TARGET PRACTICE AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY.
By Lieutenant-Commander C. S. Sperry,
Head of Department of
Ordnance and Gunnery.
U. S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Md., March 24, 1890.
The competition for the marksman’s badge for small-arm firing shall be governed by the following rules:
- It shall not be awarded to any one who has not fulfilled all of the following conditions contained in the circular of the Bureau of Ordnance, May 25th, 1889, regulating target practice in the service.
- “While on shore, firing the service rifle, with service sights and ammunition, at an A army regulation target, 170 yards distant, make 30 out of a possible 50, with 10 consecutive shots, all fired within a period of 7 minutes. The position of the firer during this practice must be standing and without artificial rest.
- “The firer being in a boat which is afloat in smooth water, do the same thing, except that the position may be any desired; an artificial rest may be used, and the score to be made shall be 15 out of a possible 50.
- “While on shore, put 4 out of 6 shots fired consecutively from a service revolver into a surface the size of the bull’s eye of the army B target (or into a rectangle 24 inches high by 18 inches wide) at 30 paces range, within 1½ minutes.”
- The firing of the Third class, in the Spring, will be at a range of 170 yards at the army A target.
- The firing of the same class during the Summer, with the rifle and revolver, will be at the ranges, and under the conditions, of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.
- The badge will be awarded as soon as possible after the commencement of the term to the cadet of the Second class who has fulfilled the above conditions, and whose total score for the Spring and Summer practice is the highest percentage of his possible score.
- In scoring the revolver practice, all hits within the bull’s eye shall count 5, and all other shots shall count o.
- The percentage under paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 shall be calculated separately and added.
- In case there is a tie, it shall be decided by firing one or more groups of
10 shots, as may be necessary for a decision, under the conditions of paragraph 2.
W. T. Sampson,
Captain, U. S. N., Superintendent.
In the Spring of 1890 medals were offered by the Superintendent to the cadet of the First class making the best score with the Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns, and to the cadet of the Second class making the best score with the Hotchkiss magazine rifle.
[TABLE: TARGET OF CADET BAILEY. VERTICAL PLANE.]
The first medal was awarded in Juno to Cadet Hailey.
The firing was from the Standish, at the service great-gun target, the range being determined by trial shots. Cadets Hailey, Coleman, and Schofield tied in a score of 138 out of a possible 144. Upon shooting off the tie, Cadet Hailey won, having fired 22 shots—12 at 1400 yards, 5 at 1050, and 5 at 950, scoring 258 out of a possible 264, with 4 direct hits. The firing was upon several different days. At the target practice from the Wyoming, before the Hoard of Visitors, Cadet Hailey showed that his success was not accidental, by hitting the target several times at 1000 yards with a 32-pounder smoothbore.
The average of the entire First class was 75 percent of the maximum score on the service vertical target, and at the examination drill alluded to, the target was struck eight times by the heavy guns, Cadet Latimer finally sinking it with a shell from the 8-inch M. L. R. when only a corner of one wing showed above water. The range was determined by Cadet Coleman with the 1-pounder K. F. gun with great accuracy, his shots frequently striking the target.
Each cadet fires during the Second class year five rounds from a heavy gun, and during the First class year about twenty rounds. This amount of practice does not seem sufficient to account for such accurate firing, and it is believed to be due to the steadiness engendered by the constant use of ammunition at all company and battalion drills, as well as to small-arm range practice. Volley firing by company and battalion at a target certainly cultivates nerve. There is no more effective safeguard against accident with arms than the constant use of blank or other ammunition, and it is an open question whether the dummy cartridge is not useless and dangerous. A blank cartridge, if the arm is not properly handled, will betray carelessness by its explosion with comparatively little danger, but the harmless dummy tells no talc, though the ball cartridge, from which a careless person will hardly distinguish it, most certainly will.
Thousands of the cartridge shells can be reloaded as blanks with a small charge with very little trouble and expense, and are invaluable in teaching care in the use of ammunition and steadiness in firing.
The competition for the small-arm medal is in progress.
NAVAL ATTACK ON A PROTECTED HARBOUR.
By Commander Egerton, R. N., H. M. S. Orlando.
(Reprint from the Journal of the United Service Institution of New South Wales.)
“What is a protected harbour, why do we protect a harbour, and what is it protected against?”
The first of these questions—“What is a protected harbour?”—can be easily answered, for it is merely a name given to a harbour which is defended by guns, torpedoes, or vessels of some kind—perhaps one, perhaps the other, perhaps a combination of each—but which cannot be called a fortress, and cannot in any way compare with such places as Portsmouth, Portland, Cherbourg, Kiel, or Cronstadt and many others of similar importance, where nature and the skill of the engineer have done so much to render them strong that nothing short of a powerful fleet of ironclads would ever dream of attacking them; and even after weeks, or perhaps months, of most persistent and severe fighting, at enormous cost, the result would be doubtful.
There are numbers of harbours which are protected by guns and so on, some more, some less, according to the value of the property behind them, either from a strategical or monetary point of view. Such harbours abound around the coast of the British Isles and the Colonies, such for instance as Falmouth, Holyhead, Belfast, Dundee, Peterhead, Aden, Singapore, Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, Wellington, and so on. These are protected harbours.
The next question is, “Why do we protect a harbour?”
This seems to be a plain question, but I am not sure that it has been very clearly answered. All harbours are not protected, and many are only protected by one or two guns, and yet the value of the property, of which the harbours are the doorways, is very considerable; and why has it only of late years occurred to people’s minds that their harbours should be protected? As a proof that this is really the case, it is only necessary to contemplate the enormous sums of money which are now being expended for the defense of imperial ports and harbours. They have been needed just as much for years past as they are now. The only answer that seems to me to meet the case is that in years past it has been assumed that the navy would protect the harbours; and I think that the naval manoeuvres which have taken place for the last few years at home have done much good in bringing it home to the people’s minds that it is very easy for a squadron of five or six ships to slip past another on the lookout for it, even in such narrow waters as the English Channel. It is true they may not be left unmolested for long; but it does not take very long, with modern ordnance, to do incalculable damage.
Many people think or have thought that in the event of war a ship or ships would be told off to protect their harbours for them, and the more the value of the property (private property, mind you), the larger would be the force told off to protect them. I do not think this would or could be the case; surely an admiral would not weaken his squadron by dividing it up into small bits and placing a bit here and a bit there. No: the defense of the harbour is not the function of the navy; we are meant for attack of ships more particularly, but still sometimes it may be forts. We are not trained to defense in its passive form. We never practice with the military, to whom the defense is entrusted, and, with the exception of some half-dozen coast-defense ships, we are not prepared for it; we are of little use boxed up in a harbour, and our place is at sea. It would be more economical, more permanent, and more satisfactory in every way to mount guns on shore than to place them in a ship which has the disadvantage that it can be sunk and cannot be hidden, without having any counteracting advantages, since there is not room for the ship to move about.
To defend the approaches to our channels and harbours is quite another thing, and is most decidedly one of the functions of the navy; here we have scope to move about, and can use the powers with which we are furnished to their best advantage, and if we are in sufficient numbers and do our work thoroughly, the ports or channels we are protecting may not have to fire a shot.
It would seem, therefore, that the real object of protecting a harbour is to delay the enemy until succor arrives. That is, the enemy, having slipped past the protecting squadron, arrives off a port; lie has double or treble the number of guns that are mounted on shore; but what the defense has to do is to delay him as much as possible to prevent his bombarding the city, town, depot, or whatever the property may consist of; to prevent his levying enormous sums of money, to prevent his finding shelter for his ships or replenishing them with coal, ammunition, or provisions, until succor arrives. The aim, then, of protecting a harbour is to delay the enemy. Hence our business in attacking a protected harbour is to do our utmost to take it as speedily as possible, knowing that delay to us means most probably defeat.
The third question is, “What do we protect a harbour against?”
Opinions on this question will vary much, no doubt, and therefore there is no harm in raising it, as it will lead to discussion, which is always useful. If a harbour aspires to beating whatever enemy may be brought against it, without any regard to a protecting navy, then I ask where is the line to be drawn? for, if a harbour is protected against a possible enemy of (say) four cruisers, and six are sent against it, what is to be done then? You cannot call out, “It isn’t fair, I won’t play.” You have disregarded or thrown over the protecting navy, and so you cannot hope for succor in that direction, for they may possibly throw you over; so where do you draw the line between a light battery and a first-class fortress? The first may defeat a fillibuster or armed cruiser; the second says, “Come, if you dare.” Hut if it be accepted that the object of protecting a harbour is to delay the enemy, then the amount of that protection will depend upon the naval force protecting the approaches to your coast, the area of seaboard they have to cover, and the distance you are from the base of a possible enemy. On this station the first is not as large as it ought to be, but provision has been made for this, and more ships are to be added; the area of seaboard is enormous, which means that you should be better prepared to delay an enemy for a longer time than ports in the English Channel, for instance; and, on the other hand, you are a long way from the base of a possible enemy, New Caledonia being, I think, the nearest possible base, which is at a distance of 1100 miles.
Before attacking a harbour we should carefully consider what resistance we might expect to find. The natural outline of a harbour or haven has so much to do with the defense which may be expected to be met with, that any harbour to be attacked would have to be considered on its own merits; but, as a general rule, wherever a harbour or haven exists we may expect to find submarine defenses, and we shall endeavor to find out beforehand whether these are kept constantly in position, whether they are real or only on paper, and whether, if our attack is sudden, we may expect to find them laid down at all. All this information we should look to our Intelligence Department to supply. We shall expect to find an inner scries of batteries so arranged as to bring a heavy cross-fire on the mine-field, and which will hamper our movements over every inch of ground we gain towards our final goal. There will be outer batteries to harass us and prevent our making arrangements for the attack on the inner defenses without a struggle, and also to prevent our lying off to bombard the town, arsenal, depot, or whatever it may be which is being protected. These outer defenses will have to be silenced before the more serious work of attacking the inner defenses can be attempted. We may safely reckon on meeting all this, because it is generally admitted that, with sea room, forts alone will not stop a fleet. The inner defenses will give us the most trouble, and the deeper they are, the more trouble they will give us, because we shall be confined in our area of movement, and every defended yard will mean delay, which, for reasons I have given, we particularly wish to avoid.
There is yet another obstacle which will give us much anxiety and which we may reasonably expect to encounter. I mean torpedo-boats.
Experience has shown that a purely passive defense is rarely successful, whether on land or at sea. No entrenched camp would be left without outposts to watch the approach of an enemy, or without sorties to harass him when he has made his appearance, and this can best be done by an active naval force and a good supply of torpedo-boats. They are as useful as cavalry for scouting. They are dreaded at nights. The terrible weapon they carry and their power of continuing in flotillas render them in every way a most powerful and necessary item of the defense, and so we must be prepared in our attack to guard against them. Therefore, having given the defending fleet the slip, we proceed to do our work of destruction on a harbour which we know to be defended by an outer line of batteries, a deep submarine defense, an inner line of batteries guarding the submarine defense and inner harbour, and, lastly, torpedo-boats.
The nature and number of vessels sent to attack a protected harbour will, of course, depend upon the individual harbour to be attacked, its natural formation, its armament, its probable submarine defenses, the depth of those defenses, the depth of the water, its distance from succor; and, perhaps most important of all, the general opinions of the fighting qualities of its defenders, their numbers, their training and their amount of practice and organization will all influence this discussion; but I think that this work will generally be relegated to cruisers, as ironclads will not be available. These cruisers will be fast ships, with a large coal capacity, a good armament, and a certain amount of protection. And I propose to say a few words on a modern cruiser, and will take for my type a belted cruiser such as the Orlando, with which most of you are familiar—a ship which would be admirably suited for work of this description.
The Orlando is 300 feet long, 56 feet beam, and 5600 tons displacement, with a maximum draught of 23 feet, and is capable of steaming at a speed of nearly 18 knots for a few hours, and has a radius of action of 4500 miles at 10 knots. She is built of steel throughout, and by referring to the diagram you will see that all the vitals of the ship are protected. The protection consists of a belt of 10-inch armour, steel-faced one-third of its thickness, 200 feet in length and 5 feet 6 inches in depth, about 18 inches being above the waterline at a load draught. On the top of this belt, and resting upon it, is a steel deck of two-inch plates, that is, two inches thick, going the whole length of the ship, being increased to 3 inches at the extremities where the ship is unprotected by armor, and taking a shape thus, running down towards the ends and assisting very materially to strengthen the ram and take the thrust. Everything that is vital to the ship is kept below this armoured deck, and every hatchway through it is protected by a water-tight door of the same thickness. Below this deck are the bunkers and double bottoms, all of which assist to protect the engines and other important items. Above the armoured deck are the upper bunkers, about 17 feet broad, and running the whole length of the engines and boilers. These, when filled with coal, offer a good protection. The ship above the armoured deck may be riddled and the water wash freely over it, but it cannot get below on account of the water-tight doors before mentioned; and also around every hatchway are high coamings, 3 feet high and 9 inches broad, called coffer-dams. Another noticeable feature in the ship is that instead of having stanchions to support the guns, conning tower, and heavy weights above (and if one is shot away renders excessive strains on the remainder, which may fail to support the weight), they are supported by steel bulkheads, which have the advantage that they may be riddled with holes but will still support much weight. All the guns are protected by 1-Inch steel shields. The conning tower is 12 inches thick, one-third of which is steel. From this tower the ship can be steered; guns, engines, magazines, and every part of the ship communicated with by means of voice-pipes and telegraphs; the guns and torpedoes can be fired by electricity from the directors, and the whole of these telegraphs and voice-pipes are carried down through an 8-inch armoured tube, being a solid tube of 24 inches bored out 8 inches in the center. The wires leading to the guns are kept below the waterline behind the armour, and when they rise above it, are duplicated and separated at least 3 feet apart, so that the same projectile will not be likely to damage both wires. There are three steering stations below the armour deck, that is, below the water-line, any of which can be communicated with; and the rudder is placed very low down in the ship, being entirely below the waterline. The whole ship is divided into an immense number of water-tight compartments, every shell-room, bunker, store-room, and magazine being itself a water-tight compartment. There are two engine-rooms divided by a watertight bulkhead, and two sets of boilers divided in a similar manner. The armament consists of two 9.2-inch B. L. guns, ten 6-inch B. L. guns, six 6-pounder and ten 3-pounder Q. F. guns, and seven machine guns, twelve White-head torpedoes with two discharges, six E. C. mines ready for use, which number would be increased in war-time, and 500-pound mines are in store, ready for issue as required, 1200 pounds of wet gun-cotton, 360 pounds of dry, one mile of unarmoured cable, a mile and a half of single core, armoured, 1000 yards of seven-core cable, with batteries, and all other necessaries for mining work, with a crew of 500 men. A squadron of four or six of such ships, with perhaps an auxiliary or two, would constitute a most formidable enemy, and would tax the resources of a good many protected harbours to their utmost.
Now, I think no question need arise as to the preparedness for war of a man-of-war “in commission; a ship in commission is always prepared for war at the very shortest notice; there is nothing more to be done when going into action than is done regularly once a week, when the whole ship’s company are exercised at what is called General Quarters.” Every man has his appointed station, knows what he has got to do, and is exercised at doing it 53 times in the year; besides this, the individual guns’ crews and ammunition parties are drilled separately very much oftener.
General quarters is also exercised at night at least four times a year, the bugle sounding to quarters when least expected. This is drill only. The amount of actual practice is considerable. Every quarter is divided into at least two parts; eight rounds per gun are fired at a target, and a large number of rounds of machine and quick-firing guns. Also once a year prize firing takes place, which is conducted thus: The target is 40 feet long and 15 feet high, and is moored; three buoys are laid down parallel to the target, 800 yards apart, the center buoy being 1400 yards from the target at right angles to it. The ship steams along the base-line marked by these buoys at 8 knots speed. Firing commences as the ship passes the first buoy, which is 1600 yards from the target, and ceases as the ship passes the last buoy, which is also 1600 yards: nothing but hits count. As the ship passes the center buoy, No. 1 falls out, and No. 2 takes his place, the gun being worked with the diminished crews. The time occupied is about six minutes. Guns larger than 8 inches are allowed two runs, the time being twelve minutes. In 1885 and up to 1886, in different ships in different parts of the world, sixty-four guns of ten-inch caliber and upwards fired 417 rounds at the prize-firing target under the conditions already stated, and made 136 hits in thirteen minutes.
Last year the Cordelia with 6-inch guns fired in this time (six minutes) nine rounds, and hit the target nine times. The Imperieuse fired her nine-inch guns eight times, and hit six times in the twelve minutes. So you will see that, though there is much talk about the impossibility of making good firing from a moving platform, in practice extremely good firing can be made. On this point I have something to say further on. Lastly, but perhaps as important as any, is the half-yearly night practice, firing with machine and quick-firing guns and rifles at a triangular target 12 feet long and 5 feet high, with and without the electric light. The value of this practice cannot be over estimated, and the difference between the apparent and actual number of hits is most astonishing, which only shows how much practice in this direction is needed.
I have entered rather freely into the description of a modern cruiser, because, speaking as I am to defenders, it may be of interest to them to know what kind of an enemy they may be called upon to tackle, and what his capabilities of doing damage may be; and I have spoken of the practice to show that we are accustomed to working our guns, that they are not mere ornaments, and that we do not act upon the principle that if we tire them now we shall not have them to fire when required. Unless a large amount of practice is carried out, it is hopeless to expect that any thing like good shooting can be made; it is remarkable what a difference it makes even with men who are well drilled, when the gun is loaded, especially if the gun is of a new type.
The Attack. (See diagram.)
I have endeavoured to plot out here a supposed attack on the outer defenses of an imaginary harbour in order to facilitate my explanations.
The attack is made by four belted cruisers of the Orlando class and two second-class cruisers of the Marathon class.
The number of guns they mount being:
[TABLE]
The guns mounted variously for protecting the arbor are:
[TABLE]
A general outline of the attack may be something of this sort:
The Admiral-in-command will arrange his movements so as to be off the port at daylight, so that he has a fair prospect of being able to get almost within striking distance without being seen or signalled. He will have communicated to his captains the exact nature of the tactics he intends to adopt, and everything will be ready for immediate action. He forms his four large ships, not into single line ahead, because a shot missing one ship might strike the next astern, and also because, as he intends to attack end on, the leading ships would mask the fire of others; not into single line abreast, because the broadside of the inner ships will be masked by the outer, and he might be enfiladed by another battery; but he forms into quarter line, i. e., each ship four points abaft the beam of the ship next ahead, in which formation he has his right-ahead and broadside fire clear. He will not form in quarter line to port because a ricochet might then strike his sternmost ships, but he will form them in quarter line to starboard, so that a ricochet, which always goes to the right, would be clear of all his ships; each ship in this formation is on a different bearing and at a different distance to the others. In this formation he steams at a speed at which he will not have to force his engines, and which all his squadron can maintain for a time without fear of straining anything; this speed will be about 15 knots, at which rate he will cover 500 yards a minute, and, allowing ample time between each round, he can make certain of being able to fire one round per gun every 1000 yards, i. e. every two minutes. He will detach the two smaller vessels, which carry six 6-in. guns and ten quick-firing guns each, to harass the two outlying batteries by keeping up a Rapid fire on them with his quick-firing and machine guns, and prevent any man daring to expose himself above the parapet or in any exposed positions for sighting his guns or using range-finder. He will select some well-defined bearing on which to steer, and will have noted down certain positions on this line, which he will find by a cross-bearing and from which he has measured off accurately the distance of the batteries on the chart, so that he can elevate his guns with very fair precision, lie will probably open fire with his 9.2-inch guns at 6000 yards or so, and with his 6-inch at 5000 or 4000, reserving his fire as each gun is loaded until his bearing comes on, when he knows that his distance is correct. He will approach in this manner to about 2000 or 3000 yards, depending upon circumstances. When the water is deep, and rough weather frequent, a systematic mine defense is difficult; the area to be defended is so large, and the ships may approach in so many uncertain paths, that unless previous definite information has been obtained of the existence of mines so far at sea, lie would not be afraid of them, and would manoeuvre his squadron to the best advantage to develop their gun fire, knowing well the difficulty of maintaining even a small group effective so much in the open; but correct information with regard to the mining matters is always the most difficult to obtain, especially when it can be confined to some half-dozen persons to say whether real or dummy mines have been laid. In our attack here the Admiral thinks it more prudent to alter his course when between 2000 and 3000 yards off, which he will do immediately after firing a broadside, under cover of the smoke. He then alters course together to starboard, and drops back into a 2-point bearing formation, because, had he retained the 4-point bearing formation, his ships would show an unbroken line to the fire of battery A. As he approaches a 2000 yards range, he gets into single line ahead, so that in case of accidents, if one ship should be blown up by a mine, the next will probably escape, and when one has passed, the next may pass, probably. By this time he has warmed up to his work, and so have the defense; they are within a good shooting range of one another, and the whole of the guns will bear; perhaps the men are getting a little excited as the fire improves, so now he orders Director Firing, a system used extensively in the navy, and which I will endeavour to explain.
The distance at which it is intended to deliver the fire being accurately known, the elevation due to that distance is previously given to the guns. The bearing of the battery from the ship when at that distance being also known, the guns are trained on to that bearing;—all this is capable of accurate arrangement beforehand. The guns are joined up for firing by electricity, and the firing-key is in the hands of the officer at the director. This instrument is simply a telescope converged and securely clamped on the same point and at the same distance as the guns. Everything is perfectly quiet except the ship, which is bowling along and gradually bringing the cross-wires of the telescope on to the selected batteries. As the point passes the cross-wires, the whole of the converged fire is delivered electrically simultaneously, and the result is according to the care with which the guns and instruments have been placed in the ship, and according to the accuracy with which the bearing, distance, and speed, which have been estimated beforehand, have been adhered to. This firing has been expressly designed to meet the case of ships passing moderately close at high speeds. If, instead of a fort, it was another ship we were engaging, each travelling (say) 12 knots, the space of time required to pass over each other’s are of broadside fire at a distance of 1000 yards would be about 2 minutes. Letting each gun fire independently would be ineffective, as half the guns would never fire at all, owing to the smoke of those which were firing, and owing to the difficulty experienced by the captain of a gun in training on to such a rapidly moving object. The confusion of each gun firing separately is avoided, and perfect silence reigns in the ship, with each gun’s crew lying down round its gun. The effect of a broadside thus delivered, if well directed, is immensely in excess of the same number of guns hitting in succession. If the ship is being fired at at the time, this firing possesses the advantage that only one man is necessary to fire the broadside; this would be an officer selected for his coolness under fire and his knowledge of the director, and even he would be in the strongest part of the ship and quite hidden from view and protected; all others would be lying down under cover. Another and most useful method of using this firing is to give the guns the necessary elevation and let the guns’ crews keep the training on. The cap-tain of the gun has only one thing to look out for, e.,his training; the officer at the director will look out for the elevation, and the motion of the ship will be made use of for elevating the guns; with central pivot mountings and cogged gear for training, the motion is so smooth and easy that there is no difficulty in keeping the training accurately on; but of course this manner of using the director is only possible when the object fired at is distinctively visible.
To return to our attack.
As we approach the 5-fathom line we must alter course, which we do under cover of smoke again, and bring our stern guns to bear. All the time we have been engaging these batteries, our Q. F. and machine guns have been keeping up a continuous fire on the embrasures, parapets, or any loop-hole which may have presented itself, the Q. F. guns throwing shell at the rate of five or six a minute, which would be comparatively slow; and with the accurate fire made by these guns it is considered that they would do very considerable execution. The squadron now retires, the two smaller vessels are recalled, and stock is taken of damage done. It is sometimes said that one good shot from a heavy gun may disable a ship. Well, I am doubtful about that; but even supposing it to be the case, the chances are very much against this one particular good shot ever coming off; and taking the case of the Huascar and Almirante Cochrane, the latter hit the former some eighteen or twenty times at close range (200 yards sometimes), and yet after the action the Huascar was capable of steaming 200 miles into port.
Well, we find that the two smaller vessels have suffered most and will take a little time to repair damages. Several guns have been disabled in the larger vessels, and one has a hole through her bunker. She is rather heeling over on one side, but otherwise still good for fighting. On the side of the defense, battery II is completely silenced; battery E has suffered severely, apparently, but still shows fight; her 6-inch guns on hydro-pneumatic mountings are still game to fight, but as they fire so slowly and make such bad shooting while we are on the move, we do not dread them very much; still we want to silence them and to give B battery a turn, so we return to the attack on much the same lines as before, only making our direct attack on B, and leaving the second-class cruisers to get ready for the work which must take place at night.
In this second attack we succeed in silencing E battery, and have two or three more of our guns disabled. B has been knocked about a good deal, but sufficient has been done to enable us to haul off and prepare for our direct attack on the harbour. The Admiral does not think it wise to land any men, since he is not sure when the defending squadron may appear on the scene.
I am aware that it has been stated that ships cannot make good practice when under weigh, and will prefer to run the risk of anchoring, but this argument has been based on the method adopted at the bombardment of Alexandria, which, unfortunately, is a bad precedent to draw conclusions from in some instances. The glare of the sun behind the forts, the half-hearted enthusiasm of the defenders, and the guns of the ships engaged not being of the most modern type, more particularly their mountings, when training and elevating was not the simple, smooth and accurate motion which it is now—all these reasons were taken into account, and the ships were anchored. So far the action has been an artillery duel between a certain number of ships and a certain number of guns mounted on batteries of various sorts. The number of guns of attack will always be in excess of the defense at the commencement of an action, for sufficient ships will be sent to ensure at least twice as many guns being brought to bear on the defenses as they can bring to bear upon the attack.
Let us, therefore, consider the pros and cons of such a duel.
To begin with: The attack, whatever its strength may be, will always have the following advantages:
First. They come into action fresh, and not worn out by false alarms and days, perhaps weeks, of suspense and uncertainty, which it is possible may have been the lot of the defenders.
Secondly. They know what they intend to do, what tactics they intend to use, what guns they will have brought against them, and where they are situated.
Thirdly. They will choose the time and conditions of the weather which will be most favourable to themselves and worst for the defense.
And apart from these unquestionable advantages to the attack, there are other considerations which may be open to argument from an artillery point of view. The question of range-finding is one of them:—the enemy approaches from out of range to fairly close quarters, at a speed of 15 knots, at which rate he covers 500 yards a minute; he steers upon a well-defined line, so that the helmsman, who is securely protected and is under the immediate eye of the officer in command, can see what to steer for accurately; the navigating officer stands by, his compass also protected, and tells the officer in command when certain prearranged bearings come on, which give the position of the ship accurately, and from which the range of the forts or batteries is known by measurement on the chart: thus the ships know the range accurately, the guns are laid for elevation due to this range beforehand, and fired either electrically or by word of command. On the side of the defense the men using the range-finders are more or less exposed. The methods of firing at a rapidly moving target are seldom if ever practiced on account of interfering with shipping, etc., etc., and I would ask you to notice this small table:
Nature of gun. | Range. | Time of flight. | Distance within which an object 20 feet high must be known to hit. | Time taken to come this distance at 15-knot speed, allowing 100 yards for length of ship. |
Inch. | Yards. | Seconds. | Yards. | Seconds. |
9.2 B. L. R. | 6000 | 12.00 | 19 | M |
" | 2000 | 3.5 | 92 | 23 |
6 B. L. R. | 4000 | 8.08 | 31 | 16 |
" | 2000 | 3.5 | 92 | 23 |
From which it will be seen that range-finders will hardly be of much use, for there is not sufficient time to lay the gun and fire it after the range is ascertained, before it will be again necessary to alter the elevation. It will, therefore, appear that the only way to overcome this difficulty will be to lay the guns for some point over which the ship will pass, and fire as they come on, which, you will observe, is the same principle as that employed by the attack, with this difference, that the attacking ships are sure to pass over the point they steer for; but are not so sure to pass over the point for which the defense guns are laid. On this point, therefore, I think the argument is in favour of the attack.
Now take the question of training and sighting. All new naval gun-mountings admit of being able to fire the gun while in the act of elevating or training, or even adjusting the sights. I am not sure on this point, but I don’t think land mountings admit of this. Take the case of guns mounted on hydro-pneumatic disappearing carriages—what sights are used? Scott’s sights have to be shipped, the gun laid, and the sights unshipped again before the gun is fired. Surely these will be no use against a rapidly moving target. Reflecting sights have never, I believe, been tried against a rapidly moving target, and ordinary target sights generally smash up by jar of the recoil; but if used, the men sighting the guns have to be exposed, and with the rapid and accurate firing of the Q. F. and machine guns, I don’t think that a very steady aim would be taken. On board ship the men are not exposed, and can see along their sights, a much more simple and, I believe, more suitable method for fighting purposes than trusting to reflection or delicate instruments which won’t stand the shock of the recoil.
The next point is: Can the guns of the defense be concentrated on any individual ship at the will of the officer in command? On board each ship this power of concentration can be and is done, as I have already explained, by director firing, electrically, and otherwise; but in many cases this ability to concentrate the fire would be far more applicable in firing at ships than in ships at batteries, because in a ship, so many guns and vitals are centralized in such a small place, whilst in a well-defended harbour the batteries are much dispersed, and, in fact, single guns dotted about here and there in good positions would be less liable to destruction than guns mounted in more imposing batteries; but whether the guns are in batteries or single, they should be capable of concentration. To do this, means that the organization must be exceptionally good, and communication perfect. I am assuming that every gun is in free communication, either by telephone or telegraph, with the position from which the defense is being conducted, for semaphore or flag signalling, or lights at night, will be quite out of the question, as the smoke would obscure it, and machine-gun fire would be too hot for the signallers. You will remember that I explained that all communications on board ship are protected by an 8-inch armoured cylinder above water, and are behind the armour below water. Are the communications on shore protected, or are wires suspended from posts used? If so, these will be almost certain to come to grief, and the communication will therefore break down, and control will cease. If they do break down, the attack will gain another advantage. The last point to consider in this duel is the visibility of the object aimed at, and here I will admit that the defenders have decided advantage, at any rate at the commencement of the action, for they can conceal their batteries to a great extent, while a ship cannot be concealed in the daytime. As the action progresses, the batteries will gradually become more visible as the foliage or earthworks get knocked away. Taking all these matters into consideration, I do not think that the attacking fleet will suffer much so long as they have room to move about, and not at all during their direct advance; and when they come to close quarters, their superiority in number of guns, especially the Q. F. and light guns, will tell enormously in their favor, and leave no doubt in my mind as to the ultimate success of the attack in silencing the batteries facing the open sea.
Having sufficiently silenced the outer defenses, the fleet will now anchor in some sheltered spot, if possible, to make their preparations for the attack on the mine-field, which, it is supposed, exists; at any rate it would be rash to go nearer the shore without having carefully examined the ground. The first thing to be done when the ships anchor will be to put the slip on their cables ready foi etting away at a moment’s notice in case of necessity; then hoist their boats ouf nd prepare their torpedo-net defense. If they have had the opportunity beijrc arriving off the port, they will have seized some steamer and put a crew on board and have anchored her well outside the sphere of action; the boats belonging to this steamer will now come in useful to make up for the boats which have been damaged in action. Gun-cotton charges for blowing up a boom, explosives, sweeps, creeps, and countermines, sheers over the bows of the steamboats for clearing obstructions, fittings to enable the boats to jump a boom, and all the various necessaries for a torpedo attack, have got to be put in the boats, the two longest operations being preparing the countermine, launching and rigging the net defense. All the time these preparations are going on wil’ ’'e a most anxious time, as it will be the opportunity for torpedo or gunboats, they exist, to worry, if not actually to attack the enemy, and force him to kc pa portion of his men at their quarters and prevent him, as much as possi from getting his torpedo nets into position before darkness sets in. It ma, be necessary, if the Admiral Ms not certain of his ground, to anchor his ships before dark in the positions they are to occupy at the commencement of the attack; but it is better, if it can be done, to bring the ships into those positions after dark, as it will prevent the defense knowing the accurate range, and it will be more difficult for the torpedo and gun boats of the defense to make up their minds as to the best method of attack. But in a strange harbour, with no leading lights or with the leading lights purposely placed in wrong positions, it is a difficult matter to place ships in a definite position after dark. The Admiral will in such a case probably determine to be under weigh and get his ships near their positions just as darkness sets in, move up five or six hundred yards after dark, anchoring with a slip on his cables as before, and at once start his search-light, keeping a good lookout for torpedo-boats.
The positions in which he will anchor his ships after dark will depend upon the number of search-lights they carry. His aim will be to throw an effective beam of light completely round his squadron, upon which, with the assistance of his guard-boats, he relics. For preventing a torpedo-boat attack being successful, his nets will be in position, but it is possible that some of the booms supporting the nets may be shot away, so that lie takes every precaution he can to guard against the Whitehead torpedo. He must also have sufficient search-light to blind the eyes of the gunners in the batteries. These lights he will not keep fixed, but will direct their rays first on, then off, the batteries, which is most confusing. The light for guarding against torpedo-boats will be worked round slowly, and then back again. It would be better to keep fixed rays, provided there were sufficient lights, but as there are not, each light must be worked through an are of 90 degrees. The ship which is told off to make the first advance through the cleared channel will remain under weigh, and will do one of two things—either put out all lights in the ship and keep up a continuous fire of shell or blank cartridge (the object being to make much smoke and so to prevent the defense from seeing what is going on), or he will throw his search light in the eyes of the defense, taking care not to allow the rays to fall on his own boats which are advancing: the direction of the wind will decide which is the wisest course to take. The boats will be sent away immediately after dark.
Guard-boats, armed with Q. F. guns, whose duties it will be to keep about, above 1500 yards or 2000 from the ship, and not to come closer; to look out for and attack guard-boats of the defense; to give warning by signal if a torpedo-boat is seen passing them; and to protect the countermining boats when they commence operations. They must on no account follow up a torpedo-boat which is attacking, because the ships must have full liberty to fire on all boats approaching them.
Creeping-boats, armed with a machine gun and explosive creeps, fitted with what is called jumping gear, an inclined plane over the bows, to enable the boats to jump a boom. It is astonishing what a boat will jump when so fitted; a boom consisting of four baulks of timber, each one foot square is lashed together, has been jumped in this way, and even more astonishing results than this have been obtained; but I regret I have not the details by me. The boats will also be provided with small sheers over the bows, with a creep suspended from them, and hanging a foot or two below the surface of the water, to catch nets or entanglements which may be laid down with a view to fouling the propellers of steamboats. Their duties will be to creep for and blow up electric cables to which the mines are connected; some will be told off to work in the channel to be cleared, and others to go close in shore in the most likely direction for grappling the 4-core or other multiple cables. One such cable being cut may disable about 26 mines.
Boats for sweeping. These boats work in pairs, with a sweep or weighted rope between them. Their object will be to sweep for mines floating below the surface, and when grappled, a gun-cotton is hauled underneath it and exploded, thus destroying the mine. Each pair of boats, following the leading boats, will work in behind one another, so that no portion of the channel to be cleared is left out; they will drop small buoys on their outer flanks, to show what portion has been cleared.
I should have explained that in selecting a channel to be cleared the Admiral will carefully consider in what direction it is best to proceed, taking into account the depth of water, the tides, the distance from the possible position of a test-room, and so on. He will mark off a straight channel as being the shortest, and will not clear more than about 120 yards in width, lie will arrange position lights of some kind as guides to the boats advancing, to see that they are keeping the channel laid down for clearance. The steamer, which, you remember, had been taken prisoner, will be brought up, and as few hands as possible, probably volunteers for the work, put into her, with directions to steam through the channel, with the object of enticing the enemy to explode his observation mines, over which she will pass, or to bump any mines to be exploded by contact;—she will have had a certain amount of water admitted into her to bring her down to the draught of the largest ship to go through the channel. The officer in command will have directions to put his helm hard over directly a mine explodes beneath him, so that should he sink, he will not block the channel. He will be provided with boats to enable the crew to escape. Boats with special charges will be sent on to make a breach in the boom, should one exist; and finally the countermine boats will advance. Time will not admit of my entering into all the numerous details of the fitting of these boats: suffice it to say that their object is to lay large mines (500 pounds), and explode them in the channel to be cleared, at such distances apart that no mines within range of 90 feet from each countermine will be effective after the explosion. The countermines may therefore be laid 180 feet apart, and if two parallel lines are laid with that distance between them, the channel cleared will be 260 feet wide.
Countermining is the most rapid and certain way of clearing a channel; but it requires a large amount of material in proportion to the space cleared. A line, or two parallel lines, will clear a channel 760 yards long in less than five minutes. A service launch carries one line of twelve mines, with sinkers and buoys for marking the channel. The mines are arranged to drop automatically; and the boats towing countermine boat carry the firing batteries for one end, and the advance ship will fire from the other end, all the buoys marking the channel. The next pair of boats then run their mines, and ship advances as before. The ship will keep up a heavy fire during the running of the countermines, in order to cover them as much as possible by smoke. As one ship advances, so another will follow in her wake, and thus the attack will go on until the channel is cleared or daylight appears, when the boats will be recalled, and the ships must trust to their guns until night falls again, or they must retire, as it would be particularly awkward to be caught by the defending fleet in such a predicament. This is where the advantage of having a deep defense comes in. I do not think it will often be possible to continue the attack on a mine-field in daylight unless there are no guns or no gunners left to man them, for the fire of light guns would be too overpowering for boats to work, even though they were covered by a brisk fire from the ships. To retire must mean that most of the work must be done over again, for the defenders would certainly take the opportunity of removing all the buoys placed by the attack and laying down more mines instead, so that perhaps the wisest course would be to retire to the entrance of the mine-field when he can get away quickly, if need be, and where he can keep guard over that portion of the field which he has already cleared. And here we will leave him, as I have trespassed far too much on your time already, and have said quite enough, I hope, to give a general outline of an attack on a protected harbour, and to raise a few points for discussion. But before I sit down, I have a few words to say which will not detain you many minutes. I do not think that in any line of fighting is practice so essential as in that of attack and defense of harbours, for without practice, organization is impossible. The grievous errors that have been made both by the attack and defense in all the experiments which have been made at Milford Haven, Ilayling Island, and so on, must be seen to be realized; they are only brought out by practice, and can only be remedied by organization: all this can be done in peace time. It is no use having the material unless we know how to use it to its best advantage. Submarine mines are no use unless they can be laid out quickly and maintained efficiently. It is easy to say we will put a boom across here and boat mines out there; but has it ever been tried out there? Where it has been tried it has been found that the difficulties are very great.
Are there definite orders as to how and where guard-boats and torpedo-boats of the defense are to withdraw, and due precautions to prevent firing upon friends?
Do the search-lights playing on the mine-fields interfere with the gunners working the guns in the battery, and can the light be directed from some position away from the light, as it is well known that those working the lights cannot see where to direct them?
Has the officer in charge of the firing of observation mines ever practiced his duties at night with the atmosphere charged with smoke?
Has the officer in charge of firing batteries definite orders?
Is it clearly laid down where military duties end and naval begin?
Can guard-boats, be provided immediately, and are the guns ready to go in them, and do the crews know their duties?
These are a few of the practical questions which have to be settled by trial and observation, and I am sure that Col. De Wolski will agree with me, after our Milford Haven experiences, that unless these attacks are practiced in time of peace at night, and under cover of smoke, the mistakes which will certainly be made when the real test comes cannot be overestimated.
Sydney is defended by guns and submarine mines; there is the naval element here for its defense, and there is a squadron on the station for attack; there are all the necessaries at hand for attack and defense, and I am sure that if the two meet in friendly contest, more practical experience would be gained by all concerned in one night than by years of theoretical study.
[From the Electrical Engineer, October 1, 1890.]
The introduction of the electric light on board ships, and especially on war vessels, with a full equipment of generators, has naturally afforded an opportunity for the introduction of other electrical devices, notable among which are electric motors for ventilation, for the training of guns, for the hoisting of shot, etc. But a new departure has recently been taken in the application of electricity to warlike purposes, in the introduction of range-finders depending upon a few simple principles, among which that of the Wheatstone bridge is prominent. The public is already familiar with some forms of Lieutenant Fiske’s range-finders, which he has recently, however, simplified to a considerable extent, so much so that the readings can now be taken direct from a graduated dial. The description in this issue of Lieutenant Fiske’s new range-finder shows it to be a neat application of the modified Wheatstone bridge principle; and not the least notable point in connection with it is, that the errors due to the variations of the conditions from actual theory are compensated for by the very construction of the apparatus. With all these refinements and means placed at the service of the commander of a modern war vessel, it is indeed problematical whether the carrying on of warfare would be a pleasant undertaking in the future, considering the enhanced probability of a shot taking effect. The fact may also be noted here that the U. S. S. Baltimore is probably the first naval vessel in which a telephone service has been established, so as to enable the commander to communicate from the conning tower with the various parts of the ship.