Address to the United States Naval War College.
The function of the Naval War College is to teach the art of sea warfare in its larger aspects without reference to the details entering into the sum-total. But the line at which the larger aspects begin to disperse in details, or the details to assemble in the larger aspects, may yet be regarded as subject to much discretion in delimitation.
In drawing such a line the definition of the true relative meaning of the two phrases is of prime importance, and upon the practical correctness of such definition the maximum value of the system of teaching depends. No one will dispute that naval armaments are essential to sea warfare, or that the accomplishment of the objects of the warfare will depend partly upon the character of the armaments, and partly on the wisdom with which their operations are directed; nor can any one gainsay that the wisdom of direction will depend on the conversancy of officers with the nature and necessities of the material units of which the armaments are composed.
These propositions being taken for granted, it becomes clear that there can be no effective system of teaching the art of naval warfare which does not embrace exhaustive study of and consequent close familiarity with the instruments by which the principles of the art are to be carried into force and effect.
From this point of view it must be admitted that questions within the province of the naval architect and problems which he is best qualified to solve, form an essential part of such a curriculum in its largest and most comprehensive aspects.
The unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt the importance of the naval architect and to augment the value of the constructor as a factor in the sum-total of sea power.
The naval armament of to-day is a mechanism. If we view it as a single ship it is a mechanical unit whose warlike value depends on its excellence as a fighting machine. If we view it as a fleet, it is an assembly of mechanical units, the warlike value of which will depend alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine, and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts to produce the most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a whole.
For this reason the word seamanship in the old-fashioned or conventional sense has ceased to cover adequately the requirements of knowledge, skill and aptness which the modern conditions of naval warfare impose upon the officer in command or subordinate.
By this I mean not to depreciate seamanship pure and simple, but to point out that modern conditions require an enlargement of the meaning of the term and a broadening of its scope of function far beyond the exactions of any former period.
In the old days there was no essential difference in ships except in size. Experience in a sloop of war qualified an officer to assume at once and in full efficiency equivalent duties in a frigate, a seventy-four or a three-decker. Familiarity with one ship, irrespective of rate, was familiarity with all ships. Tactical lessons learned in maneuvering one fleet were alike applicable to the manoeuvring of all fleets. Even the application of steam as a propulsive auxiliary in its earlier stages did not radically alter the old conditions. At all events it did not practically erase them as the stage of progress at this moment has done.
I cannot better illustrate my point than by comparing the first and the last sea-going battleships built and delivered to the Government by Cramp. The first was the New Ironsides, built in 1862. The last is the Iowa, completed in 1897. Each represented or represents the maximum development of its day.
The New Ironsides had one machine—her main engine, involving two steam cylinders. The Iowa has seventy-one machines, involving one hundred and thirty-seven steam cylinders.
The guns of the New Ironsides were worked, the ammunition hoisted, the ship steered, the engine started and reversed, herboats handled—in short, all functions of fighting and manoeuvring— by hand. The ship was lighted by oil lamps, and ventilated, when at all, by natural air currents. Though, as I said, the most advanced type of her day, she differed from her greatest battleship predecessor the old three-decker Pennsylvania only in four inches of iron side armor and auxiliary steam propulsion. She carried fewer guns on fewer decks than the Pennsylvania, but her battery was nevertheless of much greater ballistic power.
In the Iowa it may almost be said that nothing is done by hand except the opening and closing of throttles and pressing of electric buttons. Her guns are loaded, trained and fired, her ammunition hoisted, her turrets turned, her torpedoes—mechanisms of themselves— are tubed and ejected, the ship steered, her boats hoisted out and in, the interior lighted and ventilated, the great searchlights operated, and even orders transmitted from bridge or conning tower to all parts by mechanical appliances.
Surely no more striking view than this of the development of thirty-five years could be afforded.
This growth of complexity and elaboration, and this almost infinite multiplication of parts and devices, have entailed upon the naval architect and constructor demands and difficulties never dreamed of in the earlier days. The staff required to design and construct an Iowa is multiplied in number and the complexity of its organization augmented as compared with that required for the design and construction of the New Ironsides almost infinitely.
Similar conditions apply to command and Management. So that while the building of a modern battleship entails enormous work and responsibility on the naval architect, constructor and staff, the effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval warfare in this College.
Such questions and such problems cannot be relegated to the category of details. Even if we consider the art of naval warfare in the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected for better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units composing the force in operation. This being admitted, it follows that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the knowledge and capacity of the captains and their staffs; and that no extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can overcome or evade the consequences of incapacity and failure on the part of a captain commanding a part.
This is by no means my first discussion of these questions and problems.
In August, 1894, I published in the North American Review a paper on "Sea-power of the United States," some part of which I reproduce here as bearing directly on the matter under consideration. I then said:
Leaving the diplomats and the strategists to pursue their generalizations, I will try to point out the office of the naval architect and shipbuilder in the creation and maintenance of sea power.
Necessarily the employment of battleships for the enforcement of sea power involves their operation in fleets or squadrons.
The experience of war may, and probably will, modify prevailing ideas, and set a limit to the number of battleships that can be safely or effectively manoeuvered in squadron. It is more than probable that at an early stage of action the commanding officer of a battleship fleet or squadron will find it necessary to signal for each captain to do the best he can. And it is possible that fleet or squadron tactics, as now received and understood, will be found to impede, if not destroy, the efficiency of modern battleships in action.
No action having occurred between fleets of modern battleships, the tactical conditions must be somewhat conjectural, or at least theoretical; but the experience of peace drills and manoeuvers has demonstrated that the elements of difficulty and danger due to modern appliances, as compared with the conditions of the great sea fights of history, have been multiplied manifold.
For example, at Trafalgar, the Victory, Temeraire, and Redoutable were foul of each other for a considerable period. None of these ships of the line sustained any injury worth mentioning from the fouling alone.
I presume no one imagines that three modern battleships could be foul of each other for many minutes before some of them would begin to sink from the effects of contact alone and irrespective of any execution done by their batteries or torpedoes.
This ever present danger is equally great from friend and from foe, and the fact that it must be vastly increased by the circumstances of action will devolve upon the commander of the fleet and upon each one of his captains responsibilities which Rodney and Nelson and their captains never dreamed of.
These facts suggest a wide range of problems, embracing not only tactics, which is outside of my province, but design, structure, manoeuvering appliances, in short, everything that pertains to handiness, controllability under various conditions and ultimate safety after a maximum of injury. The fate of the Victoria demonstrated that subdivision into water-tight compartments is useless if communication between any number of them is left free, and that water-tight doors, at least as arranged in that ship, cannot be closed against much head of inrushing water.
Above all, it demonstrated that captains differ in capacity and in promptness, and that such difference operating in the brief time allotted to a single manoeuver may easily be fatal to a ship, or, in action, to a fleet. This is a case of the personal equation; the operation of the human factor, which is always unequal to an immeasurable degree if we consider the possible extremes of capacity and incapacity; but at best always subject to error, and hence calculated to defeat or mar in greater or less degree the efficiency of the most skillfully designed and most perfectly constructed mechanical devices. This is a fundamental fact, having its origin in the organic weakness of human nature, and hence unavoidable. At best its consequences can only be mitigated.
In a paper read before the American Society of Naval Architects, November 16, 1893, on "The Evolution of the Atlantic Greyhound," discussing the practicable size of ships, I employed the following language:
There is another limitation to practicable size which has not been mentioned—the ship may become too large for the captain. It is the fact, that while we may increase the dimensions of ships, the size of man is a fixed quantity. I mean this in the physical as well as the mental sense. A ship is not like an army which can be divided in sections, each capable of independent action. She must be commanded and manoeuvered in one piece and by one man.
I have, during many years of observation and experience in my profession, seen so much of the human factor under such circumstances (circumstances placing the lives of many men in a ship at the mercy of one man) that the elimination of it in every possible direction has become almost a passion with me. In any ship design it is the first principle with me to provide as many absolute and unchangeable qualities of performance and safety as possible, and to place them beyond manipulation.
For the reasons that I have already stated, these observations, originally made with reference to transatlantic passenger vessels, apply with tenfold force to battleships. As the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its manoeuvering power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain. As it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing.
In view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the difficulty and danger of manoeuvering them under the most favorable conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity of performance. Such provision would not equalize the personal factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give them all an equal chance at the start.
For this reason I have always considered it unwise to multiply types or to seriously modify those which the best judgment we are now able to form approves. The practice of the English, French, Russians and Germans has been contrary to this idea. Each new administration of their navies has brought in new types, until their navy lists present an almost bewildering variety.
At that writing (August, 1894) I called attention to the fact that the Mediterranean fleet of England embraced ten first-class battleships, comprising six different types, and ranging in speed from the old Dreadnaught of 12 knots, to the Hood of 162. Of these six types, four were represented, namely, the Dreadnaught, old-fashioned double turreted monitor; the Sanspareil, sister ship to the late Victoria; the Ramillies, modern barbette battleship, and the Hood, modern double turret battleship. Another type had two representatives, the Nile and Trafalgar, double turret battleships z000 tons smaller than the Hood; while the sixth type had four representatives, the Anson, Camperdown, Collingwood, and Howe, barbette battleships of the Admiral class, from 3500 to 4500 tons smaller than the Ramillies. The testimony in the Victoria Court of Inquiry showed not only the difference in the capacity of captains already referred to, but also considerable difference between the several types of ships themselves as to handiness, even at a manoeuvering speed of nine knots, which was dictated by the easy natural draught speed of the slowest ship,_ the Dreadnaught. It is not easy to imagine what the consequences of such discrepancy in the ability and promptness of officers, or in the power and handiness of the different ships, would be under the vastly altered conditions of action.
Of course the English have been accumulating different types during many years of active construction under different and disagreeing Admiralties, and having the ships on hand, must use them, no matter how motley the resulting fleet.
These observations bring us to a survey of the comparative situation of the United States in this respect. Our navy has not accumulated an assortment of battleship types, and hence is free to pursue the desirable policy of uniformity. Our very first attempt at battleship design produced a type which I consider the fairest compromise of all divergent qualities and necessities yet reached anywhere. The resulting ship carries on a displacement of 10,400 tons, armor and armament superior to British ships of 14,150 tons, is equal to them in manoeuvering speed, and much quicker and handier under helm.
Our second effort produced a ship which is in some respects a modification of the first. The changes are mainly in the direction of greater freeboard and a knot more of speed, involving 1000 tons more displacement, by which the all-around seagoing efficiency is expected to be increased; but as a fighting ship pure and simple, I think no one contends that the Iowa is an improvement upon the Indiana class. Without going into detail of the differences between the two ships, I will say, generally, that a ship of the Indiana class is able to combat any first-rate battleship afloat as to armor and armament; she has as much speed as will ever be needed for manoeuvering purposes, and her coal capacity is sufficient for any cruise that the policy of the United States will ever require in war.
When to these offensive and defensive qualities is added the fact that the Indiana developed on her preliminary trial a readiness of response and fidelity of direction under helm little short of marvellous, in view of her dimensions and weight, she becomes by great odds the handiest first-rate battleship afloat. In the language of her navigating officer on that occasion, "she steered like a pilot boat." I submit that it does not require the training of a naval tactician to see that a fleet of ten Indianas, compact, handy ships, alike in all leading qualities, would have the ten diverse and unequal battleships of the British Mediterranean fleet at an initial disadvantage of tremendous effect, and this without taking account of individual superiority.
These considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of types, and in favor of adhering to one which so plainly meets the requirements of our national situation and policy.
The composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier, but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate them except frequent and arduous drill in squadron of evolution, so that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before being called upon to use them in actual battle. There will be scant opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of war.
As already remarked, the views immediately preceding were put forth by me in November, 1893, and August, 1894. It was therefore with very great satisfaction that I read in the London Times report of debate in the Commons on the Naval estimates, March 12, 1897, the following remarks by the Right Honorable George J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty:
The committee expects some further information with reference to the programme of ship-building which we have placed before them. As the committee knows, that programme includes four battleships, three third-class cruisers, four twin-screw gunboats, and two torpedo-boat destroyers. With regard to the character of the battleships, I will undertake that before these ships are begun the House shall have full information as to their designs, and the opportunity for supplying such information would probably arise on the consideration of Vote 8. But there are reasons why, when we propose to build battleships which are to be commenced some time hence, it is undesirable to pledge ourselves in advance. It is better to have as long an interval as possible, because that gives one the opportunity of watching the development of shipbuilding elsewhere, which may have some influence and bearing upon our own plans. At the same time I would say generally that we mean to have four powerful battleships and that there are two classes to either of which they might belong. I mean the Majestic class or the Canopus class. We know at this moment what we intend, but these intentions might be modified, and I trust the committee will not press me to give more information on this subject now (hear, hear). We think it very important that these ships should belong, if possible, to one of the Classes which already exist (hear, hear). We have now arrived at a Point which to us is very satisfactory. We have got ships which, though criticised to some extent in certain quarters, satisfy public opinion and realize the intentions of their designers, and upon which no serious or large improvements are at present proposed. I believe there is nothing which impresses foreign critics more in connection with our fleet than the fact that we are able in a greater degree than any other country to put into line a number of ships of precisely the same speed and design, forming a thoroughly homogeneous squadron. The advantage of this is felt by all classes of seamen. The men who are passed from one ship to another understand all their duties on the vessel to which they axe transferred almost as soon as they get on board. There was an occasion lately when men were transferred from one battleship to another, and within one week every man knew exactly his post, the character of the vessel being familiar to him. I attach great importance to that state of things, and I think that my view is shared by the great majority of the committee.
My object in citing the expressions of the First Lord of the Admiralty is not that of finding support for my conclusions, uttered some time earlier, and which needed no support, but of exhibiting the fact that the experience of the greatest of naval powers has dictated a like policy. In my judgment it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance of homogeneity in fleet organization, and I am sure that the very first, and perhaps the greatest lesson taught by an encounter between fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of type and equality of performance in the units of action.
To this element of the art of naval warfare, then, I would invite your most earnest and penetrating attention and study.
Assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as relation of units to each other and to the sum total is concerned, we have still left for consideration the difference between men; the lack of uniformity in personnel. Homogeneity of material may be attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and construction. But homogeneity of personnel in the sense of uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals is beyond human art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the decree of a higher power. The existence of this College is itself a devout recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human frailty by exhausting the resources of training and study, of precept and example.
Illustrations have not been wanting in recent naval manoeuvers. The British battleship Resolution was buffeted, half wrecked, and driven into port in distress by a Bay of Biscay storm. Other ships, including at least two of the same type as the Resolution, rode out the storm, not only without disaster, but without effect upon their fighting power; but suppose that had happened in warfare, where the loss of one or more battleships by disability of that nature might turn the scale of odds as between two hostile fleets. From that to defeat, from defeat to loss of sea control, even temporary, and from loss of sea control to invasion, might prove short and easy steps.
There is nothing of record that could be construed as valid reason why the Resolution should have been crippled by the storm which did not affect her exact duplicates. The material was equal, or as nearly equal as likeness of design and similarity of construction could make it. But the performance or the behavior was unequal almost to the point of catastrophe. What then could have been the cause of this inequality? As only two factors were involved, material and personnel, and as the quality of the former was obvious, no cause remains imaginable except that the latter was not equal.
A great battleship, with enormous weights carried high, and massive moveable parts straining at stay-bolts and fastenings with each gyration in the seaway, and all the other vicissitudes of heavy labor under severe storm conditions—all these occurrences operating upon the judgment of a commander not wholly or closely familiar with the capabilities of the ponderous and complex mechanism under his control, might easily shake his faith in the power of the ship to stand it and thereby impel him, as it did the captain of the Resolution, to seek the nearest shelter, regardless of the tactical or strategical schemes or plans which such action might derange.
Clearly in this case the bad performance of a unit of action was due to the commander's lack of familiarity with the operating conditions of the mechanism in his charge. The misfortunes of the Resolution resulted from excessive rolling. The excessive rolling was caused by failure to accommodate the ship to the wave-action in which she labored. The failure to so accommodate the ship must have been due to want of familiarity with the group of principles in naval architecture upon which calculations of stability and righting moment are based, and upon the proper and successful application of which the safety of ships depends.
Had the commander of the Resolution possessed the rudiments of such knowledge he would have observed the periods and direction of the waves, he would have known the point to which his ship must be laid in order to meet the wave attacks to the best advantage, and his vessel would have undergone no worse punishment than that suffered by the other ships of the same type and model, from whom came no signs of distress.
Had the Resolution been a turret ship, instead of carrying her heavy guns in open barbettes, her difficulty would have been aggravated by the additional high and moveable weights of her turrets. But in no event was she in any danger not instantly and easily surmountable by the simple expedient of laying her course to the point at which the wave action, violent as it was, would be least effective upon the form of her hull.
I do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be a naval architect or constructor. But having familiarized himself with principles of that art which touch directly and immediately his function of handling his ship under sea-conditions of common occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her point of best behavior in any seaway. It goes without saying that sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be worked out.
Knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the experience of others. Close and earnest attention to this source of, at best, partial information cannot serve as a substitute for experience of one's own. At most it can only provide a sound basis on which to take quick advantage of one's own experience when confronted with an actual situation.
This brings me to the suggestion that the modern battleship, with all its complexities, weights and peculiarities of design and model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which I can find no better terms to describe than "battleship seamanship." It is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most actively exercised navy of the world, therefore it would be too much to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude, and hence less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.
It therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers to gain sea-experience by keeping all their large ships in active evolution all the time.
Having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great number and variety of mechanisms composing her. In the strict professional or technical sense these mechanisms concern mainly the engineer and the electrician. But as the foundation of all warlike efficiency in personnel is discipline, and as the foundation of all discipline is the inevitable principle of a single head, one commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch, it should follow that "the King can do no wrong."
I have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly in managing his ship as a whole; likewise I would say here, that he need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are essential to the efficiency of his command.
But, if he really commands, he must know enough about the instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when defects exist and when they have been made good. If he does not know, or cannot learn these things, he must depend wholly on subordinates immediately in charge, and their reports will be law to him, or if not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. Manifestly such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent and self-relying autocracy which is the essential and fundamental principle of naval command, and without which discipline must sooner or later vanish into mere empty form or conventional myth. These facts, even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable at once to the discharge of his duties in another.
I desire here to emphasize a distinction. A man who has successfully commanded a battleship, and has mastered the seamanship which I have described by that title, is qualified to command any other type or class. But it does not follow that a man who has been the successful commander of a cruiser or a gunboat is thereby qualified to command a battleship, because the latter is the graduating point of all seamanship in our time.
From this point of view the captain of the modern battleship finds himself at the parting of two roads as soon as he reads his orders and breaks his pennant. One road is that of taking things easy, relying blindly on subordinates in all the different branches of the ship's economy, accepting trustfully every report that may come to him, starting perhaps at a powder-boy and "respectfully forwarded" up through all intermediate ratings and grades.
The other road is the hard one. I need not describe it in extenso, but simply say that it is the road of study, vigilance, inspection, supervision, insight—in short, actual command in the broadest practical sense, in fact as well as in name.
The first road, as I said, is easy, and, if all were fair weather and smooth water, might lead to what would pass for success, if not distinction. But any emergency would end that road in the mire.
The last road is hard to travel, but when it leads into an emergency the captain is found prepared, self-reliant and able to command his subordinates on the spot, instead of waiting to receive their reports. This brings success of the kind that cannot be hid, and with it that valuable and permanent distinction which the public is always ready and anxious to confer upon those who serve it well.
The foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting the unit of action—the single ship and the captain. Passing to consideration of the unit of operation, the fleet and the admiral, we find another array of problems equally within the scope of this paper.
Let us assume that the composition of the fleet has been made as nearly homogeneous as possible by carrying out the principles previously stated as for ships and their captains, and that the admiral finds himself in command of an ideal fleet as to material and personnel. Actual differences in efficiency as between the several units of action will still remain, and it will become the first duty of the admiral to ascertain and locate these diversities with unerring judgment and unsparing perception. He should know to a nicety the personal equation of every captain and the effective individuality of every ship.
Among the captains he should be able to differentiate the traits of relative quickness of perception, promptness of action, readiness of responsibility and boldness of execution.
He should know precisely the steering quality of every ship at every speed, which would, of course, include her circle and her time of altering course in any degree, from a fraction of a point to wearing clear around.
In a word, the admiral should have clearly and definitely in his mind a true conception of the coefficient of performance of each unit of his command in all situations, and he should be able at any time and in any emergency to relate these coefficients to each other and to the whole with infallible precision. If it happens that the least competent captain has the least effective ship, and the ablest captain the best ship, the range of coefficients will be wide; if the conditions are reversed, giving to the poorest ship the best captain, and to the best ship the poorest captain, the range of coefficients may be narrowed, but there will always be some diversity, and the tact and skill of the admiral must be measured by his success in reducing the tactical effect of such diversity to a minimum.
It may be suggested that the schedule of requirements just formulated presupposes almost superhuman capacity in the admiral, both as to range of knowledge and accuracy of judgment. If so, I maintain that the command of a fleet of modern battleships, on whose success in a campaign the issue of a cause or the fate of a nation may depend, is of far the greatest and most trying trust that can ever in our time, or in the future, be confided by a people to one man.
Adverting previously to the subject of discipline in the single ship, I pointed out that it could not be attained by blind reliance of the captain on his subordinates. I now suggest that in the fleet the best ends of discipline may not always be subserved, and sometimes may be defeated, by blind obedience of a captain to orders or signals.
In the Victoria inquiry, Rear Admiral Markham stated in substance that it was from the start apparent to him that implicit obedience to Vice Admiral Tryon's apparent order would be impossible without bringing on a collision, that he could not believe that Tryon meant what his signal implied, and after exchange of signals thought that he could not intend to make the manoeuver as it was actually attempted. He said he believed, until it was too late to remedy the situation, that Tryon intended to circle round him. Asked by the court why he did not assume the discretion of acting upon his own sense of the situation, Markham replied that the Camperdown could not have altered her course then without violating the rule of the road, which, of course, was as much as saying that he did not see his way clear to disobey an order, even though he knew that obedience must result in disaster. In other words, he preferred to follow the disciplinary traditions of the British Navy at all hazards. (See pp. 52 to 58 of the Report of the Victoria Court Martial, Malta, July 17 to 27, 1893).
The court in its findings expressed "regret that Rear Admiral Markham did not carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubt as to the signal," and then added that "it would be fatal to the best interests of the service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of his Commander-in-Chief present in person." (Report, p. 144).
Read between the lines, this two-sided finding would be translated to mean that, while obedience should be the rule, it was by no means the inflexible standard of action.
Perhaps the necessary inference from this historical fact is clear enough without amplification. It is, in brief, that not only should a captain be bold enough to exercise discretion when his judgment on the spot counsels it, but the admiral should be broad enough, not only to tolerate, but to approve such discretion when exercised. Perhaps exercise of discretion in such a case is the most crucial test to which a ,subordinate can possibly be subjected.
In conclusion it remains only to be said that, valuable as the curriculum of this College may be, it is at best but preparatory. The actual knowledge and the real training which I have shown to be indispensable to warlike efficiency, can be gained by experience afloat, and by that alone.
The dullest intellect now realizes that modern fleets can not be improvised. But some apparently cling still to the illusion that modern seamanship can be. This illusion, if followed, must neutralize all the practical benefit of the new navy this country is building. For any purpose of actual warlike utility our large ships might almost as well not exist as be laid up.
If our navy is to be of use as a public defense, it must be in constant squadron evolution, whether in service on foreign stations or training in home waters.
After all preparatory courses, academic or post-graduate, the one and only ultimate school of efficiency is the deck itself, and that must be the deck of a ship under way.