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Command in War
jjjwin Van Crevald. Cambridge,
^sachusetts and London, England: arvard University Press, 1985. pp. 339. °tes- Bib. Ind. Maps. $20.00 ($18.00).
Rev'ewed by Michael A. Palmer
^Martin Van Crevald’s Command in 0jflr investigates the historical evolution na function of war that acquired its ante only a decade or so ago: that is, C3 y °mniand, Control, [and] Communica- la°asf” It is a study of C3 as exercised in Qnd warfare from the time of the ancient chr6^ t^rou8^1 die Vietnam era. The Cor°nologically arranged chapters briefly avVer die development of warfare and the in means of command and include -uepth discussion of specific battles and ntpaigns highlighting Jena-Auerstadt, l^'Sratz, the Somme, Ludendorff’s of » °^fens>ves> the Israeli counterattack * October 1973 in the Sinai, and the Th^an eff°rt ’n Vietnam. vae individual chapters, each a pro- tiy a,1Ve study from a command perspec- ofth ac*dress not onIy the omnipresence the 6 ,"^°S °f war” *n Past conflicts, but certUniversality of the condition of “un- ainty” inherent in the practice of the f0ltary art- Van Crevald shows that the njeth 3S res'sted advances in command 0v °d and technological improvements ‘‘r f tWo millennia. Just as Clausewitz’s fj^don” still stalks the modem war’ so does Van Crevald’s uncertainty. yaav'ng identified a universal problem, prQn Crevald illustrates the two basic ap- by ?C*1es t0 the command dilemma taken ^ eaders from Alexander the Great to y General William Westmoreland. 0f r°u§h centralization in planning, use (j0ContemP°rary means of communica- isie!. 0rganization of staffs (if they ex- Uianri 3n<^ suI,ordinate formations, com- certers have attempted to achieve theiainty at die h'ghcst level possible— offer °Wn. As examples, Van Crevald (j,e Macedonian phalanx, the region pi Frederick the Great, the Schlief- fer. . an °f World War I, the British of- Am'Ve °n the Somme in 1916, and the za(ierican effort in Vietnam. Decentrali- si0n°n’ lowering the threshold of deci- p^a^h'ng, offered an alternative ap- the Illustrations of the latter include °man manipular legion, Napoleon’s
Grand Armee, the Prussian Army of 1866, the Germans in 1918, and the Israelis in their wars with the Arab states.
Van Crevald argues that both approaches are viable, each involving “a different distribution of uncertainty among the various ranks of the hierarchy.” The centralized system attempts to ensure certainty at the upper levels of command, but results in uncertainty in the lower echelons where subordinates, denied initiative, are frequently left undirected, standing idle while the battle passes them by. Even modem communication systems fail to ensure timely command. They can break down, be interfered with, or simply overloaded with too much information. Lowering the threshold of decisionmaking, relying more on the initiative of subordinates, will not necessarily increase certainty at either level of command, and, conversely, may lower that at the top, leaving senior commanders out of touch as the battle rages about them.
In concluding his study of the problems caused by the fog of war and the difficulties inherent in both styles of command, Van Crevald writes:
“A point to be noted is that these remarks seem to apply to all periods studied in this book and therefore appear to be independent of any specific stage of technological development. Nor, it is suggested, will their relevance be reduced in the future. So long as command systems remain imperfect—and imperfect they must remain until there is nothing left to command—both ways of coping with uncertainty will remain open to commanders at all levels. If twenty-five centuries of historical experience are any guide, the second way [decentralization] will be superior to the first.
Van Crevald’s preference for decentralized command places his work within the growing body of reformist literature. His assault on American command methods in Vietnam is certainly meant as a recommendation for change. An earlier Van Crevald study, Fighting Power (Greenwood Press, 1982), also argued in favor of lower thresholds of decisionmaking. The latter work, a comparison of the American and German armies during
World War II, demonstrated the different methods of officer selection and training that enabled the Wehrmacht to generate greater fighting power from its formations. German success is usually attributed to their doctrine, Auftragstaktik— mission-, rather than order-type tactics.
While both of Van Crevald’s studies present the case for a mission-type approach to command, his latest work is the more original and significant, based on general examples, rather than on a specific case. The views of reformers, who generally tend to use German examples from World War II, are too often discounted with the simple retort that the United States is not Germany, and hence cannot produce a German-style army. But Command in War demonstrates that the methods that made the Wehrmacht so successful were not Teutonic monopolies, but rather were means available to, and adopted by, other armies throughout history ranging from the Republican Army of Rome to General George Patton’s Third Army in 1944-45.
Van Crevald does not discount, however, the difficulties inherent in decentralization. For such a system to function, the high command must be able to impart to subordinates the objective of an operation. Subordinates must be willing and able to exercise initiative within a broad doctrinal framework that will keep everyone moving, in his own fashion, toward the command goal. Nor does the author believe that a centralized system is a guarantor of defeat, noting that not all such armies have been unsuccessful. Alexander and Frederick earned the sobriquet “the Great” through their accomplishments on the battlefield with very centralized armies.
The excellence of Command in War should leave naval historians scanning the horizon for a maritime Van Crevald as the advances in communications technology over the millenia have had as great an impact on C3 at sea as they have had on land. Unfortunately, works on naval command remain, largely, collections of biographical portraits, rather than systematic studies. However, the principles of command at sea do fit into Van Crevald’s framework. A recent article by Navy Commander Linton Wells II on Admiral Arleigh Burke’s After Battle
Reports (“Plus ga Change,” June 1985 Proceedings, pp. 30-37) provides a striking parallel between Admiral Burke’s style of leadership and the decentralized form outlined by Van Crevald. Burke wrote: “Past actions . . . indicate successful action resulted from the exercise of initiative by well-indoctrinated subordinates. . . . [The subordinate] commander notified his boss every time he did anything, but he notified him as he was doing it. He did not ask permission to do something, he never asked permission to attack . . (No. 411, pp. 11-13). Burke also wrote of combat: “There is no time in battle to give orders. People must know what they do before they go into battle” (No. 411—1, p. 13).
Historically, not all naval commanders, whatever the state of the communicative art, have acted so. Hopefully, Van Crevald’s excellent study will stimulate a similar examination of command at sea.
cialty. For him, this book is, essentially, an introduction to the classified literature, a means of pulling together a variety of specialized publications. This latter role is vitally important, perhaps more so than the ostensible one of serving the relatively uninitiated public.
It is in this sense that Understanding Soviet Naval Developments remains disappointing. It provides no sense of the nature of Soviet naval tactics, that is the way in which Soviet naval forces fit to
gether. Nor does it give sufficient details of Soviet naval weapons or of Sovi warships. One might argue that such in formation is published from time to tune on an unofficial basis, but still relative y few officers will have the time to searc the unclassified literature for that info* mation. Nor will it have the stamp of 0 ficial approval which separates fantasy^ of which there remains a good deal^ from reality.
This question is fundamental. Any re
/
Dr. Palmer received a PhD in history from Temple University and is now working in the Research Branch of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, DC.
■- £_____
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Fifth Edition
Prepared by the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Information for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 152 pp. Illus. Tables. Append. Gloss. $6.50 ($5.85)
Reviewed by Norman Friedman
■
This book is the latest in a series of official Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. As the primary source of such unclassified information, it serves two quite different audiences. One is the media, primarily the editors of newspapers, who seek background for current news stories, and, to a lesser degree, the editors of the specialized foreign relations and defense press, who require a much greater degree of sophistication. The other primary audience is the naval officer or defense professional who does not make the Soviet Navy his specialty. Although he may well have access to detailed classified information concerning the Soviet Navy, in practice he is unlikely to read classified material outside his own narrow spe-
Understanding Soviet Naval Developments provides basic details about Soviet combatants like this “Kashin” guided-missile destroyer, but no sense of how such warships fit into the scheme of Soviet naval tactics.
Understanding Soviet Naval Developednts follows the rest of the unclassified
liti
— in concentrating on the visible ^ernents of the spectrum of Soviet naval
eapons, missiles and guns, to the virtual exclu<'
fesult
n'issil,
sion of torpedoes and mines. As a a reader might well imagine that
h(
'°mer
in effect an underwater cruise
fhe choice increasingly has been nessln favor of operational effective- t°uJ °ut this type of choice has not yet rent ^ t*1's serles- F°r example, the cur- pQlj edifion continues the long-standing nUrnh not officially revealing the tom fr or diameter of Soviet submarine ffdo tubes.
Vnders.
standing Soviet Naval Develop-
**nts
ease of detailed information will inevit- y be seen as compromising some intelligence sources. Yet, without some such l°mPromise, the defense community at ,^rge will be uninformed and ineffective Pressing for the weapons and tactics I lch are needed. In particular, we will ,°se the creative contribution of those 'viduals not obviously “needing to ni°w- The ability to fight well probably “st have a cost in terms of declassifica- n- Conversely, because classification cann°t be applied in a uniform way, it ,. cause distortions with important imitations for U. S. naval policy. One aniple particularly deserves mention.
•erature
j, ues are virtually the only important s°Vlet naval threat to our fleet. It is no to "Prise that mine countermeasures and &*> countermeasures receive rela- ®y_ little emphasis, compared with ^■missile weapons. The usual state- ilv n*S (be Soviets concentrate heav- tjnu°n nime warfare and that they con- ha 6 ?° develop torpedoes aggressively hac 'btle real impact, since most readers Coe n° list of mines or torpedoes to Pare with the longer and more im- ss,ve list of missiles. et current developments in these cat- ple°nes are weH worth noting. For exam- dia t*16 ^ov*ets have introduced a large- e(j ',letcr antiship torpedo. This year’s pu, !°n °f Jane’s Fighting Ships (Jane’s aslshing Co., Ltd., 1985) describes it a 65-centimeter (26-inch) wake- fissile
■ Th .
tPin classifying the lists of
Sec CS 3nc* torPedoes surely derives from p,aUrity considerations: the Soviets dis- dieir missile launchers, but not their cUrjerVVater weaPons- However, any se- °foth entails a choice, conscious
eff aerwise, between current operational sOUfCtlVeneSS and tbc protection of Vp„ Ces °f information. Over the last few
•Pade
suite^’ t*len’ *s written on a basic level in ;|(, to die general public. Yet it serves, Uion, a very important naval public
which needs much more information if it is to do its job properly. Moreover, the simplifications and gaps in the handbook, which are probably the casualties of classification policy, have real and important consequences for the Navy itself. It seems unlikely that those consequences have been explored in any detail.
In an important sense, Understanding Soviet NavaI Developments parallels Soviet Military Power, the Defense Department’s annual publication. Both show the major trends and both display important new Soviet developments. Neither is really useful to the analyst, because neither is detailed or sufficiently complete. Yet much of the public policy of the United States is deeply influenced by exactly those readers for whom the unclassified official literature is the primary source of information. They are an important audience, and they—we—
deserve better.
Dr. Friedman is a consultani on naval and defense affairs. The author of many books on naval weapons and ship designs, Dr. Friedman is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings and other professional naval magazines.
No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982
Julian Thompson. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985. 201 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. Maps $24.95 ($22.45)
Reviewed by Major General Fred Haynes, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
If the Falkland Islands were to slip back into the frigid South Atlantic, whence they emerged before the dawn of time, they would be missed for about four minutes. But for 74 days in the spring of 1982, the Falklands were everything to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had lost them, to Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri, who had taken them, and to Brigadier Julian Thompson, whose commando brigade of Royal Marines and paratroopers set out to take them back.
Brigadier (now Major General) Julian Thompson’s personal account of the campaign to retake the Falklands is exactly what one would expect from a nononsense military man: a straightforward and understated after-action report that lays out the problems of the campaign and how they were overcome. No Picnic is not written for a general reader. The best book for that purpose probably remains The Battle for the Falklands (W. W. Norton and Co., 1983), by Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins. No Picnic is a book for those with some grounding in military affairs and a keen interest in the workings of a complex, demanding—and successful—operation. Military professionals, members of the defense community, and sophisticated military buffs are given an excellent opportunity to look over the shoulder of a key British commander as he goes about his duties.
General Thompson focuses primarily on his own command—3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines—to which were attached two battalions of British Army paratroopers, some light armored vehicles of the Blues and Royals, and specialized units drawn from both the British Army and the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, his account of the ground war also sheds light on many important aspects of the overall campaign.
Perhaps the most important question he deals with is command, control, and communication (C3). In an amphibious operation, C3 is always difficult, involving the sharing of information and responsibility among commanders from different services trained in very different forms of warfare. For example, long- range reconnaissance for General Thompson’s brigade was assigned to special warfare troops, who initially could only be inserted and controlled by the aircraft carrier task group under Rear Admiral J. F. Woodward.
General Thompson indicates that the British had no overall commander in the South Atlantic. He points out that Admiral Woodward, commander of the carrier battle group. Commodore M. C. Clapp, commander of the amphibious ship task group, and himself as commander of the commando brigade all reported directly to the naval headquarters at Northwood in England, where Admiral Sir John Field- house served as task group commander.
General Thompson does not reveal whether this singular command arrangement functioned as outlined, or whether it exacerbated the inevitable frictions likely in any amphibious operation. As a serving officer, he obviously cannot give free rein to his opinions about the chain of command, but, nonetheless, the reader does get hints of his disgruntlement with other headquarters. General Thompson comments, for instance, that his Rapier air defense missiles “were seen in some quarters as the main defense of San Carlos Water against Argentine air attacks from . . . D-day”—this despite his warnings about initial shakedown problems, which had “either been forgotten or ignored.” He also subsequently appears to have come under heavy pressure from England to advance before he felt ready.
Although the arrival of Royal Marine Major General Jeremy Moore to take command of all land forces coincided with the arrival of a second British brigade, the additional command echelon may also have been calculated to relieve some of the pressure on General Thompson. As deputy to Admiral Fieldhouse, General Moore was well positioned to deal with higher authority, freeing General Thompson to concentrate on brigade operations. This may be a useful example to keep in mind for future U. S. operations that combine direct involvement by the highest levels of government with critical military decisions that can only be made by commanders on the scene.
Instant global communications also tend to exacerbate animosity between the military and the news media. Compared with the U. S. involvement in Southeast
Asia, the Falklands posed no great media problems. The war was popular, short, and isolated from normal means of communication. The dangers of the campaign and the dearth of civilian communications allowed the military to keep a tight rein on news reports.
Still, some security lapses did occur: General Thompson complained in a 4 June message that he was “absolutely fed up with hearing my plans broadcast on BBC news.” Despite those complaints, security seems to have been much more rigorous than Thompson’s complaints might suggest. As a CBS News consultant visiting the British Ministry of Defence during the conflict, this reviewer was impressed by their resolve not to divulge any information that might compromise security.
The real strength of General Thomp son’s narrative, however, lies not in P°‘ icy matters, but in the lucid explanation of day-to-day events. His account ot t reasoning behind the selection of Carlos Water as the initial landing area is informative. The implicit comparison Argentine and British military behavio that runs through the book illuminate^ many elements of effective training an command.
Above all, the book is a tribute to 1 l’ professionalism of the brigade’s office and men. The sudden death of a leader- even one so outstanding as Lieutena Colonel H. Jones of 2 Parachute Battali°n' never deterred subordinates from prtSS ing the attack to a successful conclusion
Soviet Military Science and the Falklands Conflict—Part 1
of naval forces took place in three echelons, lasting 27 day5 (4-30 April), 28 days (18 April-9 May), and 35 days (1° May-15 June) respectively. The first echelon consisted of- combatant and 16 auxiliary ships, comprising two carrier groups led by the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) carriers He' mes and Invincible. The force included up to 3,500 marines and ground troops, and 20 Sea Harrier aircraft. The second echelon included 14 combatants and nine auxiliary vessels which carried 1,500 marines and ground troops. Twenty Har rier and Sea Harrier aircraft were based on the containerslup
Editor’s Note: This is the first of a three-part review feature detailing the Soviet military perspective of the Falklands Conflict based on accounts published in Soviet naval and military journals since June 1982. From such a survey of the Soviet military press, it may be possible to determine lessons- learned by Soviet military science as a result of the conflict, and how these lessons will influence Soviet naval power projection in the near future. Subsequent parts will address logistics (the mobile rear), the air and missile war, electronic warfare, and the conflict in perspective.
Maritime Operations
Soviet military journals, and Morskoy Sbornik in particular, devote considerable study to the Falklands Conflict’s naval operations. Discussion about maritime operations is divided into three principal topics: the deployment of task forces from Great Britain, actions during the blockade phase, and the amphibious landing at San Carlos Bay. This method of dividing maritime operations reflects three of the four major phases of amphibious operations in Soviet doctrine: embarkation and loading of material and troops; the sea crossing; and the amphibious landing and immediate battle for the shore.
The fourth major phase, reembarkation of naval infantry on ships and preparation for further landings, has not been addressed in Soviet articles.
Phase I: Operational Deployments. Argentine preparations for the campaign were anything but thorough even at the outset of hostilities. Passivity, a term applied by the Soviets, characterized Argentine actions at sea and on the ground throughout the conflict. They belatedly carried out preparatory measures such as concentrating their aircraft on airfields in southern Argentina and deploying a group of ships only in response to British activity. “It is evident from published material, that for a number of reasons the actions of the Argentinians were insufficiently purposeful and organized” in all areas except air combat.1 This view is pervasive in Soviet assessments of British operational success.
Most Soviet writers agree that the British deployment of ships to the Falklands began on 2 April 1982. Concentration
Atlantic Conveyor, which had been specially fitted for the operation. The third echelon included seven combatants an 11 auxiliary vessels with 3,000 soldiers from “a motorized infantry brigade” and 20 aircraft carried on board the con- ^ tainership Atlantic Causeway, also specially fitted with a deC to accommodate the aircraft.2
While the first of these naval forces were deploying, Vu*'. can strategic bombers, Nimrod land-based maritime patrol a> craft, and Sea Harrier and Harrier aircraft were simultaneously rebased across the ocean to Ascension Island, which served as a forward logistical support base roughly half'vay , between Great Britain and the Falklands.3 In addition, Brit's( submarines deployed to the Falklands objective area, the of which arrived by 12 April, permitted the early declarad0 of the 200-mile exclusion zone around the islands.4 Soviet Rear Admiral I. Uskov noted that the blockade actually be? on 30 April with the arrival of the first echelon, but that t ^ period from 12-30 April was used for submarine reconnoi,e ing of the objective area.5
Admiral Uskov implicitly gives the British good marks hy commenting on their “steady build-up” of forces over the two and one-half months of the conflict, demonstrating the importance the Soviets place on the principle of massing ® forces.6 According to Soviet Admiral V. Chemavin, Chiet 1 the Main Staff of the Navy, success in an operation is di- ^ rectly dependent upon the ability of commanders and sta'j,s • create the necessary force ratios at the proper moment. A 1 ral Chemavin cites examples of the mass employment of v ous ships (submarines or ASW ships) which affected the course of World War II, as well as the massing of types 0 . ordnance or equipment (mines, electronic warfare equipnie
19«5
^ Major Ralph M. Bruner, U. S. Army
General Haynes is a combat veteran of three wars. He is currently an executive with LTV Aerospace and Defense Company and is military consultant for CBS News.
to war before another lot arrived.
Still, the men of 3 Commando Brigade persevered and triumphed, and General Thompson’s book is an excellent account of how they did it. With excellent photos, detailed maps, and a good glossary and index, No Picnic will undoubtedly serve as a standard reference source for future analysis of that gallant campaign. As such, it deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone who takes a serious interest in modem amphibious operations.
dered by the need to build up supplies and by the shortage of helicopter lift because of the Atlantic Conveyor’s sinking.
The fortuitous inclusion of a few tracked BV202 vehicles (designed to move over snow) gave the ground force at least a few transport vehicles that could negotiate the Falklands bogs. The tracked Scorpion and Scimitar light armored vehicles could also accompany the advancing infantry. But most of the brigade’s combat power consisted of infantry who “yomped” the 50 or so miles from San Carlos to Stanley. The infantrymen accomplished this feat despite boots designed for fighting from armored vehicles on the plains of Central Europe. Better boots had been ordered, but the first lot had been defective, and the brigade went
he contrast between British and Argen- me professionalism is strikingly illus- rated by the attack on the Argentine spell14' forces observation post at Top Malo 0use. Not only did the British take the P°st completely by surprise, but Argen- "Je troops at two other posts on nearby 1 's were so impressed that they Promptly turned themselves in to nearby “nt'sh units.
General Thompson’s book demonrates that prosaic matters—the proper suing of orders, the movement of sup- P les, and even the issuing of the proper 0mbat boots—continue to have great •pPH'ficance on the modem battlefield, k e British advance was seldom hindered J a failure to understand and carry out e commander’s intentions, but was hin
'vl’ich affected war in the Middle East. Furthermore, he writes:
Today, because of increased combat capabilities (of all types of equipment, including nuclear) . . . and the global jjeale and rapid flow of combat action, the massing of 0rces and means in warfare has acquired even greater significance than it had previously. This is due to the fact hat in order to guarantee the destruction of the most important targets within a very short time, concentration of lrepower is essential.”7
ttyP16 cont‘nuous buildup also points up the difference been G. S. and Soviet concepts of proportionality of re- ajn,nse- The U. S. response in circumstances similar to Brit- dea]S m'Sbt be to severely restrict our military involvement, for l^e 'ssue delicately for political reasons, and use ^ es Proportionate to the threat. In contrast, the Soviet re- Cee|JSe w°uld not be to use military forces which might suc- ty ’ rather, based on the concept of massing of forces, it sUcc ° bC t0 USe 3 large enou8h grouping of forces to assure Cettess ’n the event of hostilities. Czechoslovakia in 1968 c°n Tits this mold, and Afghanistan does, too, if one anySlfers that the timing and speed of the invasion precluded $0y. ective response, internal or external, from Afghanistan. than61 f'l'tary history is filled with examples in which more q Efficient forces have been allocated to a mission. c0nvn a different matter, Admiral Uskov discusses the use of Co«ed cotttainerships, such as Atlantic Causeway and °r Jey°r, referring to them as avianesushehiye (air-carrying t^j 'r, capable) ships, with ten to 20 Harriers each. He notes CaPah/S arrangement rnade the second and third echelons Craft fx,°^ Providing their own air cover with on-board air- grou' "bile this did not exactly turn them into carrier strike In135, the net effect was to permit the carriers Hermes and m0stC,We t0 remain in the objective area where they were c0mneeded, rather than on the relatively safe sea lines of d0vvmunicati°n (SLOCs). This permitted the British to keep 3; | n tT’e numerical ratio of aircraft in Argentina’s favor to one’ ^ber than the 6:1 ratio which would have resulted had s'Sn'f tbe carr*ers been on convoy escort duty.8 This is a deal '|ant observation, as the Soviets are now paying a good °‘ attention to such convertible containerships and may
THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS (W. W. NORTON & COMPANY. INC, 1963)
elect to follow suit, given the relative lack of expense involved in their conversion, and their many peacetime uses.
In Soviet terms, the British evidenced proper conduct of affairs by applying increasingly effective pressure on the Argentines. However, the Soviets also consider the factor of time when applying the principle of mass. The first echelon took 28 days to arrive in the combat theater, but the third echelon did not even set sail until 38 days after the conflict began. Given the actual circumstances of the conflict against an enemy both ill-prepared and incapable of striking Great Britain, the British deployments were rapid enough" But the implications for NATO are obviously serious if, after a Warsaw Pact surprise attack, the Western allies should prove unable to gear up until three or four weeks into the fight. As Admiral Chemavin points out:
‘‘The increase in the significance of the [time] factor is due to the radical changes in the military scene. . . . For example carrier striking forces and nuclear submarines are now capable of moving, within 24 hours, out of one operational area into another a thousand kilometers distant from the first. . . . Therefore combat-readiness, in our view, should be evaluated ... by what is most essential:
The nuclear-powered submarine has been the central focus of the Soviets’ discussion of the second phase of the Falklands Conflict. HMS Courageous, standing off the Falkland Sound, successfully deterred Argentine ships from penetrating the 200-mile exclusion zone after she sank the General Belgrano.
namely, the numbers of really combat ready forces, and the time required to bring forces into, a state of readiness. ...”
“The combat capacity of forces is determined by the condition of their ordnance and technical equipment and of their servicemen’s training. ... It is quite obvious that there is no point in talking about the ‘combat-readiness’ of forces which are not operational, which lack combat capacity.”9
The lessons of the British deployment to the Falklands derived by the Soviets deal with: massing of the naval task forces; the response time of the British military to events beyond their control; their ability to maintain the initiative despite extremely long SLOCs; and the use of converted con- tainerships to protect their convoys which had the net effect of a force multiplier for the combatant fleet. These are rather administrative decisions in nature, but failure to take them into account could have hampered “Operation Corporate” from the beginning. The Soviets, too, would have to consider such administrative questions in any naval power projection mission they might be required to perform. By all accounts, they consider these questions seriously.
Phase II: Blockade and Antiblockade Operations: The air and sea blockade began on 30 April 1982 with the arrival of the first echelon in the area of operations. The main British efforts, according to Admiral I. Kapitanets, who writes on the navy’s overall role, were aimed at destroying Argentine ships or preventing them from penetrating the 200-mile exclusion zone.10 The British were successful in this effort, destroying a cruiser, a patrol boat, a tanker, and a transport and damaging two transports and a patrol boat.
The most significant event of the blockade phase, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, is described as follows by Admiral Kapitanets. On 2 May, “based on information indicated by space reconnaissance,” a British nuclear-powered submarine sank the General Belgrano, which was operating without proper escort. This event made a major impression on the Argentine Navy “which practically ceased combat sorties at sea beyond their territorial waters,” and forced the Argentines to cut short their resupply efforts to the islands.11 This action confirmed the preeminence of nuclear- powered submarines in offensive naval combat. Thereafter, the blockade phase experienced very little surface-to-surface combat. Instead, aircraft activity highlighted this period.
Argentine planes, in Admiral Kapitanets’ analysis, “succeeded in delivering a number of productive strikes against British ships at sea, by employing missile weaponry as well as conventional bombs and free flight missiles.”12 The important point in Admiral Kapitanets’ discussion of the role of aircraft in maritime conditions, however, is not so much the aircraft themselves as how the aircraft were able to support operations. Essentially, his article describes how aircraft carriers and land-based aircraft should be used.
Admiral Kapitanets proceeds from the principle of a balanced fleet possessing nuclear-powered submarines, surface- to-surface missile, surface-to-air missile and anti-missile systems, auxiliary ships, and so forth. He discusses the need for
naval planners to bear in mind the specific maritime theaters when structuring the fleets, and suggests that some ships belong in ocean zones of combat far from shore, while others are suitable for enclosed sea theaters and coastal seas. Dunnr this discussion, the closest he comes to mentioning “aircrat carriers” is to write instead about the need perceived “abroad” for “deck-based multipurposed aircraft”:
“The foreign press notes that with the development of air attack means there is a continuing increase in the role ot aircraft in combat actions at sea. Without winning and holding air supremacy on an operational and tactical seal it is impossible to count on [the] success of an action or an operation as a whole.”
“The western press is discussing the question of what surface combatants should be like. . . . Experience of the conflict confirmed the advisability of having multimissi°n air-capable combatants, possessing considerable attack might and high combat stability and with multi-purpose aircraft and helicopters, as part of the grouping of forces for actions in an ocean zone.” .
“For enclosed sea theaters and coastal seas the intend011 is to have the presence in the fleets (to a certain extent justified) of surface combatants with relatively small displacement but with sufficiently powerful attack missiles and with the capability to provide for their own combat stability against attacks at sea, primarily from enemy air attack weapons.”13
Admiral Kapitanets’ discussion of the need for a balance^ navy and the important role played by nuclear-powered sub marines highlights mainstream navy issues which Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov has emphasized for years. Beside multipurpose replenishment ships, the Soviets are still lack'n' in large aircraft carriers and large amphibious assault ships- except for the Ivan Rogov class. Admiral Kapitanets’ argument relates particularly to aircraft carriers, but he may hav both latter types in mind because these two types of ship5 together are the sine qua non of naval projection of power ashore.
Admiral Uskov underscores the need for carriers, too, a though his is a more open view. The kind of air supremacy needed in combat actions far out at sea can only be provi e by earner groups. Relying solely on shore-based aircraft f° air cover of the fleet means that long-range aircraft would ^ have to be in the air at all times to provide the fleet adequa warning and protection. Inflight refueling might provide a partial solution, but tanker aircraft are also vulnerable to 111 terception. In short, Admiral Uskov implies that land-base naval aviation is not an acceptable alternative for providing air cover to a fleet operating several thousand miles from friendly bases.
What kind of aircraft carriers or how many are needed an open question. Based on the British experience, it is *°-
19*5
Problems can be worked out, complicated competing sub- “rns should not be incorporated on a single platform.
summary, a balanced fleet is still of utmost concern to
Senii
attention to how the first wave carries out its mission.
a that carriers should be capable of launching interceptor airborne early warning aircraft with long range and enI rancei as well as helicopters and vertical short takeoff and ^nding (V/STOL) aircraft. Whether his argument is meant to vocate the development of big carriers or to espouse doc- for those already being built is also open to debate.
^ 'her comments about the navy’s force structure and ship S1gn made by Soviet writers include reference to “general ■Pose” surface combatants of the Sheffield type and the r° lems associated with ships that are loaded with electronic hru Sheffield was attacked, according to Soviet Captain Rank B. Rodionov, while she was vulnerable: “radio ansmissions were being conducted by satellite (at the time ijo ,e Exocet attack) and the radars were turned off.”14 The anll6tS *lave lnterPreted this to mean that the communication radar systems on board were not compatible for simulta- (h°Us use- The implication seems to be that unless (or until)
systeP
In discussing ship design and damage control questions,
, Jiiral Kapitanets notes that modem ships suffer from being 11 with structurally inadequate materials, namely alumi- “m* *n ^act’ detailed studies by naval engineers attest that Vj Uch attention” is being given to these matters in the So- jsnaval press. The official British view on the sensational tre °f aluminum construction of ships is very much in const Kapitanets’ view:
The facts are that aluminum was used in the super-struc- Ure of the Type 21 class of frigate and to a small extent In a few other classes, but not in the Type 42 destroyers j’Uch as HMS Sheffield. . . . [T]here is no evidence that it [aluminum] has contributed to the loss of any vessel.”13 Itl:
Ph '°r ^0viet naval leaders. From study of the blockade da_Se> the Soviets learned a good deal about ship design and c|ea8c/firc prevention. In addition, the importance of nu- ^ar-powered attack submarines was confirmed. Judging by is Kapitanets’ and Admiral Uskov’s analyses, the navy rjCr 8'nning to work out employment concepts for large car- Cewhich have already begun construction. In fact, the re- fj I^I March-16 April 1985) venture of the Soviet Navy’s her ,vlrrier battle group, including the K/ev-class VTOL car- d~Nov°r°ssiysk, into the Western Pacific may well have An?°nstrated these concepts. At the same time, the vital role Plav 'ne Eghter-bombers and British strategic bombers 'nun 'n the war may suggest to the Soviets that it would be lav i r°Pr'atc f°r them to abandon their own shore-based W0 . aviation. In local waters, their land-based aviation lheat caPah[c of providing air cover. However, where the Ka .er °f military operations is in an ocean zone, Admiral giveUanetS °hliquely calls for aircraft carriers.16 This should car-- Us a good idea of how the Soviets plan to use their large ers a few years hence.
side^ W.' Amphibious Assault: The Soviets appear to con- atUnhtfle ^an ^arI°s landing operation a textbook case of how c0g . ious/joint operations should be executed. They are easi IZ3nt 0 'b® specific conditions which made the operation CrecjCr *ban it might have been, but they give the British thert|l where it is due, and they have learned much from
and mPhibiouS operations are extremely difficult to organize seeuCan be decisively repulsed if the landing force fails to tiCu^e 'be beachhead. For this reason, the Soviets devote par- and they seek to employ landing methods which will achieve the highest tempo possible, measured in men landed per minute. One Soviet writer formulated his description of the landing with the apparent purpose of analyzing the tempo of the British first wave:
“The first echelon began to land at two o’clock at night local time on 21 May on an undefended sector in the bay of San Carlos on the northwestern part of East Falkland Island. Simultaneously, assault by helicopter landing was made. In all, after 5 hours on 21 May, by a combination of methods, the first echelon (up to 1,000 men) was landed in the area of San Carlos on a beachhead of up to 10 km2, and a system of antiaircraft and antitank defenses was organized.”17
Simple arithmetic reveals the landing rate to be 3.3 men per minute (1,000 men -t- 300 minutes = 3.3 men/minute). Judging by Soviet standards, this would not seem to be particularly fast. Their World War II averages for amphibious landings of the ship-to landing craft-to shore variety are much higher—at least 12 men per minute. Yet Admiral Kapitanets writes of the landing in a positive way:
“To a considerable extent the success of the amphibious assault is attributed to the fact that the landing was conducted at a rather high tempo during darkness, which precluded a concentration of defending troops and opposition by aircraft of the Argentine Air Force. Great importance also was attached to the landing of assault forces in other sectors and the organization of dummy naval landings.”18
Admiral Uskov also notes the success of the landing at San Carlos, hence there appears to be general agreement on the issue. The reason for considering the landing to be sufficiently rapid must be in the fact that it was made under nighttime conditions. In contrast, Soviet World War II landings were made generally in daylight.
Soviet accounts illustrate a number of other reasons for the success of the landing. Primarily, the achievement of air and sea superiority by the British was thought to be a deciding factor. Sea superiority was possible for two reasons. The Argentine surface fleet ceased operating in the objective area after the Belgrano had been sunk. Furthermore, the British picked a landing site in the Falklands Strait inaccessible to Argentine submarines. Air superiority was possible mainly because the assault was made at night, when the Argentines did not fly. Under such conditions, the British were relatively free to maneuver at sea and chose the place and hour of the landing.
Second, according to “foreign observers,” “Argentine intelligence was not able to identify the immediate preparations for and the beginning of the amphibious assault operation,” and thus were tactically surprised.19 The Argentines knew at least that the landing was imminent if only because British preparations had reached a peak and negotiations had failed to resolve the issue. According to Krasnaya Zvezda of 21 May (published in the Soviet Union one day prior to the landing):
“Many organs of the Western press consider that today Britain can already begin the main combat activity. For example, the [British paper] Daily Mail writes: ‘Thousands of British soldiers are ready to seize the Falkland Islands. Yesterday evening they were transferred to assault ships and given their final orders before the assault. When the time comes that Prime Minister Thatcher speaks during an extraordinary debate in Parliament, Great Britain . . . will already be at war with Argentina.’”20
of
British life. The raid destroyed an outpost which could ha'e given the San Carlos amphibious landing some problems- Captain Galkin recounts how elements of British reconna|S sance-diversionary forces were landed on the Falklands remarkably 25 days before the main assault landing of 21 ^ which Would have been roughly at the time South Georgta ^ was recaptured.25 Thus British ground reconnaissance on Falkland was possible three weeks prior to the landing- Galkin's monograph lists the generic missions of the sp1^
cial forces in detail: they are able to provide reconnaissanj-
information of the disposition of enemy forces; they are
Having established air and sea superiority, the Royal Navy’s San Carlos landing operation—in the Soviets’ view—was a textbook case of how amphibious/joint operations should be executed.
Surely if the Daily Mail could report the transfer of assault troops to landing ships, the Argentines were aware that the landing was imminent. Furthermore, once troops boarded assault landing ships, they had to strike within seven days or risk losing combat-effectiveness.
Admiral Kapitanets discusses how surprise could be achieved by either ship-to-shore or shore-to-shore landings (the latter, like “Operation Overload,” were more typical of Soviet amphibious landings). He noted that by late evening on 20 May, the amphibious task force and the deception forces had closed to within 80-90 miles of the respective landing sites. The landing was to take place a few hours later at 0200 hours on 21 May. A distance of 80 miles between point of embarkation and landing site is not unreasonable for a one-day shore-to-shore operation. Such operations were common in the Black Sea in World War II. The difference, however, between the World War II experience and the Falk- lands landing was that in the latter, the British could not achieve strategic surprise: the task force was already at sea poised for attack. Still, Soviet writers are right to point out that the defenders were unable to predict the exact time and place of the attack. All that was necessary was for the British to achieve tactical surprise, which they did, partly through their deception operations.21
The significance of this point should be a familiar one to Westerners who have considered the “standing start” theory of war in Europe. This theory hypothesizes that sufficient surprise can be achieved by a blitzkrieg attack of forces-in- being without buildup, despite the ability of adversaries to monitor the military warning indicators of their potential forces. What Admiral Kapitanets has done is to apply the lessons of sufficient surprise to joint operations.
Concerning actual deception, British accounts discuss two operations, one on 1 May and the other on 20-21 May. The 1 May action was a naval feint directed at Port Stanley with the intention of causing Argentine forces to fire their weapons and thereby disclose their positions. The Argentines interpreted this action as a landing which was successfully repulsed by their fire.22 The Soviets do not even mention it; perhaps they too were deceived.
In describing the decoy landings on 20-21 May, Soviet Captain First Rank V. Dotsenko alludes to the Soviet style in offensive combat: “In order not to attract the Argentinians’ attention to the site of the assault landing, preparatory strikes were conducted on a wide front, with the strongest on the diversionary axes.”23 In fact, at least six diversionary attacks were made, including those at Port Darwin and Fox Bay. The Soviets, as a rule, conduct attacks on a “wide front” in order to provide maskirovka or deceptive cover for the main attack. Therefore, this comment likely is intended to indicate to Soviet military readers the optimum solution, a sort of “how-to” guide for employment of deceptive measures.
One of the aspects of the landing operation which recei'v' thorough analysis from amphibious specialists is the activity of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS), the British Special Forces. The Soviets re e to them as razvedyvatel’no-diversionnyie podrazdeleniye or reconnaissance-diversionary units. The Soviet equivalent ot these units are the voiska spetsialnogo naznacheniya or "Spetsnaz.
The reconnaissance-diversionary forces were instrumenta several actions. According to Soviet writer Y. Rakitin and Captain Second Rank Yu Galkin, a team of 14 frogmen, * had parachuted into the ocean and then had been delivered - submarine to South Georgia, managed to engineer the surref der of the Argentine captors of that outpost, six days bd°re:i the arrival of the first naval task force in the objective area' This is not quite the same picture available from British op sources, but for those who think this an odd way to get °n board a submarine, it is, in fact, a possible method that rep resents a technique entirely in keeping with specially traine commandos, including those of the Soviet Naval Infantry- After all, British submarines were in the objective area around the Falklands by 12 April, and the fastest way to liver small numbers of men to the South Atlantic would ha been in aircraft. Therefore, the rendezvous with a submannt and subsequent delivery of a raiding party to South Georgia via submarine was feasible. This is the kind of sophistical1- technique the Soviets find very attractive and one which t e already employ in training.
In another action, men of the SAS raided Pebble Island located off the northern shore of West Falkland on 15 and destroyed 11 Argentine Pucara aircraft with no loss
able
to ascertain the suitability of landing beaches; they can par| ipate in combat raids (such as those which permitted the re capture of South Georgia and Pebble Island); and they can direct naval and aerial supporting fires during the landing phase. They can also launch diversionary attacks, destroy ^ enemy logistics depots, interfere with enemy lines of com ’6 nication and make up the first echelon of the assault troop^ ^ Given the Soviet penchant for secrecy, it was interesting s find even an oblique description of Soviet Spetsnaz °PcraIljn such as that which appeared in a Krasnaya Zvezda artide late August 1982. Apparently referring to a training exerc' the article described the operations of a small “reconnats- sance group” of three Soviet naval infantrymen led by Se Lieutenant Kalinin, which bore a striking resemblance to mission capabilities attributed to the British SAS and SB ■
So
Put
°oter”-class fast assault landing craft and helicopters to commandos ashore at San Carlos. The loss of three of
ecretly landing on a remote section of a rocky coast far °m enemy dispositions,” the group traveled unnoticed over veral kilometers of tundra to seize their objective; they op- ,.ated at n‘8*lt’ though they had been landed in the daytime; fey cut off enemy communications means [causing a gap to PPear in the sector of the shore defended by the enemy].
°n the forward detachment of the landing force passes r°ugh to the defenders’ rear.” Later, the group “was as- Sned the mission to make its way unnoticed to ships which been moored at piers.”27
^Although this description reflects Soviet methods of con- ^ ctlng special operations, comparison of the capabilities of e Soviet Naval Infantry “reconnaissance group” and those ^Soviets attribute to the SAS and SBS reveals an evident uarity. One can therefore conclude that the Soviets will 0 , ^ [hc British units’ operational experience thoroughly, in er to perfect their own Spetsnaz techniques.
, As noted by Captain Dotsenko, the British made use of fo •
I .r Chinook and 12 Wessex helicopters, sunk before a conk nership could be unloaded, was a serious one for the Brit. ’ who were dependent upon these helicopters for rapid JP mobility and logistical support during ground opera- R ?S'. The helicopters which remained were used extensively, ’hn and Captain Dotsenko consider their use critical to the cce« of the ground battle.28
<j0se of a variety of boats and craft was standard practice in the*'61 landin§ operations during World War II and articles on fU] subject just before the Falklands War confirmed their use- sin?CSS *n tlleory- practice, the Soviets apparently have not Una'tane°usly used both helicopters and fast assault craft ^ 1 very recently. According to the Defense Intelligence Je,ncy> the amphibious landing conducted during the Sep- “is°er Warsaw Pact maneuvers, Shchit-82 (Shield ’82), has ^'rst 'nstance *n which the Eastern Bloc open press dj rnentioned using helicopters to deliver assault troops to equ'S^°re w^'*e us'n§ a>r cushion vehicles to deliver assault Pall!fment'”29 Thus d would appear that some lessons of the tlj 'antis Campaign have already provided the catalyst for Soviets to put amphibious theory into practice. abi]°V'et m’htary writers have taken particular note of the a1 y °f the British to conduct offensive operations at night, artn *em that continues to receive high priority in the Soviet ed forces. Captain Dotsenko writes:
The British battalions would begin offensive actions each ‘me at night after massive artillery and bombing strikes and they would complete them usually in the first half of ue day. If necessary, liaison officers located in combat Tarnations of the attacking units would call in naval gun- re and tactical air support. Wide use was made of recon- ^aissance-diversionary groups [that were] landed at night y helicopters.”30
ti sources bear out this analysis. Of the nine opera-
pi^. m W^'c^ ground forces or commandos either made am- nj ,,0Us landings or ground attacks, eight were made at
/ ■ • V .Ilntom (T oil/1 n m/Iiontar tLot tUrt vAmnlninn
nj staking of South Georgia), was conducted principally at ni„. ' ^e Soviets have also displayed increased attention to Warv’s'°n devices in their military press since the Falklands
detaV*16 ^ov'ct military press, the ground war is not given c0v'ed analysis, and certainly nowhere near the extensive [jSjfraSc found in the Western press. Captain First Rank A. 0v> who has written perhaps the most even-handed and
authoritative article published to date, writes: “The final stage of the conflict was the execution of the amphibious assault operation.”31 This assessment is in marked contrast to the way the West has viewed the war, and it signifies the parochial chasm which separates the Soviet Ground Forces from the Soviet Navy. As will be discussed in subsequent parts of this report, this is an issue which Admiral Gorshkov has tackled personally.
'Admiral I. Kapitanets, Commander in Chief Twice-Honored Red Banner Baltic Fleet, ‘‘Rol’ Flota v Anglo-Argentinskom Konflikta” (The Role of the Navy in the Anglo-Argentine Conflict). Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2-83, p. 16.
’Kapitanets, op. cil., p. 16 and Rear Admiral I. Uskov, “Uroki Anglo-Ar- gentinskogo Konflicta i RoTNadvodnikh Korablei v Bor'be na More” (The Lessons of the Anglo-Argentinian Conflict and the Role of Surface Ships in Naval Warfare), Morskoy Sbornik. No. 11, p. 88.
’Kapitanets, op. cil.. p. 16.
4Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1982), p. 17. (Hereafter referred to as “White Paper.”)
5Uskov, op. cil., p. 89. f'lbid., p. 88.
’Admiral V. Chemavin, Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Hero of the Soviet Union, “Naval Theory," Morskoy Sbornik. No. 1-82, p. 23.
8Uskov, op. cil., p. 88.
"Chemavin, op. cil., pp. 23-24.
'“Kapitanets, op. cil.. p. 16 and Uskov, op. cil.. p. 89.
“Kapitanets, op. cil., pp. 16-17 and Uskov, op. cil., p. 89.
“Kapitanets, op. cit., p. 17.
13ibid pp 17-18. (Translations of the lengthy quotations from Kapitanets article were taken from Soviet Naval Digest, No. 2, 1983, prepared by the Naval Intelligence Support Center with minor changes made by myself.)
“Captain First Rank B. Rodionov, Captain Second Rank Y. E. Nikitin, and N. Novichkov, "Radioelektronnaya Voina v Uzhnoi Atlantike" (Radio-electronic Warfare in'the South Atlantic), Morskoy Sbornik. No. 1-83, p. 77. (Hereafter referred to as Rodionov).
“White Paper, op. cil.. p. 19.
“Kapitanets, op. cit.. p. 18.
“Kapitanets, op. cil., p. 19.
KIbid„ p. 19.
'"Kapitanets, op. cil.. p. 20.
“Anonymous, "Anglia Gotovit Vtorzhcnie" (England Prepares to Invade), Kras- nya Zvezda, 21 May 1982, p. 3.
’'Captain First Rank V. Dotsenko, "Folklendskaya Desantnaya Operatsiya” (The Falklands Landing Operation), Voennyi Veslnik. No. 6-83, p. 91.
22Dr. Juan Carlos Murguizur (lecturer in military history at the Argentine Army Staff College), “The South Atlantic Conflict, an Argentinian Point of View,” in International Defense Review, No. 2-83, p. 136.
“Dotsenko, op. cit.. p. 91.
24Ye Rakitin, "Stavka na Vnezapnost”' (Gambling on Surprise), (The Amphibious Landing on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands), Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3-83, p. 81; Captain Second Rank Yu Galkin, “Deistvyya Angliiskikh Razvedyvatel’no-Diver- sionnykh Podrazdelcnii” (The Action of British Reconnaissance-Diversionary SubUnits, On the Subject of the Anglo-Argentine Conflict), Zarubezhoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 5-83, p. 64.
“Galkin, op. cit., p. 64.
26Ibid., p. 64.
“Senior Lieutenant A. Veledeyev, “Red Banner Northern Fleet,” “In Hand-to- Hand Fighting,” Krasnya Zvezda. 24 August 1982, p. 1, translated in Joint Publications Research Service 82734, 26 January 1983, pp. 39-41. The article also noted that Senior Lieutenant Kalinin was a “candidate master of sport,” very much representative of Spetsnaz troops.
“Dotsenko, op. cit., p. 92, and Rakitin, op. cil., p. 85.
’"Major James Brusstar and Frank Steinert, “Exercise Shield 82," Review of the Soviet Ground Forces, Defense Intelligence Agency, May 1983, p. 3. “Dotsenko, op. cil., p. 92.
“Captain First Rank A. Usikov, candidate of historical science, "Nekotcrie Uroki i Vyvody iz Anglo-Argentinskogo Voyennogo Konflikta” (Several Lessons and Conclusions from the Anglo-Argentine Military Conflict), Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, April, No. 4-83, p. 71.
Major Bruner served a tour in the U. S. Army’s infantry division in Korea and is presently the Deputy Inspector General of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of Coronado’s landing force staff planning course, and is a Soviet foreign area specialist concentrating on foreign policy and the use of military power as an instrument of policy.
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'\ttter.,nn,an(i Under Sail: Makers of the jarnlcan Naval Tradition 1775-1850
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The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972
Colonel G. H. Turley, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired). Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984. 387 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. $18.95 ($17.05).
On 30 March 1972, twelve divisions of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) attacked South Vietnam on three major fronts. The Army of South Vietnam was about to meet its greatest challenge. U. S. ground forces were gone and only U. S. air power and advisors remained. This book is a detailed and exciting account of the largest battle of the Vietnam War. Colonel Turley was there, alongside his Vietnamese counterparts, not only facing the massive onslaught of the NVA, but trying to convince the military command in Saigon that an invasion was in fact in progress.
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Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, Editors. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984. 346 pp. Illus. Gloss. $8.95 ($8.05).
On 25 October 1983, the United States led an invasion of the island nation of Grenada. This event was significant not only because it was the first (and so far only) time that a communist regime has been deposed by Free World forces, but also because it yielded a bonanza of captured documents. This book selectively scans this mass of documents to authentically present the “inner thoughts” and workings of a fledgling communist state. The selected documents are presented in logical order and are enhanced by commentary, photographs, a listing of important personalities, and a chronology of events leading up to the invasion.
History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: The Modern Era
Hans Delbrack. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985. 498 pp. Notes. Ind. $75.00 ($67.50).
Originally published in 1919, this classic German work has been recently translated into English by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., a former head of the Department of Foreign Languages at West Point. This is the fourth and last volume of a series which encompasses the history of warfare from ancient times through the Napoleonic era. This latest volume opens with the Renaissance and ends with the fall of Napoleon. It emphasizes the relationship between a . nation’s organizational structure and its cultural influences, and it concludes with a detailed comparison of the strategies of Napoleon and Frederick the Great.
John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography
Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985. 453 pp. Bib. Ind Maps Append. $9.95 ($8.95).
This outstanding biography of the “Father of the American Navy” was written in 1959 and was recipient of a Pulitzer Prize that year. It has been reprinted now as a Northeastern Classics Edition. For those who have never read Admiral Morison’s “sailor’s biography,” it is exactly that: the life of a most singular sailor
the
may order most books of other Pu^'s!'ul|t through the Naval Institute at a 10% ^
member. Books marked lil are Press Books. Books marked H are
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written by a most singular sailor. Both were outstanding achievers in their own ways. This account does not dwell on Jones’ social and political difficulties, but looks instead at Jones the mariner and warrior.
The Marine from Manatee
John Harllee. Washington, DC: National Rifle Association of America, 1984. 330 pp. Illus. Bib. $16.95.
“Because Colonel William C. Harllee had insisted on target practice for over ten years, the marines were able to shoot two German divisions to pieces and so save the line at Chateau- Thierry last July.” This quote from a 1918 issue of Collier's Weekly refers to the man who became known as the “Father of Rifle Practice” in the U. S. Marine Corps. This biography is recounted by his son and is a multi-faceted tale of a colorful individual who left his mark not only on the Corps but on the Navy and even the nation as a whole. It is a story of untamed youth, combat service, and an indomitable spirit. In his foreword to the book, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) writes: “Whether or not we agree with him on every stand he took, General Harllee’s life is an inspiring and informative tale of courage and a story about an original American mind at work.”
The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U. S. Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973
Shelby L. Stanton. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985. 448 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. $22.50 ($20.25).
The Battle of the la Drang Valley; Task Force Oregon; Khe Sanh; the Battle for the A Shau
Valley, and other ground combat actions of the Vietnam War are described in this book. Based on information derived exclusively from primary sources and recently declassified files, the coverage focuses on the Army and Marine Corps units who fought the battles, detailing how they were formed and brought to Vietnam as well as how they were employed once there. Accounts and assessments of the entire spectrum of ground operations provides insight into strategies, tactics, and important trends of the war. The Rise and Fall of an American Army is the first comprehensive battlefield history of the U. S. military’s ground campaigns in Vietnam and should prove valuable to researcher and student alike.
Stars and Stripes: World War II Front Pages
New York: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 1985. 224 pp. Illus. Maps. $19.95 ($17.95).
“Panzers in Full Retreat Beyond Pass”; “Bomb Injures Hitler”; “NAZIS QUIT!”; ‘‘ 1,000 Planes Over Tokyo 8 Hrs. ’ ’ These and more than 200 other headlines and many hundreds of newspaper articles tell the story of World War II in this collection of Stars and Stripes front pages. Unlike a narrative or pictorial history, this book suggests a feeling of “living through” the events depicted by presenting them in a media that is familiar and charged with a sense of urgency. The great events of the war are not all that are recounted here: such stories as “Cardinals Win World Series,” “Negro Infantrymen Go Into Action In Mixed Combat Units on Rhine," “‘Just Send Medal by Mail,’ Asks Widow of Pilot,” and “China Fears a Civil War” lend human interest and historical perspective to the larger stories which dominate the pages.
U. S. Navy Ship Procurement: Future Market and Contracting Opportunities
Washington, DC: International Maritime Associates, 1985. 190 pp. Illus. Charts. Tables- Append. $480.00 (First issue of a four-part quarterly report.)
This report has been compiled to inform keting managers and business planners o velopments influencing anticipated to ^ trends in Navy procurement, both in shtps in the systems that will go in the ships- scribes procurement procedures, explams the Navy Department plans and manage ship acquisition program, and provides p° of contact in the Navy and in the dustrial complex. Subscribers to the report be provided periodic updates as new data comes available.
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