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This chip, the heart of a TV camera being developed for the Trident missile guidance, suggests that, tactically, we are on the “leading edge” of technology, which is where we ought to be, as opposed to where we are, with our nontactical, cumbersome computer systems—on the “crumbling edge.”
Despite the “computer revolution” dominating U. S. business, the U. S. Navy is experiencing a “computer gap” seen in the increasing divergence of capability between its tactical and nontactical computer systems. The sophistication and capability that the Navy has developed in tactical applications of the computer revolution are almost overwhelming. But what about nontactical computers? How does the Navy stack up against U. S. business in the use of computers to manage the increasingly complex business and administrative functions of a large and diverse organization? Not very well, according to Newsweek, which reported, “The same armed service that can program a computer to guide a missile halfway around the world cannot seem to program them to guide the proper paycheck halfway down the hall.”1 The insidious effects of the computer gap can best be dramatized by examining the rapidly increasing disparity between the development of tactical and nontactical computer systems during the past 20 years. In the mid-1960s, the remote-controlled, drone antisubmarine helicopter (DASH) was a standard for shipboard standoff antisubmarine warfare, while the computer-card-reading, batchprocessing Univac 1500 computer was the latest in shipboard computer technology for logistical and financial applications. By 1981, the sophisticated, multi-functional LAMPS III helicopter with a data-link-capable computer on board was being readied for fleet introduction, while the card-reading Univac 1500 computer was still the most sophisticated logistics and financial computer system in the shipboard Navy.
LAMPS III is a third generation replacement for the DASH. It is designed to operate with almost any combatant ship of the fleet, regardless of size. In contrast, nearly 20-year-old Univac 1500 system was installed on the very small percentage of ships considered enough to need automation; other ships must still main , the same records manually. Technicians have compl31 of inadequate repair parts support; they jokingly thre to requisition Univac 1500 repair parts from the AnCl History Department of the Smithsonian Institu Although the Univac 1500 is currently being replaced.^ situation illustrates the severity of the computer SaP‘^[0 ond-generation administrative computers are being us support fourth-generation computerized combat syste and research and development are widening this gap 0 ^
The computer gap has resulted primarily because 0t overemphasis of computer hardware control to the ne? j. of data resources management. Analyzing this . source of obstruction in nontactical computer develop11 may be easier with the aid of an analytical frame"'0
arid
An Analytical Framework: The introduction, use. ^ management of automated data processing equipmen1^ ^ the computerization of an organization, can be viewed process. Richard L. Nolan, a noted author in the c°nl^pe' field, describes six stages common to organizations e^. riencing this computerization process and the various t cators of each stage of development.2 ^jtli
► Initiation—isolated computer experimentation,
mostly labor-saving, cost-reduction applications c°n5l)p- trating on labor-intensive task automation, scientif*0 port, and clerical task simplification. . jjjty
► Proliferation—heightened awareness of appl*cafS. increases equipment procurement, applications, ant*.Up]afl' Emphasis on labor reduction continues, with interna P ning and control oriented toward facilitating gr°w,t
► Control—the increasing costs of uncontrolled pr° 1 ujp tion generate centralization, standardization, accoun
ity assignment, and efficiency measurements. They^, direct upper management involvement in planning- j,,- trol, and distribution of data resources. There is an 1 ^ tion of efforts away from computer management data resources management. . fie
► Integration—centralization and control culminate tailored, coordinated administration of functions to ^eS tate organizational goals through control of data reS° A\- and retrofitting of data base technology to existing ' cations. Transition to data resources management ts
completed.
► Data Administration—integration of all existing applications into a comprehensive collection of operations establishes balance between centralized shared data/com- mon systems and decentralized user-controlled systems.
► Maturity—computer applications “mirror” organizational information flows with balancing of information sources and demand, layered responsibility levels, development of data resources strategic planning, and extensive user participation in management, control, and planning.
This developmental process, as a conceptual framework, is similar to the product life cycle concept in marketing management.3 Just as accurate identification of the product’s position in the life cycle is crucial to continued successful marketing and profitability, an organization’s ability to accurately identify its stage of development in computerization is crucial to successful planning of the organization’s future growth. Equally important in computerization analysis is a thorough understanding not only of the organization, but also of the environment in which it operates. Thus, there are a number of other considerations that influence the position of the Navy’s nontactical computer development within Nolan’s framework.
The Computer Environment: Perhaps the most important environmental consideration involves the computer industry itself; this is the major force in the “computer revolution.” Although the industry has grown steadily over 30 years, the most recent decade has witnessed an unparalleled increase in technical sophistication, expansion, and development. The growth in both the number of firms in the industry and revenues has been astronomical (see Figure l).4 Technological concepts have developed through mainframe to minicomputers to microcomputers, and on into very specialized functions.
In 1965, computer technology was, in today’s terms, prehistoric. Hardware costs accounted for an estimated 80% of the purchase price, and selection was limited. Today, the industry has a proliferation of machines, models, types, functions, and capabilities. Hardware costs now account for as little as 20% of the total system costs, as software variety, sophistication, and expense experience exponential growth (see Figure 2).5
Declining hardware and increasing software costs, however, are not the only significant technological changes. Computer interface with the telecommunications industry is at an all-time high. With the deregulation of the phone system and AT&T’s full-fledged entry into the data communication field, the explosion in telecommunication data processing is on the horizon.
Systems integration, machine compatibility, and translation functions are examples of concepts and capabilities that have been achieved as a result of the growth in hardware and software development. Although each computer still maintains its own unique operating system, various types of machines can operate together. They can “talk” to each other through a translator, and they can be joined in a network that expands the capability and flexibility of the machines as an integrated system.
Information systems management, too, has become
very sophisticated. Managers now design and classify ^ terns by purpose, encompassing information which collect and systematize data, management in*.° a- tion systems, which manipulate and summarize inf° ^ tion, and decision support systems, which are used f j managers in modeling, forecasting, simulation, ^ .fl, analysis, and strategic planning. Systems planning -c eludes design options such as teleprocessing, shared ^ operations, and centralized or decentralized organizan^s All of these developments have made computer sys’ planning and management complex, dynamic, and s0fg{[$ ticated tasks. Successfully directing an organize* computer development requires increasing leve knowledge and sophistication in the areas of 0ITaalld tional needs, equipment capabilities and limitation®’> the computer environment. Development is a multid* ^ sional activity where assessment depends as much 0 context as on the framework, and as much on the env
cult, f0 " “‘wituwai iiaincworjs is somewnat airn- s’tar ■ Navy *s Progressing through the developmen- §es m a second iteration. In the 1960s, a broad mix-
0f r --- ‘?uus, a uiuau uiiA-
: . 'lrst~ and second-generation computers was
ttient as , .
pe0ni„ on the specific hardware, software, and Pleware of the organization.
Using sj6 i^rf Pinpointing the Navy’s position by , olan s theoretical framework is somewhat diffital hire
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nonta„t- , tPle Nayy anc^ systematized in a variety of m0Ved !fa functional applications. As the Navy initially the ]attou8^ the stages of computerization, a number of in pia(;er sta8e developments were formalized and remain Potenzaft0day' ^et’ tpl's was a process of selective com- aPplicat’10n’0n^ sPec*fie and limited functional areas and potions were computerized.
tigep jp1 tple 1960s and into the late 1970s, the Navy man- Policy 6f6 cornPuter systems with what has been called a 3ii(l ,j 0 Incrementalism.6 Under this approach, changes Scenfrades were matPe as gradual and incremental en- >nstaue fnts> °r additions of similar equipment, to already flexjbjp systems. Capacity was increased, but speed, rerr,ajn ’ caPahihty> and the generation of technology herrijn? Scnerally unimproved. While the corresponding (he Sy uP°n these systems experienced dramatic growth, "'ere j 6IT1S themselves, managed by incrementalism, V" most cases, barely able to keep up with the bal- The° recluirements for computer support and services, antiquation of the Navy’s limited nontactical sys-
terns coupled with the societal computer revolution generated a pronounced demand in the Navy for computerization. There was a need both to update the specific systems in place as well as to develop additional applications to cover operations and functions not yet automated. However, the Navy was unable to take any timely, coordinated action to improve the situation because of the constraints imposed by Public Law 89-306—the Brooks Bill of 1965. The bill attempted to ensure economic and efficient computer acquisition and management by assigning the
linen1
payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel manage' applications).”9 As a result of these laws and regulat'0 all government agencies desiring to develop or upg1^ administrative and business computer systems must dergo extended and complicated procurement procedu In some cases, replacement of major hardware syste can take more than five years.10
The combination of these forces—the growing obso cence of in-place nontactical systems, the burge°n jj
demand for computerization of more administrative
business functions spurred by the societal computer
revo
lution, and the complex and lengthy computer Pr0^U^t ment requirements—has made cnmrmfe.rizatinn a dm*
-has made computerization a < and frustrating process. ^
This combination of pressures previously support policy of incrementalism since it was the path of resistance. Yet, with the industry’s profusion of computers, an affordable alternative was created, and now permeating the computerization process. Since inexpensive microcomputer requires much less pr°cflf ment red tape than an expensive minicomputer syste^lly mainframe, the path of least resistance becomes your own.” 11 This situation results in massive pr^1 ea. tion, which is exactly the stage of computerization dfi opment in which the Navy now finds itself.
Where Are We Going? Many believe that non'
tacticl
computer development has been arrested in the Pr0^es
tion stage; the Brooks Bill and procurement proce1 prevent progression to the control and integration star
,ose°
impasse has been described as a “self-WBPSjp straightjacket . . . recognized as the major j [automated data processing] problem faced by the fe government.”12 ^
The implications of being obstructed in the prolifera$ stage are numerous. Development of coordinated syst.^(e is made difficult because of the variety of incomp3^
computer operating systems purchased, leased, or t Integration of equipment becomes less likely wlt
creased diversity of brand, type, and control system- ^ base development becomes more remote as
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users and systems construct isolated use spheres ana nonstandard applications. -pin
At one time, the Navy displayed renowned leaders V ■ the computer field. But today, while the Navy’s non' ^ cal ADP Council is implementing COBOL, invent^ ^ Commodore Grace Hopper more than 20 years ago- a programming language for a variety of application ’^s Harvard Business School is struggling with the pr°
of COBOL obsolescence.13
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General Services Administration (GSA) sole responsibility for procurement of government computers/
The complete centralized control imposed by the Brooks Bill has been modified by GSA contract requirements and the Warner Amendment to exclude computers used for intelligence, cryptology, command and control, weapon systems, and critical military functions.8 But GSA still controls, by law, procurement of “automatic data processing equipment or services to be used for routine administrative and business applications (including
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In the 1960s, the Navy developed an ambitious p ' tc called “Outlaw Shark,” which was designed to in'^ty tactical and intelligence information from a wide v'^. of sources through a series of computers into a real' consolidated, satellite-communicated, compre strategic display of information. This concept oflg
predated the technology needed to make it possn
the project has now been developed.
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Yet that type of integrated technology exists today^r is in evidence in such innovations as the Task Force
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nioderr|0n?°*e' however> this console is a tactical system— Phisticat ynamic’ responsive to user needs, highly so- Gs^ e ’ capable, and, most important, exempt from Vere imr°|CUrernent requirements. Herein lies the most se- eration P|hCat'°n t^le lability to progress beyond prolif- aricl no m6 ever~widening capability gap between tactical future fhaCtlCal comPuter systems. At some point in the biisjn ’ 6 ant'Guated, uncoordinated administrative and Pfiopjp S ComPuters will no longer be able to support the \Vars”’jPro8rams, and equipment of the evolving “Star
^t>t^0Clc^‘n^ Extremis? The requirements for the fu- "'•denin Vlew Navy’s stage of development and the PeceSsa^ ComPuter gap, are clear. To plan effectively, it is l° ^ave a responsive procurement system. Yet, years if sPec*^c hardware and software requirements five n°mica? ac*Vance whhin an industry experiencing astro- gr°wth.is nearly impossible. As Bernard A. '‘The aw ^.escriPec* F. Hutton’s computerization, five toJectlve was a system with a life cycle of at least "'anted tSeven years” because, technologically, “we “J e.”i4° on fhe leading edge, not the crumbling
"'are. RC ,caPah'lities and applications determine hard- Perjphg | Ware determines software. And both determine COltlPlete S1.ADP P^annlng ls a dynamic process with
laterdependence of controlling factors. Thus, ^ hardware procurement time ensures predeter- l'Crs> 0t?^U*Pment obsolescence and frustrates the plana ‘cutti rat°rs’,,anc* users the equipment. Even though ^°cUrerrf CC^e ' sy.stem des'gn might be planned, lengthy edge>! enl lead time ultimately delivers a “crumbling 0rgani2a^Stern ^or implementation. No steering committee, (f>at han !°n design’ or planning approach can overcome Pr0cess1CaP without basic reform in the procurement
'Jh *
!" rtiO(jpla^°r challenge in nontactical ADP management is ^ativp nVzln8 ADP procurement procedures through leg- ^65 change. When the Brooks Bill was passed in ^ Wa°iPU^er C°StS WCre extraordinarily high, and their %ts aS 1 mi ted. The need is now almost universal; the e a mere fraction of the relative expense in 1965; ^■nist^0^111'^ ^or e^icient and effective government In jyj ^at've and business management is great.
^nt 0 ° an s Iheoretical approach, significant develop- CUrs between stages three and four with “a basic
shift in orientation from management of the computer to management of the organization’s data resources.”15 Yet without effective planning, made timely with procurement abbreviation, the current undirected proliferation of nontactical computers will not progress to the stages of control, integration, and maturity.
As long as outdated procurement logic stifles development, the disparity between tactical and nontactical capability will increase until nontactical automated data processing can no longer adequately support the needs of a growing, sophisticated, and demanding Navy organization. Failure to capitalize on computerization, readily available from a vast and progressive U. S. industry, will have a pronounced effect on the Navy’s success in internal management, combat systems support, and future effectiveness in sustaining national defense.
'Jonathan Alter, “Danger: Antique Computers,” Newsweek, 8 August 1988 ™ 27-28. 6 ’ pp’
"Richard L. Nolan, “Managing the Crisis in Data Processing,” Harvard Basinet Review, March-April 1979, pp. 115-126.
"Donald K. Clifford, Jr., “Managing the Product Life Cycle,” Marketing Manage ment and Strategy; A Reader, eds. Philip Kitler and Keith Cox (Englewood Cliffs
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 115-181. ’
4Bruce Broadwell and Perry Edwards, Data Processing (Belmont CA Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), p. 432. '
5Broadwell and Edwards, p. 442.
1982eS S5ariSt°W’ “Computers: °ur ASi"8 Workhorses,” Proceedings, August
7U. S. Army Logistics Management Center, Reference Book for Acquisition of Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE), Fort Lee VA n 4 J
8Ibid. ’ ’ ■ ■
9Title 10, United States Code, Section 2315.
'“James J. Villers, “The Resolicitation Project,” Navy Supply Corps Newsletter January 1982, pp. 15—17. ’
"U. S. Army Logistics Management Center, p. 6.
'"Bristow, p. 59.
'"Eric Soresen, “The Fleet Non-Tactical ADP Council, Working For You ” Na Supply Corps Newsletter. November 1982, p. 16; “Harvard Business School^ 75th Anniversary Colloquia,” Computing Newsletter for Schools of Business cJ orado Springs, CO, September 1983. Lol‘
MBemtd tQJein?«’ “°ffiCe Au,0mation Without Micros,” Datamation November 1983, p. 176. ’
15Nolan, p. 118.
Commander Brown is a 1974 graduate of the Northwestern University NROTC. He served in the USS Dixie (AD-14), USS John PmUoZ (DDG-32), and Navy Recruiting District, San Francisco, as a surface warfare officer. Then, he transferred to the Supply Corps where he served as supply officer in the USS Point Defiance (LSD-31) He has earned a master’s in business administration at Golden Gate University and is assigned to the Navy fleet material support office y
.Merry Christmas.
At the Panama Canal during the Christmas season, lock personnel traditionally mount large, gaily decorated Mgns along the lock walls spelling out “Merry Christmas” in foreign languages to create a holiday atmosphere for ship crews transiting the Canal Zone.
On a steamy December day, my husband Hank was piloting a Japanese freighter through the canal. The smiling, ever-polite Japanese master was at his side on the bridge during each lockage, seeming to enjoy the many signs on display along the lock walls. When he saw the sign written in Japanese, he turned to Hank and Snf’k' °,? VCry finC! AI* S'gnS Say Merry Christmas, different languages. But why Japanese sign say ‘No
Evelyn Johnstone
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
"8s / December 1984