The aircraft carrier command duty officer (underway) (CDO[U]) qualification is a requirement for naval aviators and naval flight officers to be eligible for major command at sea.1 Officers undergoing the qualification process must conn the ship during flight operations and underway replenishment evolutions, observe several special sea-and-anchor details, and demonstrate their understanding of the ship’s general operating requirements through written and oral examinations. This qualification process is broadening and educational. It is also a wasted opportunity to build a more lethal ship/air wing team.
As currently executed, the CDO(U) qualification program focuses on the routine operations of a carrier at sea. Understanding the sheer complexity, herculean efforts, and decision-making that enable the daily operation of an aircraft carrier is valuable to the professional development of embarked aviators. Further, while focusing on routine operations was sufficient during the past several decades of uncontested U.S. dominance at sea, today the carrier’s operational environment has changed rapidly and dramatically. The CDO(U) qualification process must change too and shift its focus from routine to tactical operations.
A More Tactical Qualification Process
The qualification program should focus on understanding the interactive dependencies of the ship and air wing in combat. For example, CDO(U) candidates conning the ship currently understand the effect of multiple failed aircraft recoveries on the length of a recovery cycle and the subsequent loss of sea space. But it is more important that they understand how best to balance sortie numbers, types, and lengths with the ship’s ability to rapidly reposition. In addition, they should understand how the capabilities and limitations of the air wing, ship’s defensive systems, and intelligence systems inform the carrier commanding officer’s tactical decision-making. Ultimately, this qualification process must focus on building a holistic understanding of the ship and air wing as components of a single tactical unit in combat.
Examining the governing instruction for CDO(U) qualification on one of the Navy’s aircraft carriers reveals the program’s current lack of focus on combat operations. It lists six required readings, ranging from the ship’s navigation watchbill to a section of the OpNav instruction on the Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) of the U.S. Navy. There is no requirement to read the naval tactical publications that inform the commanding officer’s tactical decisions. The qualification process requires trainees to stand multiple watches as conning officer and a watch in the propulsion plant. It does not require trainees to stand a watch with the ship’s tactical action officer; only a tour and discussion of the ship’s combat systems are required. Tactical watches—whether stood in the electronic warfare module, carrier intelligence center, or combat direction center—should supplement watches stood on the bridge. The final qualification board held with the commanding officer must incorporate tactical scenarios and decision-making.
Any growth in tactical training requirements should be offset by a corresponding reduction in routine training requirements. CDO(U) candidates do not have unlimited time to devote to this qualification. They do, generally, have many years’ experience learning, considering, and perfecting tactical execution within their aircraft. It is far more important that CDO(U) candidates understand how to mitigate the tactical vulnerabilities a ship incurs while performing an underway replenishment than observing the same evolution at a fueling or cargo station. Framing the CDO(U) qualification as one that is inherently tactical in nature may also spur innovation within carrier tactics. A broader array of officers thinking deliberately about carrier combat operations would yield a wider range of perspectives to examine the challenges the current operating environment presents.
Some may argue that substantially changing the CDO(U) qualification offers little return on investment. While this qualification is a requirement for major command at sea, most of the qualifying officers will never serve in that capacity. Eligible officers generally qualify as command duty officers while serving as aviation squadron department heads. A smaller portion of those who qualify will be selected for operational O-5 command, and a smaller portion of those will screen for major (O-6) command at sea. This provides even more compelling justification to change the qualification process.
Most officers not selected for operational O-5 command will likely continue to serve the Navy both at sea and in key staff billets. Many officers not selected for major command at sea will do likewise. It is debatable whether these officers need to understand how to properly make up tugs when a carrier is leaving or entering port. There is no dispute, however, that senior naval aviation officers need to more fully understand the tactical employment of aircraft carriers engaged in major combat operations.
The CDO(U) qualification process can be revised quickly and at no added cost to the Navy. A tactically oriented qualification process does not require temporary duty budgeting, simulator scheduling, or external resources, nor does it necessarily require additional time from CDO(U) candidates. It simply requires an honest assessment of whether the current process remains sufficient in meeting the needs of a Navy that must be ready for war at sea.
1. Officers may also satisfy this requirement through qualification as fleet officer of the deck (underway).