Professional military education (PME) encompasses the formal education and professional development of military personnel and provides them essential academic opportunities to develop their critical thinking, leadership, warfighting, and staff operations capabilities. However, in recent years, the current officer PME enterprise has been accused of not adequately preparing U.S. military officers for the challenges of the modern operating environment.
The most common refrain, and one directly asserted in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, is that PME stagnated during the global war on terror years as operational requirements focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency and stability operations. Some argue that this shift in focus came at the expense of core warfighting competencies, with PME institutions devaluing instruction related to operational warfare, military history, and combined arms. With the reemergence of great power competition and the increased possibility of great power war, the debate has shifted from a niche topic to a core national security issue.
Over a nine-month period, a George Washington University–based research team worked in collaboration with a variety of service PME stakeholders to assess whether Navy and Marine Corps intermediate-level school (ILS) PME programs are properly preparing officers for their follow-on assignments and for the requirements of multidomain, joint, high-end warfighting. The research incorporated both qualitative and quantitative research methods to identify trends, determine causality, and develop realistic and actionable recommendations for PME program improvements. What follows is the result of more than 20 interviews with a range of Navy and Marine Corps PME stakeholders, including leaders in the fleet and current and former ILS PME faculty and staff, and the analysis derived from the survey feedback of 96 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps ILS PME complete officers.
Command and Staff Graduate Student Survey Feedback
From February to March 2023, with the support of the U.S. Naval Institute and CIMSEC, the research team solicited survey feedback from Navy and Marine Corps ILS PME graduates. Because of the software used, the research team was capped at 41 Marine Corps respondents and 45 Navy respondents. With such a small sample size, it is important to note that the research team does not present the below data as a comprehensive representation of the thousands of Navy and Marine Corps PME students who have attended remote and in-residence College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) and Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) over the years, but rather a sample meant to inform the public-facing discussion regarding this topic.
While both Marine Corps University (MCU) and Naval War College (NWC) also conduct their own extensive surveys of graduates to inform their own internal decision-making and curriculum development, this data is generally not publicly available. The analysis to follow provides important context and data from a small but useful sample size that can be used to inform public debates over the future of PME. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the survey responses serve as a subjective perspective of a select group of PME graduates and should not be taken as an authoritative assessment of the effectiveness of the CNCS and MCCSC program objectives or learning outcomes.
Primary Survey Questions: Navy Results
Key Takeaway: While most of the surveyed naval officers responded that their PME experience prepared them for their current assignment, a slight majority felt it was not adequate to prepare them for their anticipated role during high-end combat operations.
The first of the two primary research questions posed was, “How well do you feel that the core curriculum of Command and Staff prepared you for your current assignment?” The intent for this question was to determine a baseline among respondents to understand the perceived return on investment for their time spent at PME, either in residence or on their free time for those who attended non-resident. (See Figure 1).
The second of the two primary research questions was a straightforward “yes” or “no” response to the prompt “do you feel that core curriculum of Naval Command and Staff adequately prepared you to fight and win as a an officer in a high-end maritime peer-on-peer conflict characterized by contested multidomain maneuvers, joint operations, and rapid decision making?” This question also provided respondents the opportunity to provide comments with their answers, which provided added context to their responses. (See Figure 2).
One Navy officer who answered “no” to the second question stated the following:
The resident naval command and staff college curriculum familiarizes officers with governmental bureaucracy but fails to prepare us for high-end maritime conflict. Limited to unclassified discussions with classes of majority non-naval joint and partner nation officers, the maritime discussions are limited to familiarization of current tactical and strategic thought with little incentive to address pressing challenges that require classified and out-of-the box thinking.
Many respondents who similarly answered “no” to the prompt expressed this same sentiment. Of those that answered “yes,” they generally pointed to individual examples of the success of the curriculum such as “tabletop exercises were top notch” or “the exposure to joint aspects of coordination and warfighting are invaluable.”
Primary Survey Questions: Marine Corps Results
Key Takeaway: There was an overall feeling amongst surveyed Marine Corps field grade officers that their PME prepared them for their current assignments. However, as with the Navy respondents, a slight majority of PME graduates also felt their experience did not prepare them for high-end warfighting.
Marine Corps respondents provided the following (see Figure 3) responses to the question “How well do you feel that the core curriculum of Command and Staff prepared you for your current assignment?”
To the question “do you feel that the core curriculum of Command and Staff adequately prepared you to fight and win as a field grade officer in a high-end maritime peer-on-peer conflict characterized by contested multi-domain maneuvers, joint operations, and rapid decision making,” the Marines respondents who answered “yes” were succinct and simple, such as “I believe the material in the curriculum was necessary to understand big picture, joint-level concepts. Without these, multidomain operations would be harder to understand.” However, comments from those who answered “no” carried with them a palpable frustration, such as, “There were times the curriculum was beneficial and forced folks to think through problems, however, it did not breed a warfighting mentality. Basically, we create and celebrate the same milque toast [sic] officer type who is ultimately a careerist and will not challenge the status quo.” Totality of responses can be found in Figure 4.
Secondary Survey Questions and Trend Analysis
In addition to the data gathered from the primary research questions, the team also provided secondary research questions to solicit supporting background data from the respondents. The intent was to allow the research team to identify any trends in respondents’ views on their PME experience.
Current Assignment: Staff Officers vs. Commanders
The first of the assessed secondary data for trend analysis was whether the respondent was a staff officer or a commander within their formation.
Navy Trend Key Takeaway: Navy respondents currently serving in staff officer billets found their PME education both more beneficial to their current assignment and better in preparing them for war than their peers serving in command positions.
As one Navy respondent stated, “[PME] provided me with core military knowledge and concepts required of staff officers. However, this knowledge is only useful if built upon in practice as a contributing member of an operational staff.”
Marine Corps Trend Key Takeaway: Like their Navy counterparts, Marine Corps officers currently serving in staff officer billets found their PME experience was more beneficial than their peers serving as commanders. However, neither population felt overly confident that their experience prepared them for the needs of a field grade officer in combat.
One Marine Corps respondent who answered “no” articulated the following to the research team: “It would be hard for any one school to prepare you for the above listed scenario. Preparation for high-end combat takes a long-term professional dedication to training and education. With that said, I think command and staff gives you the basic tools to act as a staff officer at the MEF and below. It is highly dependent on your instructor and the civilian faculty and their experience, education, and perspective. We do NOT teach planning and planning processes well—this is a larger service issue. Overall, I think it provides a good basic education in the operational art for junior field grade officers and should expand the interests of true professionals.”
While the overall number of Marine Corps respondents who were currently serving as commanders was somewhat smaller than their Navy counterparts, their responses were no less informative. One Marine Corps respondent who is currently serving as a commander put it succinctly: “PME was helpful, but it doesn’t beat operational experience.” Another officer currently serving in the supporting establishment stated, “I felt like CSC did more to prepare me for staff work than warfighting or tactics.”
Resident vs. Nonresident: The Experience
The next trend for analysis based on the secondary data was to determine the difference, if any, in the experience between resident and non-resident PME graduates. There is a substantial amount of debate surrounding the efficacy of the non-resident CSC programs versus the more substantial but resource-intensive in-residence curriculum.
Navy Trend Key Takeaway: Most Navy respondents who attended resident PME felt it prepared them exceptionally well or well compared with their nonresident counterparts whose answers were more evenly spread. However, neither group enthusiastically felt their PME experience prepared them for war.
It is clear from the above data that the in-residence curriculum had a larger overall positive effect on the respondents, which was largely borne out in the comments provided to the research team. These included comments such as, “I do believe the in-residence program is incredibly beneficial in developing an understanding of why we fight, how to prepare for war, and how to deter adversaries. The discourse with officers from other services and countries, as well as the instruction from senior military officers and professional academics will prove to be an unparalleled educational opportunity.” Overall, there was a consistent (if not unsurprising) trend of comments favoring the resident experience over that of the remote non-resident curriculum. For example, when discussing the latter, one respondent stated, “The curriculum was too easy. Online discussion boards are insufficient to adequately train O-4s for senior billets. There is much to be learned from a class that is lost when there is no seminar portion. I am convinced institutional online learning is adequate only for the bare minimum standard.”
Marine Corps Trend Key Takeaway: Marines had similar experiences at both resident and nonresident schools, with resident students having higher percentages at the extremes with nonresident students answering with more general satisfaction overall. In addition, neither population was enthusiastic about PME’s ability to prepare them for war.
Among Marine Corps respondents, the results were somewhat less stark. Of the Marine Corps officers who attended resident CSC, 25 percent felt their experience “prepared me exceptionally well,” compared to 10 percent of their non-resident peers. Respondents’ comments regarding the difference between the resident and non-resident experience elicited some passionate responses. One enthusiastic respondent commented, “I completed one semester of four of non-resident CSC prior to being selected for the resident school. It was a good experience, and I would have continued if I were not selected for resident PME.” However, others were not so positive, stating that “non-resident PME is a check in the box to do in order to get promoted to O-5. As a graduate of both resident and non-resident CSC, I can say without a doubt the non-resident course catalog is worthless. The quizzes are an exercise in rapid Ctrl-F searches and educated guesses. The discussion posts are verbal diarrhea that can only be used as a proof of life.”
For the questions regarding preparation for high-end warfighting, the Marine Corps respondents’ answers were roughly in alignment with their Navy counterparts. As one non-resident respondent felt that “the material could definitely use a more maritime flavor for the current realities that we face.” Similarly, another non-resident Marine Corps officer put his views succinctly, stating “warfighting functions focused primarily on maneuver and fires with minimal integration of information, intelligence, and non-lethal effects. We were prepared to fight another Desert Storm, and not the high attrition and maritime denial of a modern peer on peer conduct.”
Impact of Electives: Navy and Marine Corps Trends
Key Takeaway: Students who took electives directly related to their projected follow-on assignments found their overall PME experience to be more beneficial than those who did not. While this may seem common sense, it indicates the effects electives have on the overall experience to include the core curriculum taken by all students.
To determine the effect of electives, the research team asked the question “How would you best describe the electives you took while attending Command and Staff?” Respondents were offered choices characterizing their electives; the research team then cross-referenced those answers to the answers provided for the questions “how well do you feel that the core curriculum of Command and Staff prepared you for your current assignment?” and “do you feel that core curriculum of Command and Staff adequately prepared you to fight and win?” The clear correlation between electives and overall satisfaction can be observed in the charts below.
Fleet Officer Senior Leader Interview Responses
While the data drawn from the 96 PME graduates was compelling and provided insight into the effectiveness of PME, the research team spoke with six active-duty, O-6 officers (three Navy captains and three Marine Corps colonels) to get their perspective on the performance and quality of PME-complete O-4 level officers in the operating forces and supporting establishment. This was done acknowledging the fact that while the students are the recipients of PME, they may not know why their curriculums are structured the way they are, and in the end the “the fleet is the true customer.”
When asked if they believed CSC prepared the officers they now lead, all six respondents said it did, albeit with varying levels of enthusiasm. The consensus among the O-6s was that while not perfect, it provided an important baseline for officers to understand their roles and responsibilities in O-4 level billets. When asked if they had different expectations between those officers who were “PME-complete” or not, or those that completed PME through resident or non-resident programs, all answered the expectations remained the same. However, there was an acknowledgment that PME-incomplete officers may require more explanation on some tasks, and non-resident graduates may have had more limited exposure to some more advanced concepts.
Notably, more than one interviewee also stated that more important than the education received, the work ethic, discipline, humility, and dedication of the Marine or sailor is usually more indicative of their success than whether they are “PME-complete.” However, when asked if they thought CSC was preparing their officers for the requirements of high-end warfighting, all six said it was not. One O-6 invoked the interwar years between World Wars I and II responding, “U.S. admirals were prepared for World War II’s battle in the Pacific because they had all studied War Plan Orange while attending the NWC earlier in their career. Today’s naval officers have received no such systematic, formalized training and most naval officers have never even read or seen an OPLAN.”
The Present and Future of Naval War College
Insights and Interviews of the Faculty and Staff
NWC current and former faculty members expressed unwavering support for the CNCS curriculum in the face of du jour topics such as great power competition. Despite consistent calls for significant curriculum modifications considering contemporary geopolitical challenges, NWC prides itself on maintaining strategic autonomy apart from fleet command influence regarding the design of its curriculum. While a larger emphasis on great power competition has clearly taken shape within the NWC’s wargaming department to accurately reflect the adapting future battlefield, interviewees expressed the importance of integrating the foundational lessons from their teachings of history and strategy as evaluative criteria in which to frame modern warfare domain or competitor agnostic. For them, PME’s goal should be to ensure all officers, regardless of occupational specialty background or the contemporary threat, leave with a baseline appreciation for seminal international affairs principles, such as deterrence and interagency decision making. For faculty and staff, it is important to maintain formal mechanisms for curriculum development and guidance that are tied to strategic priorities and operational requirements.
Throughout the global war on terror, the NWC faced many external critics who aimed to implement more niche coursework to better understand the intricacies of “flavor of the month” topics. This came in the form of an enhanced curriculum hoping to educate intermediate-level officers in topics such as Islamic history and languages such as Arabic and Farsi. While undoubtedly useful to those in highly specialized fields (most found in enlisted occupational specialties), such attempts left graduates in a risky position of omitting critical liberal arts and historical competencies expected of senior officers for those of more junior specialists on the ground or in-country specific assignments/units. In many ways, the college and other institutions are seeing a renewed push to adopt the latest teachings in contemporary great power affairs, namely through the “Sino-fication” of national security education. Multiple faculty members cautioned against such an approach because the curriculum risks being far too prescriptive in design, and less dependent on professorial autonomy and expert input.
According to one interviewee, the appropriate question that field grade officers should be asking on entering NWC is, “How do the discrete tasks that I will be asked to carry out in my postgraduate assignments fit into the larger strategic environment?” Graduate outcomes in many senses can be synthesized into knowing what can and cannot be done within the U.S. political and military contexts. Understanding and having an appreciation for the nuance of what policymakers and senior military leaders face from an organizational standpoint leads to better understanding and operational execution of military plans and decisions. Several interviewees made it clear that the Navy inherently values training over education. This is understandable because modern sailors and naval officers must be highly trained to carry out their demanding day-to-day tasks in an increasingly technological environment. Education, however, is preparation for the unknown; it is learning how to think and solve problems by learning to ask the right questions and analyzing potential solutions. To be effective and durable, training and education require continual practice. However, to the Navy, time spent on education is shore duty, and too much of it is viewed as an impediment to a naval officer’s career. According to many, the incentive for a Navy officer to go to school and excel does not go much further than checking a box for promotion.
Regarding adaptation to contemporary distance learning environments, NWC was an early mover in enabling remote submarine crews to maintain operational commitments while allowing officers to achieve CSC credentials while underway. Subsequently, early CD-ROM courses were inevitably leaked to adjacent warfare communities, allowing a wider array of student officers to graduate with NWC credentials without stepping foot in resident facilities. According to one interviewee, such a move was equivalent to “academic fraud” in that listing one’s credentials as a NWC graduate of the online version of the CNCS curriculum is “inaccurate and a highly watered down” version of the resident experience. While interviewees did recommend further investment and research into adaptive learning delivery methodologies, their main concern was the lack of close interaction with faculty and the ensuing disconnect from the core tenets of CNCS learning outcomes. Generally, the sentiment across all those interviewed was that completely asynchronous digital learning was antithetical to the education of a modern field-grade officer and that its furtherance and proliferation largely diminishes the return on investment for the service.
With regards to the longstanding debate among both NWC administrations and Pentagon leaders concerning whether NWC students and faculty should hold and maintain security clearances for their entire course of study, many interviewees shared that not only does a clearance requirement affect the long-term matriculation and incentivization for international officers to continue to attend U.S. PME institutions, but it affects civilian faculty members’ ability to conduct research and field work abroad. Another source of debate and frustration is that there is currently no tenure track at NWC. From their perspective, the lack of tenure negatively affects hiring by undermining the college’s ability to attract competitive civilian academics and international affairs scholars. NWC hiring panels lost out on many highly sought after civilian scholars to other institutions because of this factor. One former NWC professor recommended that to supplement the argument for addressing contemporary security challenges, NWC should hire highly specialized adjunct professors on two- or three-year contracts to allow for niche subject matter experts to support warfighting education.
Ultimately, when the Navy does send students to CNCS and similar resident PME programs, it disproportionately nominates under-qualified students. In fact, the Navy tends to send exceptional junior officers into higher echelon programs, such as the NPS and civilian-run engineering programs, while a predominance of staff corps officers (i.e., doctors and chaplains) are sent to the war colleges instead of those in critical mission fields such as surface warfare, aviation, or special warfare. To harness the bulk of the Navy officer community and to intellectually capitalize on the tested skills of such operational communities, a more careful selection of officers with a talent for command should be screened and selected for CNCS attendance.
The Present and Future of Marine Corps University
A quick review of officer PME policy makes it clear that the core resident and nonresident programs at MCCSC have shifted away from the global war on terror era to focus more on the operational requirements and challenges associated with near-peer conflict and competition. In fact, CJCSI 1800.1F, the premier officer PME policy, stipulates that MCCSC shall ensure that its resident students “are knowledgeable in the art and science of warfare, specifically historical and contemporary warfare theories, international security studies, operational art and design, small wars, and amphibious operations.”1
When the faculty and staff was interviewed and asked whether MCCSC is effectively preparing U.S. military officers, there was unanimous agreement: “Yes.” MCU affirmed that the MCCSC curriculum has adapted to the new global threat environment and that it is constantly changing the curriculum and program objectives to improve program outcomes and officer development. Notably, one respondent qualified their response by stating that while MCCSC is effectively preparing its students and meeting its learning objectives, it simply cannot produce warfighting experts within the time allotted, and “there is very little that PME institutions can do to fully prepare [students]” for multidomain, joint, high-intensity conflict conditions.
Each interviewee made clear that MCCSC does not have the time or resources to fully develop multidomain, joint, high-end warfighters at the level of expertise that many external commentators would like. Several interviewees cited the need for more faculty and staff. For example, one respondent highlighted that the service has removed faculty positions from the school. Moreover, another stated that MCCSC does not have the experts to teach some subjects of the warfighting curriculum. One interviewee also noted procedural challenges with hiring and relieving civilian faculty, stating that it can be an arduous process to change civilian staffing rosters when needed.
Moreover, the resident program only has 10 months to cover 13 courses and provide opportunities for practical application exercises. While resident students’ daily seminars help ensure students are routinely engaged with the curriculum, the breadth of material that MCCSC is required to cover does not provide many opportunities for students to discuss the material in more depth. In the case of the nonresident program, students have a weekly seminar schedule, resulting in significantly less contact hours with the curriculum and faculty. Unsurprisingly, one respondent argued that MCU is “chasing its tail if it thinks it can integrate all-domain warfighting instruction” at MCCSC, emphasizing that its PME programs are already “saturated” with curriculum requirements. Interviewees asserted that MCCSC can overcome its time constraints by the lack of depth in the programs’ curriculum. Specifically, students are exposed to a wide range of topics related to high-end joint warfighting, operational planning, and security studies throughout their time at MCCSC, and the school has designed its programs to maximize students’ time and exposure to the material.
A major component of the interviewees’ confidence in the effectiveness of MCCSC PME stems from the school’s transition to an outcomes-based approach in the development, delivery, and assessment of curriculum.2 Previously, MCCSC focused its assessments on whether the curriculum content was addressed rather than whether the students were meeting the program outcomes and learning what they needed to learn. Now, MCCSC is working to make its program outcomes more accessible and measurable to enable more effective assessments and increase the return on investment. This includes formalizing elements of assessment requirements that will help student learning, such as formative and summative assessments and focus groups.3 The assessments then drive curriculum modifications.
One respondent highlighted how flexible and responsive the curriculum development process is, citing how MCCSC conducts course-content review boards (CCRBs) at the end of each semester. The CCRBs incorporate student performance assessments, student feedback from surveys and focus groups, faculty feedback from surveys and after-action reviews, and stakeholder feedback from the Fleet Marine Force (O-5/O-6 commanders, chiefs of staff, and general officers) alongside new guidance to shape future curriculum. Most importantly, this biannual process ensures frequent updates to the curriculum’s delivery and content.
Finally, a couple respondents highlighted naval integration challenges in the school’s effort to deliver all-domain, joint warfighting PME. For example, while MCCSC had two Air Force officers and one Army officer on faculty at the time of the interviews, it did not have any faculty representation from the Navy, Coast Guard, or Space Force. This poses a challenge since MCCSC does not otherwise have the expertise to properly teach naval operations. One respondent characterized the problem as systemic, arguing that the Navy undervalues PME since it is not inherently beneficial for naval officer careers. In addition, one respondent claimed that when the school does get Navy students, “dentists and chaplains are overrepresented and [surface warfare officers] are underrepresented.”
Ultimately, the interviewees made clear that putting the onus of responsibility on PME as the determining factor in whether U.S. officers are fully prepared for all the challenges and requirements of a near-peer conflict is unrealistic and misunderstands the role of ILS PME. From their positions, MCCSC “teaches military operational planning within the context in which it occurs.” MCCSC’s role is not to produce expert warfighters on its own. Instead, it is primarily focused on using the time available to offer a broad, graduate-level education, emphasizing that PME starts before students arrive at MCCSC and continues long after they graduate.
Recommendations
Target Unrestricted Line Officers for NWC Participation
To remain competitive, the Navy must reform its process for CNCS (and greater NWC) selection, screening, and assessment to take full advantage of the breadth of naval occupational specialties resident across its force. According to current metrics, a predominance of staff corps officers (i.e., supply or medical corps), or restricted line officers (i.e., intelligence or cryptologic warfare officers), are sent to institutions such as NWC vice those in critical mission fields such as surface warfare, aviation, or Naval Special Warfare (unrestricted line officers). A cultural distaste for such officers to willingly accept shore or supporting establishment assignments has long hamstrung their intellectual representation within war college classrooms. While certainly critical in their respective roles, staff corps and restricted line officers do not represent the warfighting core competencies of their unrestricted brethren. Going forward, a more careful selection of officers with a talent for command should be screened and selected for NWC ILS attendance. In addition, exceptional academic performance at Navy PME programs should be rewarded with targeted placements in positions in which their skills and education could enhance the Navy’s core missions.
Align MCU Exercise Schedules
Since MCCSC lacks the capacity to expand its curriculum, one respondent recommended that MCCSC align its exercise schedule with its fellow primary- and senior-level PME schools at MCU. Currently, each school—the primary-level Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) and the senior-level Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)—conducts their exercises on a different schedule. By aligning the EWS, MCCSC, and MCWAR exercise schedules, MCU can provide its students a more holistic opportunity to plan and conduct an exercise and can maximize the time available to ensure its students are prepared for the requirements of integrated, joint operations. The challenge for MCU would mostly come down to scheduling, as each school has a different graduation timeline that could make such coordination difficult. However, since these planning exercises are already a part of each schools’ curriculum, it would not at face-value require any additional cost or time.
Increase MCU Subject Matter Expertise
To increase MCU’s subject matter expertise, MCU and MCCSC should consider the following recommendations. At the service-level, the Marine Corps should either create new billets or reallocate billets from other parts of the Marine Corps. Moreover, the service should explore how it can streamline the hiring and non-renewal processes for civilian faculty members. The Department of the Navy could direct its PME programs to have a certain makeup of Navy and Marine Corps faculty. Even more, the Joint Staff could direct all DoD PME programs to have a certain makeup of service branch faculty. Both options would promote all-domain, joint PME. In addition, the Joint Staff should work with its interagency and service counterparts to identify relevant subject matter expert organizations to provide support to service PME programs’ new curriculum requirements. While something like this may already exist in practice, interview respondents made clear that identifying subject matter expertise external to MCU is ad-hoc and unsustainable.
Conduct Classified Wargames at Resident PME
While the survey and fleet feedback indicate that the services’ PME institutions are largely successful at preparing officers for their follow-on assignments, there is a noticeable deficit in their ability to train future combat leaders. To rectify this, both schools should introduce a two-week classified wargame at the end of their curriculum. This scenario should be based on either school-developed portion of existing OPLANs or the already established Joint Forces Operating Scenarios. In addition, to accommodate IMS officers attending MCU or NWC, these officers should have the opportunity to simultaneously conduct an unclassified two-week wargame.
Conduct an Elective Audit
The survey results indicate that the chosen electives of the PME students heavily influenced their overall PME experience. Those who took electives directly related to their jobs overwhelmingly found that PME both better prepared them for their current assignments and for the anticipated requirements of a field-grade officer in a high-end conflict. As a result, NWC and MCU should conduct an elective audit to remove those deemed least helpful by prior students. The schools can solicit feedback from recent graduates from their respective services both on courses to remove as well as new elective classes to create.
End Fully Remote (Asynchronous) Non-Resident PME
Fully remote, asynchronous (i.e., no student-instructor or student-student contact outside of message boards) PME should be phased out. In its place, both services should conduct in-person or virtual (over Zoom, Webex, etc.) classes once a week. This is already the Marine Corps’ primary method of non-resident learning and is partly used by the Navy as well. While this might not remove the “check-in-the-box” attitude many officers have concerning PME, it would emphasize the peer-to-peer and peer-to-instructor interactions that many nonresident students highlighted as the most positive aspect of their experience. In addition, emphasizing the nonresident but in-person education would allow the inclusion of unclassified wargaming into the curriculum using commercially available realistic tabletop games, mirroring to an extent the benefits of the resident experience in developing warfighting acumen. For deployed personnel who lack access to high-speed internet and the appropriate bandwidth, a modified version of the totally remote asynchronous program can be maintained to cover certain predetermined sections of the curriculum and allow a service member to temporarily continue their PME until they can return to an in-person, nonresident experience.
Standardize ILS PME Requirements
The discussions with both NWC and MCU made clear that CNCS and MCCSC provide very different intermediate-level PME programs. Thus, while both schools are entitled to define learning objectives and program outcomes, the lack of top-down standards on what ILS PME should be presents a critical gap in U.S. PME and means that neither school is pursuing unified goals. Consequently, the Joint Staff should standardize U.S. PME requirements at all levels. For example, rather than pushing down curriculum guidance in the form of “add more China,” the Joint Staff should define what an O4-level officer attending CSC should know about China upon graduation. It is important to note that this recommendation does not advocate for the Joint Staff to diminish the services’ ability to define their objectives and shape curricula; however, it does advocate for a system of accountability that enables the Joint Staff to have a standardized measure of effectiveness with which to guide PME curriculum and assessments.
Looking Forward
Amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the heightened tensions over Taiwan, it is imperative the officer PME enterprise be hyper-focused on preparing leaders for the challenges of the modern battlefield. Indeed, a once-esoteric debate about the role of PME and officer higher-level education, the concerns regarding the efficacy of existing PME programs represent a core national security concern with potential impacts on the United States’ capability and capacity to fight and win in a peer-on-peer conflict characterized by contested multidomain maneuvers, joint operations, and rapid decision making. The next conflict is likely to emerge rapidly and require combat-ready leaders in the first minutes and hours of crisis. Once conflict begins, there will not be time to reexamine whether the established PME enterprise is properly preparing officers for the core warfighting competencies they will need in the modern operating environment.
1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01F, Officer Professional Military Education Policy, 15 May 2020, A-B-3.
2. Per CJCSI 1800.01F, outcomes-based education means “clearly focusing and organizing everything in an educational system around what is essential for all students to be able to do successfully at the end of their learning experiences.”
3. Regarding the latter, MCU recently implemented its Fleet Feedback Program in which MCU asks the fleet whether they are getting what they need from MCU graduates.