The purpose of this paper is to show the practical working of a messenger pigeon service and to point out conditions under which it may be used with much advantage to the fleet.
The question of communication by means of signals arose with the first organization of fleets, as it was realized that a fleet could not render efficient service unless orders could be signaled by the flagship, and thus have all vessels under the control of the central power.
During our present age of large fleets of high-powered vessels, the question of signaling becomes a most serious factor, because it is of the utmost importance for the commander-in-chief to be able to communicate rapidly over long distances in order to concentrate or deploy his vessels as the conditions of war demand.
Many codes of signals have been used, and now we find ourselves in possession of codes that have very limited ranges. By long-distance day signals our limit of communication is between three and four miles, and by night signals about seven miles, while this range may be increased at night by signaling with the electric search-light.
However, all of our present methods of signaling are limited to distances less than ten miles, distances which can be covered by modern fleets in little more than one-half hour, and from this we realize that a system of long-distance communication becomes the more necessary with the increasing speed of modern war vessels.
In the past, when fleets could make only six or seven knots, their approach could be signaled by our present code in time to permit our vessels to prepare for action; but with vessels of twenty knots speed the result is far different, and we must have long-distance communication in order to enable our fleets to manoeuvre for advantageous positions, to form a junction at the point of attack, or to move to intercept the enemy. If, then, we can devise a system by which we can have reliable communication with the shore from any position as far as one hundred and fifty miles at sea, we will have solved the all-important problem, and the only way to obtain this long-distance communication over water is by means of messenger pigeons.
It is not necessary to go into the details of the many experiments made with homing pigeons both in Europe and in America, because the experimental stage belongs to the past, and it has been determined beyond question that trained pigeons are reliable messengers for long distances over land or water. It is safe to assume that in a well-regulated pigeon service, at least eighty per cent, of all pigeons released within one hundred and fifty miles of their home station can be relied upon to make the flight at a rate of twenty-five to forty miles an hour. Throughout Europe, for many years pigeons have been used successfully as the bearers of messages; and to-day, in this country, many of these birds are being flown by the numerous "homing clubs" with excellent results.
History records the valuable service rendered by homing pigeons during the siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian war. At that time a number of homing pigeon societies existed in Paris and in the provinces. All of the trained pigeons of Paris were taken into the provinces before the siege, and those from the provinces were taken into Paris; the result was that daily communication was maintained between besieged Paris and the provinces; and not only official messages were sent, but thou sands of private messages. Nearly every balloon that left Paris carried out pigeons, which were in turn released with messages from the besieged capital. During the last few years much attention has been given to the training of pigeons by the signal corps of the foremost European powers, and to-day they possess well-organized pigeon services. They are no longer experimenting with the pigeons, but they are putting them to practical use by sending them out each day as the bearers of important despatches. In Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Russia, the organization of pigeon posts for military purposes is very complete; France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Spain maintain pigeon posts for naval purposes, and Great Britain is now turning her attention to this valuable method of communication over sea.
An issue of the London Royal United Service Institution gives a very interesting account of experiments made during the Italian naval manceuvres. It says:
"An experimental service of carrier-pigeons was instituted on board the Sicilia, Savoia and Re Umberto during the naval manoeuvres this year, and gave splendid results. The weekly official resume of news supplied from the information bureau on board the Elba states that the pigeon service, controlled by the telegraph, gave the most satisfactory results under all possible conditions. The principal centres for the pigeon service were the Sicilia for the Green Squadron, under the direction of an army lieutenant, and on the Savoia and Re Umberto, in charge of two non-commissioned officers of the army, assisted by non-commissioned officers of the navy. Four flights were sent off, one from the Sicilia at Maddalena, fifteen hours to Rome; another from the same ship between Capraia and Vado, and two from the Savoia between Elba and Monte Argentario. The pigeons are kept on board in suitable cages, well ventilated, and are put on lower diet than on shore, with a view to greater speed for flight. The females appear to be the best messengers for short distances, being quicker than the stronger male birds; the latter are, however, more reliable for long distances. The sexes are kept apart from each other. Every flight consists of about five pigeons, and they are fed about two hours before being sent off. Bad weather, birds of prey, etc., may cause them to deviate from a direct line, but in good conditions they can make about 77 kilometers (say 48 miles) an hour." [Italia Marinara.]
Great Britain has a pigeon station at Gibraltar for receiving communications from Tangiers, while Spain has pigeon communication with Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. Great Britain's most important admiralty stations are located on the Scilly Islands off Lands End, and on Sable Island, one hundred and fifty miles east of Halifax. A regular pigeon post is maintained 1 between Sable Island and Halifax, so that messages received at Sable Island from ships cruising in that vicinity would be transferred to other pigeons and sent to Halifax. Islands in the Mediterranean that have no cable communication with the continent maintain a pigeon post, by which messages are carried at the rate of thirty to forty miles an hour. A pigeon post has been proposed between the Farallones Islands, thirty-two miles due west of San Francisco, and the mainland, for the purpose of bringing reports of the weather, reports of vessels in distress, and other important information.
The Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco is very much interested in the development of this service, and is considering the establishment of a system for the use of the merchant marine 1 on the Pacific coast. Pigeons are being taken out by many steamers leaving San Francisco, and the steamship companies are giving every encouragement to this work. An unusual number of steamers have been lost on the California coast within easy pigeon range of San Francisco during the last three months, and much time has been required to get requests to San Francisco for tugs and other assistance. These cases illustrate the importance of having pigeons on board all coasting steamers, as lives and property could have been saved had not so much valuable time been lost in sending for aid. In most of the cases a pigeon could have reached San Francisco in little more than half an hour, while it took many hours to get the report of the disasters and request for assistance to the nearest telegraph station.
I cite the above instances to show that homing pigeons are the trusted messengers of the European commercial, naval, and military worlds.
If, in the absence of the telegraph, pigeons are entrusted with important messages by commercial houses, where, if they consider the carriers unreliable, they can send their messages, without much financial loss, by the less rapid ' mail steamers, why cannot we trust the same messengers with our despatches from sea where we have no other means of communication, and where grave disasters may be averted or decided advantage gained if we can send our information to the commander-in-chief at a high rate of speed?
A poorly equipped pigeon service is worse than none at all, for no reliance can be placed in the time of flight of the birds. Consequently, in order to have an efficient and reliable service we must require rigid and systematic training of the birds within definite geographical limits; we must stock our lofts with homers of the best breed; and we must issue instructions to govern the care of these little messengers when confined on board ship, and to define the limits within which they must be flown.
The naval pigeon stations should be located on or near the coast at well fortified points, or at points inaccessible to the enemy's cruisers; and each station should be connected by telegraph with Washington and the various naval stations, and with all military stations and cities on the seaboard. An efficient messenger pigeon service could be obtained by locating stations on the Atlantic coast at or near the following points: Bar Harbor, Portsmouth (N. H.), Chatham (Mass.), Newport, New York, Delaware Bay, Norfolk, Beaufort (N. C.), Port Royal, St. Augustine, Jupiter Inlet, Key West, Tampa, Pensacola, Port Eads and Galveston. On the Pacific coast at Port Townsend or Port Angeles, Astoria, Empire City (Oregon), Cape Mendocino or Eureka, San Francisco, Port Harford, Wilmington (Cal.), and San Diego.
By this system a ship would be within range of a pigeon station from any position along the coast. Some of the above stations have been established recently by the Bureau of Equipment.
A special system should be adopted for the Great Lakes, as they could be completely covered by trained pigeons, and these stations would be of the utmost importance both to the army and to the navy in the event of war with. Great Britain. The homers for the lakes could be trained with very little trouble, and they would prove to be of much value to the shipping world in peace times, as they could be flown from any point on the lakes.
Our most important coast stations should be those nearest adjacent foreign territory, for in the event of hostilities with a government having such possessions, our fast cruisers could scout the enemy's coast, keeping a constant watch on the ports used as a rendezvous for the enemy's fleets, and still be in communication with the home station. Consequently, Key West should be our most efficient station on the Atlantic, and Port Townsend on the Pacific; the former being only two hours' flight, and the latter one hour's flight from foreign ports.
Charts (see appended charts) should be made containing the locations and limits of the pigeon stations, so that plotting the ship's position on the chart will show immediately which pigeons are to be flown from that position. It would be well to note each pigeon station on the chart with colored ink and draw the limits of the station with ink of the same color so that they may be seen readily, and so that the overlapping limits of stations will not be confused.
It is very important that the pigeons should be flown only within the limits of their home station, and for efficient and reliable service the limits of a station should contain only about two hundred miles of the coast line, that is, about one hundred miles on either side of the station. The charts prepared to accompany this paper give limits within which very good flights should be obtained, but in case of emergency pigeons should be released from positions far beyond the limits given on the charts.
To avoid confusion and loss of time in the selection of messengers, the pigeon-cote for a ship should be so constructed as to have a small compartment for each station on the coast, and the name of the station with its geographical limits should be stamped in the proper color on the door of its compartment. Each compartment should contain pigeons of the station as stamped on its door, and from no other station.
"First-rate naval powers, more especially those with long stretches of coast line, realize the importance of using vessels as scouts in time of war; fast merchant steamers of large coal capacity being well fitted for such service. A proper organization of such scouting vessels into a scouting division would prove a particularly valuable aid to a fleet of battle-ships and to the military stations along the coast. It may be remarked that a small fleet of battle-ships with an efficient scouting service, by using its information to decide when to strike and when not to strike, can so baffle and worry a superior enemy as to keep him always on the defensive, thus pursuing a Fabian policy adapted to the sea."
The scouts form the "information bureau" of the fleet; they tell when and where to strike the enemy. Deprive the fleet protecting our vast coast line of its scouts and you reduce its usefulness fifty per cent.; it is like depriving a boxer of the protection of his guard arm. The scouts are the guard arm of the fleet; they insure against surprise; they place the fleet on the offensive and enable it to select the most opportune time to strike the " knock-out " blow with its powerful right arm—the battle-ships.
In protecting our coast our strength lies in concentration of forces; our fighting ships are too few in numbers to be divided; we must keep them together in order to be able to strike a powerful, decisive blow, and here is where the scouts, with their swift-winged little messengers, stand out in such importance, because the scouts are the ones that furnish the fleet with the information which tells when and where to strike with the death dealing right. A fleet without scouts is like an army without cavalry.
In the event of hostilities between two nations of equal naval strength, the one that has the more efficient scouting division will have the advantage more or less decided in proportion to the superiority of this division.
In order to obtain the best service from scouting vessels, it is necessary that they should have rapid and reliable communication with the shore from various distances at sea, and the only way of accomplishing this is by means of homing pigeons. The nation that has a number of twenty-knot cruisers of large coal capacity, and homing pigeons trained to fly at a speed of thirty to forty miles an hour from various distances off the coast, will have an ideal scouting division.
In time of hostilities we would find much difficulty in protecting the cities along our extensive coast line, even if we possessed a naval force as large as that of Great Britain or France. It would not be wise to scatter our battle-ships and armored cruisers along the coast and thus be so weak at every point as to be unable to attack or to withstand an enemy's fleet. Our probable plan would be to concentrate the battle-ships and armored cruisers at two or more strategic points, to station monitors and torpedo-boats at various ports, and to use the fast cruisers and naval reserve steamers for patrol duty and for destroying the enemy's commerce. The coast line would be divided into sections, and cruisers of the Columbia and Cincinnati type would be used for patroling these sections, thus forming a continuous picket line.
In order that the patrol vessels or scouts may perform efficient service, they must have reliable pigeon communication with the shore, and thus be able to remain on the picket line and send in their messages.
PROBLEM I.—[See Chart No. 1.]
A large fleet of battle-ships, armored cruisers, and protected cruisers approaching the coast to make an attack on a fortified port, or in search of a hostile fleet, would be steaming, probably, less than twelve knots per hour; consequently, the fast scout, which had been under full steam since sighting the smoke of a large fleet, can easily escape from any pursuing cruisers. Upon being chased, the scout should, if possible, lay a course similar to the apparent course of the enemy's main fleet; so that, when the chase is abandoned, the fleet may again be sighted and more information despatched to the shore station. By keeping a long distance in advance or inshore of a hostile fleet—always, if possible, keeping it in sight, however—a scouting vessel, by dispatching pigeons, may be able to keep the shore stations informed of the fleet's movements until it is actually sighted from the land. If one scout should lose sight of the hostile fleet, another would probably pick it up later, and pigeons would carry the news to the shore; thus all the forts and all the ships along the coast could be informed of its approach, and of its general course, speed, and strength.
For the purpose of illustrating the usefulness of the messenger pigeon service, let us assume: (1) that hostilities exist between the United States and a first-rate naval power of Europe; (2) that the United States has an efficient messenger-pigeon service; (3) that her fast cruisers and the fast steamers of the naval reserve are stationed as scouts along the coast from Cape Sable, Nova Scotia, to Galveston; (4) that the scouts have orders to cruise as far as one hundred miles from the coast and to destroy the enemy's commerce, but if the enemy's fleet is sighted the scouts are to keep in touch with it as long as possible and dispatch pigeons with information of its movements, speed and strength; (5) that the scouts are not to engage the enemy's cruisers sent in pursuit, except as a last resort when hard pressed; (6) that the Columbia is ordered to scout from Cape Sable, Nova Scotia to Browns Bank, the St. Paul from Browns Bank to Georges Shoal, the Raleigh from Georges Shoal to New South Shoal lightship, and the Cincinnati from New South Shoal lightship to Montauk Point; (7) that these vessels are supplied with pigeons from all stations on the New England coast and from the New York station; (8) that the battle-ships and armored cruisers are organized in two fleets—the northern fleet being stationed in the vicinity of Long Island Sound or New York, and the southern fleet at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay—(9) that coast-defense vessels and torpedo-boats are stationed at ports along the coast—three monitors, one ram, and four torpedo-boats at Newport for the protection of the entrance to Long Island Sound, and three monitors and two torpedo-boats at Boston. On June 15, at 6 P. M., the following pigeon message is received at the Bar Harbor station (see Chart No. I):
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Lat. 42° 55' N., Long. 65° 40' W. (31' S. S. W.
Cape Sable), 2 P. M., June 15, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have just sighted smoke of a large number of vessels to N'd and E'd of Cape Sable, apparently standing to S'd and W'd. I will try to ascertain nature and course of the vessels. -
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Upon the receipt of this message, orders are telegraphed to the northern and southern fleets to be ready to sail at a moment's notice, and the message is telegraphed to all naval and military stations on the New England coast.
On June 15, at 7.30 P. M., two pigeons arrived at the Bar Harbor station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Lat. 43° 03' N., Long. 65° 31' W.,
3.15 P. M., June 15, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have just sighted a large fleet—probably twenty vessels—to N'd and E'd of Cape Sable, standing about S. W. by W. (mag.) to S'd of Georges Shoal, at rate of about nine or ten knots. Will try to keep in touch of fleet until dark, if not chased, and will then try to lay a course parallel to that taken by fleet.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Upon the receipt of this message, the northern fleet is ordered to take station off Newport, and the southern fleet is ordered to proceed with all speed to New York. All naval and military stations on the northern coast are informed of the approach of a large fleet.
On June 16, at 9 A. M. and 9.35 A. M., pigeons arrive at the Chatham, Mass., station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Lat. 4.10 21' N., Long. 67° 14' W.,
5 A. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Lost sight of enemy's fleet yesterday at 5.30 P. M., when we were in Lat. 42° 37 N., Long. 66° 17' W., having been chased by three cruisers until after dark. Fleet was still steering about S. W. by W. (mag.) to S'd of Georges Shoal, and had been on that course for about three hours. Made out mastheads of eighteen vessels. Have not sighted the fleet this morning, but I hope to pick up smoke very soon.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
The northern fleet is kept in readiness to sail at a moment's notice, in order to intercept the enemy's fleet if it should head for Boston.
On June 16, at 12.45 P. M. and at 1.20 P. M., pigeons arrive at the Chatham, Mass., station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. RALEIGH,
At sea, Lat. 41° 02' N., Long. 67° 51' W.,
to A. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have sighted a large amount of smoke bearing about S. E. by E. (mag.). It is probably smoke of a large number of vessels in company standing to the W'd. I will try to learn something more definite.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
and at 2.25 P. M. the following message is received at the same station:
U. S. S. RALEIGH,
At sea, Lat. 40° 52' N., Long. 67° 50' W.,
11.30 A. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have just sighted a large fleet—probably fifteen or twenty vessels—on bearing E. by S. (mag.). Fleet is standing about W. by S. (mag.), to S'd of New South Shoal Lt. Sh., at a speed of eight or nine knots. Two vessels have just been detached from fleet and evidently intend to chase me. I am standing for New South Shoal Light Ship.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
By this message it is seen that the enemy was standing too far to the S'd for an attack on Boston, and was evidently bound for Newport or New York. Consequently, a dispatch vessel is sent from New York to intercept the southern fleet and give orders to the commander-in-chief to take station off Montauk Point as soon as possible, in order to intercept the enemy; to station a despatch vessel within signal distance of the Montauk Point signal station for the purpose of receiving orders or information from the commander-in-chief of the northern fleet, and to be ready to move with all speed to the support of the northern fleet.
At 5.30 P. M. and 5.45 P. M., June 16, pigeons arrived at the Chatham station each with the following message:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Lat. 400 34' N., Long. 68° 19' W.,
3 P. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have again sighted smoke and mastheads of a fleet bearing E. N. E. ½ E. (mag.), and standing about W. Va S. (mag.), to S'd of New South Shoal. Speed eight or nine knots: Fleet must contain fifteen or twenty fighting vessels and has steered the same general course since first sighted by us off Cape Sable yesterday at 2 P. M.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
At 5.20 P. M. the following message is received at the same station:
U. S. S. RALEIGH,
At sea, Lat. 400 40' N., Long. 69° 10' W.,
3.15 P. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
We have lost sight of the enemy's cruisers after having been chased for three and one-half hours, and we will now attempt to find enemy's fleet before dark. My last message was sent at 11.30 A. M. to-day, and stated that a large fleet was sighted bearing E. by S. (mag.), when we were in Lat. 40° 52' N., Long. 67° 50' W., and that it was standing on a course about W. by S. (mag.) to the S'd of New South Shoal, at a speed of eight or nine knots.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
and at 7.10 P. M. and 7.30 P. M. the following message in duplicate is received at the same station:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Lat. 40° 35' N., Long. 68° 34' W.,
440 P. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
After sending message at 3 P. M. to-day, I steamed ahead to avoid enemy's cruisers and lost sight of fleet; but later I slowed engines, and fleet has just been sighted from aloft on bearing E. 14 N. (mag.). Fleet is still steering about W. (mag.) to S'd of New South Shoal Lt. Sh., and making about eight or nine knots. Fleet is large, and had kept same general course since passing Cape Sable.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
and at 7.30 P. M. the following message is received at Chatham:
U. S. S. RALEIGH,
At sea, Lat. 40° 39' N., Long. 68° 45' W.,
5.40 P. M., June 16, 1896.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Have again picked up enemy's fleet on bearing E. S. E. (mag.), and it is steering about West (mag.), to the S'd of New South Shoal Lt. Sh., making eight or nine knots. Fleet seems to have between fifteen and twenty ships, and has been making course West (mag.) since I sighted them at 11.30 A. M. to-day. I will keep in touch with fleet until dark if permitted to do so by the cruisers. The evident intention is to make an attack on Newport or Long Island Sound at daylight to-morrow.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
The above message is telegraphed to all points on the coast, and full preparations are made to resist the attack. The northern fleet is informed, by despatch vessels, of the enemy's movements; and the Montauk Point signal station is telegraphed to signal the information to the southern fleet upon its arrival.
At 6.35 A. M., June 17, two pigeons arrive at Newport station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. CINCINNATI,
At sea, Lat. 40° 34 N., Long. 70° 54' W.,
5 A. M., June 17, 1896.
To THE COMMANDANT NEWPORT NAVAL STATION:
Have just (daylight) sighted a large fleet on bearing S. by W. 1/2 W. (mag.). Fleet is standing in for Newport. Cannot make out number of vessels. I will slowly approach the fleet to learn its strength, and I will run for Newport when chased.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
The northern fleet gets under way by daylight from anchorage near Block Island, and at 7.45 A. M., when 8' S. E. by E. of Block Island, it is signaled by a despatch boat and given the above message from the Cincinnati. The message is telegraphed to Montauk Point for the southern fleet, with orders to cruise off the east end of Long Island, but within easy communication of the Montauk Point signal station.
At about 7 A. M., June 17, messages, in duplicate, are received at the Chatham and Newport stations from the Columbia and Raleigh, stating that the enemy's fleet had passed about 20 miles to the S'd of New South Shoal lightship, and had laid a course for Newport about 4 A. M., steaming about ten knots; and that at daylight the fleet had been sighted in lat. 400 12' N., long. 700 59' W., heading for Newport, and that the Columbia and Raleigh were making for Newport.
At 7.10 A. M., June 17, three pigeons arrived at the Newport station each with the following message:
U. S. S. CINCINNATI,
At sea, Lat. 40° 32' N., Long. 700 59' W.,
5.30 A. M., June 17, 1896.
To THE COMMANDANT NEWPORT NAVAL STATION:
Enemy's fleet bears S. y, E. (mag.), distant about 7 miles, heading for Newport at speed of about twelve knots. The fleet consists of about twenty-three vessels, and, as well as I can make out, are as follows: six battle-ships, five armored cruisers, eight cruisers, and four large torpedoboats. The present formation is double column, battle-ships leading, with torpedo-boats between main columns. I am making for Newport under full speed, being chased by two cruisers. I have not yet sighted our fleet, but have just sighted a vessel to E'd, off starboard quarter, and it is probably Raleigh making for Newport, as enemy has just sent a cruiser after her. Enemy has just sent torpedo cruisers ahead as scouts.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
This message is telegraphed to the Montauk Point signal station for the southern fleet, and is immediately sent to the northern fleet by a twenty-knot despatch vessel; and the fleet is signaled at 8.30 A. M., 15 miles S. E. 72 E. (mag.) of Block Island, just after it has made out the Cincinnati and Raleigh, and has sighted a large amount of smoke to the S'd.
At 7.40 A. M., pigeons arrive from the Raleigh with messages of same general purport as the message from the Cincinnati.
At 8.20 A. M., June 17, three pigeons arrive at the Newport station, each with the following message from the flagship of the northern fleet:
U. S. FLAGSHIP KEARSARGE,
8' S. E. by E. (mag.) of Block Island,
7.50 A. M., June 17, 1896.
To THE COMMANDANT NEWPORT NAVAL STATION:
Have just received Cincinnati's message dated five o'clock this morning. Will endeavor to engage the enemy about 26 miles S. by E. (mag.) of Pt. Judith. Send the three monitors, the ram, and torpedo-boats with all speed to join me at that point. Sea smooth, very favorable for monitors and torpedo-boats. Telegraph Montauk Point Signal Station to signal Southern Fleet to join me with all speed at a point 26' S. by E. (mag.) of Pt. Judith; also send a despatch vessel to communicate with southern fleet off Montauk Pt. Have just sighted two vessels. One is probably Cincinnati. She will remain with the Flag.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
At 10.35 A. M., June 17, two pigeons arrived at the Newport station, each with the following message:
U. S. FLAGSHIP KEARSARGE,
24' S. by E. 4 E. (mag.) of Pt. Judith,.
9.45 A. M., June 17, 1896.
To THE COMMANDANT NEWPORT NAVAL STATION:
Have just engaged enemy at long range. Torpedo-boats are just arriving and monitors are in sight. Enemy's fleet is composed of seven battle-ships, six armored cruisers, six cruisers, and four torpedo-boats_ Telegraph Southern Fleet at Montauk Pt. Signal Station to join me with all speed at this point, if you have not already done so. Telegraph Boston to send monitors with all speed to take station to the E'd of Phelps Bank, in order to cut off retreat of enemy.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
At 1.35 P. M., June 17, the following message in duplicate is. received at Newport:
U. S. FLAGSHIP KEARSARGE,
26' S. S. E. (mag.) off Point Judith,.
12.50 P. M., June 17, 1896.
To THE COMMANDANT NEWPORT NAVAL STATION:
Have closed to 1600 yards, both sides suffering severely. Enemy's. losses are: two cruisers and one torpedo-boat sunk, two armored cruisers set afire and disabled, and two battle-ships partially disabled—unable to. fire barbette guns. Have just ordered Cincinnati, San Francisco, and' Montgomery to attempt to make the Sound. They are disabled and leaking badly, so send tug to meet them between this point and the Sound, and tow them to New York with all speed. Telegraph New York Navy Yard to have docks ready to receive disabled cruisers. Monitors. are doing effective work. Southern Fleet has been sighted. Brooklyn has signaled that she is seriously damaged and unmanageable. Have signaled Detroit to tow Brooklyn beyond the line of fire and try to. make Newport. Send some vessels to her assistance. Take her to New York if possible, and only beach her as the last resort. Have lost one torpedo-boat.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
PROBLEM II.—[See Chart No. II., Gulf of Mexico.]
Let us assume that strained relations have existed between the United States and Spain for several weeks and that both nations are preparing for war. Spain has continually increased her fleet in Cuban waters until it consists of the following-named vessels: The 990o-ton battle-ship Pelayo; the 7000-ton armored cruisers Infanta Maria Theresa, Viscaya, Princessa de Asturias and Cataluna; the 3300-ton cruisers Alfonso XII., Aragon, Navarra and Castella; the 1100-ton cruiser Conde de Venadito, and six others of the same class; eight gunboats of about 750 tons, and six torpedo-gunboats.
Havana is the headquarters of this large fleet, while the cruisers and gunboats patrol the coast for filibustering expeditions.
The United States has gradually recalled vessels from foreign stations and assembled at Key West a powerful fleet, which now comprises most of the ships of the navy and many armed steamers of the reserve. An efficient messenger-pigeon service is in operation with stations at Key West, Tampa and Pensacola on the west coast of Florida, and at Jupiter Inlet and St. Augustine on the east coast. Particular attention has been given to the training of the pigeons of the Key West station, as this station contains within its range the Old Bahama Channel, the Straits of Florida and Yucatan Channel—the three channels leading to Havana—as well as the coast of Cuba east and west of Havana. (See charts Nos. II. and III. for limits of stations.)
The commander-in-chief of our fleet has organized a scouting division of high-speed vessels, and each vessel is to carry pigeons from all Florida stations.
In the event of hostilities, the scouts are to take station and cruise in pairs as follows (see chart): The Cincinnati and N. R. S. S. St. Paul off Cay Frances, to patrol the west entrance to Old Bahama Channel; the Marblehead and N. R. S. S. New York off Cape San Antonio, to patrol Yucatan Channel; the Columbia and N. R. S. S. St. Louis between Florida coast and Great Isaac, at the junction of Florida Strait and N. W. Providence Channel, to patrol the north entrance to Florida Straits, and the Raleigh and N. R. S. S. Paris to patrol the Cuban coast near Havana. Other vessels of the naval reserve are to cruise within the limits of the various pigeon stations on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.
The principal duty of the scouts is to watch the movements of the enemy's ships and to report by messenger pigeons what information is obtained; the secondary duty is to capture the enemy's and contraband neutral commerce within the limits of their scouting stations, but not to engage the enemy's war vessels except under very favorable conditions.
In his orders to the scouting division, the commander-in-chief states that scouts are not fighting ships, and that the object in using them is not for the purpose of engaging the enemy's vessels single-handed, but for the purpose of keeping the commander- in chief informed of the general movements of the enemy's vessels, thus enabling him to surprise and strike the enemy with his heavy fighting ships.
On September 10 our minister is withdrawn from the Court of Spain, our consular officers leave the Spanish ports, and a state of hostilities is declared to exist with the government of Spain. Upon the withdrawal of our Consul-General from Havana, he reports the presence in that port of the entire Spanish fleet, as referred to above, except a few gunboats that are still along the Cuban coast; and he further reports extensive preparations on shore and afloat to defend the port of Havana. New guns have been mounted in the fortress, and the fleet is to assist in the common defense of the port.
In its manifesto notifying foreign governments of the existence of a state of hostilities, the United States Government grants many concessions to neutral trade; and at the same time orders are issued to the commander-in-chief of our naval force directing him to refrain from bombarding even fortified ports where the lives and property of non-combatants are endangered. Resort must be had to blockading the enemy's ports and to attacking his fleet upon the sea.
Our ships are organized into three divisions—the "main fleet," the "flying squadron," and the "scouting squadron." The main fleet is composed of the following-named vessels: Iowa (flag), Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Texas, Puritan, Terror, Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monterey, Philadelphia, Boston, Atlanta, Montgomery, Detroit, Charleston, Concord, Yorktown, Bennington, Machias, Castine, Katandin, Vesuvius, eight torpedo-boats, and four despatch vessels.
The "flying squadron" is composed of the Brooklyn (flag), New York, Olympia, Maine, Baltimore, Chicago, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Newark, and four fast steamers or yachts for despatch duty.
The scouting vessels are sent to their stations, as above detailed, while the main fleet and the flying squadron remain at Key West.
By stationing the scouting vessels in the three channels leading to Havana, the commander-in-chief is insured of the receipt of information, by pigeon messages, of the approach of the enemy's vessels within four or five hours after they are sighted by the scout.
The scouts off Havana can send pigeon messages to the commander- in-chief in two hours' time, thus informing him of any movements of the main Spanish fleet at Havana.
With this disposition of scouting vessels, which vessels can communicate with Key West by messenger pigeon within less than five hours, the commander-in-chief becomes master of the situation, and he can intercept any movement of the enemy. Knowing the names of the Spanish vessels in Cuban waters at the beginning of hostilities, the commander-in-chief knows the remaining ships of the Spanish Navy that are available for an attempt to re-enforce the fleet at Havana, or for making a descent on our coast cities. The only vessels available for the service are the Carlos V. (cr. 7000 tons), Almirante Oquendo (ar cr. 7000 tons), Alfonso XIII. (cr. 5000 tons), Lepanto (cr. 4800 tons), Reina Christina (cr. 3500 tons), Reina Mercedes (cr. 3100 tons), and a few old vessels of low speed.
The "flying squadron" has been organized of vessels that are capable of overtaking and defeating a fleet composed of the above-named Spanish vessels. This squadron is to remain at Key West and await pigeon messages from its scouts telling of the approach of any Spanish re-enforcements, and then it is to manceuvre to intercept and capture the re-enforcing fleet. If Spanish vessels should approach to attack our coast cities, the news of the approach would probably be received at the proper pigeon station from the scouts stationed along the coast and then telegraphed to Key West; this would cause the "flying squadron" to move up the coast (communicating with pigeon stations along the coast by despatch vessels as it proceeds) for the purpose of finding and engaging the enemy.
On account of the humane and highly commendable course assumed by our Government, the commander-in-chief is debarred from bombarding the port of Havana and thus sacrificing innocent life and property. Consequently, his object is to remain at Key West and endeavor to entice the Spanish fleet out of Havana; and as any movement of the enemy's fleet will be reported at Key West by pigeons within two hours, the commander-inchief will be able to chase and engage the enemy, or at least the flying squadron will be able to overtake and engage the enemy until the arrival of the main fleet. The "flying squadron" appears off Havana for the purpose of inducing the enemy to come out and engage a smaller fleet, but without success.
The scouts in the three channels have practically stopped all commerce with Havana. The scouts off Havana send daily messages to Key West, stating that the Spanish fleet remains in the harbor, thus showing that the Spanish commander-in-chief is not desirous of engaging our fleet, but knowing our superior strength, he wisely prefers to assist the forts in the defense of Havana.
All efforts to draw the Spanish fleet out of Havana proving futile, a strict blockade of Havana is ordered, and the main fleet, with the exception of the monitors, sails for Havana and establishes the blockade. The flagship is supplied with Key West pigeons, to be used in communicating with the "flying squadron," the monitors and the colliers and supply vessels at Key West. Despatch vessels from Key West supply the flagship with pigeons every few days.
Ten days after the establishment of the blockade, news is received in Washington from Madeira of the arrival at the latter place of a steamer reporting "having sighted a Spanish fleet to the W'd of Madeira and standing W.S.W." Fifteen days later a British steamer arrives at Baltimore from Barbadoes and reports having been stopped and searched, five days before when off the Virgin Islands, by the Spanish cruiser Almirante Oquendo, the flagship of a squadron of six large vessels and four torpedo-gunboats, and that the squadron laid a course for Porto Rico after the search.
This news is telegraphed to Key West and it is concluded that the "Spanish relief squadron" has stopped at Porto Rico for coal and to communicate with Havana.
Two additional scouts are immediately sent out to find the St. Paul and Cincinnati in Old Bahama Channel, and, in company, they are to patrol the eastern entrance to Old Bahama Channel. When the scouts sight the Spanish squadron they are to dispatch pigeons, and one vessel is to proceed with all speed to communicate with the commander-in-chief off Havana, dispatching pigeons to Key West frequently when within easy range; the other scouts are to keep in touch with the enemy and dispatch pigeons with information of his movements.
We now have a very interesting but simple problem: We have the main Spanish fleet blockaded in Havana by a much superior American fleet; we have our flying squadron" at Key West ready to move in any direction at a high rate of speed; we have the three passages to Havana and to the Gulf of Mexico patrolled by scouts that can get pigeon messages to Key West within four or five hours; we have at Key West a fleet of monitors which, after a Spanish relief squadron arrives within easy pigeon range, can join our main fleet off Havana long before the Spanish squadron can possibly reach Havana; and we have the news of the presence of a Spanish "relief squadron" of six vessels in the neighborhood of Porto Rico.
Let us assume that the object of the Spanish commander-in-chief is to effect an escape from Havana with his fleet, and that his plan is for the "relief squadron" to attempt to raise the blockade of Havana by appearing off that port for a combined attack on our main fleet, or for the "relief squadron" to attempt to draw our fleet from Havana by making an attack on one of our ports. The Spanish squadron being in possession of no coaling port nearer our coast than Porto Rico, will probably not make a raid on the ports of our northern coast, which are so far from the base of supplies.
We now arrive at the point in our problem where the messenger pigeons become of great importance, and by using them our problem becomes very simple (see "scouts" on chart). We practically have the main Spanish fleet shut up in Havana, and we will receive notice of the approach of a "relief squadron" from any direction at least ten hours before it can reach Havana by the shortest route; or, in other words, we will receive notice at Key West before such a squadron arrives at any point within 120 miles of Havana, even if it attempts the passage of Old Bahama Channel by night.
If the plan of the Spanish commander is to make a combined attack on our blockading fleet off Havana, the "relief squadron" must reach Havana by one of three routes—by the direct route through Old Bahama Channel, by the indirect route along the south coast of Cuba and through the Yucatan Channel, or by the other indirect route outside of the Bahamas and then through N. W. Providence Channel and Florida Strait.
Let us assume that the Spanish commanders at Havana and Porto Rico have communicated with each other and agreed upon a plan of attack on our blockading fleet. The "relief squadron" is to proceed to Havana by the direct route through Old Bahama Channel, and the attack is to be at daylight on November 17.
Just before dark on November 1, the Cincinnati and St. Paul sight a large amount of smoke to the E'd of Old Bahama Channel. They steam towards the smoke and discover a number of vessels in company standing to the W'd for Old Bahama Channel (see chart No. II.). The Cincinnati and St. Paul steam to the W'd during the night, keeping well in advance of the other vessels, but before daylight they slow down to await the enemy, and at daylight they discover a fleet of warships. The scouts release pigeons from the 200-mile range and steam to the W'd, sighting the fleet at intervals, and finally being joined by the other two scouts at the west entrance to Old Bahama Channel.
At 1 P. M., November 16, two pigeons arrive at Key West from the Cincinnati, each with the following message:
U. S. S. CINCINNATI,
At sea, west entrance Old Bahama Channel,
Lat. 200 53' N., Long. 79° 00’ W.,
7.30 A. M., Nov. 16.
Yesterday, at 7.30 P. M., sighted a number of vessels in company standing to the W'd through Old Bahama Channel at a speed of about nine knots. We stood to W'd during night, and early this morning we awaited the vessels and find them to be a fleet of six large vessels and four gunboats standing to the W'd along Cuban coast. We are steaming to the W'd, St. Paul and other scouts appear to be doing the same.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Upon the receipt of this message the monitors prepare to proceed to Havana, and the "flying squadron" is ready to sail. A despatch vessel is sent with all speed to convey the above message to the commander-in-chief off Havana, and to inform him that the monitors and torpedo-boats will be sent to join him.
Soon after the receipt of the above message, similar ones are received from the St. Paul and other scouts.
At 3 P. M. the monitors and torpedo-boats leave Key West to join the main fleet off Havana. The "flying squadron" remains at Key West for further information, in order to see if the enemy continues through Nicholas Channel for Havana, or if he stands to the N'd through Santaren Channel to make a feint at attacking our ports for the purpose of drawing off our blockading fleet.
At 5.30 P. M., several pigeons arrive with messages similar to the following:
U. S. S. ST. PAUL,
At sea, Nicholas Channel,
Lat. 23° 20' N., Long. 79° 48' W.,
1 P. M., Nov. 16.
A fleet of six large and four small vessels has entered Nicholas Channel and is standing to the W'd at speed of about nine knots—evidently intends making an attack on blockading fleet at daylight to-morrow. Cannot make out class of vessels. One scout has been sent to communicate with the commander-in-chief off Havana. These vessels were first sighted last evening at east entrance to Old Bahama Channel and have been standing along Cuban coast. We are in company with Cincinnati and will endeavor to keep in touch with the enemy until dark and during the night; after he passes out of west entrance to Nicholas Channel we will run for Havana to communicate with commander-in-chief.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Messages similar to the above are received at Key West until 8 P. M. from the Cincinnati and St. Paul, and they show that the enemy is bound for Havana.
Before the enemy's "relief squadron" left Porto Rico its commander was informed by the Havana officials of the presence of our monitors at Key West; consequently the Spanish commander has no intention of attacking Key West, which he supposes is still defended by the monitor fleet, but his plan is to make a daylight attack on our blockading fleet before the monitors can re-enforce it.
This plan is effectively thwarted by the receipt of the pigeon messages announcing the approach of the "relief squadron," when it is yet 150 miles from Havana, and thus the monitors and torpedo-boats are given ample time to join the blockading fleet off Havana long before the enemy's "relief squadron" can possibly arrive there. The "flying squadron" remains at Key West until dark to receive the last pigeon messages, in order to be assured that the Spanish squadron does not diverge from its course for Havana to make a feint at one of our ports. Being assured of the plan of the enemy's squadron, our "flying squadron" sails for Havana with all speed and joins the blockading fleet during the night. At daylight of November 17, when the enemy plans to surprise and overwhelm our blockading fleet by a combined attack during the absence of our monitors, flying squadron and torpedo-boats, he is himself much surprised to find our entire naval force in readiness to receive the attack. These manoeuvres to concentrate our forces so quickly in order to receive the attack have been brought about by the receipt of the pigeon messages announcing the approach of the enemy's "relief squadron," and everything hinges on the receipt of this information. In the above problem, the assumption of daylight as the time for the attack gives the most unfavorable conditions for using the pigeon service. If the attack had been planned for a later hour, or in the afternoon, or at night, the pigeons could have kept up continual communication with the home station until the time of the attack.
This problem illustrates how the messenger-pigeon service makes the "flying squadron" the master of the situation, by furnishing such information as to enable that squadron to combine with the main fleet at the proper moment, or to tell it when and where to strike the enemy.
PROBLEM III. [See Chart No. II.]
Let us assume now that the Spanish" relief squadron "takes one of the indirect routes to relieve Havana, in order to avoid the scouts that are known to be stationed in Old Bahama Channel. -We will see, by a glance at the chart, that information of the approach of the enemy's squadron will be received many hours before it can reach Havana; and, if it is so desired, our flying squadron can easily intercept and engage the enemy's squadron when it is many miles from Havana. If the enemy's squadron comes through the N. W. Providence Channel and Florida Strait, its approach is communicated to the Jupiter Inlet station by pigeons from the Columbia and St. Louis, and is then telegraphed to Key West.
In the morning of November 16, pigeon messages are received at the Jupiter Inlet station from the Columbia and St. Louis, stating that a number of vessels have been sighted; and later on messages state that the enemy's squadron has been sighted entering Florida Strait from N. W. Providence Channel, and standing to the southward. This information is telegraphed to Key West, and a despatch vessel sent to the blockading fleet, as are other messages that arrive later. The monitors and torpedo- boats may be sent to join the fleet off Havana. The "flying squadron" is in position to intercept and attack the enemy's squadron, or it may wait until assured, by the course and position of the enemy's squadron, that Key West is safe and that the plan is to attack the blockading fleet, and then proceed at full speed to join our blockading fleet. By this means the main Spanish fleet may be drawn out of Havana to join the "relief squadron" and then forced to give battle.
If the enemy's squadron attempts to reach Havana by way of Yucatan Channel, its approach will be detected by the Marblehead and New York, stationed in that channel, and the pigeons will arrive in time for the monitors and "flying squadron" to reach Havana long before the attack.
In the above cases the scouts keep in touch with the enemy and despatch pigeons until the destination of the enemy is determined.
We have considered the only three routes by which the enemy's "relief squadron" can reach Havana, and we see how completely it is in the power of the force at Key West, on account of its movements being detected and so quickly reported to Key West.
Next, we must consider the attempt of the enemy's "relief squadron" to make an attack on one of our coast cities for the purpose of drawing our blockading fleet from Havana, and thus permitting his main fleet to escape.
The enemy having his base of supplies at Porto Rico, will attack probably one of our gulf ports, or possibly St. Augustine or Charleston—his only object being to draw away our blockading fleet.
If the enemy enters the Gulf of Mexico, his presence will be known at Key West in time for the "flying squadron" to overtake him before he can reach any gulf port. (See chart No. II). Assume that the enemy's squadron at Porto Rico plans a feint attack on Pensacola, and, being aware of the presence of our scouts in the Old Bahama Channel, Yucatan Channel, and around Key West, decides to enter the Gulf of Mexico through Straits of Florida and to pass Key West at night. At 9.30 A. M., November 20 two pigeons arrive at the Jupiter Inlet station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. ST. LOUIS,
At sea, Lat. 26° 54' N., Long. 79° 24! W.,
7.30 A. M., Nov. 20.
Have just sighted, on bearing E. 14 S. (mag.), a fleet of vessels entering Florida Straits from N. W. Providence Channel and standing to the S'd. I will try to learn strength and nationality of fleet, and will then run to the S'd, keeping in sight of the fleet as long as permitted to do so. Columbia is to S'd and W'd, but not in sight.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
This message is telegraphed to Key West, and the monitors, torpedo-boats, and "flying squadron" prepare to sail. A dispatch vessel is sent with the message to Havana, and additional scouts are sent to the E'd of Key West with a radius of 20 miles.
At 10.45 A. M., November 20, the following message from the Columbia is received at Jupiter Inlet station:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Florida Sts., Lat. 26° 01’ N., Long. 70° 42' W.,
8.50 A. M., Nov. 20.
Sighted the Si. Louis about 8.30 this A. M., standing for us at full speed, being chased by an enemy's cruiser. When we joined company, enemy's cruiser hauled off and stood about E. by N. (mag.), in which direction we sighted a large amount of smoke. St. Louis reports having sighted a fleet at 7.30 this morning when in Lat. 26° 54' N., Long. 79° 24' W., bearing E. ½ S. (mag.) and standing to the S'd in Florida Straits, and that a vessel was sent in chase of her when she approached to learn strength of fleet. She reports fleet consisting of six or more vessels. We will remain in company and try to keep in touch with the enemy.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
A message similar to the above was received at the Jupiter Inlet station from the St. Louis an hour later, and these messages were telegraphed to Key West as soon as received. At 1.45 P. M., November 20, the following message is received at the Jupiter Inlet station from the Columbia, with a similar one from the St. Louis:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Florida Sts., Lat. 25° 32' N., Long. 79° 44' W.,
11 A. M., Nov. 20.
In company with St. Louis, picked up enemy's fleet of about six vessels at 10.40 this A. M., and are now being chased by enemy's cruisers. We are running to S'd at full speed and when chase is abandoned we will try to pick up the fleet. Enemy's fleet is standing to S'd through Florida Str. at speed of about 10 knots.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
These messages are despatched to the commander-in-chief off Havana. The vessels at Key West are ready to move at a moment's notice, but await more definite despatches in order to decide upon the probable plan of the enemy.
A message is received at the Key West station about 5.30 P. M., November 26, from the Columbia, dated Lat. 24° 48' N., Long. 800 15' W., 1.45 P. M., November 20, stating that after three hours the enemy's cruisers had abandoned the chase of the St. Louis and Columbia, and had stood to the E'd at reduced speed. The message also states that the St. Louis and Columbia will try to pick up enemy's fleet before dark, and it gives the course, speed and strength of fleet when last sighted. At 6.45 P. M., November 20, two pigeons arrived at the Key West station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Florida Str., Lat. 24° 57' N., Long. 8o° 03' W.,
3.30 P. M., Nov. 20.
We have again sighted enemy's fleet standing about S. W. by S. (mag.) for Matanzas on Cuban coast, at speed of about to knots. Fleet consists of about six vessels and entered Florida Str. at 7.30 this morning from N. W. Providence Chl. St. Louis is with us, and we will try to keep in touch of fleet, unless again chased. If during night we find enemy changes his plan, will send St. Louis to Key West and I will run for blockading squadron with the information.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Messages similar to the above are received from the St. Louis, and the monitors and torpedo-boats are ordered to join the commander-in-chief off Havana, as the probable plan of the enemy is to make Matanzas during the night, communicate with Havana by telegraph, and then make a combined attack on the blockading fleet at daylight. Despatch vessels are also sent to inform commander-in-chief. The "flying squadron" is to cruise off Key West, but remains in port until dark to see if other messages arrive. The "flying squadron" has orders not to leave Key West undefended while the enemy is in that neighborhood, and, at the same time, not to prevent the enemy from attacking the blockading fleet, as the object is to bring on a general engagement and thus draw the enemy's main fleet out of Havana; but the flying squadron is to join the main fleet after the attack is begun, and thus take the enemy in the rear.
At 7.50 P. M., November 20, three pigeons arrive at the Key West station, each with the following message:
U. S. S. COLUMBIA,
At sea, Florida Str., Lat. 24° 43' N., Long. 8o° 17' W.,
Nov. 20, 5.30 P. M.
Have again picked up enemy's fleet, bearing E. (mag.). Fleet has changed course to the W'd and is now standing about W. S. W. (mag.) at to knots speed. Six vessels in fleet. Fleet was standing for Matanzas on Cuban coast when sighted before at 3.30 P. M., had to steam ahead to avoid enemy's cruisers. Probably night attack on Havana intended. Will try to pick up fleet during night, and will then despatch St. Louis with information. Send other scouts to the E'd of Key West to communicate with me during the night, as I must keep in touch of enemy.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Several pigeons arrive from the St. Louis just about dark with messages similar to the above.
From the above messages, the plan of the enemy cannot be definitely determined; he may be bound for Havana or for Key West or Gulf ports. However, it is readily seen that the enemy cannot reach the neighborhood of Key West before 11.30 P. M. if steaming at 15 knots an hour. Additional scouts are sent out to cruise within 20 miles of Key West. The flying squadron gets under way and takes station off Key West, for the protection of that port, or to intercept the enemy if bound to a Gulf port. The blockading fleet has been re-enforced by the monitors and torpedo-boats, and the flying squadron is in position to move in any direction. At 10.45 P. M., November 20, the St. Louis signals the flying squadron off Key West and reports having been ordered to Key West by the Columbia to report approach of enemy's fleet. At 6.00 P. M. enemy was in lat. 24° 40' N., long. 8o° 18' W., and standing about W. S. W. (mag.) at 10 knots speed. After a full report of the movement of the enemy's fleet during the day, the St. Louis is sent to scout to the E'd of Key West.
At 1.45 A. M., November 21, a scout signals flying squadron off Key West, and reports having spoken Columbia at 12.15 A. M. when 22 miles E. S. E. (mag.) of Sand Key, and having been ordered to report the enemy's fleet about 15 miles S. E. (mag.) of American Shoal at 11.40 P. M., November 20, and standing about W. S. W. (mag.) at 12 knots speed. Columbia would try to keep with enemy.
At 3.15 A. M., November 21, the St. Louis signals flying squadron that she has failed to find the enemy, and then she is sent to the W'd at full speed with other scouts to try to find the enemy. At 6.00 A. M., November 21, four pigeons arrive at the Key West station, each with the following message from the St. Louis:
U. S. S. St. Louis,
At sea, Lat. 24° 17' N., Long. 82° 22' W.,
4.50 A. M., Nov. 21.
At early daylight sighted large amount of smoke to the S'd, and have just made out a fleet on bearing S. E. by S. (mag.), standing about W. (mag.).
COMMANDING OFFICER.
Other pigeons arrive from the Columbia with messages stating that at daylight she picked up the fleet standing to the W'd.
Upon the receipt of these messages it is seen that the enemy's plan is to attack a Gulf port and not to attack the blockading fleet. Consequently the "flying squadron" sails at full speed to the W'd and overtakes and engages the enemy before he reaches the nearest Gulf port. This manceuvre to overtake and engage the enemy is made possible only by the receipt of the pigeon messages from the scouts that have kept the "flying squadron" posted of the enemy's movements. If the enemy's plan is to go to Havana direct, or to make Matanzas at night, and after communicating with Havana, to attack the blockading fleet, then the scouts will continue to report the enemy's course until dark. During the night, if the definite plan of the enemy is learned, the St. Louis or other scouts will be despatched to Key West with the information and the Columbia will run for the blockading fleet.
The patrol vessels of the blockading fleet will also report the approach of the enemy, so that pigeons can be despatched at daylight for Key West ordering the "flying squadron" to Havana with all speed, and this squadron will arrive in time to flank the enemy or to prevent his escape. Fleets at sea beyond communication from the shore are of very little value for concerted action, and therefore it is important to keep the "flying squadron" in port until the definite plan of the enemy is determined, and then to move at high speed in order to strike at the most opportune time and place. As was said before, a squadron of fast ships stationed at Key West, with an efficient scouting division to keep it informed by pigeon post of the movements of the enemy through the three passages to the Gulf, is practically master of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and can lay its plans accordingly.
From its geographical surroundings, Key West will become our most important pigeon station on the Atlantic; and Port Townsend, which controls the Strait of Fuca, and entrance to Puget Sound, will be the most important on the Pacific. By glancing at a chart it will be seen that the Port Townsend Station can control the entire entrance to the Western possessions of Great Britain, and this would prove of great value in the event of hostilities with that country.
The rapid concentration of naval forces at the point of attack, or the movement of forces to intercept the enemy, is only made possible when we have a system by which we can communicate rapidly with the shore stations from long distances at sea, and the messenger-pigeon service is the only system by which we can obtain such communication. This service might be called, very appropriately, a "sea telegraph" system, and although its messages cannot be despatched with the speed and absolute certainty of the telegraph, yet the system has the advantage of forwarding its messages from any position within definite limits, and therefore it is not necessary to seek the telegraph station in order to send a message.
In the event of hostilities, many more messages than those given in the above illustrations would be sent, in order to insure the receipt of important information, and if only one of the many little messengers should arrive in time to enable our fleet to manoeuvre so as to engage the enemy before he could inflict appalling destruction of life and property upon some one of our seaports, then this service would prove itself most valuable to the Government, and well worth the small annual sum required to maintain its efficiency.
It requires but one practical illustration to strike home and to open our eyes to the merits of this service. Let a single human life be saved from shipwreck in time of peace, or let one manoeuvre of the enemy's fleet be frustrated in the midst of war by the timely arrival of one of these swift-winged, trusty little carriers with its urgent message, and all the country will applaud the result and will realize the value of a Messenger-Pigeon Service upon the seas.