INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.
Reasoning from the numerous applications made by commanding officers to the Bureau of Ordnance, as soon as they join their ships, for some change of battery, it must be a general belief that the total weight and character of the guns is determined hap-hazard, and without any reference to known principles.
In fact, the writer can call to mind only two or three instances during the many years in which he has been conversant with the affairs of this branch of our Naval establishment where some change has not been proposed, generally on insufficient grounds, and often without any reasons being assigned, except a desire for change.
The object of this paper, therefore, is to remove these erroneous impressions, and to point out the basis on which the assignment of total weight and character of the guns composing a ship's battery is made.
THE ARMAMENT OF OUR SHIPS OF WAR.
The main points to be considered in determining the armament of a ship are:
1st. That the aggravate weight of the guns should be in proportion to the tonnage.
2d. Having decided what this weight shall be, the next point of importance is to dispose of it in the best manner to develop the greatest power of which it is susceptible.
3d. The relation of the battery to the speed of the vessel; for although it is absolutely necessary that a ship of war should exercise a full power of offence and defense within the circle of which she is the centre, next to this, and to this only, in importance, is her ability to transfer this power to another point with certainty and rapidity.
We will proceed to consider these points seriatim:
If we were about to evolve the battery of a ship from our inner consciousness, we should find the subject surrounded with many difficulties. But, fortunately, the gradual progress of naval construction enables us to proceed with cautious but certain steps from the known to the unknown without risk of serious error.
To exemplify our first point, we may take the old sailing frigate Constellation as a type of what was considered to be, at the time she was built, a well-armed ship. Her tonnage was 1,236, and the battery consisted of thirty 18-pdr. cannon on gun-deck, and sixteen 32-pdr. carronades on the spar-deck, weighing in the aggregate 100,700 lbs., and throwing a broadside weight of 530 lbs. of shot.
In 1845, the Ordnance Board recognized the importance of reducing the number of guns and increasing the calibres, and assigned a battery of thirty-eight 32-pdrs., weighing 174,048 lbs., throwing a broadside weight of metal of 674 lbs., and 22 lbs. of explosive material.
In 1853, her sister ship, the Macedonian, carried a battery of two 10-in. in pivot, sixteen 8-in. and two 33-pdrs. in broadside, weighing in the aggregate 158,432 lbs., and throwing a broadside in metal of 672 lbs., with 26 lbs. of explosive material.
Finally, Admiral Dahlgren proposed for these ships a battery of eighteen 9-in. guns, weighing 164,000 lbs., broadside weight of metal, 721 lbs, with an explosive content of 30 lbs.
It will be observed that in these changes, m.ade by competent authority, the relation of weight of battery to tonnage of ship was closely adhered to, while augmenting the power of the armament by reducing the number of guns and increasing the calibres.
With the first introduction, however, of steam into the navy, a departure from the law of relation of armament to tonnage of ship became unavoidable, because the pioneer paddle-steamers did not afford the requisite room and conveniences for proportionate batteries. It was evident to all seamen that the few guns carried by these vessels were entirely disproportionate to their tonnage, and the success of the screw was at once accepted by our best thinkers as a solution of the problem. The Princeton the felicitous conception of Commodore Stockton, was a move in the right direction, which we failed at the time to follow up, and still continued to build side-wheel steamers.
Even after the screw was determined on as the motor, there was manifested a great indisposition to sacrifice gun-power to facility of shifting one's position; and, although the five frigates of the Wabash class had only auxiliary power, the conservative spirit of the day reduced the effective force of the battery one-fourth by substituting on the spar-deck 8-in. and 10-in., in lieu of 9-in. and 11-in., as originally assigned. This defect, however, has since been remedied by the unification of the broadside battery, and the ships of this class now carry a weight in guns belter proportioned to their tonnage, though not excessive, viz., forty-two 9-in., two 11-in., and two 100-pdr. rifles.
We may remark, in connection with these ships, that the plans of Admiral Dahlgren contemplated for all of them an entire spar-deck battery of 11-in. guns; and the details exist for mounting six on the spar-deck of the Franklin; in which, however, he was overruled. The Niagara alone was the first ship to realize the conception of speed and power combined; but owing to faults of construction, she never was a favorite ship.
We next come to vessels of the Hartford class, which were constructed to carry a respectable armament combined with full power of movement.
If we assume these ships to have been well armed, as is admitted by every one, and take the ratio of weight of battery to tonnage, the lightest armed (Hartford, Richmond, sixteen of 9-in. in broadside) will give us a factor of 108 lbs. of gun to each ton. The heavier ships of the class, Brooklyn, Pensacola, armed with twenty 9-in. and one 11-in., give a factor of 130 lbs. to the ton.
Applying the least of these factors to the later full-powered ships of the Plymouth class, we have a total weight of battery of 121,176 lbs. = fifty-four tons, proportionate to their tonnage.
Now, these ships were originally designed to carry two 11-in. in pivot; but, for constructor’s reasons, the after-pivot was omitted, and the battery modified to consist of—
Guns | Weight of Broadside |
One 11-in…16,000 lbs. | 136 lbs. (shell) |
Six 8-in…39,000 lbs. | 150 lbs. (shell) |
One 60-pdr…5,000 lbs. | 60 lbs. (shell) |
60,000 lbs. | 346 lbs. |
a weight of guns and broadside entirely disproportionate to their tonnage.
Substitute six 9-in for the 8-in increases the weight of battery and of broadside to 75,000 and 400 lbs respectively. But, in fact, these ships should carry—
Guns | Weight of Broadside |
One 11-in…16,000 lbs. | 136 lbs. (shell) |
Ten 9-in…90,000 lbs. | 350 lbs. (shell) |
One 60-pdr…5,000 lbs. | 60 lbs. (shell) |
111,000 lbs. | 546 lbs. |
It may be claimed, however, by some that these ships have not sufficient breadth for the 9-in, and that their deck-beams and scantling are too light to support such weights. If this be really the case, then we would propose, as a compromise, for such a ship, an armament of—
Guns | Weight of Broadside |
Three 11-in…48,000 lbs. | 408 lbs. (shell) |
One 100-pdr…9,200 lbs. | 100 lbs. (shell) |
57,200 lbs. | 508 lbs. |
which, with a less weight of guns than the battery first assigned, would give a power of 508 to 346.
It is also to be observed that the pivot-carriages cover so many of the beams, and the weight being thus distributed over a greater surface, the 11-inch strains the vessel less than the 9-in mounted at the side on a Marsilly carriage.
From actual measurement, however, it appears that the ships of this class have at least five (5) ports of a side, which will allow the muzzle of a 9-in gun to come twelve inches inside the port, affording ample space for loading and sponging in actual firing, at which time trifles generally disappear. In mere exercising, there may not be convenient space for the in-tackle blocks, but this inconvenience is surely not of so much importance as to sacrifice to it the grave considerations of caliber.
We next essayed two classes of vessels, with different powers, in the effort to realize the idea of a fast gunboat, heavily armed with cannon of great range and accuracy. To these belong the Ticonderoga (1,049 tons) and the Wachusett (695 tons).
Both of these ships are melancholy examples of the incoherent reasonings of their several commanders and of the desire of the Bureau to satisfy their wishes.
To the Ticonderoga, Construction assigned 78 tons for armament, of which only 22 tons were for guns and howitzers.
The Bureau of Ordnance therefore determined upon three of 11-in , with four 24-pdr. howitzers; but before the vessel was finished, the 150-pdr. (8-in.) rifle made its appearance, and the battery was modified to—
FIRST BATTERY
| Weight of Broadside |
Two11-in…32,000 lbs. | 272 lbs. (shell) |
One 150-pdr…16,000 lbs. | 150 lbs. (shell) |
Four 24-pdr howitzers… | … |
48,000 lbs. | 422 lbs. |
(Howitzer weights are omitted as too light to affect the question.)
This was an excellent arrangement, combining range, power, and facility of handling.
Her first commanding officer, however, wished to have some broadside guns; therefore, in order to satisfy him, the detail was changed, and the first battery actually mounted was—
SECOND BATTERY
| Weight of Broadside |
One11-in…16,000 lbs. | 136 lbs. (shell) |
One 150-pdr…16,000 lbs. | 150 lbs. (shell) |
Four 9-in…36,000 lbs. | 144 lbs. (shell) |
One 50-pdr…5,000 lbs. | 50 lbs. (shell) |
Two 24-pdrs… | … |
73,000 lbs. | 480 lbs. |
Here the absolute weight of battery was increased one-half, while its power of broadside remained practically the same, but imperiled by the introduction of two new calibers, and a diminished facility of handling in a sea-way.
A few months after, at the request of her commander, sanctioned by the commandant of a navy-yard, there was substituted a
THIRD BATTERY OF
Twelve 9-in. broadside 433 lbs.
One 100-pdr. pivot 100 lbs.
117,200 lbs. 532 lbs.
Unfortunately, this 103-pdr. rifle burst during the first attack on Fort Fisher, and the ship went into a second action with fourteen of 9-in. in broadside. (This battery was shortly after landed at Philadelphia.)
The ship was now ordered to be fitted out for a foreign station, and the original weights restored; but the foremast having been shifted, and a forecastle built upon her, there remained only room enough for two pivot guns; therefore, there were mounted as a
FOURTH BATTERY
| Weight of Broadside |
Two11-in…32,000 lbs. | 272 lbs. (shell) |
Two 9-in…18,000 lbs. | 72 lbs. (shell) |
One 60-pdr…5,000 lbs. | 60 lbs. (shell) |
Four 24-pdr. how’s… | … |
55,000 lbs. | 404 lbs. |
(This battery was reported by her commander as altogether inadequate.)
It will be observed that in all these changes of battery, the original idea was lost sight of. However, the ship having now become deprived by natural causes of the prime element of speed, it only remained for the Bureau to make her as formidable as her construction would admit of to all enemies which might come or be brought within her reach; and reverting to the factor of weight proportionate to tonnage, we have 110,100 lbs. to be distributed in a
FIFTH BATTERY
| Weight of Broadside |
Two11-in…32,000 lbs. | 272 lbs. (shell) |
Eight 9-in…72,000 lbs. | 248 lbs. (shell) |
104,000 lbs. | 520 lbs. |
which gives a fair mixed battery for pivot and broadside, and tends to supply the deficiency of weight on the spar-deck, which is needed to modify the heavy roll of this class of vessels.
The other ships of this class are to be similarly armed, after having experienced, however, a round of changes which would give a dozen different batteries.
The Wachusett was particularly the exponent of the "cooper-around-the-cask" idea—a swift, handy, light-draught, powerfully-armed craft which should be able to keep the sea, in all weather, under canvas.
The armament assigned was—
FIRST BATTERY
| Weight of Broadside |
Two11-in…32,000 lbs. | 272 lbs. |
Four 32-pdr. 27 cwt…12,096 lbs. | 52 lbs. |
One 30-pdr rifle…3,500 lbs. | 30 lbs. |
One 20-pdr… | … |
47,596 lbs. | 354 lbs. |
Commodore Wilkes, who had his flag on board when she first fitted out, proposed an alteration of the battery to—
| Broadside |
One 100-pdr, 9,200 | 320 |
Ten 8-in. 55 cwt., or twelve 32-pdr. 43 cwt., 61, 600 or 57,792 lbs. | Or |
One 30-pdr rifle, 3,500 lbs. | 267 |
He argued that the removal of the heavy 11-in. guns, and a distribution of their weight in broadside, would tend very much to prevent the vessel from rolling so much. Said he:
"As for using the large pivot-guns, it is entirely out of the question in a sea-way.
"There is not an officer under my command but is satisfied with the inadequacy of the armament of these vessels, and the uselessness of having such large and heavy calibers"; and he recommended a broadside battery for all small steamers then in commission.
This subject of broadside and pivot-guns will be discussed further on; but my own experience is that the 11-in. can be cast loose and handled in a sea-way when it would be difficult and dangerous with the broadside guns.
The vessels of the Wachusett class were not intended to perform the functions of a broadside vessel like the old frigates and corvettes as it is evident they would be very feeble in this respect, the weight thrown from their broadside not exceeding 300 lbs.
But they were intended to have high speed, so as to overtake or leave broadside-armed vessels, and harass them by deliberate practice with a few heavy shells at ranges where the guns of broadside could not reach.
Their light draught was also to permit them to move in shoal water not accessible to heavy vessels.
If the vessel was deficient in the primary condition—speed—the proposed change in battery would not afford a remedy.
As regards excessive roll, that belongs to all propellers, and increasing the weights should moderate the movement; but it does not appear that this can be carried to a profitable extent for want of capacity, nor is there sufficient room for 9-in. guns.
However, her armament has been increased to a
THIRD BATTERY OF
| Weight of Broadside |
Two11-in…32,000 lbs. | 272 lbs. |
Four 9-in…36,800 lbs. | 140 lbs. |
Three 20-pdr rifles…3,900 lbs. | 40 lbs. |
72,700 lbs. | 452 lbs. |
This battery is reported as "too heavy," "not room sufficient for 9-in. guns," etc.—facts entirely within the cognizance of the Bureau, but overlooked by commanding officers in their desire to secure increased number of men.
There have also been added to the ships of the Ticonderoga and Wachusett classes poop-cabins and forecastles; the weight of these, added to that of the battery and supplies, without doubt increased the comfort of everybody on board, but converted the ships into "tubs" which inefficiently perform any service.
The Juniata, Osipee, and Mohican have had even greater changes.
The light cruisers of 410 tons—Kansas class—were designed to carry the 10-in. Parrott rifle (300-pdr.) of 26,090 lbs., but such guns were never provided, and the vessels were, therefore, heterogeneously armed. At the end of the war the
Kansas carried one 11-in., two 9-in., one 30-pdr. rifle;
Nipsic carried one 11-in., one 30-pdr. rifle;
Nyack and Shawmut carried one 100-pdr., two 9-in., one 30-pdr. rifle, two 24-pdrs;
Yantic carried four 9-in., one 30-pdr. rifle;
Saco carried one 60-pdr., six 32-pdrs., one 30-pdr. rifle;
Pequot carried one 150-pdr., six 33-pdrs., one 30-pdr. rifle, two 24-pdrs;
while the battery originally assigned to these ships was
One 300-pdr. rifle,
Two 24-pdr. howitzers.
Sufficient has been stated to show the principles on which the armament is based.
First, the aggregate assigned to ordnance by the Naval Constructor in distributing his weights.
Secondly, the weight of battery, which experience shows can be safely and conveniently carried; which is from one-third greater to double that allowed on the given displacement.
Thirdly, the smallest number and heaviest pieces which can be conveniently handled, having due regard to space and tonnage.
It is to be observed that, since the introduction of full power into steamers, the space below has to be carefully apportioned; and that the addition of even a single gun with increase of crew crowds the magazine, shell, and store rooms, and cumbers the berth-deck.
Having, then, determined the total weight of battery for a given tonnage, next in importance is its distribution, with a due regard to the accuracy, power, and range of the guns.
The power of a ship of war may always be in proportion to her capacity, and the largest ship can always be made the most powerful in offence as well as defense; the smaller ship, on the contrary, can never be made more effective than the larger, unless the means of the latter are misapplied.
It has always been urged that a small vessel, with a single heavy gun, can annoy and injure a larger vessel having, like itself, only a single heavy gun.
But when the large vessel can bring several heavy guns against the one gun, the chances are increased in the same ratio, and the one gun cannot attack with impunity.
One of the first elements to be considered is the ability to handle the projectile in the confined quarters of a ship, subject to violent motions of rolling and pitching. For obvious reasons, only one man can conveniently handle the shot of a broadside gun, and but two that of a pivot gun; and experiment proves that the 9-in. and 11-in. are the largest shells which can be so handled with ease.
There are, however, many persons of the opinion that some smaller caliber, 32-pdr. or S-in., substituted in broadside for 9-in., may by celerity of fire, and being more numerous for the same weight of battery, more than compensate for diminished accuracy and power.
This is entirely fallacious, and has been completely refuted by Admiral Dahlgren in "Shells and Shell-Guns."
But we will here repeat the argument.
The reasoning in favor of the 8-in. against the 9-in. is that, with the same weight, one can have more cannon, and, firing faster, the weight of metal thrown is much increased.
This argument is not new; it was offered in 1813 by the English for preferring the 18-pdr. to the 24-pdr., and has no better foundation now than it had then.
The 8-in. weighs 6,500 lbs., the 9-in. 9,200 lbs., the rates being 65-92, or nearly two-thirds—that is, three 8-in. cannon weigh as heavy as two of 9-in.
The 8-in. throw three shells of 51 lbs. = 153 lbs.; the 9-in. two of 72 lbs. = 144 lbs.
In actual trial at the battery here, the 9-in. gun has been fired five rounds at an average of 53 seconds per round.
Is it likely .that an 8-in. gun can be fired more rapidly?
On board the Plymouth, commanded by myself, and then cruising as the ordnance ship, a trial was made for rapid firing, with the following results:
U.S. Ship Plymouth,
Off Cape Catoche, Sept. 10, 1858.
Guns manned by the regular crews:
17 to 9-in. and 15 to 8-in.
Guns run in and all ready.
9-in | 8-in | |||
| Min | Sec | Min | Sec |
Sponge | 28 | 40 | 28 | 40 |
Fire | 29 | 25.45 | 29 | 25.45 |
Fire | 30 | 12.47 | 30 | 12.47 |
Fire | 30 | 57.45 | 31 | 00.48 |
Fire | 31 | 47.50 | 31 | 55.55 |
Fire | 32 | 38.51 | 32 | 59.64 |
Average time of fire, 47 3/5.
Shifted the 15 from 8-in and 15 from 9-in, leaving the roller hand-spikeman and one other.
| Min | Sec | Min | Sec |
Sponge | 45 | 00 | 45 | 00 |
Fire | 45 | 30.30 | 45 | 30.30 |
Fire | 46 | 7.37 | 46 | 6.36 |
Fire | 46 | 44.37 | 46 | 40.34 |
Fire | 47 | 23.39 | 47 | 22.42 |
Fire | 48 | 3.40 | 48 | 3.41 |
Average time of fire, 36 3/5.
Both crews had been under careful drill for more than three months.
Of course, no other pointing was possible than to preserve the guns nearly in their original position when fired.
The celerity of fire, then, from the 8-in. and 9-in. guns will not vary materially under like circumstances.
At the same time I may remark that every officer knows that the time required to load, fire, and run out is never the standard for accurate practice; that is controlled on shipboard by the difficulty of pointing amidst the smoke, and disturbed by the rolling and progressive motions of both ships, etc.; so that, as a general rule, under fair conditions, the rate of good firing may be two to three minutes.
The original difference in weight of metal thrown by the 8-in. and 9-in. guns should not be affected, therefore, by the rate of fire.
But it will be influenced by another condition, not generally considered in estimating the value of the lighter guns, viz., the inferior accuracy of the inferior caliber.
That of both guns has been tried, with the most extreme care, at a target 1,800 yards distant. The 9-in. was found to strike 75 per cent, of its fires, and the 8-in. 50 per cent.
This difference was due entirely to conditions of weight and resistance of spherical bodies moving through the air, and to the pointing of them; both being adjusted with equal care.
A sample of this practice may be seen at page 242 of my work on "Shells and Shell-Guns," though introduced then to illustrate another application of the same principle
The weight of shell, then, that strike from an S-in. gun, will not, when accuracy is involved, be equal to that of a 9 in. gun, and the difference in accuracy will reduce the weight of metal which strikes from 153 lbs. and 144 lbs. to 77 lbs. from the 8-in., and 108 lbs. from the 9-in., or in that proportion.
Again, the charges of the shells enter into the question; the three 8-in. contain 6 lbs. of powder, and the two 9-in. a like quantity; but each of the 8-in. shells contains only 1 7/8 lbs., while each of the 9-in. shells contains 3 lbs., and Ave know that the action of powder is in far greater ratio than its weight; that is, the explosive force of the 8-in. to the 9-in. charges is in a greater ratio than the weights of the charges 3 to 3.
This is an important consideration, as well as that of concentration by reason of greater weight.
Again, the penetration of the 9-in. shell is greater than that of the 8-in. shell; so that the former not only enters further into the opposing ship, but will carry with it a far greater bursting effect individually.
In the foregoing data enough is stated with exactness to show that the ordnance power of the two guns is hardly comparable, and that no effort should be spared to use the heavier calibre; whenever possible to go above the 9-in , I would advise it, but never below it.
And the Ironsides has shown the power of the 11-in. broadside, as well as the facility of using such cannon.
Whenever there is space on the deck that will allow the muzzle of a cannon to come in, if only clear of the inside, the gun may be fought, and any obstacles that arc removable ought to be made to give way without scruple.
The next point to be determined is, should the guns be mounted in pivot or broadside?
The same reasons which cause the 9-in. to be superior to the 8-in. may also be urged in favor of the 11-in.
The higher the calibre, the greater the range, accuracy, and power.
The 11-in. shell has the content and nearly the weight of two of 9-in.; and since the pivot-gun can be fought on either side, and usually the 9-in. cannot be shifted over, it is practically equal to four of 9-in., whilst its weight with carriage is little more than that of two 9-in.
The concentration of effect due to the explosive capacity of the 11-in. shell is even more important than that due to penetration and size of orifice.
It will be seen by comparing the Ticonderoga's battery as first assigned, and the last one, now carried, that increasing the total weight of battery from 22 to 54 tons only increased her power one-fifth, from 422 to 520 lbs. of broadside.
Notwithstanding Admiral Wilkes's opinion, quoted above, it seems hardly credible that a gun should be more manageable on a carriage placed upon the deck than on a carriage upon a slide.
Guns are generally used when the ship is in motion, and a pivot-gun is always more under command than one in broadside. If a pivot-gun cannot be easily controlled, then much less can one be which takes any direction when fired, and is only limited by its breeching in the extent of its movements. In action, on cither carriage, a gun requires free space in every direction in its rear, and it is only when the gun is secured out of action that the slide becomes an encumbrance.
The misfortune of the larger calibre is that its substantial benefits are seldom visible before those who continually experience the disadvantages of its greater weight and size.
The bulk of the gun, the toil in handling it and its projectile, are ever enforced to the eye of the officer and to the exertions of the men.
But the great power it confers is not exhibited by the ordinary practice, and remains a myth until the hour of battle discloses the fact, and permits the heavy calibre to tell its own tale more eloquently than the most convincing arguments.
It has, however, been abundantly proved that the 9-in. gun is perfectly manageable on a broadside carriage in any vessel having sufficient room to work them; still, the writer is in favor of mounting them on a pivoted broadside carriage in all vessels—having reference here to the greater facility of training and consequent greater accuracy of fire, and the preservation of the decks, the fibers of which are crushed by the great weight resting on the front trucks.
The injury is aggravated by the neglect of executive officers to order the guns run in whenever the decks are washed, and keeping them partly in until the water ways are dry.
I have approached this subject of broadside pivots very gingerly, however, fearing the critical eye of a smart executive, whose snowy gun or quarter-deck, the pride of his heart, is encumbered by such troublesome companions.
It will be seen by the preceding list of batteries that the Bureau had definite ideas on the subject of armaments, but often yielded to the importunities of officers who had not very thoroughly studied the question.
There can be no more striking example of this than in the armament of the Kansas class.
The basis of armament is either—
Given a ship of a certain tonnage, draught of water, and speed, with so many tons of displacement assigned to ordnance, how dispose of that weight to best advantage?
Or, as in the Kansas class—
Given a designated battery, what is the smallest ship which, on a given draught of water, will carry that battery?
In every case, the Bureau assigns the smallest number of the heaviest guns to form the weight, and prefers pivots to broadside when the deck arrangements will permit.
For it is thoroughly established that a small number of large pieces will inflict injuries beyond the power of a large number of small pieces.
In order that she may exercise her full measure of offence, speed has become the indispensable attribute of every ship of war. Without it her powers are altogether incomplete, and experience appears to have determined that it is judicious to sacrifice a large portion of the armament in order to procure great speed at any cost.
It is very right that when a vessel of war encounters a superior force, speed should be able to make her safe, but the necessary diminution of offensive power should not be so great as to disable a first-class steamer from matching any vessel of her own class of inferior speed, but provided with a proper armament; otherwise her usual business would be running—fighting the exception!
Although the large vessels of the Tennessee and Florida class were constructed on the theory of cutting up an enemy's commerce and flying from his cruisers, yet it is repugnant to our notions to employ such large and expensive vessels for this purpose.
It will often happen that in order to protect important interests, the battle must be fought at all hazards, and that avoiding the action will not serve the purpose. What then will be the chances of these costly fabrics?
It is, moreover, certain that v/e have a right to demand that our vessels of war shall have equal speed with those of other nations.
It is by this equality only that our vessels shall select and retain the distances they prefer, and less speed than this should not be admitted in any discussion of the subject.
This does not mean that every United States ship shall equal in speed the best ships of other nations, but that the average speed of our navy, taken collectively, shall be equal to that of others, also taken collectively.
If, however, our ship is inferior in speed, then the choice of distance is with the enemy, who is supposed to prefer close quarters; but if our ship is properly armed, he can only reach this position after passing through the deliberate fire of powerful guns.
The small vessels of the Kansas class, only 410 tons, were constructed to curry, and can carry, 10-iuch rifles—formidable guns to any but the very latest iron-clads.
In 1863, Assistant-Secretary Fox proposed. Admiral Dahlgren designed the armament, and Constructor Lenthal the hull of a vessel of the same length as the Lancaster, but -with more beam, to carry twelve 11-inch guns in broadside pivots, on main deck, and two 11-inch in central pivots, on spar-deck; but the resources of our navy-yards were too severely taxed during the war to permit its construction.
This antedates, by some years, the English Inconstant and Shah (late Blonde), with a similar arrangement of armament.
The great majority of cruising ships must continue to be wooden or (its equivalent) composite vessels; but with the introduction of iron-clads of various degrees of resistance, these wooden ships should be capable of effective offensive action against most cruising iron-clads.
And although the preceding reasoning is based on our present armaments and wooden ships, it is equally applicable to an iron-clad fleet, and there is no reason why our ships, heretofore superior to all others in armament, cannot be restored to an equality; for the time has now come when we must prepare for an entire change in the armament of our ships, although the principle for determining it remains undisturbed.
I am also of the opinion that this change must be the introduction of the rifled cannon as the entire armament of our ships, otherwise we shall find ourselves, in a war with any leading power, overmatched not only in numbers but in power of individual ships.
This we cannot afford; our ships, if few, should be the best of their kind, and hitherto, so far as armament was concerned, were superior to all foreign ships.
A clever English writer remarks of our ships in 1812: "By substituting long guns instead of our short ones, they secured for themselves the immense advantage of being able, without loss or damage, luxuriously to pummel us to death, at ranges which they had pre-calculated they would be completely out of our reach."
But other powers have since adopted our system of a few heavy guns, and have, after many years of experiment and millions of expenditure, established two, or perhaps three, systems of rifled ordnance as worthy of confidence.
1st. The system of breech-loading, known as Krupp's, to whom it owes its experimental development, though it is understood that this system was presented to Captain Wise, one of my predecessors, years before Krupp adopted it. The essential features, the round-backed wedge, the locking-screw, and the gas-check arc due to our countryman, Broadwell. Exhausted by the war, we had no means of experiment, and he received no encouragement. It is, however, probable that it would not have proved a success in our hands, owing to the state of the steel manufacture in our country at that time.
2d. The French System. —This, which has been successfully applied to the largest calibres, is also an American invention, developed in France, and is, in my opinion, the best method mechanically of closing the breech, particularly for small calibres.
3d. The Woolwich muzzle-loading has met with success as a gun; but its studded projectile is far inferior to our expanding system.
Recent advices show that after pooh-poohing our expanding system for many years, and experimenting on wads and gas-checks to prevent erosion in the bore of their muzzle-loading guns, our English friends are about abandoning the studded projectiles for our own plan.
The principal advantage of rifle cannon consists in their greater penetration, due to the concentration of effect on a smaller and better form of surface; next, in greater explosive contents for same weight; then range; and, lastly, accuracy.
The accuracy of spherical projectiles is, however, quite sufficient at usual engaging distances, and the difference due to a rifle projectile is quite lost in the difficulties of aiming and the motion of both vessels.
That the rifle to be adopted should be a breech-loader is, I think, obvious, and for two principal reasons:
1st. In order to utilize a slow powder less destructive to the gun, the bore must have greater length in order to admit of a longer time for the gases to act.
2d. Since guns wear out by the rush of gas over the projectile in muzzle-loaders, scoring the bore is largely prevented by breech-loading.
To these we may add that, with the increased length of gun, the beam of very few ships will permit the muzzle of the gun to come within the port for convenient loading.
That there is no risk of accident from overloading, and that incipient cracks are easily detected.
Having no colonies, it is not probable that we will ever construct cruising iron-clads, nor does it appear to be necessary, since most of those now in existence may be pierced by their own guns, or such guns as they should carry, if properly armed.
Since the general introduction of armored ships, the conditions of warfare have been altered, and the subject of penetration has become of paramount importance.
With wooden ships, the mere lodgment of a shell in the side before its explosion might inflict a fatal injury; but against armored ships complete perforation is essential.
The form of the projectile, its material, cross-section, weight, and velocity on impact, must be such as to ensure this, or it will be practically harmless.
Experiment has proven that shells containing a suitable bursting charge may be driven through plates of a thickness equal to the calibre at short ranges, and this is about the limit of useful effect.
Therefore, with the present types of armored ships, carrying from 4 ½ to 6 inches of armor, 7" is the lowest calibre on which we can rely to ensure perforation, taking into consideration oblique impact, even at short range.
The English have, however, settled on the 8-in., the Prussians 814 (31 centm.), and the French 7.5 (19 centm.), as the gun for general service, weighing from 17,000 to 20,000 pounds, firing with charges of 27.5 to 35 pounds of powder, projectiles from 116 to 180 pounds, capable of perforating 6" of iron at 1,000 yards.
At present we have no guns, except those in the monitors, which will injure seriously the lightest armored vessel.
Substitute a 7-in. or 8-inch rifle for the 11-in. smooth-bore, and few of them would come off without great damage from the more numerous cannon of the unclad ship.
The monitors are deficient in speed: though formidable antagonists at close quarters, their sphere of offence does not extend beyond 500 yards, which might be increased to 3,500 yards by the substitution of an efficient rifle of the same weight, 10-in. or 11-in. calibre, for the 15-in. smooth-bore.
Various projects have been brought forward to convert our present smooth-bore guns into rifles; but these are all make-shifts, permissible in time of war, but unpardonable waste in peace. Our futile efforts to utilize the old small-arms should warn us to make no expenditures in this direction.
Other nations possess much greater stocks of convertible guns, but none have thought fit to convert them, except by lining and reducing the bore; nor can they be converted to breech-loaders, which I consider the essential feature in any rifled system.
A writer in the Army and Navy Journal of February 28, 1874, gives a summary of the objections to converted guns, which I commend to your perusal.
It is time this paper should close, its principal object being to remove the apparent impressions of officers that our ships are armed without system, to be changed at the caprice of each succeeding commanding officer; but I have been led into the discussion of other subjects bearing on naval efficiency.