The Marine Corps is well into its transformation through Force Design 2030. The balance between a regionally focused, purpose-built force and a global crisis response force can only be sustained with an increase in the baseline budget or end strength. A principal catalyst for Force Design 2030 was the need to make new investments for the future fight without requesting an increase in the Marine Corps budget. The service divested legacy platforms, equipment, and formations to make fiscal and end-strength space for the force of the future.
General David H. Berger, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, made no secret of the risk assumed to traditional missions and he assured supporters and critics alike that the Marine Corps would manage the risk in a manner that would allow it to continue as a naval expeditionary force. However, recent history appears to challenge the delicate balance between force design and force development. As the Marine Corps enters its fourth year of force design and welcomes the new Commandant, it is essential to examine critically the balance committed to in 2021 and determine if adjustments to service-level strategy are required.
The National Strategy Documents
Force Design 2030 justifies bold change by strategic documents such as the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy. The threats and challenges China poses are undeniable. However, there are threats to U.S. interests outside of the Indo-Pacific Region. The latest National Security Strategy dedicates less than 6 of its 47 pages to China. This does not diminish the importance of the China threat, but rather highlights the rest of the challenges the United States faces globally. It sets the stage to debate where the Marine Corps falls in the division of labor and the best role to support the joint force in meeting all the challenges required to sustain a global strategy.
When reviewing where Force Design 2030 began three years ago, it is fair to assess that the Marine Corps embarked on an ambitious plan to close gaps in joint force capabilities in the priority theater. In U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, other services are meeting the demand signals of the combatant commander. However, as the rest of the Joint Force catches up to Force Design 2030, the service must reframe its purpose within the current strategic environment and ask where to serve the national strategy best.
An essential task for the military is to deter and, if necessary, win wars. It is widely accepted that large-scale decisive formations come from the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The Marine Corps traditionally supports naval and land campaigns through amphibious operations while also providing the joint force with an expeditionary force in readiness capable of responding to wide-ranging crises. As the other services turn their attention to the Indo-Pacific, a practical assumption is that conventional deterrence against the pacing threat will improve. One opportunity is for the Marine Corps to mitigate the risk of virtual attrition—the commitment of military power in an auxiliary mission so that it is not in a position to respond to the primary threat—to the joint force in non-priority theaters across the globe.
The Rest of the World Gets a Vote in National Strategy
Overextension in the Middle East has created challenges in thinking about a potential conflict with China. An argument is made that the joint force became decisively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, expending finite time and resources on a non-existential threat to U.S. national interest and allowing China to rise to an unmitigated threat. As presidential administrations transitioned in 2008, so too did the strategic calculus, with the administration declaring its intention to shift the military priority from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. In December 2011, U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, and the administration attempted to turn its attention to the growing threat of China in the Indo-Pacific Region. Planners believed Iraq could manage the terrorist threat and allow military capacity devoted to the Middle East to transition to Asia. The strategic assumption in the Middle East appeared valid until the “Arab Spring” of 2011, when the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) seized substantial territory in Iraq and Syria. The United States may have believed that military engagement in the Middle East was no longer in its strategic interest. Still, enemies in the Middle East believed that attacking the United States and its allies was in theirs.
In On War, Carl von Clausewitz defines tendencies and trinities that dictate a nation-state’s desire or necessity to enter conflict with another state or group. The trinity of the people, the army, and the government describes the interplay of elements that could drive a nation to war. Though the military and government reframed national strategy to pivot to the Indo-Pacific with resources from the Middle East and assessed that ISIL did not pose an existential threat to U.S. national interests to require a military commitment, the people viewed the threat differently. The public largely decided that lone wolf attacks in the West and U.S. homeland were unacceptable and demanded a military response. The joint force returned to Iraq and expanded to Syria to conduct counterterrorism operations and restore the status quo in Baghdad, leading to the commitment of a Combined Joint Task Force under a three-star officer with multiple component commands. Though Operation Inherent Resolve was a tactical and operational success, combat operations cost the coalition $14.3 billion by June 2017, not to include military posture and the opportunity cost in Indo-Pacific operations, activities, and investments.
Following Operation Inherent Resolve, the Marine Corps began its transformation through Force Design 2030. Since its commencement, three major military crises have impacted service-level decision-making, none of which came from China or the Indo-Pacific Region.
First is the evacuation of Afghanistan and the Hamid Karzai International Airport attack in 2021. The Marine Corps deployed two different battalions from separate crisis-response forces to defend the airport and assist in the noncombatant evacuation operation. A suicide attack at the Abbey Gate killed 13 service members and increased the difficulty of the crisis-response operation. One of the major issues contributing to friction during Operation Allies Refuge was overly complicated command relationships. The Marine Corps provides the Joint Force valuable crisis response capabilities through the simplicity and unity of the Marine Air Ground Task Force.
The second event is the war in Ukraine, beginning in February 2022. Though reasons continue to be debated, the failure of conventional deterrence in Eastern Europe continues to attrite U.S. and allied materiel and readiness for potential conflict against China because of the Presidential Drawdown Authority to support NATO interests in the conflict. The commitment of U.S. military equipment and security assistance exceeds $46.6 billion, and places stress on stockpiles needed for potential war and contingency operations.
The third major event is the noncombatant evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Sudan. Here, the Marine Corps could not deploy in its traditional role because of a lack of available amphibious ships and forward-deployed crisis response forces, leading to the U.S. Special Operations Command completing the mission.
These three incidents and Operation Inherent Resolve demonstrate that significant challenges exist outside of the western Pacific. When crises or threats emerge, the joint force will inevitably respond. The questions the Marine Corps must ask itself is who is the best to respond to a crisis outside of the priority theater and what best achieves a conventional deterrent in theater against Chinese aggression.
Should the Marine Corps Reframe Service-Level Strategy?
The Marine Corps met the needs and strategic direction outlined by the President and by initiating Force Design 2030. Other services will continue to address the demand signals the combatant commanders set, leading to a better posture and possible deterrent toward the pacing threat. As strategic risk continues to grow, the Marine Corps must assess where it best serves national strategy globally. The service will still need to adequately support the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as it will remain the priority theater for the foreseeable future. However, if risk is minimized in the Indo-Pacific Region with increased resources and attention, it can increase elsewhere. Planners and leaders must account for the risk to mission in the Indo-Pacific region if significant force structure or resources from decisive formations are diverted to the strategic periphery.
As the Marine Corps continues its transformation, it should account for the inevitable crises that will emerge in lower priority theaters. The addition of Marine littoral regiments, stand-in-forces, expeditionary advanced bases, and other emerging capabilities will no doubt be valuable in a conflict with China. By preventing virtual attrition to decisive forces postured or aligned to the Indo-Pacific, the United States may be more capable of sustaining a conventional deterrent against the pacing threat. General Berger’s acknowledgment of the delicate balance between force design and an expeditionary force in readiness still holds. As transformation under Force Design 2030 progresses, it is the responsibility of planners and leaders to assess the best value of the service in support of global strategy and how to weigh the 38th Commandant’s scale.