Expeditionary advanced based operations (EABO) could take place in a variety of environments, from urban areas to small, remote islands in the western Pacific. Operating in a logistically degraded region with a contested supply chain is a real possibility in any future operation. The old ways of thinking about employing logistics will not help the Marine Corps overcome the challenges presented by peer adversaries in a globally connected operating environment. The enemy will most likely spend a massive amount of time and energy to destroy U.S. logistics capabilities in a modern conflict.
The Marine Corps must use unconventional means to support EABO ground forces, such as with special forces logistics (SFL) teams. These are 10 to 20 highly trained Marine logisticians who are mobile, carry little weight, and remain concealed to distribute supplies in contested environments and fill gaps in broken supply chains. SFL teams offer unique and emerging concepts to project logistical combat power across the competition continuum.
Signature Reduction
One of the key factors of operating in an EABO environment is the ability of a small unit to reduce both its electromagnetic and physical signatures. Signatures give an enemy insight on unit locations, activities, and timelines. In the EABO environment, unconventional methods to reduce the risk of signature detection may be required. Using SFL teams as a stand-in force for resupply would greatly reduce the physical footprint and allow for flexibility and fluidity across the battlespace.
Command and control (C2) of the EABO battlespace must be mobile and include the ability to hide in plain sight. The future fight may require multiple C2 nodes to be disbursed across the weapons engagement zone (WEZ). Small C2 nodes that move daily demand their leaders understand commander’s intent and the concept of decentralized command. Using these nodes enables Marines to be persistent and have the flexibility to maneuver and operate as needed. For example, a well-planned scheme of maneuver with a relatively small civilian box truck decked out with C2 can move through any city within and outside the WEZ virtually undetected. Other examples include using local buildings for power, using a system such as Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) to provide low-signature networks with a common operating picture and streamlined communications between all involved forces, and moving daily or every few hours to disrupt patterns in communications and location.
Another way to reduce a stand-in force signature is by using nonstandard uniforms (NSUs). NSUs are host-nation civilian clothing with a distinctive device or emblem to distinguish the wearer from the civilian population. NSUs fall within the Geneva Conventions and law of war and enable better force protection and surprise, allowing forces to “blend in” with the civilian population.1 According to the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations, “Advantageous force posture can be leveraged to disproportionately draw or distract enemy forces, or create dilemmas, which enable fleet forces to mitigate risk in a contested environment or seize opportunities elsewhere.”
Large-scale logistics consisting of long trains of big tactical vehicles cannot support a flexible and adaptive distribution network. Moreover, as learned in Burma during World War II, heavy tactical vehicles will not be supported by most roads in the Pacific Island chains and risk getting stuck in the mud and sand. Large vehicles such as the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement and Logistics Vehicle System Replacement have a massive signature and present a tempting target to the enemy. Nontactical vehicles (NTVs), such as local pickup trucks, will greatly reduce the signature and disrupt enemy targeting of convoys. Much like NSUs, NTVs allow the force to become more survivable by blending in with the locals. And NTVs are quite capable of distributing food, water, and ammunition across the battle space.
Survivability
As history has repeatedly demonstrated, guerrilla fighters with scarce resources can wreak havoc on adversaries, including those with highly advanced militaries—especially in a bush environment. Guerrilla fighters do not rely on heavy logistics footprints. SFL teams will be much like guerrilla fighters—light and mobile with forward provisioning skills that far surpass any other small unit.
Bushcraft is an essential component for stand-in forces. Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape school and other Marine Corps schools and publications on survival do not provide the knowledge or hands-on training needed to sustain stand-in forces in the WEZ. Most Marines do not have bushcraft skills such as water procurement and purification, plant identification, and animal butchering. Bushcraft training develops individual skills to enhance forward provisioning at the fire-team and squad level in a logistically degraded environment. In the event the supply chain is cut, SFL teams can continue to support units. SFL nodes can operate in any climate and terrain anywhere in the world.
SFL teams will need to be able to sustain themselves for extended periods. It is unlikely a 15-man team will be able to carry up to 20 PRC-152 batteries or charge them while maintaining a low signature on foot. SFL teams must plan to carry small, wallet-sized battery banks; pocket-sized solar panels; football-sized wind turbines, and Nalgene water bottle–sized turbines to power their ATAK devices, power banks, and other forms of communications and electronics.
SFL teams must be prepared to contract and use local NTVs and even pack animals in the most extreme cases. Indeed, they can use any form of transportation—ground, surface connectors, or air—to complete the mission. It is realistic for a 10- to 20-man SFL team to remain completely self-sufficient for communications, food, and water for up to three months while transporting the items they are tasked to resupply.
Deception
The U.S. Army has experimented with the leader-follower autonomous, robotic vehicle concept for a few years.2 This concept is a result of experiences in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Unfortunately, it is outdated. While the Marine Corps should never forget counterinsurgency tactics and techniques, the leader-follower concept attempts to keep large vehicles in the fight. Furthermore, in Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, Paul Scharre writes of the grave dangers of autonomous systems and the need for human interaction in the decision cycle.
However, the leader-follower concept could be used as a deception tactic. Cheaply built autonomous vehicles need never spend a day conducting resupply but will look exactly like large-scale logistics trains. Flooding the battlespace with these vehicles would confuse the enemy’s targeting cycle. The U.S. military would not care if these vehicles were targeted because the SFL teams would be driving logistics with NTVs, forward-provisioning, pack animals, boats, and other means.
Special forces logistics teams allow for speed and fluidity of logistics across the battlespace. They enhance survivability, create unpredictability and opportunities for deception, and reduce the signatures to the lowest possible form. These mobile and highly trained logisticians fill the gap in the Marine Corps’ plan to sustain stand-in forces. The competition continuum demands leaders think outside the box to stay ahead. This may one day mean the difference between winning and losing.
1. W. Hayes Parks, “Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms,” in International Law Issues 80: Issues in International Law and Military Operations, Richard B. Jaques ed. (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, May 2006), 69–119.
2. Scott Wakefield, “Leader-Follower Vehicles to Offer Army Increased Operational Capability,” Army.mil, 8 April 2021.