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ied
an article by General P. X. Kelley and Major
Corps in the overall naval campaign (Table 1)
There is not enough amphibious shipping in the Navy to lift the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious brigade. Without this capability, the United States may not be able to deploy the forces required in a general war.
As a power with interests and commitments around the globe, the United States must be able to execute its defense strategy worldwide, even in locations where it is politically, economically, or militarily impractical to keep U. S. forces permanently ashore. The Marine Corps, with its three Marine amphibious forces (MAFs), is in a position to execute its part of this strategy.
In the “Maritime Strategy Supplement” to January 1986 Proceedings, former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman stated that:
“Geography, alliances [vital interests], and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual number of ships—the ‘size of the Navy’—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our maritime theaters.” 1
Hidden among the 15 carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, and 100 attack submarines that would compose the 600-ship Navy was mention of 65-75 ships to provide sufficient lift for the assault echelons of a MAF and a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB). Unlike the Navy’s carriers and battleships, this amphibious lift was not divided among the various theaters. Since the article specifically addressed shipping for a MAF and a MAB, the implication was that one fleet would be allocated a MAF’s worth of lift and another a MAB’s worth. Those who have accused Secretary Lehman of choosing the 600-ship Navy as a political-bureaucratic targe ^ and creating the maritime strategy later could app*y ^ same argument to the three-MAF Marine Corps an ^£[.e Navy’s long-range goal of 76 amphibious ships- Was ^ some underlying strategy that led to the conclusion gf MAF operations would only be conducted in one t jf during general war, while another theater would len to MAB operations, or was the MAF-plus-MAB ious-lift goal chosen as “all that the budget could e
The Amphibious Warfare Strategy
The same “Maritime Strategy Supplement” conW> ^
O’Donnell on “The Amphibious Warfare Strategy which was developed by the Navy and Marine Corps part of the maritime strategy.
Whereas Lehman carefully outlined the strategy UI1^ lying the 600-ship Navy by earmarking his 15 carried ^ four battleships to specific fleets, General KeHey Major O’Donnell chose to address the role of the M . „
- # - - striiC'
so, they failed to translate the strategy into a force ture. Perhaps the authors felt that the Marine Corps s$ tory force structure of three divisions and three air ^ would continue to be taken as a given in the ^ra g Rudman-Hollings era.2 Another reason for not asSl^nl£iy the three division/wing teams to specific theaters.^ have been the Marine Corps’ long-standing claim of able to fight in “any clime or place.” j
To execute U. S. defense strategy, however, the M ^ Corps must position forces of the needed size and struc. worldwide. Amphibious shipping is about evenly d*vs between the Atlantic and Pacific, even though the keep one MAF in the Atlantic and two in the *ant (Table 2). A “swing” strategy would be needed to nl a MAF-size assault exclusively from amphibious shipr
19»1
WUI current torce disposition presumably . a balance—where Marines might most be expectscr's's balanced against where the United States (he base ,Use lbem in general war. Or does it represent b clem0k-r 3t I5603016 available during the post-World War .'‘Zat'on? In any event, during the rewrite of Title establishjC Coc^'ed the National Security Act of 1947, threel^le Marine Corps strength as three wings and ^e°rSan’1S1°nS"—re9u'rcd by the Department of Defense ^rePared'Za^°n ^ct 1986, the Marine Corps must be I*1 his t0.answer the question “Why three MAFs?” the Nav » c e> Lehman conducted a regional review of Wartime S ^cacetmie force deployments and its expected essay rnee(!s to arrive at the force requirements. This The N)reS?nts a s*rr,har drill for the Marine Corps. ti°tis w- avy s stated goal of a one-third tempo of opera- depioy hi s‘x'mor|th deployment lengths requires three ^he Marin ships for each forward-deployed commitment, by arine Corps achieves a similar tempo of operations tro°ps , ln8 infantry battalions, squadrons, and force c°ntineanion§ deployments afloat, garrison duty in the Ityakn nta* Waited States, and unit rotation to Okinawa or ni> Japan.
^^Theater north t l'ant'c theater extends from the Barents Sea in the N0l>0 the Antarctic Circle in the south. It includes the e^lan> Baltic, and North seas on NATO’s northern eht fl a['C* Mediterranean and Black seas on its south- atlk. Closer to home, it includes the Gulf of Mexico IV ana tne Caribbean bea.
The NATO alliance is the United States’ most vital interest in the region. The alliance codifies a long-standing economic and cultural relationship with European allies by demonstrating the clear U. S. intention to come to their aid if attacked. In addition to NATO’s southern flank in the Mediterranean Sea, the United States has vital interests in the Middle East and North Africa that, in certain situations, could require military support.
U. S. interest in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico is dictated not only by their proximity, but also by the fact that in a war, 60% of U. S. resupply of NATO would flow through these waters. Other vital interests to the south include the Panama Canal, the Central and South American allies on the west, and the developing nations of western Africa to the east.
The threats to U. S. vital interests in the region can be divided between low intensity conflicts (LICs)—such as terrorism, Third World instability, and communist expansion by Soviet client states—and the general war or “superpower” threat.
Terrorists carry out their criminal attacks from havens in Cuba, El Salvador, Libya, Nicaragua, and Syria. In Cuba, for example, we see a 297,000-man army that keeps 30,000 soldiers in Africa. Nicaragua’s 75,000-man army lends support to communist rebels and terrorists operating throughout Central America.3 In the Middle East we see regular Libyan incursions into Chad, and Syrian expansion into Lebanon.
The threat of general war is focused on the East-West confrontation in Central Europe, but the Third World
Table 1 Amphibious Warfare Strategy
_________________ Phase I_________________
Deterrence:
—Forward Deployed Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs)
—Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPSs)
—Readiness
—Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Operations (MAU/MAB)
Transition to War:
—Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs)
—MPS MABs (Southwest Asia, Norway, Northeast Asia)
—“Prepo” MABs (South Korea, Norway)
—Amphibious MABs (Atlantic and Pacific) —U. S. Marine Corps Reserve Mobilized
_________________ Phase II_________________
Seize the Initiative:
—MABs Employed
—Seize Advanced Naval Bases —MAB Raids on Soviet Rimlands —Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF)
—Composite from Amphibious, MPS, and “Prepo” MABs
—Position for MAF Operations
________________ Phase III_________________
Carry the Fight to the Enemy:
—MAF Assaults on the Soviet Rimlands
forces mentioned above must be considered as Soviet lies for the sake of contingency planning
al-
-------------------------------------- j * — tivP-dUt)
The United States needs to maintain three act
to dept0?
MABs for the Atlantic Fleet Marine Forces MAB in LICs, to move a MAB rapidly by air to to coordinate the use of a MAB and the maritime preP
Norway' «i- ial
Table 2 Deployable Amphibious Ships (FY87) | ||
| Pacific | Atlantic |
Type | Fleet | Fleet |
Command Ship (LCC) | 1 | 1 |
Assault Ship (LHA) | 3 | 2 |
Assault Ship (LPH) | 3 | 4 |
Cargo Ship (LKA) | 3 | 2 |
Transport Dock (LPD) | 7 | 6 |
Dock Landing Ship (LSD) | 5 | 5 |
Tank Landing Ship (LST) | 9 | 9 |
Total | 31 | 29 |
tioning ship (MPS) squadron, and to maintain a P ^ Operations Capable Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)] in the Mediterranean. ujCk
Atlantic Theater LIC Requirements: To ensure response to crises on the volatile Mediterranean coa • ^ Marine Corps must always maintain a MAU (S ^ 3 ployed on board amphibious ships to that regl0n' 0ll crisis this would enable them to avoid the now-co 2 delays in getting clearance for overflights and s bases. A typical MAU (SOC) requires three to four depending on the type allocated, to deploy. These rotate every six months, so the MAU (SOC) comm' actually uses six to eight amphibious ships.
The Marine Corps must also be ready to deploy 3 ^
on short notice for use in LICs. Operation Urgent the rescue of U. S. noncombatants from Grenada 0 #
October 1983, demonstrates how a MAB could haven> used to best effect in offensive LIC. (In this °Peratlirji- however, a MAU en route to a routine Mediterranean over was diverted to join elements of two Army ** ■ $
battalions in the operation.) Other possible require' ^ ^ for a MAB in an LIC include use in the Middle e peacekeeping forces; in Angola, Chad, or elsew ® (0 Africa to support allies there; or in Central Amerlof discourage communist expansion from Nicarag t Cuba. Twenty to 24 amphibious ships are required to MAB assault echelon. ^
Atlantic Theater General War Requirements: The ^ phibious Warfare Strategy calls for the early dep'0- of a MAB to Norway. The goal would be to airlift a ^ into Norway during the transition to war both t0 *j0r- U. S. resolve and to prevent the capture of import311. wegian air and port facilities at the outbreak of host* . As Colin Gray, president of the National Institute f°r0f lie Policy, said, “Soviet seizure of airfields s°u. (egy Evenes (Narvik) would render a forward maritime stra^{ by NATO in the region increasingly hazardous. e Atlantic Fleet Marine Forces must, therefore, be "nt enough to airlift a MAB to its prepositioned equ'P near Trondhiem, Norway, even while a MAB an
MPS
Squadron^
Unit Type
Amphibious Shipping for the Amphibious Warfare Strategy
Amphibious
Pacific Atlantic Shipping
MPS MAB | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
Amphibious MAB | 2 | 1 | 60 | 0 |
Airlift MAB | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
MAU (SOC) | 2 | 2 | 12 | 0 |
USMCR MAB | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
|
|
| 72 | 3 |
Th
w»y assumes that a MAF will de-
arnphibiou tr S nort*lern Bank, using a MAB’s-worth of and afloatand equipment prepositioned ashore fiord h be r®S’on s geography is suited to this type of of its fix°^ln^’ w^ere a MAF can operate the majority Mabs S(? aircraft from shore bases, while its three :_Utte along the coast in a combination of amphib-
be8in'emhriUOn't°-War phase also cal"ls for a MAB t0
Atlantic MPSlng ^ 'S not a'ready embarked, and for the aient deci ' scIuadron to advance, pending an employed duri S(!)rir,-^e ^ar'ne Corps Reserve may be mobi- Force unitg ^ pbase> But the active-duty Fleet Marine
Ploy kv -s Jrc the ones that remain ready to rapidly de- y dir und of 1. r*
10US sK*
rtlechanl^S'i UIr'CUSb'°ned Ending craft, helicopters, and yehicles26 amPd'hious vehicles (such as light armored Phase i|i Un<^ amPhibious tractors). This could lead to K°ia Penjim^J1'b>*°US assauits on Soviet home ports on the
hold tbat C- S. allies in Turkey, Italy, and Greece
^^orit2'1^ f^'roun<d an(l that NATO retains control of the need for 0t ^°Utbern BuroPe s coastline, there will be no lean a forcible entry” capability in the Mediterra- tben wdi* Unt'* P^ase HI °f ^e Maritime Strategy. Only tral Eu' a decision, likely based on the situation in Cen- c°nfinrC^6, be made on whether to venture into the more size yC ^aters of the Black Sea. Until that time, MAB- assault forces would be wasted in the
Celtrranean-
tion ()Uln Contingencies, such as noncombatant evacuating ,Pfations and amphibious raids, will require the nean a -ates t0 maintain a MAU (SOC) in the Mediterra- c0uIc]adng general war. In peacetime, the MAU (SOC)s w°u]tle subordinate units of the airlifted MAB, which Thjs °Perate one light infantry battalion in general war. North pU^ be an asset when planning C-141 sorties from Carolina to prepositioning sites in Norway.
'^^fTheater___________________________________
Th
north6 Pac'f'c theater extends from the Bering Sea in the Itrdj ,0 New Zealand in the south, and west across the Jap Un Ocean to the Persian Gulf. It includes the seas of n and Okhotsk, the East and South China seas, the
Norway is one place where the Marines need amphibious lift capability. During a general war, they will use amphibious ships—such as the USS Saipan (LHA-2), participating here in Northern Wedding ’86—to shuttle troops, equipment, and cargo along the coast of Norway.
numerous seas and straits of the East Indies, and the Arabian and Red seas in the extreme western portion of this vast theater.
The United States has vital economic, political, and military interests in this region. Trade with the Pacific basin nations is expanding. Many bilateral defense agreements or their functional equivalents link the United States to western Pacific nations such as Australia, China, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. Although it is debatable whether the Persian Gulf oil fields are vital to U. S. interests, the western Pacific trade routes on which the oil travels are definitely vital to the United States and its allies.5 The U. S. goal of deterring Soviet aggression and expansion extends to this region, with a special emphasis on preventing the Soviets from seizing a warm water port via Iran or Pakistan/’
There are many threats to these interests that could lead to LICs. Most often mentioned are the unfriendly governments in North Korea, Vietnam, and Iran. The Soviets maintain a threat of general war by improving their Pacific fleet; expanding bases at Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Cam Rahn Bay, and Dahlak Island in Ethiopia; and occupying Afghanistan with 115,000 troops.
Pacific Theater Peacetime/LIC Requirements: As in the Atlantic, there is a need to keep a MAU (SOC) continuously deployed in the western Pacific to respond rapidly during crises. Also like the Atlantic commitment, this requires the full-time use of six to eight amphibious ships.
With its far-flung obligations in this theater, the United States must be prepared to deploy two MABs simultaneously in the Pacific. It may need, for example, to deploy concurrently a MAB to Southeast Asia and to the Indian Ocean littoral. This would require 40-48 amphibious ships in addition to the six to eight dedicated to MAU (SOC). Although the possibility of such a requirement is remote, the United States must be able to demonstrate this capability even while hoping that it will never need it; it is central to the defense strategy of deterrence. The Thai- Cambodian border is an area, for example, where this strategy could be effective. As defense author Jeffrey Record observed, “It is difficult to imagine a more powerful deterrent to Vietnamese invasion of Thailand than the threat of concerted action by Chinese ground forces and American naval and air power.”7 Pacific Theater General War Requirements: The United States cannot create the impression that deploying two amphibious MABs would leave it unable to reinforce South Korea or Japan. Colin Gray summarizes the strategic importance of the area:
“One might recall that the proximate casus belli for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was a Russian move to secure hegemony over Korea. Furthermore,
state, “The United States must establish its presence
Amer'1
and force upon the Soviets the risks of ousting
forces, rather than always finding itself in the situa11 having to remove the forces of hostile states.’ ^5, General George B. Crist, Commander in Chief Central Command, has outlined the utility of the
Corps in Southwest Asia: “The Maritime Preposh'1
mPle'
from the geostrategic perspective of Beijing, a strong U. S. military posture in Japanese and South Korean territory and waters, preferably with considerable offensive potential, is a vitally important constraint upon Soviet freedom of action against the Chinese heavy industrial base in Manchuria.”8
Since U. S. presence on the Eurasian landmass in the Far East and Southwest Asia is limited to South Korea, the Navy-Marine Corps team is at the heart of that “strong U. S. military posture” in the region. To be effective, the Marine Corps portion of that team must be prepared to deploy rapidly two MABs by air in the western Pacific and one MPS MAB to the Indian Ocean, even while two MABs and two MAU (SOC)s are at sea. This adds up to two MAFs for the Pacific theater.
During Phase II of the Amphibious Warfare Strategy, the MABs could conduct amphibious raids on Petropav- lovsk, the Kuriles, or elsewhere on the Soviet periphery as they combine to form composite MAFs. These MAFs would be used to increase pressure on the Soviet rimlands, perhaps shuttling by MABs from Hokkaido to Sakhalin or from the Aleutians to Kamchatka. If the war in Europe goes badly and the National Command Authorities believe a more substantial piece of Soviet real estate is needed to negotiate peace on favorable terms, there may be a two-
MAF assault on Vladivostok late in Phase III, after 1 e of Japan has been cleared of Soviet warships. ^ Indian OceanIPersian Gulf: Just which f°rce .pje United States should allocate to this region at the eXj gast of defending other more vital interests in Europe a ^ Asia has been the source of extended debate since ^ when President Jimmy Carter declared the security _ Persian Gulf to be a vital interest of the United .gS Given the Gulf states’ reluctance to grant the Unite1- ^vaj permanent bases, the best option appears to be a ^ presence backed up by the rapid deployment of a large enough to prevent a Soviet fait accomplim 0jie Pakistan. As Alvin J. Cottrell and Michael L. ^ j-rSt
C3f
of
Ship (MPS) squadron deployed to Diego Garcia con ^ ments our amphibious lift, and gives us the capabi j rapidly move a 16,500-man Marine brigade to a cr>slS and rapidly marry it up with its equipment.” 4.rines In this region, the United States will be using ^ for their readiness capability rather than for forcible c^g Therefore, the combination of a MAB with an ^ squadron and three-to-four amphibious assault ship* be the Marine Corps’ contribution to the area in Se ^ war, at least until Soviet intentions are determine MAU could provide security for the port and air fac . that are needed for MPS offload and MAB troop ar^oVg and the amphibious ready group could be used to
a three-MAF Marine Corps for
'erring
0Peratio° a^ress*on> operating in LIC, and conducting directly fS aur'n8 general war. This size can be derived interests T'11 U review °f geography, threat and vital U. S. tts with1 U'S0 meets the goal of one-third tempo of opera- six-month MAU (SOC) deployments and con-
Bai^::;th'n ^le theater. A MAU that had landed in the exaninie 30 re^'on op westem Pakistan/eastem Iran, for
whileth' MAd’Pr°Vide security for an MPS offload, ‘kplanin2 • \ S. amPhibious ships could shuttle troops ^uchistLn1 ^as*ra^’ ^man; or *n Karachi, Pakistan, to
ShiPPing for the Three-MAF Marine Corps
to reniemh'SCUKS'n® ernP^°yment possibilities it is helpful 0r a checkl^ ^at mar^^me strategy is not a timetable Parative a(/St’ ^Ut a ^ramcw°rk for using the U. S. com- War 0rr .^antage in maritime capability to deter general terms. T(,ai ln^ .t*lat’, t0 bring about peace on favorable context ofC po®s*hilities above should be considered in the theater c Cdl *“roPsey’s statement: “Wars are fought by ties and °miTlan^ers’ who must be able to seize opportunities ta^f01 ^anSers as they arise, without specific tirne- Washi’ „C lcl°r targets preordained somewhere inside the Th Beltway. ” 11 detenLf0re80in8 defines tinued six-month unit rotations to Okinawa. But how do we decide how many amphibious ships are required to fight three MAFs?
The Marine Corps measures the amount of amphibious shipping required to lift the assault echelons of a MAB with what is commonly termed a “footprint” (Table 4). It consists of troop capacity (bunk spaces), vehicle stowage (square feet), cargo capacity (cubic feet), and helicopter deck spots. Given a reasonable mix of amphibious ships from our present inventory, an assault echelon of a MAB would require about 20-24 ships to deploy.
Politically, the footprint concept is a gamble. The Marine Corps needs enough assault shipping to put three MABs and two MAU (SOC)s “on the water” simultaneously—space for about 50,000 troops and their equipment. In the clipped prose of congressional testimony it would be easier for the commandant to say the Marines need 76 amphibious ships—the number the Navy includes in its deployable battle force goal of 600 ships.12 This would certainly be more dramatic than asking for 50,000 bunk spaces.
The Navy does not ask Congress for a certain number of A-6 sorties and then let Congress choose the number and size of the platforms; the Navy wants 15 aircraft carriers of 90,000 tons each and says so right up front.
As the “more bang for the buck” service, it is a matter
Table 3 The Three-MAF Marine Corps*
Pacific III MAF | Atlantic II MAF | |
MpS MAB , (pAC) MpS MAB | PHIB MAB | MPS MAB |
(CENT) hib mab tJ^Mcr mab -^0_MAUs | AIR MAB | PHIB MAB |
USMCR MAB | AIR MAB | |
| USMCR MAB | |
| TWO MAUs |
nu,nbcred*s similar to Navy Fleet numbering, with odd Hiimu MAFs, MABs and MAUs deployed in the Pacific and even mberea in the Atlantic.
!?saefiae> (AE) Iotal
Troops
Table 4 Assault Echelon (AE) Lift Requirements
Vehicle Cargo
Square Cube LHD/CH-46
(Ksq ft) (Kcu ft) Equivalent
LCACILCUILCM-8
34,090 | 746 | 1,647 | 479 | 67/7/36 |
3,680 | 38 | 146 |
|
|
10,790 | 273 | 624 | 156 | 24/3/14 |
1,440 | 20 | 73 |
|
|
50,000 | 1,077 | 2,490 | 635 | 90/10/50 |
Und' ~ Marine Amphibious Force, MAB = Marine Amphibious Brigade, NSE = Navy Support Element, LCAC = Landing Craft, Air Cushion, LCU ln£ Craft. Utility, LCM = Landing Craft, Mechanized
Brigading the Marine Corps
cohesion and to reduce the hea quarters to riflemen ratio a problem that was exacerbated y creating permanent MAB hea - quarters while retaining the divi sion, wing, and force service sup port group headquarters.
Clausewitz’ arguments on thv impact of organization on disp°sl tion could be further applied to the internal organization of the MAB itself. “It follows,” he says, “that the number of subdivisions with equal status shou be as large as possible, and the chain of command as short as
It is difficult to write about the forces needed to execute the national defense strategy without crossing the line into tactics. Military writers, especially, tend to return to their roots—squads and platoons—when discussing strategy. Karl von Clausewitz faced a similar problem in his classic On War, and solved it by stressing the importance of understanding how strategy affects tactics. “The order of battle, as we have defined it,” he said, “was, therefore, bound to interact with strategy; and the interaction is most marked at those points where strategy and tactics meet—in other words, where general deployment of armies passes into
actual dispositions for battle.”1 A similar problem arises when discussing the Marine Corps’ role in the national defense strategy.
In examining why we need three Marine amphibious forces (MAFs) and how they will get to the fight, we cross into strategic deployment, the point where strategy and tactics begin to meet for amphibious forces. If the Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) is the most likely form of employment for Marines in either low-intensity
conflict or in the early phases of general war, and our contingency plans and strategic lift are apportioned accordingly, then why not brigade the Marine Corps?
Clausewitz notes the difference between “organization,” the peacetime structure, and “disposition,” wartime employment. In discussing order of battle, Clausewitz emphasizes the peacetime structure and training as building blocks for a successful wartime employment. “The army’s disposition starts from the basic tactics in which it has been instructed and trained in time of peace—characteristics not susceptible to basic change once war has broken out.”2
Currently, only one MAB, the 1st MAB in Hawaii, is responsible for both the peacetime administration and training and the wartime employment of its Marines. The remaining MABs serve as planning headquarters, while their personnel and equipment remain in the care of a division or wing headquarters until embarkation. Besides best supporting the national defense strategy, creating permanent MABs would allow the Marine Corps to increase unit possible; the only qualification being that command is diffiem1 1 exercise over more than eight to ten subdivisions in an army, an over more than four to six of them in smaller units.”3 Clausewitz would probably wonder how air support and coin bat service support had achieve “equal status” with the groun combat element of the present MAB, and how the MAB commander had become insulated from his maneuver elements b^ an “extra level of command.
The MAB could resolve the tra off between a shortened chain o command and a manageable span of control by giving the MAB commander direct control of h|s maneuver battalions while reta'nser, ing the existing air and combat vice support organizations.
'Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and o lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pre5S’ 1984), p. 293.
2lbid., p. 292.
3Idib., p. 295.
"Ibid.
of pride to the Marine Corps that it asks support for clearly identified needs, no matter how boring the text. The request has been spruced up with the “sufficient lift for the assault echelons of a MAF and a MAB” line, but in using that argument the Marines may be forced to explain where they intend to employ an embarked MAF. Pointing to a
, f cail f°f
stack of unified commanders’ operation plans thai more than four MAFs will not suffice. ^ the
Given the standup of permanent MAB headquarter ’ay prepositioning of MAB-size equipment sets in .. joas and on MPS, and the theater allocation of amp*11 ^at shipping, it is fairly obvious to congressional stair •
\9»1
and wi ,° t 6 ^uture wd* as MABs, not as divisions necessa e Murines’ best argument for securing the
,rooDs (th 11 rema'ns their requirement to lift 50,000 (LHn i\hree MABs and two MAUs). As the first Wasp creased S ^ Whidbey-Isk,nd (LSD-4 l)s, with their in- ber of ,Car£° and trooP caPac't>'> join the fleet, the num- into the 'fs^e<lu'red to carry the three-MAF Marine Corps come tl§ht Wil1 decrease, and the number 76 will be- The aningleSS‘
entry oyn’ted .^tates needs either an amphibious forcible where it ^ deP*°yment capability in those regions land for. °CS not ^ave luxury of permanently based amPhibiCeS t^lree'MAF Marine Corps, composed of CaPabilit°US’ . and airlifted MABs, can provide these Marines ICS.^lt*ler 'n l°w intensity conflicts or general war. ter in N W* m°St d^ely be deployed in the Atlantic thea- Pacifjc theal^' 'n ^ Basin, and throughout the
fends ltManne ^0IPS W‘B be on solid ground when it de- 1°; it Wiu aree'MAF structure during the rewrite of Title oUs |jj-(' slmPly need to point out that given the amphibi- Vlarin P’^ndy available, near-term deployment of the °rps during general war will be a tight fit.
'John F. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy,” “The Maritime Strategy." supplement to U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 32-33.
Title 10 U. S. Code, Section 5013.
department of State and Department of Defense, The Challenge to Democracy in Central America (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, October 1986), pp. 7-36.
4Colin S. Gray, Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (New York: Ramapo Press, 1986), p. 59.
5MGen Edward B. Atkeson. USA (Ret.), "The Persian Gulf: Still a Vital U. S. Interest?” Armed Forces Journal (April 1987). p. 46-56.
"Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Game Plan: How to Conduct the U. S. Soviet Contest" (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, J986), pp. 41-65.
7Jeffrey Record, Revising U. S. Military Strategy, Tailoring Means to Ends (Washington, DC: Pcrgamon-Braseys, 1984). p. 77.
"Gray, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
9Alvin J. Cottrell and Michael L. Moodie, The United States and the Persian Gulf- Past Mistakes, Present Needs (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 35. '"Statement of General George B. Crist, USMC, Commander in Chief. U. S. CENTCOM before the SASC on January 27, 1987.
' ‘Seth Cropsey, “Forward Defense or Maginot Line?” Policy Review (Fall 1986), p. 41.
'"Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 1988, Executive Summary’, p. 168.
Captain Decker is currently attending the Defense Intelligence College. He has served as a platoon commander and an assistant operations officer with Batallion Landing Team 2/6 during 1981 and 1983 deployments in the Mediterranean. He graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1980 and received an M.A. in Govemment/Nationa! Security Studies from Georgetown University in 1987.
------------------------------------------------------- Pulling Rank_____________________
Two battleships assigned to the training squadron had been at sea on maneuvers in heavy weather for several days. I was serving on the lead battleship and was on watch on the bridge as night fell. The visibility was poor with patchy fog, so the captain remained on the bridge keeping an eye on all activities.
Shortly after dark, the lookout on the wing of the bridge reported, “Light, bearing on the starboard bow.”
“Is it steady or moving astern?” the captain called out.
Lookout replied, “Steady, captain,” which meant we were on a dangerous collision course with that ship.
The captain then called to the signalman, “Signal that ship: We are on a collision course, advise you change course 20°. ”
Back came a signal, “Advisable for you to change course 20°.”
In reply, the captain said, “Send: I’m a captain, change course 20°!”
“I’m a seaman second class,” came the reply, “You had better change course 20°.”
By that time, the captain was furious. He spit out, “Send: I’m a battleship, change course 20°.”
Back came the flashing light, “I’m a lighthouse!”
We changed course.
Frank Koch
------------------------------------------------------- Eager Beaver______________________
A Royal Navy recruiter wrote in the London Observer: “A small boy looked eagerly at the pictures of warships and foreign places in the window of my office where I work as a recruiter. Then he came to my desk and said: ‘I want to be a sailor.’ I gave him a colored brochure and told him to come back in eight years. He looked disappointed as he walked out, then came back and asked: “Morning or afternoon?”’
Herm Albright