It is no secret that the U.S. icebreaker fleet lags that of Russia and that U.S. polar icebreaking capability is at risk. The new polar security cutters (PSCs) are on the way after many delays, but the Coast Guard is considering acquiring a civilian icebreaker to quickly augment the fleet. The M/V Aiviq, a commercial offshore supply vessel with basic icebreaking capability, is the only available ship that on paper meets the service’s requirements, but buying and refitting the Aiviq would be a waste of time and money.
There is a better option: Bring back the USCGC Polar Sea (WAGB-11). Rather than spending $150 million to buy plus untold millions more to modify the Aiviq, the Coast Guard should spend roughly $250 million revitalizing the Polar Sea and regain one of the most capable icebreakers in the world.
Historical Context
The USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-10) reached the end of her 30-year service life in 2006, and the Coast Guard then laid her up. There was no money to do necessary maintenance on the Polar Star and no plan to recapitalize the icebreaker fleet, so the service focused on keeping the Polar Sea alive. It was not until 2008, when the Polar Sea reached the end of her service life, that the Coast Guard began studies to determine what assets it needed to perform its missions in the polar regions.
At the time, the Coast Guard estimated new heavy icebreakers would cost $800 to $900 million per vessel and take eight to ten years to deliver the first unit. In the meantime, the Polar-class icebreakers could get another 25 years of service for $400 million each or extend their life just long enough to commission the next class—eight to ten years of life support to prevent the loss of icebreaking capability—for about $60 million each. It was at this time that then-Commandant Admiral Thad Allen said the Coast Guard was at a “crisis point” on how to recapitalize the icebreaker fleet.
The Coast Guard elected the second option. Congress authorized reactivation of the Polar Star—she was overhauled and back in operation in late 2013—and the Polar Sea received significant investment, including work to improve her material condition.
Disaster struck when Polar Sea suffered catastrophic engine failure on all six of her main propulsion diesel generators in 2010 after botched upgrades. Engineers estimated it would cost $30 to $50 million to replace the engines and a total of $100 million plus 15 months in dry dock to make her operational again. Coast Guard leaders intended to scrap her, but three senators from Alaska and Washington asked the Coast Guard to hold off. Polar Sea has been tied to Seattle’s Pier 36 in caretaker status ever since. Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger testified before Congress supporting repairs. Then-Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. also testified, but said repairing her was a poor option compared to developing new ships.
Recapitalization of the Polar Sea did gain some congressional support. In 2016, Senators Maria Cantwell, Dan Sullivan, and Patty Murray proposed legislation to allocate $150 million to repair her. The Coast Guard was generally uninterested.
Enter the Aiviq. After Royal Dutch Shell stopped drilling for oil in the Arctic, Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO), the Aiviq’s owner, began marketing its 360-foot ice-capable offshore supply vessel and anchor-handling tug to the Coast Guard as a bona fide polar icebreaker in 2015. The Coast Guard declined, stating that the Aiviq “was not suitable for military service without substantial refit.”
Finally, in 2017, then–Admiral Paul F. Zukunft declared that the Polar Sea would be no more than a parts donor for the Polar Star. Reactivation was simply too expensive.
It was not until 2018 that bidding opened on the contract for the new polar security cutters. Halter Marine won the $1.9 billion contract for two vessels and an option to build a third. It planned to deliver the first vessel in 2024, but this has been pushed back to 2027 or 2028 after design delays, bankruptcy, and supply chain problems. With the PSCs still years away, the Coast Guard decided to give the Polar Star an extensive $76.2 million service life extension beginning in 2021.
Change of Heart for the Aiviq
After declining to purchase the Aiviq several times since 2015, the Coast Guard has warmed to the idea of giving her a multimillion-dollar overhaul and a coat of red paint. The fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget included money to buy the vessel, but Congress removed it at the last minute. Admiral Schultz told Congress the Coast Guard “could use the ship to shape our thinking about what the Arctic security requirements could look like.”
However, building the mission around the ship is fundamentally backward. The Coast Guard has known since 2011 what it needs: three heavy and three medium icebreakers. If the Healy is the standard for a medium icebreaker, the Aiviq will fall short, even after millions of dollars in modification.
Nobody knows how much it will cost to refit the Aiviq. There is some precedent, though. The Canadian Coast Guard recently bought and converted three Norwegian icebreakers that were slightly smaller than the Aiviq. The program cost roughly $615 million in U.S. dollars ($205 million per vessel), and delivery was delayed up to three years. These ships are a full 85 feet shorter than the Aiviq and also needed “substantial refit.” Scaling acquisition cost to vessel length, the Aiviq could cost up to $260 million to acquire and put into service.
In addition, each new class of vessel needs a new support network of technicians, spare parts, and support facilities, etc. A new class of three ships can be worth it. A single ship is much harder to justify. If it purchased the Aiviq, the Coast Guard would have a nonstandard asset, all the costs associated with maintaining a class of one, and still would need three heavy and three medium icebreakers. It would be a win for ECO but a loss for the Coast Guard.
Intentionality
Bringing the Polar Sea back has several advantages over buying the Aiviq, not least of which being that it may end up costing about the same amount for greater capability. The figures created during the 2010s would need to be reassessed, but replacing the engines, doing other upgrades, and conducting a service life extension likely would cost between $225 and $250 million and require 20 months in dry dock. Contrast that with $150 million plus untold millions more and 18–20 months in dry dock to convert the Aiviq. The Polar Sea can break 6 feet of ice at 3 knots and 21 feet backing and ramming, making her and the Polar Star the most powerful non-nuclear icebreakers in the world. The Aiviq can break a nominal 3.3 feet of ice at 5 knots, but ECO shied away from proving it in ice trials for fear of failing to meet the Coast Guard’s standards.1 And, she has no helicopter hangar. The choice here should be clear.
The Polar Sea is an old vessel, and bringing her back is not ideal. But she is a machine, and machines do not know how old they are. They only know whether they have been maintained properly. In the case of the Polar class icebreakers, the hulls and primary structures are still in excellent condition. It would not be necessary to “scoop out” the hull and build in a new boat, as some suggest. The Navy vessels USS Blue Ridge and Mount Whitney are examples of how old ships can be maintained and upgraded to stay at the cutting edge. Although they are almost a decade older than the Polar class, they remain flagships and boast some of the most sophisticated communications equipment and electronics afloat. They are unique and expensive to replace like the Polar class, so the Navy takes care of them.
Replacing the engines is difficult, but doable. The Polar Sea uses six Alco V16 251F diesel engines, the same series as in the 210-foot Reliance-class and 270-foot Famous-class cutters. Fairbanks Morse still provides full support for 251-series engines. There already is an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract to produce new engine blocks and support for the 270 fleet. It would be relatively simple to produce six more engines for the Polar Sea.
The Polar class icebreakers are engineering marvels. The innovative hull form was the brainchild of Coast Guard Captain Roderick White, who developed an icebreaker bow at MIT that maximized the downward breaking force on the ice while minimizing the force needed to extract the vessel when backing and ramming. Lockheed Shipbuilding consulted White when it started designing the Polar class icebreakers. Even though the seakeeping is not stellar, the ships are extremely easy to drive and maneuver in the ice, where it counts.
It is a shame that an extraordinarily capable ship such as the Polar Sea has been broken down and mocked as “Building Eleven” at a time when the Coast Guard needs icebreakers more than ever. The time is ripe to bring back the twin of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker and to rebuild the Coast Guard’s icebreaking capability in an intentional, thoughtful way. Buying and refitting the Aiviq does not fit into that picture.
The Capture of the Externsteine
The aurora subsided the night of 15 November 1944 and left the German icebreaker Externsteine in the dark. She was trapped off Greenland, hemmed in by pack ice, which muffles any noise and makes the vast, dark expanse seem to close in. The German captain must have felt secure—until volleys of five-inch shells from the USCGC Eastwind (WAGB-279) ripped through the night and exploded around his vessel: one short, one over, and one across the bow. The next would have sunk him and his men had he not promptly surrendered.
The attack stunned the German captain. He sooner thought tanks had driven over the ice than that a ship had managed to break through and attack from 4,000 yards undetected. After the Eastwind took the crew prisoner, Coast Guardsmen went aboard, renamed the vessel East Breeze, and sailed into Boston harbor with their prize. So goes the story of one of the few American captures of an enemy vessel in World War II and the farthest north of any naval combat in history.1
Now, imagine this. The scene is Bering Strait, and the Second Cold War has gotten hot. The German vessel is the USCGC Aiviq, a former offshore supply vessel with basic icebreaking capability, and the 33,000-ton Russian nuclear icebreaker Arktika stands in place of the Eastwind. Counting on the enemy to provide an opportunity to surrender before sending the Aiviq to Davy Jones’s Locker is not exactly a winning strategy. But supposing the Russians did take the Americans prisoner, they probably would not bother with the Aiviq. After all, they already have a fleet of far more capable icebreakers. They would just sink her.
1. CAPT Charles W. Thomas, USCG, Ice is Where You Find It, 1st ed. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1 January1951), 211–27.
1. “Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 10 December 2018, 31–33.