they will weather Admiral Langen offensive as well.
“Balancing the Nuclear
(See S. A. Erickson, pp. 60-65, Septenl
1984 Proceedings)
Captain Linton F. Brooks, U. S- ‘^ ^ 0n Stanley Erickson is correct to 0 t(,e
aircraft-delivered cruise missiles ^
primary nuclear threat and on the ^yjet tance to deterrence of holding naval aviation bases at risk. |jCy
sional testimony has made U- • to clear. Should the Soviet Union e^njted initiate nuclear use at sea, the restates will not necessarily alio", ^ the suiting conflict to remain limite sea. This policy serves to con r ^r- Soviets with massive risk an nce tainty, and thus both enhance de ^c\caf of war in general and help deter attacks on the fleet.
uiiiuiiuiiaici^, iuiiuvYiH& - v
Dr. Erickson’s arguments weae(j. tfe much of his discussion is ^avvbc views a future war as a contest ^ the Soviet Union and an individua ^5,
battle group (CVBG) commander- ^
he erroneously assumes that stri must be under the control commander to be credible. .-bjlity tion is clearly incorrect; the ere ^.j|
U. S. response depends on H not Of overall military balance, and n cific command arrangements- ^tiir6 The author’s assumption of 1 ^ed- of a possible future war is als°.
He postulates a limited nuclear ^ ^? ing with a Soviet nuclear bolt-on ^ pfO" blue attack at sea, followed J appJr longed war to control ocean tra e> ently while totally ignoring aI-
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* ____________________________________________ ___
is rtd*°*hy of examination, his article ti°nsann With unsupportable assump- Plistio , ’^'Conceived and far too sim-
betwPJ„ ?Ce a8ain> the war appears to be Navy r ‘he U‘ S- Navy and the Soviet cal ci|na her than between the two politi- ^°gicaP^rP°iWers• This supposition is il- W'ar j. 0 t‘le Point of being incredible. Cernibl 3 ^>0^t'cai act to serve some dis- of oceaS PUrpose- Not only is the control the Sen." traC*6 an insufficient reason for CotintrylehS t0 risk tlle destruction of their d°ctrine fthere is no suPPort in Soviet sea j tor a nuclear war limited to the
Nation f context °f a European war, a nudear 3r m°re like>y *s one 'n which Alth USe at Sea pollows use ashore, wit]) Navy must be concerned
concelC ear readiness- it must base its the nat, °n 3 reasonahle understanding of ErjCL. r,e op a possible future war. Dr. n s article does not.
tieiiten nt R°y L. Wood, U. S. Navy, and E' Haggerty, U. S. theme of e P)r' Stanley Erickson’s cquitahi exacting from the Soviets an ft e trade-off for an attack on our > Wc
died ind
tlc solutions.
First, his scenario of limited nuclear war at sea assumes almost instantaneous destruction of all U. S. carrier battle groups (CVBGs) by nuclear strikes from Soviet naval air forces, and thus leaves the Soviets in control of all sea lines of communication with a stranglehold on Western economies. All these events could supposedly happen without causing either a general conventional world war or an escalation to general nuclear war.
However, historically, attacks on U. S. shipping and, in particular, U. S. warships, have either directly or indirectly precipitated major wars. For example, President William McKinley requested a declaration of war against Spain after the sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor in 1898. The United States entered World War I in large part because of Germany’s refusal to limit its submarine warfare tactics in the Atlantic. And in 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into the war in the Pacific. In every instance, the war at sea was not decoupled from the land- based conflict but, in fact, escalated U. S. involvement to include the land battle in the general war.
The Soviets should have little doubt
that an attack today on our CVBGs would lead to rapid escalation and general war with the United States. Indeed, a Soviet attempt to blockade all Western shipping, as Dr. Erickson suggests, would surely force NATO and other allies into the conflict, as well.
In addition, Dr. Erickson, with his supposition that Soviet naval air power will “chew up” all U. S. CVBGs by surprise nuclear attacks, has painted a bleak picture of undefended (and presumably indefensible) floating targets prepositioned within strike range of the bigger- than-life Soviet long-range bomber force. While not indestructible, the CVBG must be recognized as a formidable offensive and defensive force whose multilayered sensor and weapon suites are capable of detecting, tracking, and destroying enemy forces hundreds of miles from the aircraft carrier.
Giving Dr. Erickson’s theory the benefit of the doubt, it is conceivable that in a worst-case scenario, U. S. CVBGs which are forward deployed at the time of such a massive, surprise attack could be destroyed. But this loss would still leave the remaining carrier assets to fight the war- forewarned.
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Dr. Erickson offers several remedies for countering the Soviet military threat, including:
► Long-range missiles carried on board U. S. Navy vessels which could strike Soviet air bases with nuclear warheads, thus neutralizing that threat
► A surgical strike capability for U. S. submarines with which to attack Soviet shipyards and industry in response to their fleet’s interdiction of our sea lines of communications
► Small, inexpensive surface ships which could be used as trail units to immediately attack Soviet submarines as they launch their submerged attacks
The first two of these items appear to assume that the Soviets would not take offense at our attacks on the Russian heartland. His assumption seems to be that a nuclear strike from the sea would not solicit immediate retaliation against the U. S. mainland. If we believe, however, that the Soviets’ highest priority is defense of the homeland and that they would not back down in the face of nuclear escalation, we must be prepared for the consequences.
Assuming that we are willing to launch such an attack in the face of this reality, we already have in place the devices with which to accomplish such a mission. These weapons include the intermediate- range Pershing II missiles deployed in Western Europe and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. To the victims of such an attack, it will matter little from where these missiles were launched—whether from ashore, or from some new naval platform. In fact, this consideration is unlikely to influence the Soviet Government’s response to such a nuclear attack.
The last of his solutions envisions a new class of cheap destroyer which can locate, track, and target a high-speed, evasive, and hostile Soviet submarine and then launch a nuclear attack upon detection of the sub’s weapon launch. The sophistication required for such a vessel must include a high-quality sonar, a responsive and economical power plant, and a nuclear weapons delivery capability. Given these requirements, the ship would be neither small nor inexpensive. Furthermore, his implication that the ship could be expendable (no need to evade or destroy the submarine’s weapon) runs counter to common sense and basic morality.
Dr. Erickson’s basic premise is noteworthy, but more consideration must be given to the political and social implication of such a strategy. His scenario places much more at stake than the survival of the fleet.
“Preparing for Tomorrow,
Today” 1984
(,See D. E. Miller, pp. 90-92, September
Proceedings)
Lieutenant James F. Lowder U< ^ ^ Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Mi ® u(]. made several interesting points, ^Q|.e fortunately, his essay is significan ^ for what it leaves unsaid than for1 elusions it provides. that we
While I wholeheartedly concur ^ should envision the application o ^ em technology in future combats ios, I vehemently disagree that r primarily on technical expertise w ^ spire men to give their individ11gS •• corporate best in all circumstan Lieutenant Miller has highlig”e ^r. subjects, but he fails to make the t tant connection. ^,]iti-
I would argue that recent U. . _c|,jef cal experience at the commander-1 level has proven just the opposl jnUtiae much involvement in technical m> ^ detracts from the ability to discs
forest from the trees and has even
less1
jin?
do with making decisions and 'nsg?,po- people to support them. Given t c0lg- nential growth rate and extreme y ^ ^ plex nature of technological aC*van the are making in the tools of warfare' ^ ollf consequent specialization require ar)y personnel, it is simply impossible commander to master the techw tails of all the combat systems at ^ ^ posal. A captain’s combat syste ^ jS much more likely to fail becaus unaware of the skills of his peop ^ 0v,m than because of any deficiency >n technical expertise. ledge3
Nor is extensive technical knotv<,y. * precondition for using techno r^0. don’t have to know how to write^ ^ gram to find new uses for my w° nCe's essor. Although technical compe „ leader
- .. a lea'
a central element of leadership- must also be familiar with
all the
sources at his command. hJ° trained sailor will follow a com into harm’s way simply because
W
hiy
idef
isoi1
boss’s technical proficiency. ^
The example of Admiral Lor ^jgVgn' is highly instructive, but hardly j ac- to Lieutenant Miller’s hypothec' ^ knowledge Lord Nelson’s tactica nevertheless, his real talent as ^iii' was in his ability to effectively rws cate his plans and convey hi- ^ th spirit to subordinates. I submit ^ jo Admiral’s dictum, “No Captaih^gjjd6 very wrong if he places his ship a(0 pat' that of an enemy,” is more crUCVjng c^1 tlefield success than a comman cer’s technical knowledge.
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for leaders to bring their specialists together as a team. Their first requisite is a thorough understanding of themselves, their people, and their purpose. Lieutenant Miller’s ideas are well taken; however, the human factor is still paramount. A technical education does not produce a leader. We must never allow ourselves to substitute technical expertise for leadership potential.
“A Relevant Reserve”
(See D. F. Yriat, pp. 45-51, October 1984
Proceedings)
Captain Steven E. Daskal, U. S. Air Force Reserve—One area the Navy might find ideal for enhanced reserve activity is in command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). Naval intelligence reservists already comprise much of our total naval intelligence capability, but there are probably even more C3I billets that could be made available for reserve officers and senior petty officers, capitalizing upon the greater (and also broader) experience they possess as compared to many of their active duty counterparts.
I believe this for a number of reasons. First, by nature, a large portion of C3I functions are located ashore, especially for senior grades. Second, most C3I positions require continuous staffing, with added personnel available for contingencies. Third, the growth (for better or worse) in C31 duties is likely to outstrip the availability of active-duty billets for them, not to mention overtaking the available supply of trained watchstanders and analysts.
There is little threat that the U. S. Navy’s C3I community will lose too many shore billets into which active-duty forces rotate. The problem is retaining the trained experienced people to perform C3I functions and to train new operators.
As a member of a strong Air Force reserve program—the Air Force intelligence service reserve—I look forward to seeing more of my Naval Reserve colleagues fill a wider range of the challenging “citizen-soldier” duties essential for a healthy democratic republic.
“Using and Fighting Submarines”
(See H. A. Caldwell, pp. 62-69, August 1984 Proceedings)
Commander David G. Powell, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Caldwell’s article was interesting and pleasantly surprising. It is not often that one reads criticism—a criticism I have long befriended—that
the U. S. Navy is preparing to fig ^ next war with new equipment but the last war’s tactics and strategy- ^ haps a few lessons from the past ca useful (as well as a few things that this old mine warfare specialist)- ^
► Stating that “the submarine gue>r ^ course . . . eventually strangled
. . .’’is giving all credit where on y ^ tial credit is due. Air- and submarine^ mines, true guerre de course >we, (,u[lj used in “Operation Starvation, s be given fair credit for the succ blockade of wartime Japan. . 5,
► To believe that “most of the e
Navy’s primary ASW [antisu ^
warfare] sensors and weapons e
work well in shallow water” is to £ e entirely the value of the nava Those European nations the aut*1°Lno\V willing “to squarely face” the s ^ water ASW problem will d° St°ategy- mines as a major part of their she0ry’’
► The author’s “more plausible t ^
that Soviet subs will not penetrajC. Greenland-Iceland-Norway gaP l31g[icap- count for his silence on the use 0 sulated torpedoes (CAPTOR) in 1 .n pis tegic gap. But it does not exp 0f failure to discuss elsewhere the flSt CAPTOR, a weapon designed ^ jt solely as an ASW weapon. N°r.e[.ne'v explain his complete silence on ot generation mines. als<>
► Mr. Caldwell mentions, “Mia
threaten SSNs [nuclear-powere erS.’’ submarines] operating in Soviet fled Presumably our SSNs are not thr goby mines outside Soviet waters, 0ut viet submarines seem to be safe mines in any waters. , e trap
Mr. Caldwell has fallen into ^ ^<,56 that seems to ensnare so many ^aCe. responsible for developing air' . s and and subsurface naval warfare tac tpe strategies: No provision is made useful interface of a tried aa. ^ air. weapon, the naval mine, with (a ^es- submarine, and surface warfare on)y Those who doubt this premise nevv,affafe look at the doctrine for those taCtical forms contained in current alhe and naval warfare publications-^ rpie’
Several years ago, I asked of Naval Operations Admiral how one could ensure that mine jjil- attained and kept its rightful place pje, in
itary thinking and procurement- ^ star effect, said that we needed a 1 sjr
czar in the Pentagon. For one peei
cerely believes in the efficacy a the for an across-the-board approaC.n(jeed 3 use of mines in warfare, it lS bitter pill to swallow.
(Continued on Pa&
Comment and Discussion
“‘Restoring Order’ South of the Border”
(See R. K. Kolb, pp. 56-61, July 1984; T- C Hone, B. R. Davidson, p. 99, September 19 ' F. Q. De los Rios, p. 172, October 1984 Proceedings)
Judge Philip Y. Killien, Seattle D's!' ,IJ Justice Court—Richard Kolb’s artic a simplistic and historically 'nacC^ ollr account of the complex problem ot relationship with this troubled So
over as
this
U. S. Serviceman.” I suppose
war, which resulted, as one
,et
(Continued from page 26)
“The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?”
(See R. Fraser, pp. 40-45, February 1984;
G. D. Bond, B. P. Clarke, A. Iglesias, pp. lb- 21, April 1984; T. A. Nies, O. W. Siler, pp. 2430, May 1984; M. Adams, pp. 17-20, June 1984; R. Schweighardt, C. H. Hill, pp. 101—
104, August 1984; M. Hill, pp. 105-107, September 1984; J. Hatch, pp. 116-121, November 1984 Proceedings)
Commissioned Warrant Officer Third Class Thomas W. Flynn, U. S. Coast Guard—As a former commanding officer (CO) of one of the Coast Guard’s 110-foot harbor tugs, I strongly agree with the comments made by Petty Officer Martin Hill.
As of 1 October 1984, the Coast Guard decommissioned two of the remaining eight vessels of this class, one light ship, and the icebreaker USS West Wind (AGB-6). It is appalling that no attempt is being made to keep these ships in service. While CO, I wrote two letters recommending these ships for the service life extension program (SLEP) which our 180-foot seagoing buoy tenders are now undergoing. The 110-footer’s power plant is similar in many respects to that of the 180-foot vessel. The hulls in these vessels are in good shape and are sound. A study should be made to determine the feasibility of removing the deck house and redesigning the interior space to add greater stability, watertight integrity, and crew comfort. Deck houses could be redesigned along the lines of the newer 140-foot icebreakers and constructed of modem lightweight materials.
Not being a naval engineer, I do not have all the answers. However, I believe my suggestion is at least worth a little research. Considering the cost of building a modem ship, I do believe this SLEP could be accomplished far less expensively than building from scratch.
“Self-Confidence—The First Requisite”
(See T. Cutler, p. 84, June 1984; W. B. Hunt,
D. J. Curran, p. 99-103, September 1984;
K. P. Weinberg, p. 170, October 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul B. Hendrickson, U. S. Naval Reserve— Commander Cutler’s comments about the preponderance of “screamers” in the Navy are unfortunately true. When 1 entered the U. S. Naval Academy in June 1969, I was both depressed and alarmed by the number of screamers I encountered. I always wondered why these officers had to scream to get results; why they couldn’t calmly, and in a mature fashion tell us what was required, and then let us follow through.
I served under two commanding officers (COs) who were calm, effective, and professional, and the ship’s performance proved outstanding. They tended to work with people rather than direct them; in other words, they were facilitators that used their positions to help subordinates do their jobs. Morale and performance were exceptionally high. Despite a taxing underway schedule lasting more than three years, the ship won the Golden Anchor Award, the Ney Award, the Surface Forces Atlantic Antiair Warfare Award, and numerous efficiency awards.
I decided to leave the Navy because I realized that my two COs were the exceptions rather than the rule. In the business sector, where employees can transfer, resign, or be fired, and where absolute control does not exist, management is primarily an art of convincing and persuading. Because there is nothing binding a person to a company, a screamer in management could cause people to leave a department, or the company altogether. Such poor management would cause high turnover and inefficient operations.
The most important concept I learned in graduate school was the question, “How would you like to have you as a boss?” After much introspection and contemplation about my personal leadership style in the Navy, I concluded that I had come up short in many areas.
Currently, I am employed at IBM, where the management is more consensual than, as in the Navy, directive. To measure management effectiveness, each employee at IBM completes an annual opinion survey. The survey allows the employee to rate management performance, working relationships, and work conditions. In addition, space is left for any general comments, and all answers may be made anonymously.
An opinion survey may or may not be appropriate for the Navy. However, each commanding officer should contemplate what the opinion survey results would be on his ship today.
American region.
The War with Mexico is passed an “acquisition.” I am not aware or legitimate source that does not cons this war as an American invasion- 1898, the United States declared war Spain with the rallying cry of “Rf1” 0f ber the Maine.” I believe the weig 1 current opinion is that the Maine sunk by an internal explosion. The U- manufactured revolt of Panama an ^ seizure of the Canal Zone aren t e given any attention. ,jel
Mr. Kolb attempts to draw a P”1 j between critics of the Mexican War(() modem “liberal journalists” wh° ® jjCy. question current administration P°
But he also fails to mention that on ^ the most vocal political opponents o Mexican War was Abraham Linco • Mr. Kolb states that, “interve ^ opponents often found their rrtaik^ ^
mark is intended to show that, even • ^ 1840s, the military did not rece,Vjj(jn’t proper support from civilians who ^ know any better. I would direct Mr- p and others to the timeless words ot dent and General Ulysses S. Gran ‘ wrote:
“For myself I was bitterly °PP°Sj the measure and to this day re§^.
most unjust ever waged by a stI^ nation against a weaker nation- ^ an instance of a republic follow’ ^ j6s bad example of European mor> Join not considering justice in 111ofy. sire to acquire additional ter ^ . . . The Southern rebe^’f!*e)(jca” largely the outgrowth of the N Loll- War. Nations like individuals & g0t ished for their transgressions-
our punishment in the most nary and expensive war of 111 times.”
from" lntroduction of RPVs to the fleet is operaa Proportionally larger segment: the
and a combat environment, and it is 0 see the reluctance of any captain
e4sy
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The Empty Cockpit”
p*e D' M- Parker, pp. 38-44, August 1984 n°ceedings)
Worth, Program Manager for the Wa RPV Data Link Antenna, Teledyne Reties—Commander Parker’s dislot H°n °.f the aPPlication of remotely pi- com Ve^'c^es (RPVs) to naval warfare is int Prehensive and insightful. Intense Past^f1 'n applications during the suc 'eW years’ particularly after their siteCeSSful Use in ticstr°y'n8 Syrian SA-6 geS m Lebanon, has unfortunately not -fd strong sponsorship of develop- 0,. Jands within the U. S. Navy. Other ber ?.e recent purchase of a small num- Ua(i° Mastiff drones from Israel for eval- “'?n ,and use for reconnaissance and \|a ,er naval applications, the Navy/ (,in'|ln,e CorPs service lags severely be- LVij, the development efforts of the Army Wit- *tS At|uila program and the Air Force >ts Pave Tiger program.
leth°mmander Parker feels that the Navy oWnargy in developing RPVs lies in his ers" ,aviat'on community because the fli- pl° Navy don’t like the specter of thejatlned obsolescence” hanging over ^.Pilots’ wings if they advocate and Id nbute to a successful RPV program. any believe that the blame, if there is •heft °U*d placed on the air arm of t0 ^ ayy- The resistance within the Navy lai)ra'0rs °f the platform that would the Ch’ Control, and recover the RPVs— 6 surface Navy.
C(Jrneef niajor resistance to RPVs has to r6 fr°m the sailors who are expected eiectCover a flying device, packed with r.?n'CS’ Power supplies, and uncon- arran fUCl’ by means of 3 net or hook tai| 0?ernent on the helicopter pad or fan- Wj(h Ltbe*r sb'P- Compound the problem Seasd*§h winds, low visibility, heavy
UgUift ui any vajjuuil
to k; ae 30 unmanned missile or vehicle s own ship.
dis, e reasons for the surface Navy to 9 viak,tand denigrate the use of RPVs as Sorse adjunct to other shipbome sen- systear,d manned airborne intelligence areasms can be traced to two problem sUbm the exPerience with the drone anti- tr0| j nne helicopter (DASH) and con- Hianea‘a bnk loss during final recovery
Most •
i>i0r senior surface officers were ju-
Si°tflCers when the first DASH P'at- Plet ’ CSS Buck (DD-761), com-
I953 t ^ ^ua^^ca^on trials in January DASH program utilized a helicopter which carried either two
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Mk-44 or one Mk-46 torpedoes, or as an alternate, a single nuclear depth charge. In addition to the drone, a landing helipad and a hangar for two drones had to be installed on the support ship to supplement operations. Control was provided by a single console in the ship’s combat information center (CIC) which integrated SQS-32 sonar detection and tracking SPS-10 (search) and Mk-25 (fire control) radars. The selected platforms for DASH were the fleet rehabilitation and modernization (FRAM) destroyers.
The entire program, in hindsight, was a disaster. The reasons for the failure are manifold, but the primary problem was the lack of a feedback loop from the drone to the operator, which meant that the shipboard operator in the CIC had no idea of the drone’s orientation and could literally fly it upside down into the helipad. In addition, the DASH had the embarrassing problem of responding to a variety of radio frequency (RF) sources including those of its own support ship platform, nearby ships, and manned aircraft. One DASH literally followed an attack aircraft back to its carrier; another DASH refused to answer commands to return and stubbornly maintained a parallel course to its own ship until it ran out of fuel and crashed.
DASHs were mistrusted by the FRAM destroyer captains who had to use them. This mistrust would seem to be borne out by the fact that of the 746 drones built, more than half were lost at sea. While the spurious RF signals in peacetime exercises may contain elements of humor, the implications of hostile jamming of the DASHs’ controls in a war scenario made the system useless.
The second problem that RPVs have, in the view of the surface Navy, is manifested during recovery operations under combat conditions when a ship, with an RPV coming in for recovery and under active up-link control, must rapidly alter course and speed to meet a hostile threat, such as a torpedo or missile attack. Potentially, the change in course could block the up-link control because of interposition of the superstructure or weapons mount between the RPV and its command console. The common view is that lack of a signal will cause the RPV to continue on its path and hit the ship, making the RPV as dangerous as any hostile threat.
The modem RPV, however, has been designed to overcome both signal loss and improper signal response (jamming), with the present state-of-the-art being far superior to any previous systems, such as the DASH program of the 1960s. User education, of course, is still more important to successful RPV application than any technical advances to the sophisticated RPVs already in use throughout the world.
The data links in use today have feedback loops designed into them enabling the RPV operator to have a real-time appraisal of orientation, attitude, and position of his vehicle, in addition to providing positive active control. More importantly, the data links are virtually unjammable. The Army’s Aquila RPV is an excellent example of advanced antenna design, conceived since DASH 'va developed, which, with its narrow ban ^ width and steering capabilities, is v*rtu ally unjammable.
The second concern—that a loss data link control and command turns returning RPV into a hostile weapon has been solved by incorporating a Prlj gram in the RPV’s control computer t a ’ upon loss of signal, the RPV immediate / reverses course, ascends to a Pre ■ s mined altitude, and circles until it re®aiy signal link-up. The Israeli’s Mastift 8 has this incorporated feature.
I
for
newspapers and magazines, and as a
War
coverage.
-le'vP°int was not adequately presented. |e "'e coverage is, in fact, biased and
^ Re point is this; Any person charging ^ Press with bias must first void himself
Eivi
‘Wanted: A Fair Press”
jfee R- L. Upchurch, pp. 68-74, July 1984; lQ»I^man’ ^ Lauer, pp. 22-25, September 4; W. Key, B. Baggett, J. McWethy, pp. 16’ October 1984 Proceedings)
Wanted: A Professional Press”
lSee B- Baker, pp. 74-76, July 1984; lQs^man’ ^^auer» PP- 22-25, September 4, W. Key, B. Baggett, J. McWethy, pp. 16’ October 1984 Proceedings)
Wanted: A Responsible Free Press”
{?ee J- M. Smith, pp. 77-85, July 1984;
IQsr'llman' R- Lauer, pp. 22-25, September
84; W. Key, B. Baggett, J. McWethy, pp. 16’ October 1984 Proceedings)
p
p'ty Officer Martin Hill, U. S. Naval eJerve—As a professional journalist 1 a experience covering military topics
I - . , - -------- c---------- ,----------------
r 8'dme reservist, I read your three-part ^Port on press coverage of the military e keen interest. I was pleased to see cn of -;,e three articles contained combatively little of the venom which has 'sorted this issue, and yet the writings sj* reflected the same type of tunnel vi- v°n with which many of my colleagues tfle press subject. It is a vision 0r‘ch> unfortunately, sets up a “them- Rs ’ scenario. With each side facing , from opposing ends of the tunnel, it is likely either side will ever see the of k evcn with the help and assistance lhe recently approved rules for future he difficulty with charging bias in the fress is that the allegation itself stems st<>tT1 self-interest. Controversial news Sj ,r'es always have at least two opposing of ? ^ one s'fle charges bias in coverage 'hat story, it is, in effect, saying that its
If
ib’Hg 'n favor of the opposing view, lat * *avoreti siflc will probably congratu- e the writer for his or her “objective” ^Porting. The standing joke in the field ^Journalism is that if both opposing tes charge bias in coverage, then the P^J has succeeded in producing a ahy objective report.
the
a|l subjective feelings. The injured J may have been criticized by the bu( 3 or somcone quoted by the media, Ip 'hat is not reason enough to charge 1^1S' Despite the party’s own personal ti0'ef °f the virtue of his stance, his posi- n may simply not hold up under the ®~and-take of public scrutiny, he allegations of bias levied by Colonel Upchurch, Captain Baker, and Lieutenant Smith stem from a confined view of the environment in which the press and the military both work. Their reports, though pointing out some very real professional problems in the field of journalism, tend to be based largely on myth and misconception. In short, their articles suffer from the same bias they accuse the news media of possessing.
Among these common misconceptions are the following:
► The Liberal Press: Despite this charge, the fact is that the majority of the American news media is owned by conservative business interests (between 60% and 80%). While some reporters may have liberal views, they are normally kept in check by the publication’s conservative policies.
► Headlines and Circulation: The charge that screaming headlines sell papers is erroneous. This contention was true in the 1930s and 1940s, but it hasn’t been true since television took over as America’s main source of news. Today, circulation boosts are accomplished by studying demographics and readership surveys and using scientific strategies.
► Television News: TV news, however, is altogether another game. Its viewership is judged with the same rating system that judges the popularity of television’s prime time entertainment shows. As long as this continues, TV news will continue to be produced as an entertainment commodity—using sex and scandal and the like to attract and maintain viewership. It is no wonder that most of the authors’ criticism was aimed at TV reporters.
► The Press Lost Vietnam: This is the military’s most popular myth. Reporters don’t lose wars, generals and politicians do. The popularity of a war is determined by its military success or failure.
Studies of the press coverage of that war show that most of the reporting on the conflict came from Washington, D.C., in the form of assurances of its successful management from the State Department and the White House. It wasn’t until the Tet Offensive of 1968 that the U. S. press took a deep interest in covering the war from “the front lines.” By that time, surveys indicated that public opinion about the war had been steadily declining since 1965.
The American public has never gladly accepted the spilling of American blood in foreign wars. “I Didn’t Raise My Son To Be a Soldier” was as prevalent a World War I ditty as the tune “Over There.” The American public’s weariness of the bloodshed of World War II (despite the “good” press coverage) was one of the factors considered by President
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fr°gance of reporters (and it certainly 'es exist), why shouldn’t reporters feel
utid
>bat
received his third and most crippling
wound while helping load casual-
continued news blackout resulted in ,sstve misconceptions being reported
the
^a*1^ S Truman in deciding to use the °nuc bomb against Japan.
ab 6re *S n° <^ou*3t l^at problems and uses existed in the American press cov- a8e of Vietnam. But the responsibility ur any failure of the press in that war eUst be equally shared by the U. S. Gov- Went. The adversary relationship that Sloped stemmed largely from the gov- Uiment’s unwillingness to confide in the f^ess early in the war. As John Mecklin, ./^er U. S. Mission spokesman wrote out his experience in Vietnam, “For leofficials of the U. S. Mission, mis- (■ d*ug a newsman was almost instinc- e- ’ If military men are fed up with the
doi
UP with the arrogance of government military officials (which, just as as- SUrudly, also exists)?
Colonel Upchurch’s insinuation that Le ^porters of World War II and Korea H r® *n some way braver than those of ai|C ^ietnam War is the greatest myth of ■ While many Saigon-based journalists (ned their livings by simply attending Assistance Command Vietnam pie “Ten O’clock Follies” (which Used the government), many more mPed through the boonies with the nts- In fact, there was much more r°nt-line” reporting in Vietnam than in Previous war, and that resulted in the ^aths of more journalists (55) than in Previous war. Some of those report- ^ and photographers who covered the r had more combat experience than SQ0st °f the military men in MACV. (As- Coc;ated Press’s Peter Arnett, for one, ered Vietnam for 13 years, spending ueh of that time in the bush.)
.Colonel Upchurch also overlooks the dj °lsm exhibited by many journalists in Am War’ suc^ as Denby Fawcett, the ^ erican correspondent for the Honolulu k\en‘Ser’ w^° smgluhandedly saved p £ral members of an Army of the Rein . Vietnam patrol from drowning ^ river. Or Life photographer Tim Page (jS aboard a medevac chopper. Colonel vfbureh also forgets that his own ser- tbre awarded honorary Bronze Stars to t06£ U. S. journalists for their attempts ^rescue a wounded Marine at the battle y ^ue. (Two of the reporters were Unded in the attempt.)
^ 0 °ne can blame the military for not f0> to take a mob of journalists along k *be initial invasion of Grenada. But
press. Some of these were gener- by the Cuban Government, some by
our own government; irregardless of where they were generated, they were politically motivated. The prime example is President Reagan’s announcement that the invasion was a multinational effort. To emphasize the point, Prime Minister Charles of the island nation of Dominica stood strategically at his side as the President made the announcement. What he didn’t say, however, is that Dominica has no army; Mrs. Charles abolished it upon taking office. It was only realized much later that the multinational force actually comprised U. S. servicemen and a handful of poorly trained, ill-equipped Carrib- bean policemen. The question now is, was that deceit a military necessity or a political expediency?
All this comes to one simple point: Both sides have evidence to prove the other to be irresponsible in this mutually shared relationship. As the authors point out, education programs must be initiated to close the gap between the military and the press. But with all respect to the authors, the instructors teaching the military personnel should be experienced civilian journalists. A college degree in journalism, or 20 years as a Navy public relations man, does not a journalist make. The instructor must be able to explain the difficulties and pressures of the journalism profession. This is particularly acute for the education of the military professional. While many professional journalists have military service experience, few military professionals have true journalistic experience.
It might be advisable for local commands to hold regular “gripe sessions” with members of the local media to discuss frictions between the two parties. Such meetings are common practice between police and news media, and help to clear the air.
I wholeheartedly agree with the authors’ criticism of the irresponsible actions of the news media in covering the suffering of the families of servicemen killed in the bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut and other incidents named. But the actions of a few unprofessional newsmen should no more be an indictment of the whole profession than the actions of a few Lieutenant Calleys should be an indictment of the U. S. soldier. Both infractions have occurred. But such biased views can only be averted when both sides—the news media and the military—step back from their selfrighteous platforms and take in the whole, unrestrained view.
Robert L. Lawson, Editor, The Hook, The Tailhook Association—Our media
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friends might find this item excerpted from the 15 July 1937 Bureau of Aeronautics’ newsletter interesting. It shows just how much relations have improved between the press and the military:
When a Stranger Boards The Ranger
By Willis O’Brien
The United States Navy broke down yesterday and revealed to a reporter and photographer for The Chronicle all the secrets of its newest and most jealously guarded ship, the aircraft carrier Ranger [CV-4].
Well, almost all of the secrets.
. . . after a long series of conferences between ranking officers of the ship it was decided that the following information might be released to the general public through the news columns:
A—The sharp end of the Ranger is known as the “bow” and the blunt end is called the “stem.”
B—There are several airplanes aboard the Ranger.
C—The Ranger is propelled by steam and can develop a speed of several knots.
D—The quality of the coffee served in the officer’s wardroom is excellent.
The Chronicle conceived that a mighty interesting story might be written about the navy’s newest aircraft carrier, the only one now in commission which was designed and built as a carrier. The other three carriers, the Lexington [CV-2], Saratoga [CV-3], and Langley [CV-1], were all built for other purposes and later transformed into carriers.
By some strange mischance the navy granted permission for a reporter and cameraman to go aboard. So yesterday they steamed out through the city of steel formed by the 42 big ships of the navy in a trim little barge marked on its bow, “Rngr.” They made their way up the starboard gangway of this mighty gray ship.
At the top of the gangway they were met by a pleasant, smiling gentleman with two and a half gold stripes on his sleeves, who announced that he had been detailed to show the ship to the press.
‘Er—ah—is that a camera you have in that bag?’ the Commander asked the photographer. When he admitted that such was the case, the Commander suggested that it was much too heavy a burden for such a frail individual as the bulb squeezer, and perhaps it would be better if he turned the whole business over to a waiting sailor.
The Commander led the way to the wardroom and ordered coffee all ’round. While all hands sipped, the Commander was very chatty about the original Ranger, which Captain John Paul Jones commanded back in 1776. He described all the armament of the sloop-of-war, its speed and all its details. He even related details of the other two Rangers [CC-4 and CC-5] which preceded the present one.
But when the subject of the present Ranger came up, [the] Commander’s memory suffered strange lapses. He couldn’t for the life of him remember the speed of his ship, how many planes are aboard, what types of planes the ship carries—in fact, he gave an excellent imitation of an embarrassed policeman before the Grand Jury.
Really, how the navy could get anywhere with such absent-minded officers as the Commander is a mystery!
Then a highly restricted tour of the ship. He admitted that some place down in the basement of the ship are some engines which move her along with some degree of celerity, but that was not in his department and he couldn’t venture down there with the visiting press.
The sailor entrusted with the camera case had totally disappeared during this interlude, and if there is any sillier sight in the world than a photographer without a camera, it’s difficult to imagine what it [might be].
The visiting press were escorted up a lot of stairs and down a lot more. They climbed into the ship’s garret. The Com mander couldn’t recall what the navy called the place officially, so ‘garret will have to be—and they stood on tn front porch and examined the chimney5 or stovepipes or whatever they are call® • They were given a splendid view of1 three seagulls sitting on a couple of p°* attached to the ship.
Then a lot of peculiar whistles began11 blow. The Commander regained hi memory. ,
‘That’s your boat to take you ashof®> he informed the visiting firemen. you’ve seen everything you want. Glad have you come again.’ .
Just as the press was descending 1 gangway the sailor with the photo#3 pher’s equipment appeared. He hand the bag to the coxswain of the barge- The Commander’s head appeared °ve the rail. (
‘The coxswain will give you back
away, and then you can take all the P1 tures you like,’ he beamed. ,s
So now you know all about the seen of the USS Ranger. At least, you kno*' ^ much as The Chronicle’s operat,v found out.
“The Unsellable Dream”
(See E. F. Black, pp. 38-42, September l9g4 Proceedings)
David C. Ricks—General Black from the seemingly reasonable assu ^ tion that ballistic missile intercept*011 both feasible and advisable; he then c° eludes that any lack of popular supP' for President Reagan’s strategic del® initiative (SDI) must be due to cynlC'oSt in the news media. However, the severe criticism of SDI does not c from a biased news media but from 1 ^
pendent studies within the scientific' engineering communities. , 9
For example, in testimony presen May 1984 before the Defense Subc ^ mittee of the House Appropriations mittee, Union of Concerned Scientists^, nior arms analyst Peter A. Clausen sta
“The Union of Concerned Sc'en^n- has recently completed a comPre ^g$. sive technical analysis of the P . pects for ballistic missile de ^ (BMD). Our conclusion, like other independent studies ot issue, is that there is no realistic ^ of developing defensive weapons could protect the American P° ^ from overwhelming destruction 1 ^
event of a determined Soviet n
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I have always believed, though trary to my experience, that opeiah administration, and planning are not ^
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(Continued on pa&
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suffer from a combination of inherent technical limitations, intractable basing dilemmas, and susceptibility to countermeasures. . . . As a result, it is extremely unlikely that boost-phase systems can achieve anything like the rate of success that would then permit the midcourse and terminal defense layers to cope with the surviving portion of the attack. Instead, the failure of the system compounds from one phase to the next.”
We must predict the course of the arms race to plan for our future defense, and that is the root of the problem. Even a modest SDI success would force the Soviets to take radical, unknown steps to guarantee a deadly deterrent for their own defense. Some Western analysts would expect the Soviets to overwhelm a ballistic missile defense with easily manufactured penetration aids, such as decoy boosters, decoy re-entry vehicles, and chaff. They might build special weapons to attack the fragile BMD satellites themselves. Or, the Soviets could simply bypass a BMD system by relying on submarines armed with cruise missiles or depressed-trajectory ballistic missiles. Can any proponents of SDI tell us where we are headed with this?
“Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners”
(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 74-78, August 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John W. Ferrill, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Having served with all three of the types of officers Captain O’Rourke mentions, I’d like to add some of my own impressions to each of his characterizations. First, great operators as a rule tend to be more people-oriented than either administrators or planners. Whatever their shortcomings, operators tend to realize and acknowledge that their performance depends on the quality and effectiveness of their working relationships with their associates and subordinates. In fact, some of the operators I have known have shown a naivete in selecting those in whom they place their trust.
In a couple of tragic instances, this trust was misplaced, and disastrous consequences ensued. On the other hand, 1 have seen other instances where bold and daring operators have literally been plunged into the “fiery furnace” only to emerge unscathed because of the help of some perceptive and alert subordinate who covered for them and saved the day. Although luck and fortune seem to play a
big part in the operator’s performance' the end results ultimately depend on t operator’s skill and ability.
Second, as a former shipboard officer’ I have noticed that good administrator11 often tend to be very inflexible in the pcf formance of their operational duties- Some of my former commanding °j cers, who had strong administratis backgrounds, were unfortunately ve •' poor shiphandlers. Likewise, some ot no former department heads coming tr° administrative jobs ashore demonstra a pronounced inability to deal with opera
• , , , , . ■ Vet HI
tional problems and situations, ici. , „hacf.” envf ronment, good administrators are their weight in gold. As a former exec tive officer of a fleet destroyer, I shud to think what my life would have be like had I not been blessed with an oulC who possessed an extensive adminis tive background to assist me with great volume of paperwork we were
Third, although my planning va ^ ground is limited, after three years . fleet staff duty, I have concluded that’ general, planners are difficult to feu1 ^ As a group, they are speculative often out of touch with operational re ties. Furthermore, when called UP°” y make estimates and evaluations, seem to intellectualize rather than ij1 firm judgments based on operations ^ perience. Planners are also tentative hard to pin down. However, as a r j they are highly imaginative and ong in their approaches to problem s°*v ^ Toward the end of my career there ^ an increasing emphasis on the plan function at all levels in the Navy- ^ doubt, as Captain O’Rourke points o there is an even greater need for long-range planning in these unce times.
tually exclusive but rather are corTl^[fi mentary and interdependent functioning the overall scheme of things, they ’
all opel ators, administrators, and planners ^ something major to contribute. H°VVL'^ before one can be a good planner.
achieve this end, officers should be 8 s0 early exposure to the planning pr°ce ^tet they are not overwhelmed when ^ called upon to perform. Each , tfie
>
170)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 124)
route would be lost as soon as it su
to discharge its cargo. What protect'^ would a submarine have against air atta in the landing zone? i
A far better candidate for the tBp long-range transport of heavy arrnor.„ the wing-in-ground-effect (WIG) vehtc . A WIG vehicle can skim over the stin3^ at aircraft speeds, while maintaining operating efficiency much greater that of an aircraft. Thus, very large P3^ loads can be carried over great distan ^ A prototype of this vehicle is in an vanced stage of development in the viet Union but has failed to receive s'11 lar support in the United States.
“Submarine Tank Carrier”
(See C. Abt, pp. 140-141, September 1984
Proceedings)
Colonel Ernest O. Agee, U. S. Army (Retired)—Dr. Abt has written a unique and imaginative article, but it contains some incorrect information, particularly about the number of tanks and armored personnel carriers in a heavy division, the number of C-5s it would take to move them to the Persian Gulf, and the comparative costs involved.
His first error appears in the article’s opening paragraph. He writes, “If all of our 100 C-5s were to make a delivery [of tanks] every two days to, for example, the Persian Gulf, after ten days there would be only 500 tanks deployed ...”
The Air Force currently has 77 C-5s, of which 70 are in primary aircraft authorized (PAA) status allocated for airlift missions. In 1989 when the last C-5B is delivered, there will be 127 inventory C-5s, with 114 in PAA status.
Dr. Abt’s 500 figure is based on a supposition that the C-5 can carry only one tank. Actually, the C-5 can carry two tanks (M-l or M-60A1), but the Air Force, for wing life conservation reasons, limits the peacetime load to one tank. In 1987, when the present C-5 wing mod contract is completed, this restriction will be lifted. The present 70 C-5 PAA force in a ten-day deployment to the Persian Gulf could make 259 sorties and airlift 518 tanks, and the 114 C-5 PAA force could make 422 sorties and carry 844 tanks. The 100 aircraft force noted in Dr. Abt’s article could carry 740 tanks.
Dr. Abt’s second error comes up toward the end of the article. He states, “Using C-5s, a ten-day deployment of a large armored division’s vehicular complement of 20 heavy tank battalions, consisting of 2400 tanks and 2000 armored personnel carriers, would require five round trips by a fleet of 600 C-5s costing at least $60 billion. ...”
First, an Army armored division has only six tank battalions with 54 tanks per battalion for a total of 324 per division. If the 36 tanks in the armored cavalry squadron were added, there would be 360 in the division. Even with items mounted on tank chassis, such as the M-88VTR (Retriever) and ABLV (Bridger), the tank organization would only have 374 “tank” vehicles in it. The addition of retrievers in other combat elements would bring the total to 423. Second, concerning the armored personnel carriers (APC), the tank battalion has only 18 of the Ml 13 and six cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV) for a total of 144 in the division. If the 24 Ml 13s and 50 CFVs of the Armored Cavalry Squadron and the 285 Ml 13s, 205 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs), and 30 CFVs in the five infantry battalions are added, the total of APCs in all combat elements in the division would be 738.
Even if the entire combat element is transported in C-5s—360 tanks, 63 items on tank chassis, 417 Ml 13s, and 321 BFV/CFVs—a Persian Gulf deployment would require only 304 sorties, which equates to 82 C-5s. Using the 360 tank inventory figure, only 73 C-5s would be needed. In 1989, when the 50 C-5Bs are in the Air Force inventory and 114 in PAA status, there will be 41 C-5s available to lift the balance of the division’s outsized equipment.
I also think it is interesting that Dr. Abt’s submarines would have to transit 12,000 sea miles and could only offload its tracked vehicles on a seacoast. The C-5, on the other hand, would only have to transit 7,000 nautical miles and can offload inland.
Geoffrey Sommer—Dr. Abt has produced a “straw man,” which in and of itself is weak. However, it may serve to prompt more thoughtful solutions to the United States’ logistical problems.
Dr. Abt envisions a submarine tank carrier of catamaran configuration, with the mid-section surrounded by a thin pressure hull. The “plastic bagged” vehicular cargo is carried in this mid-section, immersed in a fluid providing counteracting pressure to the external seawater at depth.
Unfortunately, Dr. Abt has inexplicably failed to consider the effect of such a pressure increase on the cargo. Either the
“plastic bagging” would rupture 'nvvar. ^ or the vehicles themselves would crushed flat. Strengthening the pressur hull would reduce the internal pressur but would involve a disproportion2 weight increase, since the cross-sect' of Dr. Abt’s design is very inefficient a pressure vessel. It would be far rn cost-effective to design a submarine ta carrier along conventional lines.
Dr. Abt justifies his brainchild aS “quick reaction capacity” tank cam ’ yet he fails to explain how his cur,° submersible is expected to reach the tn ter any faster than a conventional vess • Perhaps what he had in mind were batta ion-scale covert operations? Any ste®1 advantages his submarine may have ^
“Sailing Under the Ice”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 121-123, June 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Alfred S. McLaren, LJ■ S- ^ .s (Retired)—Although Mr. Polmar ^ j cite my article at the end of his dige feel specific recognition of my vv0.. ^ the direct and definitive source o majority of his 1958-79 data should been included. In the instances * Polmar has expanded on this h>st0^a(je submarines in Arctic waters, he has some errors and missed a few tn(0: Among the omissions are references ► The February 1984 cruise of three ^ viet submarines which took part |[^oI1, expedition to remove personnel ^ Ivan Papanin’s North Pole ice fl°e
‘ng scientific experiment ' The 1957 USS Nautilus (SSN-571)/ Trigger (SS-564) cruise under ice (This expedition was the first U. S. mul- tlsubmarine operation in Arctic waters, ^ceding the voyages cited by Polmar of 'he USS Skate [SSN-578] and USS ^adragon [SSN-584] in 1962.)
The 1979 Greenland Sea cruise of NMs Sovereign
In addition, much of Polmar’s information and commentary is misleading and inaccurate in reference to the follow- 'n8 items:
^ In 1970, the crew of the USS Queen- .h (SSN-651) did not “ponder the ques- lQn: “Had their boat passed over, under, 2 through the North Pole?” We knew by me end of 5 August 1970 that we had ^complished all three feats within a enth of a mile accuracy.
The statement by the commanding of- 'Cer of the USS Aspro (SSN-648), as Jaoted by Polmar, is somewhat dramatic.
disagree that “maneuvering a subma- r,ne under the ice is the most challenging and unforgiving operation a submarine
can do.” Certainly things can get tight during under-ice operations, but I am sure any experienced submarine captain could cite equally challenging and even more harrowing experiences in the open seas. I can’t help but wonder what the captains of submarines who conducted harbor minefield penetrations during World Wars I and II, and the captains of other submarines—Soviet, German, British, and U. S.—who have conducted successful operations in the Arctic, would think of such a statement? I mention this because, in my opinion, our technological capabilities, knowledge, and experience in the Arctic during recent years have made under-ice navigation and piloting increasingly routine.
► Contrary to Polmar’s implication, there is no evidence to indicate that “diving limitations” imposed on some submarines after the loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593) inhibited Arctic operations, per se. At the time, it was more a question of operational priorities.
► Again, contrary to Polmar’s implications, the answer to the question of how
(C. L. WRIGHT)
much ice a nuclear-powered attack submarine could break through in an emergency is generally known from on-site experiments and tests such as those conducted, as funding has permitted, by Dr. Waldo Lyon, Head of the Arctic Submarine Laboratory, San Diego.
► While it is true that the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines do not possess the sail, sail planes, and rudder strengthening and positioning features for routinely breaking through ice, nevertheless they do possess all the equipment necessary for navigation and operations under ice anywhere in the world. They are also fully capable of surfacing in open lakes of water or polynyas and leads within the ice of sufficient size. They could certainly break through first year ice (i.e., less that two meters in thickness), in an emergency.
► Polmar’s assumption that a malfunction on board a submarine under ice would lead to entrapment and disaster is misleading. Methods for sending emergency signals from under the ice are already well developed. He also does not seem to consider that the essence of submarining, and particularly Arctic submarining, is preparedness for all eventualities. This includes physical equipment and control system redundancy and the extensive training and resultant skills, both general and specialized, of the crew members.
Perhaps this is why, in all the years that U. S. submarines have operated in Arctic waters, none have been stranded, or left their crews to wander the frigid Arctic ice pack. But Polmar can rest assured that past and present submarine operations in these regions include maneuvers that greatly increase the likelihood of survival in the remote event of a serious casualty.
► Polmar apparently perceives U. S. submarine operations in the Arctic as much more limited, both in numbers and particularly in capabilities, than they actually are. A more thorough review of U. S. conventional and nuclear submarines and their achievements in the Arctic might possibly change his mind.
► Finally, it is not clear how the characteristics of the Soviet “Typhoon”-class ballistic missile submarine cited by Polmar indicate a specific design capability to operate under the Arctic ice pack.
The Queenfish and her crew knew for sure they had reached their North Pole objective in 1970 when they came upon this jolly old fellow in a red suit. Merry Christmas!
fleet ballistic missile submarine op®1^ tions. Soviet attack submarines vV°
“The ‘Unknown’ Reserve”
(,See S. A. Kateher, pp. 145-47, October 1984
Proceedings)
Joseph J. Tobiaski, U. S. Merchant Marine (Retired)—Lieutenant Kateher should be commended for making the first public statement I’ve read that the casualty rates for the crews of this “unknown” Merchant Marine Reserve were proportionally higher than the casualty rates for crews of the U. S. Navy. It is my wish and hope that the “powers that be” in these matters read such articles and support efforts to obtain veteran status for World War II Merchant Marine seamen and publicly acknowledge “that we also served!”
“Escalation and Naval Strategy”
(See L. F. Brooks, pp. 33-37, August 1984;
P. S. Schratz, pp. 25-29, October 1984; W. V.
Kennedy, pp. 18-24, November 1984
Proceedings)
Steven Howell—Captain Brooks has based his deployment strategy to safeguard aircraft carriers during the initial outbreak of hostilities and to use them as strategic reserve forces on three basic points: First, forward deployment of carrier battle groups near the Soviet Union may escalate a crisis since the Soviets fear a nuclear strike by carrier-based aircraft, thereby negating such deployments. Second, carrier battle groups lack adequate air defense against the multiple Soviet missile threat and are, therefore, “exceptionally vulnerable” to such attacks. Many improvements in fleet air defense are still to be realized in the future. Third, “sufficient land-based air power’ ’ can replace carrier battle groups in their duties, allowing the carrier battle groups to act as a strategic reserve. However, each point is flawed in premise, resulting in the nullification of the entire strategy. A strategy based on these three points, contrary to what Brooks states, would, by default, grant the Soviets large areas of vital importance to the United States and Europe.
Captain Brooks’s first point ignores the reality of the situation the Soviets already face or soon will face in Europe. The Soviets view the 108 Pershing II and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles currently being deployed by NATO as a much more serious nuclear threat than that posed by American carrier aircraft used in the nuclear strike role. The Soviets must also deal with 150 F-111E/F attack aircraft based in the United Kingdom, capable of low-level nuclear strikes over 2,000 miles from their bases. Compare the capability of this nuclear force, already or soon to be in NATO hands, with the limited nuclear strike potential of the 68 A-6E and A-7E attack aircraft in the entire Sixth Fleet.
It is mistaken to assume that the approach of carrier battle groups near the Soviet Union will escalate a crisis. The Soviets would expect a NATO first use of nuclear weapons to involve Pershing IIs, cruise missiles, or F-111E/F aircraft and not our carrier-based attack aircraft. The Soviets know the limitation, in range and penetration capability, of our A-6E and A-7E aircraft and would expect a nuclear strike to involve weapons of greater accuracy, range, and penetration capability of Soviet air defenses.
Captain Brooks’ second point raises an issue of great concern to all considering the investment by the U. S. Navy in multibillion dollar carrier battle groups.
Can carrier battle groups ensure adequate air defense? Captain Brooks believes they cannot hold their own against the Soviet threat. This fact, he states, supports his strategy of keeping carrier battle groups out of hostile air and sea environments and forming these carrier battle groups into a strategic reserve.
Unfortunately for Captain Brooks’s argument, carrier battle groups’ air defenses are not as inadequate as he believes. To the present air defenses must be added the introduction of the new 77- conderoga (CG-47)-class guided missile cruisers with the Aegis combat system and SM-2 missiles. Dual role F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and the Phalanx close-in weapon system are now entering service. In the future, the introduction of the Ar- leigh-Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers will provide even better protection against the Soviet missile and air threat. The “Leak-proof” defense Captain Brooks would like to see, and for that matter all of us, will likely never exist because of technological limits and advances in weaponry imposed upon us.
This leads me to Captain Brooks’s third point, the substitution of “sufficient land-based air power” in lieu of carrier battle groups. This would be done in areas, such as the Norwegian Sea or North Pacific, where the presence of a carrier battle group might escalate a war and where carrier battle groups would suffer catastrophic losses due to Soviet air and missile attacks. Aside from the fact that the approach of a carrier battle group would not be viewed by the Soviets as a move toward escalation and that carrier battle groups’ air defenses are adequate and improving, what would be the results of such a substitution? In the Norwegian scenario provided by Captain Brooks, we would most likely see the loss of northern Norway and its airfields to the Soviets.
Land-based air power would be calk upon to provide many varied missions' missions difficult enough to carry oU| under favorable operating conditions, »e alone under the harsh climatic and ge°" graphic conditions to be expected in Not way. Consider the facts. Land-based aif power would have to operate out of exist ing Norwegian airfields. Norwegian nit field defense is inadequate in that it limited to 56 obsolete L-60 guns and 3 L-70 all-weather guns. Even the expect® introduction of Hawk missiles will lcavC Norwegian air defense weak against de termined Soviet attacks. To this must included the threat of airfield and aircra sabotage by Soviet Spetsnaz comman groups. Thus, the rate of attrition N land-based aircraft would be very big The types of missions land-based air craft would have to fulfill include: an1 submarine, antiship strike, air superi°r ity, and airborne early warning, al°nr with ground support for Norwegian an other NATO forces. Air power vvou^ also play a key role in preventing a sU ^ cessful Soviet amphibious landing against Norway. Clearly, a failure in am one of these tasks might spell disaster Norway and NATO’s entire North® Flank. A failure, in any task, would * suit in the loss of northern Norway and > airfields to the Soviets. From these a> fields, the Soviets could launch l°n^. range Tu-22M “Backfire” bomb® armed with AS-4 stand-off missd® These bombers would directly threa the sea lines of communication betw ^ America and Europe. Another r®s would be the expansion of the af . available for Soviet nuclear-po'vel
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now only have to run the antisubmah . barrier of the Greenland-Iceland-U111 ^
Kingdom Gap, freeing them from atta ^ by NATO antisubmarine-warfare aircf in the Norwegian Sea. -ng
Carrier battle groups will be °Pp j4 / under air defenses provided by the b Phoenix combination, numerous th inch guns, five-inch guns, 20-mm- j lanx close-in weapon systems, Standard surface-to-air missile batte ^ The ability to defend itself, yet bave ?ce ficient offensive power against su ^ combatants, subs, and aircraft lS p. greatest asset of the carrier battle gr .
It is not by choice, but by neceS0jt- that carrier battle groups will be com ^ ted to the Norwegian Sea. As '°n®vef land-based air power, in w*13 -fl, amount, is open to attack because o ^ adequate air defenses, we must re i ^ the superior protection afforded t0 » carrier battle groups and their ah
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