When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in 1949, U.S. defense officials became concerned about a possible Soviet bomber strike against the United States. That same year, the Soviets began production of the Tupolev Tu-4, a four-engine strategic bomber that was a direct copy of the B-29 Superfortress. In response, the United States and its allies accelerated the development of fighter-interceptor aircraft and the deployment of surface-to-air missiles (some with nuclear warheads).
The United States also established a massive radar warning system. That system—eventually dubbed the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line—stretched across the Northern Hemisphere, with radars in the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Iceland, Greenland, and Britain to protect against a raid over the North Pole.
The U.S. Navy was reluctant to become involved in the project, fearing it would distract attention and drain resources from the service’s principal “sea control” mission—the protection of Atlantic convoys carrying troops and weapons to Western Europe—and its nuclear strike capability. Directed by defense officials to establish seaward early warning “barriers,” however, the Navy extended the DEW Line to sea using radar picket ships, aircraft, and airships.The Navy carried out that mission for more than a decade, among the most complex and physically difficult operations undertaken by the Navy during the Cold War.
The Navy modified 34 of the several hundred World War II–built destroyer escorts (DEs) to serve as radar picket ships for these barriers, redesignating them DERs. The ships received an aluminum deckhouse, two tripod masts for the AN/SPS-28 air-search radar, and a tactical air control and navigation (TACAN) pod; the AN/SPS-8 height-finding radar also was installed. The DERs were authorized crews of 20 officers and 150 enlisted men and were armed with two 3-inch/50-caliber antiaircraft guns and several 20-mm guns. Some antisubmarine weapons also were fitted.
In the air, the Navy used Lockheed WV-2 Warning Star radar picket aircraft (the Air Force designation EC-121 was later applied to Navy aircraft). These four-engine planes, derived from the company’s Super Constellation commercial airliner, had the AN/APS-20 air-search and AN/APS-45 height-finding radars and contained combat information centers. The normal flight crew numbered 27, and barrier flights lasted about 12 hours. The Navy purchased 152 aircraft.
The DERs began operating in 1949. The Navy began detailed planning for large-scale ocean radar barriers in 1953, and the airborne early warning (AEW) “Willie Victors” began limited operations in the seaward approaches to the northeastern United States in 1954. The Atlantic barrier became operational in 1957, with four DER picket stations at intervals of some 250 nautical miles from Newfoundland to the Azores. The escort ships also provided weather reports and were available for search-and-rescue and limited antisubmarine patrols. The DERs normally patrolled for six to eight weeks.
The Navy initially kept four WV-2s airborne in the Atlantic at all times (but later reduced the patrol to two for budget reasons), flying 200-mile-wide racetrack patterns at altitudes from 5,000 to 20,000 feet. The WV-2s operated from bases in Newfoundland, Iceland, and Greenland—locations plagued by fog, rain, snow, and wind. Writing in the summer 1999 issue of Naval War College Review, Captain Joseph F. Bouchard noted that the WV-2 pilots “took great pride in their ability to get the big birds into the air. If they could see far enough to taxi to the end of the runway, they took off.” When the weather at those bases was too poor, some WV-2s operated from the Azores. It required about nine aircraft to keep one continuously on station.
In the Pacific, the DERs began barrier operations in 1955, with limited WV-2 aircraft coverage. The Pacific barrier initially stretched from Midway Atoll in the central Pacific to Kodiak in the Aleutians, with five DERs stationed at roughly 200-nautical-mile intervals. Subsequently, the northern end of the barrier was shifted from Kodiak to Umnak Island, the largest island in the Aleutian chain. Flying out of Midway with additional refueling bases available in Alaska, four or five AEW aircraft were kept continuously on station.
The Atlantic aerial component of the DEW Line included airships starting in 1954. Captain Bouchard wrote:
The airship patrol was hampered from its inception by limited funding, which restricted flight hours and the availability of aircraft for air intercept controller training. At one point ZW 1 [the airship squadron] was restricted to a hundred flight hours per month, a paltry amount considering a single airship’s endurance.
Five large ZP2N airships were built by Goodyear for the AEW role. The AN/APS-20 search radar was fitted inside the “gas bag,” while the AN/APS-69 height-finding radar sat on top of the aircraft. Propelled by two radial engines, these nonrigid airships—blimps—had a flight endurance of more than 200 hours and a crew of 21.
Goodyear later built four ZPG-3Ws, the largest nonrigid airships ever produced. They were 403 feet long with a volume of 1.5 million cubic feet; their top speed was 90 mph. All operational blimps were based at Lakehurst, New Jersey.
The service life of the AEW airship was brief, however. A ZPG-3W collapsed in the air in June 1960, and a year later, on 28 June 1961, the Navy announced the end of the airship program. The final Navy blimp was decommissioned on 31 August 1962, ending an interesting—albeit expensive and not overly productive—epoch in naval history.
Meanwhile, the ocean radar barriers continued with surface ships and aircraft. In 1957, the Navy began to supplement and eventually replace radar picket escorts with radar picket ships, designated as “yard craft”—YAGR and then AGR. The 16 AGRs were converted Liberty-type merchant ships, larger than the escort ships, displacing 10,750 tons when fully loaded. At 441½ feet in length, the Liberties provided more working space than the DERs. They rode better in rough seas and had ample room for electronics, a combat information center, crew accommodations, and a recreation area. They cost $4 million per ship to convert, about a quarter of that for the electronics. The ships were equipped with an AN/SPS-17A long-range air-search radar, an AN/SPS-8 height-finding radar, a TACAN, and other electronic equipment. The 42-foot-wide antenna of the air-search radar was capable of detecting high-altitude aircraft out to 300 miles.
The authorized crew of an AGR was 14 officers and 168 enlisted men, and accommodations were “luxurious” by contemporary warship standards. All the ships had movie theaters in one of the cargo holds, with other holds used as basketball courts, archery ranges, weight-lifting rooms, libraries, and hobby shops. One AGR reportedly had a small swimming pool. As commissioned Navy ships, the AGRs were fitted with two 3-inch antiaircraft guns plus a few .50-caliber machines guns.
In the Atlantic, the AGRs normally had three- to four-week patrols—five to six weeks in the Pacific—alternating with three or four weeks in port. Although the AGRs were more comfortable than the DERs, sailing in northern oceans during winter remained arduous duty.
The perception that a Soviet bomber attack was the primary threat to the United States—exacerbated by exaggerated reports of a “bomber gap”—ended abruptly in October 1957. Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, forced the realization that the Soviets could strike with intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet missile that placed Sputnik in orbit—given the NATO designation SS-6 Sapwood—had the range and payload to strike major U.S. cities.
But the DEW Line radar stations and seaward barriers continued to guard against the limited Soviet bomber threat. Some DERs sailed on the radar picket barrier until April 1965, with several of those ships then heading to Vietnam to participate in Operation Market Time patrols to interdict North Vietnamese seaborne infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam. The AGRs quickly followed the DERs in hauling down their ensigns, the last being decommissioned later that same year.
An epithet to barrier service was provided by Admiral John Hyland, who said: “It was those people in the seaborne part of the barrier that really had some rough weather to go through. In the middle of winter in the North Atlantic, there isn’t a more difficult or unpleasant place to be.”
Author’s note: An excellent, detailed account of the Navy’s role in homeland air defense is in CAPT Joseph F. Bouchard, USN, “Guarding the Cold War Ramparts: The U.S. Navy’s Role in Continental Air Defense,” Naval War College Review (Summer 1999), 111–135. Also see ADM John J. Hyland, USN (Ret.), “Barrier Patrol,” Naval History Fall 1989, 58–59. This article was adapted from the admiral’s oral history.