Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century
Geoffrey Till. London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004. 430pp. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $36.95.
Reviewed by Captain Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy
This book is not so much a reinterpretation as a reintegration. It also deserves recognition as the best and most up-to-date discussion of sea power currently in print.
One of the foremost scholars on naval matters, Geoffrey Till is superbly qualified to attempt a reexamination of the concept of sea power in the context of 21st-century reality. Author or coauthor of such influential Cold War-era books as Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (New York: St. Martin's, 1982) and The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), Dr. Till currently is Dean of Academic Studies at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Swindon, United Kingdom, where his obvious focus is on jointness-or jointery, the corresponding British term. he also, however, maintains a presence in maritime debates through his editorship of publisher Frank Cass's book series on naval policy and history, in which his own book is volume 23. Naturally enough, his current work benefits from his editorship of others, as well as from his own extensive knowledge of the history of naval thought.
This knowledge is displayed in a calm, methodical fashion as Till maps out the first part of his book. he easily and effectively sails the reader through both the backgrounds and conclusions of the classical naval theorists to explain, as he puts it, "who said what and why it matters." This sortie alone is worth the attention of "don't know much about theory" readers. If you cannot tell your Corbett from your Callwell from your Colomb, but you are not thrilled about reading 1890s-era prose, Till's book is the place to go. This is one of the best of such syntheses.
Of course, no one can write about the "S" word (sea power), without addressing the "M" word (Mahan). That is where much writing on naval matters becomes either exhortative or dismissive. Till becomes neither and, in fact, patiently and convincingly points out both the similarities and complementary natures of Alfred Thayer Mahan's emphasis on sea control and the emphases of his supposed critics and rivals. This is why the book can be considered a reintegration of naval theory. Despite the interpretation of some modern scholars, it is likely that Mahan's contemporaries saw their own theories as refinements to his concept of sea power, not refutations. It is refreshing to see them portrayed in that light.
Having described the intellectual context, the author identifies the constituents of sea power. One of these is the influence of technology on naval operations, which in the modern era means the impact of information technology. Not a technologist, Till wisely skips any attempt at detailing systems. But he does come up with a series of factors that are critical for successful technology transformations. Military transformation advocates would do well to review them.
The heart of the book, however, is a series of chapters discussing securing and exploiting command of the sea. Like using the "M" word, defining command of the sea usually becomes an (unnecessarily) contentious issue, a battle between maritime and continental advocates. But as Till points out, most of the classical naval theorists saw command of the sea as a relative, not absolute, term. Thus, command of the sea-within a region-is as important for smaller navies with limited resources as it is for those with global capabilities. The author makes a critical point: command of the sea is not an end in itself, but is achieved for a purpose. Such purposes include expeditionary operations, naval diplomacy, and resource control-all discussed in detail by the author.
Concluding with a look at the future of sea power, Till provides no prediction that has not been discussed elsewhere previously, but he does emphasize a seldom-mentioned trend: smaller, presumably coastal defense navies are quietly acquiring ships and submarines with greater out-of-area capabilities. This trend runs contrary to the expectations of those who perceive navies as anachronistic in the post -Cold War world. In researching the book, the author spent some time consulting with naval thinkers in countries with smaller navies, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, so his assessment appears firsthand.
This book delivers exactly what its title promises, and delivers it well. Organized in textbook fashion with numbered subchapters, it is more than a textbook; it is an insightful assessment that (through its historical discussions) makes its logic explicit. Initially, I was put off by the textbook-style organization, but by the second chapter I found it to be no distraction-and it actually was quite helpful. If you happen to be teaching a course on sea power, it would be the perfect basic text. But for those of us who are not, it is a read that can bring you up to date on the subject while encouraging some thoughtful analysis of your own.
Captain Tangredi soon will assume the post of defense attache to Greece. he recently received the 2004 Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement from the Navy League of the United States.
Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War
John Darrell Sherwood. New York: NYU, 2004. 352 pp. Photos. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $32.95.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Denny Wisely, U.S. Navy (Retired)
What a pleasure to find John Sherwood not only has done his factual homework, but also written about many of my friends. From J. B. Souder to Mugs McKeown to Fingers Ensch to Randy Cunningham and even Sir "Snuffy" Smith, their stories all are here in vivid detail. The author brings to life America's longest and most controversial war and describes personal stories with such clarity it seems as if you are right there with these heroic people. There are no punches pulled when describing characters in the heat of battle, nor are there any pulled in describing how the politicians ran the war. This is a book written on multiple levels, and well worth reading.
Just when Navy aviators and their Air Force counterparts were making great strides-even with huge restrictions on targeting-in the air war against North Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson and secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pulled the rug out with a bombing halt in 1968. Afraid of bringing the Chinese and possibly the Soviets into the war, this restriction on bombing the North lasted until spring 1972. This was a severe blow to the warriors fighting the war. I wish Sherwood had included Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997) by H. R. McMaster in his extensive bibliography. He then might have expanded on his discussion of this Washington-directed, totally mismanaged air war that was executed as well as possible under the circumstances by dedicated professional aviators.
The chapters about J. B. Souder offer an extraordinary insight into the life and mind of a "tell it like it is, damn the consequences" true hero. From J.B.'s days in flight training, where he was cut for night vision, to his early days as a naval flight officer, his story is told as if you were there. J.B.'s description of his first MiG engagement, as documented so well by Sherwood, puts you in the cockpit of the F-4 Phantom. There are missiles flying everywhere, many of them friendly on friendly. J.B. paints the situational awareness picture from the vantage point of the pro that he was. I won't let you know what happens, because it is a graphic tale of air -to -air combat with all its shining glory and warts as well.
J.B. was again in the war in 1972. By this time, the war had dragged on and popular opinion had turned negative. President Richard Nixon was faced with several choices. After the huge Easter offensive by the North, he decided to pull out the stops and bring back the prisoners of war with honor. For those aviators flying strikes again, it was difficult. It was not easy to strap in a jet and get shot at when the support of their countrymen was not there. At the same time, however, the old "arm behind the back" rules of engagement and restrictions were significantly lifted, allowing much better targeting. Sherwood describes this very well. Again we find ourselves in an F-4 with J.B. in a flight led by the squadron commanding officer, the bigger-than-Iife Tooter Teague. Teague was hell bent on getting a MiG and got his chance, only to have J.B. and his pilot, Al Molinare, shot down.
As well as I know J.B., I did not realize what great things he did during his time "in jail" in Hanoi. Sherwood brings in people such as Robby Reasoner, Bud Day, Jim Stockdale, and Ron Polfer. These men, some of them there for more than six years, endured severe torture at the hands of the North Vietnamese. Many were maimed for life, while others were tortured to death. While Polfer and J.B. were the "new guys," Sherwood gives the reader great insight into the daily life of a prisoner of war. With basic training learned from his nurse sister, J.B. became the medic for a number of badly injured.
There are many other great stories. This book is hard to put down. If there is a fault from my perspective it is with the detail of Navy versus Air Force sortie counts. Although this war unfortunately was in many ways one of statistical analysis (maybe analogous to McNamara's "Wiz Kids"), I found these parts boring-it is the people that count.
Admiral Wisely flew 350 missions over Vietnam between 1965 and 1967 and most of 1972 in F-4s. During that time he became the first with two kills, was shot down on a Hanoi strike, was rescued by helo, and then became acting commanding officer by attrition. he later commanded Fighter Squadron 151, the Blue Angels, the Sylvania (AFS-2), and the carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67).
Surprise, Security, and the American Experience
John Lewis Gaddis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 128 pp. Notes. Index. $18.95.
Reviewed by Gebhard Schweigler
"A truly grand strategy" was how Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, in a much noted Foreign Policy review published in November -December 2002, assessed President George W. Bush's national security strategy. Gaddis (incorporating a series of lectures) now has enlarged that article into a book about the American experience with surprise attacks and resulting security issues. The slim volurne-118 pages of text plus notes and index-shares the all-too-common fate of such publications: it is a fascinating exploration of highly topical issues, full of insights and stimulating arguments, yet suffers from sweeping generalizations, many open questions, and not a few inconsistencies.
There is really nothing new in U.S. grand strategy, Gaddis argues. Unlike most other nations, the United States has "generally responded to threats-and particularly to surprise attacks-by taking the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security." Such a grand strategy must, not surprisingly, rest on three elements: preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. Having been attacked three times in its history, this is how the United States responded each time (and actively at other times in between, as well). When President Bush warned in june 2002 that Americans must "be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives," Gaddis claims, "he was echoing an old tradition rather than establishing a new one. Adams, Jackson, Polk, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson would all have understood it perfectly well."
It is a tradition founded by John Quincy Adams when he forced Spain to cede Florida to the United States by pointing out that the United States could not tolerate what would now be called a "failed state" in its neighborhood. Similarly, U.S. security was threatened by the reestablishment of European powers in the western hemisphere-thus the creation of the Monroe Doctrine. When James Polk took half of Mexico and Theodore Roosevelt (as Assistant secretary of the Navy and as President), claiming the need for "the exercise of an international police power," acquired some Caribbean and Pacific islands, the Isthmus of Panama, and the Philippines, these were the arguments used in defense of U.S. actions. Were Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt exceptions to such strategies? Well, yes and no. Reacting to changes in warfare that lessened the importance of distance (and thus the geographic protection afforded the United States), Wilson sought to enlarge the sphere of U.S. responsibility to everywhere through the concept of collective security, which the Senate promptly rejected. FDR overcame the resuiting period of relative isolationism only after the attack on Pearl Harbor and with two decisive innovations: by seeking allies who actually would do most of the fighting, and by establishing hegemony based on consent.
So why, if preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony are so well established, is the new strategy possibly "the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War"? The answer is not clear, and not helped by narrow -minded comparisons with President Bill Clinton's foreign policies. This new strategy is Wilsonian in nature ("spread democracy everywhere") and presumably FDRish in execution. In his original article, Gaddis laid down two markers for the success of such a strategy: "the willingness of the rest of the world to welcome U.S. power with open arms" in general, and especially "our being welcomed in Baghdad if we invade. . . . This strategy relies on getting cheered, not shot at." The latter statement is no longer to be found in the book. Strangely enough, Gaddis here claims at one point that the "direst warnings about the risks of military resistance . . . the eruption of outrage in the Arab world, a new outbreak of terrorism, a huge increase in the price of oil, and astronomical estimates of the human and material costs of the operation" did not come true, while complaining at a later point about the "raggedness" of the occupation and "a major diplomatic failure" when it came to getting international support. At this point at least, the strategy of spreading democracy (and thus security) through the almost unilateral occupation of Iraq no longer appears grand.
John Quincy Adams once famously warned against going abroad "in search of monsters to destroy" lest the United States become "the dictatress of the world" while no longer "the ruler of her own spirit." Gaddis thoughtfully returns to this central problem of U.S. grand strategy: How do you avoid the grandiose arrogance inherent in the "insistence that one nation's security is coterminous with that of everyone else"? Where do you draw the lines of an "empire of liberty"? His answer: some form of international consensual federalism. It seems a mere afterthought here. It should be the central thesis of a new book about U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century.
Dr. Schweigler is a professor of international relations and national security strategy at the National War College in Washington, D.C.