As the military situation in Europe continued to deteriorate, the U.S. government began to gear up its mobilization machinery. In September 1940 the first peacetime Selective Service Act was signed into law. Just as earlier U.S. Army studies had predicted, women’s organizations across the country became increasingly insistent on being given a substantive role in the war effort. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt proposed that American women should perform antiaircraft barrage duty, as women in Britain were currently doing. She also recommended the establishment of a pool of women under government control that could be drawn upon by all the services as needed.
In a nod to its World War I experience, the Navy proposed to amend the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 to establish a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve as a branch of the Naval Reserve. Budget officials recommended that the Navy submit legislation to establish a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve on the same basis as the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) legislation that had already received the Bureau of the Budget’s endorsement. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox supported the establishment of the Women’s Reserve from the outset.
The WAAC legislation had encountered dogged resistance when it reached the House floor in March 1942. The strongest objections to women serving in the armed forces were couched in terms of the erosion of cultural values and socially prescribed gender roles. Legislators’ protests transcended party and regional boundaries. Self-appointed guardians of domestic virtues raised the specter of the humiliation of the American male and the degradation of American womanhood. Rep. Clare E. Hoffman (R-MI) protested that he and several other members of Congress were being coerced to vote for a measure “we know will not aid the war effort, because if we do not, we are sure to be accused of aiding Hitler and our enemies across the sea.”
Hoffman referred to the creation of the WAAC as “a diversion, a detour from the straight and narrow road.” He asked plaintively, “Who then will maintain the home fires; who will do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble, homey tasks to which every woman has devoted herself; who will rear and nurture the children; who will teach them patriotism and loyalty; who will make men of them, so that, when their day comes, they too, may march away to war?”1
Rep. Andrew L. Somers (D-NY), a Navy veteran, called the bill “the silliest piece of legislation that has ever come before my notice in the years I served here.” He found the proposal humiliating to manhood and so revolting to his concept of Americanism that it defied rational or civil discussion on the floor of the legislature.2 Rep. Hampton P. Fulmer (D-SC) thought the bill “ridiculous,” a waste of taxpayers’ money on “uniforms and lipstick kits.”3
Ultimately, the strong endorsement and personal prestige of Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson rescued the WAAC bill from defeat.4 When the bill establishing the Navy Women’s Reserve subsequently was introduced in the House in April, it was approved in an astonishingly fast nine days.
The bill’s reception in the Senate was a different matter. Senate opposition to the legislation focused on the provisions that distinguished it from the WAAC bill—namely, that the Women’s Reserve would be a part of the Navy as opposed to a separate auxiliary. Navy officials remained adamant on this point—not out of any newfound sense of feminism but out of desire for maximum efficiency.
To win this crucial point, the Navy Bureau of Personnel proposed amendments to the legislation to placate some senators’ objections. Members of the Women’s Reserve would not be allowed to perform duty outside the continental United States. “Congressional chivalry felt that women’s ‘place’ was not outside the country in time of war; there was distrust of the probable efficiency of ‘supervision’ of the women if they went abroad.” The second amendment stipulated that “women shall not be assigned to duty on board vessels of the Navy, or in combat aircraft.”5 Banning women from serving on these platforms, and hence with the operating forces of the Navy, imposed the greatest obstacle to facilitating the true integration of women into the service for the next 50 years.
Among the strongest opponents to the Women’s Reserve bill was the powerful chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, David I. Walsh (D-MA). His attempts to derail it were stopped short by recommendations of the Navy-appointed Citizens’ Advisory Council, composed of presidents and deans of women’s colleges and at coeducational universities, and civic leaders from across the country. Virginia C. Gildersleeve, dean of Barnard College, chaired the council.6
Dean Gildersleeve and Harriet Elliott, dean of women at the University of North Carolina, both wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt apprising her of the dilemma and reiterating the importance of getting the bill enacted on the Navy’s terms. Ultimately, Secretary of the Navy Knox informed the Chief of Naval Personnel that President Franklin Roosevelt had authorized Knox to organize the Women’s Reserve “along the lines I think best” and suggested “that we now press this matter to as swift an enactment as we can.”7 The Secretary informed Senator Walsh of the President’s decision on 19 June. The bill quickly cleared the full Senate and the House and was signed into law on 30 July 1942.8
The provisions of the act establishing the Women’s Reserve fell far short of true integration. First, the Women’s Reserve was authorized only for the duration of the war or national emergency “and for six months thereafter, or until such earlier time as the Congress . . . may designate.”9 No one anticipated a need to keep women on duty after the cessation of hostilities. The stated mission of the Women’s Reserve was “to release male officers and enlisted men of the naval service for duty at sea.”10 The sensitive issue of the exercise of military authority by women was “handled by Congress in the combined spirit of traditional parliamentary distrust of the ambitions of the military and masculine suspicion of the masterful female.”
The Women’s Reserve originally authorized one lieutenant commander and 35 lieutenants. “No limit was set on the total number of lieutenants, junior grade, and ensigns, but no more than one third of the total number of persons holding these ranks could be j.g’s.”11 Confining women to the lowest of the commissioned ranks created recruiting problems and unbalanced the organization. Professional women were reluctant to leave the civilian sector for a position whose rank and level of compensation were not commensurate with the level of responsibility they were accustomed to exercising and that held little prospect for promotion.12
Many officers were predisposed to resist the invasion of their masculine domain by women. Sensitive to the potential for inflaming this latent antagonism, the women responsible for setting up the new organization were careful in selecting a name for it. Professor Elizabeth Reynard of Barnard College, a member of the Citizens’ Advisory Council, is credited with devising the winning appellation: Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service—WAVES.
Reynard reasoned “the word ‘Emergency’ would comfort the older admirals because it implies we are only a temporary crisis and won’t be around for keeps.”13
Wellesley College President Mildred McAfee, who was appointed the first director of the WAVES at the rank of lieutenant commander, quickly developed the skills necessary to operate in a male-dominated organization. McAfee relied on an informal network of women and a few key men in powerful positions to operate within the hostile Navy bureaucracy. She and her assistants achieved remarkable results in standing up the organization in a short period of time.
WAVES officer applicants were required to have a baccalaureate degree or at least two years of college plus “no less than two years of compensating business or professional experience.” Enlisted applicants were required to have successfully completed high school or business school. All applicants had to be at least 20 years of age, have no children under the age of 18, and “be of good repute in the community.”14
Initially, WAVES officials advocated opening all enlisted ratings to women, but the Bureau of Personnel (BuPers) rejected this proposal. Dispersing women over a wide range of ratings could pose problems in arranging transfers if there were small numbers of women occupying certain rates. In addition, “the sheer weight of traditional attitudes or prejudices as to what was ‘women’s work’ limited the practical usefulness of some of the rates which were opened.” For example, at some commands enlisted women rated as mechanics were not given the opportunity to utilize their skills. Misconceptions as to the nature of the duties associated with other ratings also led to disillusionment. Consequently, BuPers liberally approved WAVES transfer requests “in the interest of morale.”15
The accomplishments of the WAVES were many and substantial. On the third anniversary of the Women’s Reserve on 21 July 1945, the Navy issued a radio and press release recounting women’s contributions to the war effort. There were 86,000 women serving on active duty: approximately 8,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted WAVES posted at 900 shore installations throughout the continental United States and in the territory of Hawaii. An additional 8,000 women were in training or awaiting call to duty.
WAVES constituted 18 percent of the total naval personnel assigned to shore establishments in the continental United States, serving at air stations, naval hospitals, district headquarters, Navy yards, and supply depots. In Washington, the release noted, “approximately 20,000 WAVES, almost twice the original enlistment goal proposed for the entire Women’s Reserve, are serving in the Navy Department and the Potomac River Naval Command in the nation’s capital. WAVES compose 55 percent of the uniformed personnel in the Navy Department in Washington.”16
WAVES handled 80 percent of the work involved in the administration and supervision of the Navy mail service and constituted 75 percent of the total personnel in “Radio Washington,” the nerve center of the entire Navy communication system. WAVES provided 70 percent of the manpower in BuPers. At the Indian Head rocket powder plant, responsible for 70 percent of the testing for all U.S. rocket propellant, WAVES completely operated the laboratory, manned one of the two firing bays, and did approximately half of the ballistic calculations.17
Seamen constituted the largest group of enlisted women, numbering approximately 24,500 and serving in a wide range of billets. Thirty-eight ratings were open to enlisted women, with approximately 14,500 serving as yeomen. They also served as storekeepers, radiomen, specialists, telegraphers, electrician’s mates, cooks, bakers, and printers. One hundred women qualified as chief petty officers.
The Hospital Corps included some 13,000 enlisted WAVES who served as hospital apprentices or pharmacist’s mates working in wards, clinics, and laboratories. Thirty percent of WAVES were assigned to naval aviation—repairing planes, packing parachutes, and collecting weather data. One thousand women served as Link Trainer instructors, giving lessons in instrument flying to approximately 4,000 men a day. WAVES served as gunnery instructors and operated the Link celestial navigation trainers at 17 naval activities. They also served as air traffic controllers and flight orderlies. Thousands of WAVES served in the Supply Corps and were responsible for outfitting the fleet and handling monthly transactions in the millions of dollars.18
Although it was not widely publicized at the time for reasons of national security, WAVES also made important contributions in the field of intelligence. Agnes Meyer Driscoll had served as a yeoman (F) in World War I. She did not put the uniform back on for World War II, but she continued working in the Office of Naval Communications as a civilian. An Ohio State University graduate who majored in mathematics, physics, foreign languages, and music, “Miss Aggie” was a brilliant cryptanalyst. She trained most of the naval officers who received the lion’s share of the credit for the Navy’s codebreaking accomplishments during World War II.
Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz’s intelligence officer during the war, wrote of Driscoll in his memoir, “She not only trained most of the leading cryptanalysts of World War II, but they were all agreed that none exceeded her gifted accomplishments in the business.”19
Those accomplishments included making critical inroads into the Japanese fleet’s operational code, JN-25, which the U.S. Navy exploited after the attack on Pearl Harbor for the rest of the war. Codebreaking was critical to the American victory over the Imperial Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway.20 Driscoll and other female civilians working for naval intelligence organizations proved their value and opened up opportunities for thousands of Navy WAVES.
The efforts of thousands of civilian and Navy women who provided critical support to the Navy’s intelligence organizations during World War II have only recently received the recognition they deserve. Women assembled and operated codebreaking equipment, helped build and run the libraries and information centers that held extensive repositories of collateral information that correlated with new material, and provided the context for analytical breakthroughs. They were pioneers in information warfare, a field that today is recognized as a warfighting discipline on a par with surface, submarine, air, and special warfare.
The exigencies of World War II compelled a certain measure of tolerance for women in uniform. Their inclusion in the ranks was justified by the national emergency, but their presence was not intended to be permanent. It was statutorily required that they be discharged as rapidly as possible at the end of hostilities. Given that such a large percentage of women in both the Navy and the Army had been engaged in tedious administrative work at installations and commands far removed from the action, and many had been given little sense that their contributions were important to the war effort, most welcomed the prospect of demobilization. Like the men, women were anxious to return home to their families or to start their own families. Despite all predictions, the upheaval of the war did not topple domesticity from atop the pantheon of cultural values and expectations for women.
The fact that women had so successfully taken over support functions within the Navy in such areas as communications, medical, administration, and supply, however, made their rapid demobilization problematic. It was not long before Navy and Army leaders alike realized there would be a continuing need for women in the peacetime military.21 The rapid transition from hot war against the fascist Axis powers to a Cold War against expansionist communism would require larger peacetime military and naval establishments than had previously existed in America. The participation of America’s women was required. The way that participation would be accepted set the stage for the next phase of the ongoing struggle—the integration of women into the regular components of the U.S. armed forces.
1. U.S. Congress, Proceedings and Debates, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 88, part 2, 23 February 1942–25 March 1942 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 2592–93.
2. Proceedings and Debates, 2606.
3. Proceedings and Debates, 2607.
4. Mattie E. Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 25.
5. Bureau of Naval Personnel Administrative History, World War II, box 3, folder “Women’s Reserve” [hereafter Women’s Reserve Official History], RG 24, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, 22.
6. Joy Bright Hancock, Lady in the Navy: A Personal Reminiscence (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 60.
7. Women’s Reserve Official History, 12–13.
8. Women’s Reserve Official History, 13.
9. U.S. Congress, Senate, “Establishing a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve in the Navy,” Report No. 1511, CIS U.S. Serial Set, Miscellaneous Senate Reports, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rpts. 4, no. 1415–1631, microfiche.
10. Women’s Reserve Official History, 20, 26.
11. Women’s Reserve Official History, 15.
12. Women’s Reserve Official History, 15–16, 19.
13. Hancock, Lady in the Navy, 61.
14. Women’s Reserve Official History, 78; Chief of Naval Personnel, Procurement Directive No. 1–44, 8 January 1944, Enclosure (A), Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Regulations Governing Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (“WAVES”), July 1942–Nov 1945, box 1, RG 24, NARA.
15. Women’s Reserve Official History, Supplement, 7–8.
16. Navy Department, 21 July 1945, “Eighty-Six Thousand WAVES on Third Anniversary,” Acute Care Nurse Practitioner (ACNP) Records [hereafter ACNP Records], Series I, Subject Files, 1940–1970, microfilm, roll 1, frames 65–68.
17. ACNP Records, roll 1, frames 65–68.
18. ACNP Records.
19. Edwin T. Layton, And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 33.
20. John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 78–80.
21. Hancock, Lady in the Navy, 213–16.