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According to the authors of The Generals’ War, the effort to win the Persian Gulf War was marred by discord at the upper levels of U.S. leadership, excessive centralization of military authority, and interservice competition in the field.
The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf
Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. 560 pp. Ulus. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $27.95 ($25.15).
Reviewed by Dr. Russell F. Weigley
This provocative analysis of the Persian Gulf War by the chief Pentagon correspondent of The New York Times and a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general (who also has been a military correspondent of The New York Times) is essential reading. It is so not only for those wishing to keep up with the literature of the Persian Gulf War but also—and even more importantly—for anyone concerned about the effectiveness of the current U.S. military.
It suggests that, paradoxically, command of the armed forces is both excessively centralized in the person of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and insufficiently “joint” in the field.
The effect is centralized control of strategy and of military influence on policymaking but disjunctures in attempting to effect strategic goals on the other levels of the military art—e.g., in the Persian Gulf, each service largely was allowed to do its own thing, operationally and tactically. The anomalies of this command structure were aggravated during the Persian Gulf War because the JCS Chairman—General Colin L.
Powell—was much more a uniformed politician than a master of military command—but perhaps that situation also is implicit in the current organization of the Department of Defense and the JCS.
The Generals ’ War suggests that sometimes the conventional wisdom is not merely conventional but actually wise. So, it is an additional paradox—at least in terms of the conventional wisdom regarding the attitudes of professional military men—that General Powell was one of the most pacific influences on U.S. policy and strategy. Problems arise when a nation’s chief military man, the representative of armed force, opposes using such force except in extraordinary circumstances.
Up to the Persian Gulf War, General
Powell consistently opposed most kinds of employment of U.S. military power in the Middle East. General Powell, of course, has contended that whenever and wherever military force is to be used, it should be overwhelming. This principle does not readily embrace the deployment—for deterrence—of the less-than- overwhelming power likely to be available in peacetime. Therefore, when civilians in the State and Defense Departments urged deterrent military gestures in the Persian Gulf, General Powell rejected the idea and helped to block military efforts that might have convinced Iraq of the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to its allies—and thereby headed off war in the first place. At least he remained consistent in his reluctance to accept the Middle East as a suitable arena for U.S. military action. According to Mr. Gordon and General Trainor, he would not have gone to war to liberate Kuwait, but only to prevent further Iraqi conquests. Overruled by President George Bush about accepting the loss of Kuwait. General Powell nevertheless used his influence inside the government—and even within the anti-Iraq alliance—to try to postpone military operations and to rely instead on economic sanctions. He was overruled again.
Admittedly, General Powell’s insistence on a military buildup more than ample to ensure victory contributed much to the dramatic success of Operation Desert Storm. But he also contributed to unsatisfactory peacemaking. He was so determined that military action must be brief that he played a decisive part in ending the ground offensive before the Iraqi ground forces were destroyed substantially—although, earlier, such destruction had been his own criterion for victory— and before the United States assured itself of enough leverage over Iraq to guarantee the enforcement of conditions that would deny Saddam Hussein the means to become a menace again. To be sure, General Powell was hardly alone in the Bush administration in settling for the appearance of swift and spectacular defeat of Hussein rather than running risks for the sake of a greater reality of victory. Yet, the whole history of the Persian Gulf War demonstrates that the problems with General Powell’s leadership—and the impact that centralization of military' authority in the JCS Chairman gave it— run far deeper than the fact that General Powell was an unexpectedly pacific influence. The deeper issues involve the undermining of strategy and policy alike through his reluctance to employ military force except with the most minimal risks: war was not deterred although it might have been, and when war began it was not pursued until the conclusion ensured that the costs were worth paying.
Mr. Gordon and General Trainor also emphasize that the commander on the scene—the head of U.S. Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf— also contributed to muddling the prospects for an effective victory. He did so in part by agreeing during the truce negotiations to allow Iraq to fly its military helicopters, which went a long way toward enabling Saddam Hussein to put down Shiite and Kurdish rebellions. General Schwarzkopf did more by falling in with General Powell’s rush to end the ground war after four days even though his own planners had envisaged an additional day. Much could have been done to destroy Iraq’s Republican Guard with that extra day.
But the making of an incomplete victory in terms of what the theater command was doing—as distinguished from what went on in Washington—reaches back well before the last hours of the ground war. It goes to the beginning of the ground offensive and, despite the theory of joint operations and command, to the tendency for each service to get its own way. In particular, the Army and the Marine Corps each planned and conducted its own part of the land campaign, and coordination between them was tenuous.
General Schwarzkopfs grand operational design was to envelop the most formidable elements of the Iraqi Army, especially the Republican Guard, with his now-famous left hook. Beginning on 25 February, the hook would be thrown by VII Corps—with the XVIII Airborne Corps going even farther to the left and ranging all the way to the Euphrates River. The 1st and 2d Marine Divisions were to open the door to the rout and then the entrapment of the Iraqis by attacking across the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait border—and directly into the Iraqi defenses—beginning at 0359 on 24 February. The Iraqi Army crumbled under the Marines’ assault almost immediately. Even though the Army consequently received orders to launch the left hook earlier than planned—beginning with an artillery barrage at 1430 on 24 February— the Iraqi retreat was already too far along for the desired entrapment to take place. If the coordination between the two Army corps had been better and the ground offensive had gone into the planned fifth day, the Republican Guard might yet have been destroyed. A genuinely joint command, however, would have recognized the quick collapse of the Iraqis’ spoiling attack that became the battle of Khafji on 28-30 January for what it was—ample evidence that the enemy would flee before the Marines’ assault—and would have sent the Army’s enveloping force forward earlier, not later than the Marines.
Beyond the overriding issues of command, Mr. Gordon and General Trainor detail much else about the war. Readers of this journal should pay special attention to what they say about the prepositioning of Marine Corps equipment, the deficiencies of the Navy’s minesweeping capabilities, and the reasons why not even a feint toward an amphibious assault occurred. There also is a penetrating survey and critique of the air campaign.
But above all, this book is correctly titled. It is primarily about the generals’ war, and it is an analysis that scarcely enhances the reputation of Norman Schwarzkopf—and raises still more doubts about the stature of Colin Powell.
A Professor of History at Temple University, Dr. Weigley is the author of many works of military history, including The American Way of War (Macmillan, 1973), and Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (Indiana University Press, 1981).
China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
393 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos.
$45.00 ($40.50).
Reviewed by A. D. Baker, III
A more relevant subtitle for China’s Strategic Seapower might have been “Such As It Is,” for the amazingly detailed study by Stanford University’s John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai chronicles the agonizingly complex and torturous progress of China’s 20-year effort to produce just one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. China’s strategic sea power is embodied in the primitive, one- and-only Project 09-2 submarine—known in the West by its intelligence community nickname, the “Xia.” That submarine has launched exactly two missiles, both back in 1988, and its weight in the worldwide strategic nuclear power equation is exceedingly minimal. Building the Xia with its dozen nuclear-payload missiles cost China untold wealth, and tens of thousands of Chinese engineers labored and even literally fought to develop it for two decades.
Heavily annotated, this work includes some 74 pages of end-notes and a 44- page list of cited references to back up its 242 pages of densely written but clearly organized text. As scholarship, it is a tour de force, revealing innumerable sources never tapped before in a study of the military capabilities of China’s supposedly closed society. China's Strategic Seapower excels in relating the tortured politics and halting progress in the gestation of the submarine itself, and the book is especially successful in describing the complex development of the submerged-launch JL-1 ballistic missiles for the Xia. China’s leaders were rebuffed contemptuously by Nikita Khrushchev when they asked for assistance in the development of their own ballistic missile submarine capability. (The only concrete help before the 1960 split with Russia was the provision of the components to build a Soviet Golf-class diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine—but no missiles.) Thus, in order to emulate the Soviet Union and the West, Mao Zedong and his successors had to direct vast resources into the development of an indigenous capability to assemble and test not only the missiles and the submarine systems, but even such assets as a complete fleet of specialized ships to provide instrumented data about the missile launches.
The authors have been adept in unearthing an amazing array of sources to describe the successful solving of the myriad of complex technical challenges faced by the Chinese missile engineers, who worked with virtually no outside assistance. The description of the development of the Project 09-1 nuclear-powered attack submarines and of the Project 09-2 ballistic-missile submarine based on their design is less successful, however, perhaps because the U.S. experts the authors consulted seem to have confused Chinese references to twin turbines in the submarines with twin propellers; both classes of submarines have but a single, centerline propeller. The authors also have been led into misidentifying several of the large number of generally excellent photographs chosen to illustrate the text: a Soviet Northern Fleet Golf-class submarine is said to be the Chinese unit, while the modified Romeo-class cruise missile submarine is said to be a unit of the Project “39” class.
The major omission of the book is not technical. The authors, rather, in their brief section on strategy, never manage to explain how the Chinese planned to operate their one-ship strategic deterrence fleet nor what difference its small number of not-very-accurate missiles might have made in keeping the superpowers at bay. Indeed, the Xia’s operations, if any, subsequent to its triumphant submerged launch of two ballistic missiles in 1988 are never mentioned. All that work by all those people under such awful conditions of political and physical stress, and its ultimate meaning is not addressed.
These reservations aside, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai have performed an amazing feat of scholarship in the writing of their book, and the lessons it does provide in how weapons research and development are pursued amidst the chaos of Communist Chinese politics provide invaluable guidance for those seeking to understand what China might accomplish in the future—especially with the added benefits of the renewed competition among Western and Russian arms industries to sell the Chinese their latest and greatest developments.
Mr. Baker is the editor of the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World and a frequent contributor to Proceedings and Naval History.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Anyone Here a Sailor? Volume 1:
Popular Entertainment and the Navy
Dennis Carpenter and Joseph Dorinson. Great Neck, New York: Brightlights Publications, 1994. 240 pp. Photos. $22.95 ($20.65) Paper.
What do Raymond Burr, Bill Cosby, Henry Fonda, Soupy Sales, and Herman Wouk have in common? They all served in the United States Navy. This unusual book provides minibiographies of 140 sailor-celebrities and minireviews of more than 150 Navy-related Hollywood movies and television programs. Pierre Salinger—also a Navy veteran—contributed the foreword.
& Appointment with the Squire
Don Davis. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 1995. 368 pp. $24.95 ($19.96).
A nationally known crime reporter, Mr. Davis turns to fiction for the first time in this history-based thriller described by Kirkus Reviews as “very plausible, very possible, and very well-done.”
With action ranging from the front lines in World War II Europe to President Franklin Roosevelt’s retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia, this is a novel of sinister espionage and high- stakes adventure.
Besides a pageturning plot filled with suspense, land, aerial and naval combat, and human passions, the story rings true with historical plausibility and technical accuracy. Alongside a cast of believable fictional characters are the legendary personalities of the time who lend additional flavor and authenticity to this fast-paced story.
Chesapeake Steamboats: Vanished Fleet
David C. Holly. Centreville, MD: Cornell Maritime Press, 1994. 332 pp. Append. Bib. Ulus. Ind. Maps. Notes. $29.95 ($26.95).
Steamboats plying the great rivers of the nation’s interior—the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Ohio—are a familiar aspect of American maritime history. Lesser known—but no less important or interesting—are the steamboats that paddled the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries from 1813 to 1963. This is no dull design history, but a fascinating account of the engineering marvels, corporate battles, wartime intrigue, and maritime adventure related to the Chesapeake steamboats. Appendices include schematics of early steamboat engines and maps showing the regions served by these often unusual and always colorful ships.
A History of the Irish Naval Service
Aidan Mclvor. Dublin, Ireland: Irish Academic Press, 1994. 256 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Illus.
Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $39.50 ($37.53).
The origins, early history, and current operations and organization of the Irish Naval Service are detailed in this account. Operating modern patrol ships—and in conjunction with helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft of the Irish Air Corps—this small but significant force serves as a key element in European fishery protection, transports military supplies to Irish troops serving with the United Nations, and is playing an increasingly important role in drug interdiction.
Naval Warfare in the Baltic, 1939-1945: War in a Narrow Sea
C. W. Koburger. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994. 176 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss.
Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $49.95 ($47.45).
The Baltic Sea is one of the most strategically significant bodies of water in history. It was no different during World War II. Koburger’s history is unique among related works in that the roles of all the involved navies are considered. Also, the often overlooked Scandinavian forces receive an appropriate degree of consideration along with the German and Allied forces.
Prisoners of Hope: Exploiting the POW/MIA Myth in America
Susan Katz Keating. New York: Random House, 1994. 287 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $23.00 ($20.70).
“I was certain that live American POWs remained against their will in Vietnam. I became obsessed with finding the POWs. ... As the years went on, though, and no POWs surfaced, I began to realize a curious phenomenon about this story. It is deceptive, in that once you scratch the surface, you are convinced that POWs exist; but after you really dig, you discover the truth as put forth in this book.” So begins this thought-provoking and sure-to-be controversial book. The result of extensive research and careful analysis, it is worth reading—no matter what your preconceptions on the issue may be.
The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World
Maj. Richard A. Paulsen, USAF. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1994. 207 pp. Ind. Notes. Tables. Free. Available to active or retired Department of Defense employees only. Contact: Cadre-EDP: 170 West Selfridge St.; Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-6610.
Increased Third World instability and conflict in a multipolar world environment presents new challenges for U.S. strategists. Major .
Paulsen first revews the historical role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy and war preparations, then reviews current initiatives in search for their relevance in the post-CoId War world. Finally, he proposes “some overall nuclear force characteristics that would provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold war era by maintaining the capability to respond across the full spectrum of conflict.”
Scapowcr: Theory and Practice
Geoffrey Till, Editor. Portland, OR: International Specialized Book Services, 1994. 210 pp. Figs.
Ind. Notes. $35.00 ($33.25). $17.50 ($16.63). Paper.
Some of the world's foremost maritime strategists have contributed eight thought-provoking essays that analyze the role of seapower in world affairs. Among the contributions are Colin S. Gray’s "History for Strategists: British Seapower as a Relevant Past.” John Pay’s “Full Circle: The U.S. Navy and Its Carriers, 1974-1993,” and Geoffrey Till’s "Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century.”
■L The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Candian Navy and the Offensive Against Germany’s Submarines
Marc Milner. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 336 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Gloss.
Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $29.95 ($23.96).
Dr. Milner’s first book on the Battle of the Atlantic—North Atlantic Run (Naval Institute Press, 1985)—is the definitive account of the Royal Canadian Navy’s defensive battle against German submarines in the early years of the war. This new work continues the Canadian antisubmarine story and covers the latter years of the war when the RCN went on the offensive, seeking and destroying German submarines throughout the North Atlantic. The story addresses the changing technologies— on both sides—and the consequent changes in tactics that occurred between 1943 and 1945.
U.S. Intervention Policy for the PostCold War World: New Challenges and New Responses
Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, Editors.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. 226 pp. Bib.
Figs. Ind. Notes. $25.00 ($22.50).
Experts in government, political science, economics, the military, and international affairs join together to weigh the pros and cons of U.S. intervention in various theatres and situations in the post-Cold War world. Special at- tenton is pad to recent trouble spots, such as Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and the former Soviet Union.
Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order
Rosemary Righter. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995. 42! pp. Ind. Notes. $29.95. Order direct from: The Brookings Institution; 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.; Washington, D.C. 20036.
Although she contends that the United Nations has an important role in the post-Cold War world, Ms. Righter also argues that reforms are necessary if that controversial body is to be effective in the years to come. Although known as a critic of the UN, she nevertheless takes an optimistic—if somewhat guarded— view of the ogranization’s future in world affairs. She holds that a UN that does fewer things, but does them better should be the goal; she also believes that certain parts of the organization should submit themselves to the rigors of competition.
Wreck Ashore: The United States LifeSaving Service on the Great Lakes
Frederick Stonehouse. Duluth, MN: Lake Superior Port Cities, 1994. 220 pp. Append. Bib. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos. Tables. $24.95 ($22.45). Paper.
From 1870 to 1915—when it became one of the original components of the U.S. Coast Guard—the U.S. Life-Saving Service was responsible for rescue in coastal waters and other waterways. The exploits of the men of this agency—known at the time as the “storm warriors”—on the Great Lakes are recounted in detail, revealing exciting tales of daring rescues and harrowing disasters. These adventures are accompanied by a thorough discussion of many aspects of daily life in this vital service’s stations along “the Third Coast.”
On Air Defense
James D. Crabtree. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994. 230 pp. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Maps. Photos. $19.95 ($18.95). Paper.
From the early days of the French Revolution when artillery gunners fired on primitive balloons to the employment of Patriot missiles in the Persian Gulf War, this is a study of all aspects of air defense. Included are analyses of air defense in the two world wars, Vietnam, and war in the Middle East.
Women Marines in the Korean War Era
Peter A. Soderbergh. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994. 216 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $45.00 ($42.75).
The story of those relatively few women who maintained a “thin green line” by serving in the Marine Corps in the years following World War II and through the Korean War. In her Foreword, Colonel Eleanor M. Wilson, writes that “this book is written by a man with first-hand knowledge of combat,” and adds that “the author has chosen his method of healing and, in so doing, has left us with a social history to be enjoyed by generations to follow.”
Out of Uniform: A Career Transition Guide for Ex-Military Personnel
Harry N. Drier. Lincolnwood, IL: VGM Career Horizons, 1995. 256 pp. Append. Bib. Figs.
$12.95 ($12.30). Paper.
With chapters covering such topics as “The Psychology of Transition,” “Financing the Transition,” "The College Question,” “Navigating the Job Market,” and “Networking,” this new book provides useful information and reassurance to those men and women about to leave the military and embark on a civilian career.
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