The great, immediate, and entirely unforeseen result of its war with Spain was to make the United States a colonial power. Just before this war, it was never a matter of discussion or debate whether or not it would be advantageous for our country to extend its authority to lands beyond the seas.
The war with Spain was inevitable. Never would the people of Spain voluntarily have permitted their government to agree to Cuban independence. They had to be whipped into doing it. Americans almost to the last man believed that incredible cruelties were being inflicted on the island of Cuba; that, at last convinced of the impossibility of subduing Cuban patriots by arms, Spain had determined upon a policy of extermination by starvation. Reports, on the face authentic, were published that hundreds of thousands of Cubans, a majority of them women and children, had been starved to death in the reconcentrado camps; it was unbearable to Americans that such destruction of human beings should continue so close to their shores. The blowing up of the Maine precipitated the conflict, yet before this, war between Spain and the United States had for some time been inevitable. Each government occupied a position from which it could not recede, and war had to come.
In going into war the United States was influenced by no desire or expectation of extending its own authority or adding to its territory. Such contingencies may have been foreseen by a few far-sighted men, but they were not at all considered by the vast populace of America who were clamoring that the intolerable conditions in Cuba should cease. Americans, having no faith whatever in Spain, in her motives, in her promises, insisted that Cubans must be entirely freed from Spanish rule, that Cuba must be independent. Here was a condition that could not have been made a subject of arbitration. America went to war to set Cuba free, and for no other purpose. The end of the war saw Cuba freed from Spain, but this was only a small part of the result to the United States. It really was but an incident.
The great result was that our country became a colonial power, controlling Cuba, and possessing Porto Rico in the West Indies, and Guam and the Philippines in the far east, and Hawaii in the mid-Pacific. A few other small islands, among them Wake and Midway, were also added.
The capture of Porto Rico was, of course, part of the campaign. It was untenable that this island should remain under the Spanish flag; this was determined by the President and his military advisers, not by congressional action. Without ever having given much thought to Porto Rico the American people accepted the capture and annexation of that island without demur.
While the war against Spain was in progress Hawaii voluntarily put itself under the stars and stripes. This was not incident to that war. It was a measure long determined upon by the governing element of that country. It had been tried once before, in 1893, when Queen Liliuokalani and her native government had been deposed, and the American minister had raised the American flag, only to see it hauled down and his action disowned by order from Washington. After this the Republic of Hawaii was established, but every one knew that this could be but temporary. The ruling element there was entirely American in sentiment, and most of them were of American birth or descent and clung to their American citizenship as underlying their Hawaiian denizenship. These but waited for an auspicious time again to throw themselves under American sovereignty.
Guam, of the Ladrone Islands, was taken by the Charleston in June, 1898, without resistance, and in fact, in its remote seclusion without knowledge that it was included in a war.
The island of Tutuila, of the Samoan group, in 1899, became a possession of the United States by treaty with Germany. Our flag has also been hoisted from time to time over various islets of the Pacific Ocean which, except Wake Island, used as a cable station, are unimportant.
The Philippine Islands became lawful prize of Dewey's guns on May I, 1898. They were captured from the Filipinos later. International courtesy accorded the title of possession of these islands to Spain, but after Dewey's arrival it was only American arms that made that title good. The truth is that immediately upon Dewey's arrival Filipinos started in on their own hook to capture the islands for themselves, and at the time Dewey hoisted the Olympia's flag over Manilla, on August 13, 1898, the Filipino revolutionists were everywhere else, except in two minor points, in possession.
Dewey could have taken Manila at any time after his victory. Also at any time after that, had Dewey sailed away, the Filipino revolutionists would have made complete their physical conquest of the islands from Spain. Although Spain surrendered her title of legal sovereignty to the United States, she did not have much else to give up. Except Manila, the revolutionists had made a complete conquest of the Philippine Islands. But international courtesy, or what might be better named international necessity, sanctioned the transfer of the entire archipelago. This can be defended, probably successfully, on the ground that the Filipinos had acquired no right to international recognition as belligerents. However, in considering the causes that actuated or compelled the United States to receive the title of these islands, their internal condition should be understood, as well as their relation to the great powers.
These causes were several, the most important were sentiment at home and international necessity abroad.
American patriotism was stirred by the glory of American arms, ten thousand miles from home. This was fed by pictures of the glowing richness of these far-off islands, of the vast trade soon to spring up in the Pacific, and of the ultimate great benefit possession of these islands would be to America. But outside of the United States, international necessity, or jealousy, or balance of power, however it be termed, regarded the fate of these islands with intense concern. The great European powers would have been content either to see the islands revert to Spain, or retained by the United States. In December, 1898, at the time of the treaty of peace with Spain, the United States could not with self-respect or honor have abandoned her former allies, the Filipinos, and restored them to Spain. The Philippine Islands could not be restored to Spain, and it was impossible to abandon them to themselves. The only course open to the United States was to accept the moral duty which the war with Spain had thrown upon her. It must be agreed that the disposition of the Philippines put great responsibilities upon the United States toward other great powers. Retaining them for herself was the least difficult way out of a probable international complication over them.
These points have been touched upon for the purpose of fixing the attention on the fact that the United States did not intentionally become a colonial power. Nor did she become one as a result of policy, or belief in the desirability, or benefit, of such an eventuality.
To show how little the United States contemplated the possession of extralimital territory and how it needed an act of war to arouse us to our outlying needs, reference may be had to the Revised Statutes regulating the occupation of guano islands by American citizens. These Revised Statutes state that when a citizen of the United States discovers guano on an island, rock, or key, not within the limits of the United States, and not occupied by citizens of a foreign government, and takes peaceable possession and occupies it, this island, rock, or key may be considered as appertaining to the United States. And further, when the guano is all removed, the United States is not necessarily to retain possession of the island, rock, or key, which had been temporarily occupied by American citizens.
Under ordinary conditions it is quite conceivable that a treaty of peace with Spain would have restored to her the Philippine Islands. But our bringing Aguinaldo to Cavite from Hong Kong, and the subsequent victories of the Filipinos over Spaniards in every part of the archipelago put us in a position toward the natives from which there was no escape. Had Aguinaldo reached the islands without help from us, had he started on his remarkable career of conquest over Spaniards without our assistance, we might have been under no moral obligation to the Filipinos when the final disposition of the islands was determined. Had there been no native insurrection against Spanish authority the islands could have been restored to Spain by the treaty of peace. The fact that we brought Aguinaldo to Cavite in one of our government ships, and assisted him at the outset of his remarkable career, has proved to be of momentous concern to the United States. That act obligated our country to take the Philippine Islands without reference to whether they were to be of strength or weakness, a support or a burden, a benefit or an expense.
The last few years have seen acts of grave import in the lands and islands of the Pacific. In the school-boy geographies of thirty years ago China and Japan were described as half-civilized countries. Since then great western nations have annexed islands and great territories, and have established spheres of influence. Japan has forged to the front as a world power. The world has been awakened to the future possibilities of China, with her vast riches in mineral deposits and her enormous population. The conviction of future tremendous trade in the far east has caused all occidental powers to secure footholds in these regions. With the Panama Canal, and naval bases in the Caribbean Sea, with harbors on our Pacific coast, with Hawaii, Tutuila, and the Philippine Islands, it would seem that our country is bound to have her share of commercial enterprise in the Pacific, now that she has marked, if not protected, the highways of such commerce.
What we have done in the Pacific and what we intend to do has been a matter of constant discussion in the press, at public meetings, and by the home fireside for nearly ten years throughout the length and breadth of our land. And in it all, is it not supremely astonishing that the glorious prematurity of the forerunner of all American annexationists in the Pacific, one of our historic naval captains, David Porter, who, believing in the future importance of the Pacific to America, conquered and solemnly in his country's name took formal possession of the Marquesas Islands, should scarcely be known?
When the war of 1812 broke out, David Porter was already distinguished for daring, resource, and decision of character. In that war, while in command of the Essex on the coast of Brazil, he found himself threatened with destruction, starvation, or blockade. Cutting loose from his orders, acting upon his own high sense of public duty, and in the entire ignorance of his government, he evaded British warships searching for him, and sailed to the Pacific. There under, the broad pennon of "Sailor's Rights," he rid the ocean of a fleet of armed British whalers more intent on taking American ships and impressing American seamen than on cutting whale blubber. Finding himself in need of a station for repairs he sailed to the Marquesas Islands.
Here he endeavored to preserve friendly relations with the natives, but these un-reclaimed cannibals sought to destroy him. In protecting himself he made war upon the islanders, conquered them after several fierce battles, and then took public possession of the islands as territory of the United States. His act was one of necessity. He needed a naval base and from here fitted out a fleet of cruisers to destroy British commerce. But also, he said: "Besides, I believed that the possession of this island might at some future period be of importance to my country, and I was desirous of rendering her claim to it indisputable."
Had Porter been a British officer his act would doubtless have been approved and he would, at least, have been decorated by his government. He was of just the type of man that has made the island kingdom the great empire it has become. But as an American officer, Porter's act was almost unnoticed, and to-day it is forgotten. Yet, had his government followed up his act and had it assumed permanent possession, consider in what a position of enormous advantage it would have placed our country with reference to the trade routes from the Panama Canal to New Zealand and Australia. Had our government then approved of Porter's act, and were our flag now over the Marquesas Islands, Porter would not only be famous as a brave naval officer, but his appreciative country would honor his memory as one of those farsighted Americans whose deeds have been of inestimable value to succeeding generations of Americans.
PRESENT STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC.
The value to a country from a military point of view of territories beyond the seas depends somewhat upon the wealth and military strength and resources of that country. If the country be poor and weak, unable or unwilling to fortify properly such possessions, the latter must in time of war invite attack by the enemy. If such a possession be properly fortified the fortifications at least will never be attacked. No admiral to-day will risk his ships against modern land fortifications. Many thoughtful men believe that the unsettled conditions in the far east, the scramble for territory, the competition that all commercial nations are making for the large Pacific trade that yearly increases by leaps and bounds, make it probable that the Pacific will be the scene of national combat at no very distant date. With a long Pacific coast line, with colonies in the Pacific Ocean, as the builder and guarantor of the Panama Canal, and as an aggressive and determined candidate for a share in development of Pacific commerce, it is timely that our position in the Pacific with reference to our ability to protect our country's interests therein be considered.
Potentially we are strong in the Pacific, that is we have the advantage of position in a home base and in outlying points of great strategic value; and we have the wealth, if we can secure the authorization to use it, to make these inexpugnable. We are actually weak because our possessions there are almost entirely undefended. Should war be declared to-morrow by a great Pacific power, should our fleet be absent, our island possessions in that ocean must inevitably be abandoned or surrendered.
Secure on his inland farm, the prairie statesman cannot be made to believe in the possibility of war. He is equally reluctant to comprehend the necessity of spending huge sums to fortify outlying points. When war is actually threatened he is patriotic to the last degree, and cheerfully sanctions on but short consideration, the expenditure of fifty or a hundred millions, whatever may be called for. But in time of peace he will not spend thirty millions on fortifications necessary to render Hawaii or Olongapo secure from attack. If war in the Pacific is forced upon us our fleet must be the enemy's first objective; and in time of war our fleet must have a series of operating bases in secure stations where the ships may go for coal, supplies, and repairs. Without these a fleet of warships cannot long exist. And to keep our fleet efficient such stations must be secure from attack. In the possession of Hawaii our naval strength in the Pacific is immeasurably increased if Hawaii be secure from the enemy. But if the enemy take it and keep it, our naval strength is weakened in the same ratio. Holding Hawaii, our Pacific coast is absolutely safe from attack. And yet Hawaii remains inadequately fortified. Should war be waged in the Pacific in the absence of our fleet, our island possession must succumb, and our fleet must start from ports of our Pacific home base laden with stores and coal; the effect of this may be to make our battleships armored cruisers, for it is well known that the tops of the main armor belts of our battleships is already close to the water-lines, and if the ships be over laden they will be beneath it. And in each of the days of the first fortnight's voyage under these damaging conditions of overload, the fleet will be exposed to battleship attack from an enemy which has acquired by preliminary conquest of the American territory of Hawaii a base from which to deliver blows within a five-day radius, and with her own choice of position.
The activity of great powers in any one locality has always presaged conflict. Interests in a growing commerce, and in aggrandizement of territory always threaten peace. One frightful war has but finished, and since then far-reaching alliances in preparation for the next great struggle have been made in the far east, and great fleets of warships have been, or are there, assembling. The Spanish war has made the United States an oriental power with colonial dependencies in the Pacific seas; and great though its potential power may be, should war come to-morrow in the Pacific, unless our fleet be there, our first experience must be disaster, defeat, and national humiliation. And in addition to our territorial position in the Pacific and our defenceless state therein, our weakness will be increased by the creation of the Panama Canal. An enormous volume of trade is certain to pour through that opening, bound to the north, south, and west. Only with an adequate fleet in the Pacific, and with suitable naval stations, properly fortified, will American interests have proper protection. This again accentuates the arguments for the fortification of Hawaii, and it means that a suitable naval station should be created at Tutuila. The southwestern trade routes that will exist when the Panama Canal is opened, again bring David Porter's annexation of the Marquesas sharply to mind. These are in mid-Pacific, and command the Canal and the Pacific coast of South America, much as Hawaii does the coast of North America. Today one can but regret that the acts and the far-sightedness of this great American conqueror should have been treated with ignorant indifference and neglect. With the commercial routes from the Canal we will have great interests in the south Pacific; troublesome questions are certain to follow commercial extension, and the time is coming when American interests in the south Pacific will be far greater than at present. All of which would make the Marquesas Islands invaluable to us if we had them, and should induce us to hold the name of David Porter in high regard.
For national strength in the Pacific the possession of naval stations suitably situated, such for instance as Hawaii, is vitally essential. And perhaps a naval station at Guam, or at some one of the Philippine Islands, is also most desirable. But many of our citizens believe that the possession of the Philippine Islands is detrimental to the United States and that the future will never prove them a benefit. From a military point of view they are decidedly a weakness. They do not produce coal or naval supplies. These, and even the food used by our warships in Philippine waters are brought from afar off. No Filipinos are found aboard our warships; we do not depend upon Filipino workmen for repairs, when in Philippine waters.
It cannot be believed that large numbers of American workmen, farmers, or laborers, will ever find permanent homes in these islands. The climate is too hot, and the recompense is entirely too low to attract Americans. Besides, the islands are thickly inhabited, there is an average population of 67 to the square mile in these islands compared with 26 in continental America. Then the laws that regulate the commerce and industry of the Philippines are framed for the benefit of Americans at home, not of Filipinos. It is conceivable that a few Americans, representing the greater aggregations of capital, will make permanent stay in the islands; that here will be engineers, bankers, foremen, and some others there; but these will form but an insignificant per cent of the population. A few Americans at home may draw large incomes from tobacco, sugar, and hemp investments in the Philippines. But the vast majority of the population must always remain of the rice, fish-eating class, and of Malay blood. We have driven away most of the Spanish merchants and Spanish trade, and have passed laws the effect of which is to benefit tobacco and sugar interests at home and to restrain possibilities in these lines in the islands. The trade with the islands is large in the aggregate, yet this depends on other things than the flag which may be flying over Manila. Title to these islands will not affect largely American trade with China, Japan, or other Pacific countries. From a military point of view they are a weakness, not a source of strength. So far as concerns the efficiency of our fleet in war time we should be far better off if we had a secure naval station situated somewhere in these seas, than at present with a territory of over 100,000 square miles, open to attack along an altogether disproportionate length of coast line, and obnoxious to the enemy's invasion. As for the Filipinos, in spite of what we have tried to do for them in the way of beneficent government, they remain sulky and inappreciative, and long for the good, easy old times of Spanish rule. The possession of these islands has cost our country vast treasure and valuable lives. If our government's title to them is beneficial to neither the islanders nor ourselves, why do we keep them? Such are views frequently heard from Americans.
The answer is that we have them, and it is difficult to determine what disposition of them, other than keeping them, could be made. It is unlikely that the American people will ever consent that they should be disposed of in any way except with the Filipinos' own consent. It may be they will finally attain ability to govern themselves, but the future for this does not at present, at least, look hopeful. Just now they are a military weakness and a heavy expense to our country.
This seems to be wandering from David Porter. But considerations of present conditions in the Pacific must bring to mind Porter's annexation of the Marquesas Islands. His work in the Pacific was to injure British interests. In doing this he destroyed or captured a dozen armed British merchantmen; some of these he converted into American cruisers. He found the possession of a base absolutely essential, and so seized Nukahiva, one of the Marquesas Islands. These are over 3000 miles from the Panama Canal, Samoa being still 2000 miles further on. If to-day we possessed Taiohae, the fine harbor of Nukahiva, we would unquestionably find much use for it in the near future as a naval station. It is admirably situated with reference to the trade routes that will stream from the canal to the south Pacific. Porter's mind was imperial in its conception. He had the prescience to see that American control of the Pacific was essential to the national stability, and this in 1814, when the United States extended even theoretically but little west of the Mississippi.
Hawaii is beautifully situated for our strategic needs in the north Pacific; we are most fortunate that that is American territory. And most advantageously situated with reference to the Panama Canal are the Marquesas Islands. It is now seen to be extremely unfortunate that Porter's annexation of those islands was not made permanent by his government. But past governmental ignorance should not detract from the credit due that great naval commander.
The American government found itself in 1898 assuming essential off-shore positions. It waited 84 years, and then justified Porter's far-sighted act of annexation. But in this long interval Porter's great wisdom was entirely forgotten, and even now our country is in ignorance of what it might have owed to Porter had his government but approved his seizure of the Marquesas Islands instead of leaving them to be gobbled up by France 30 years later. Being ignorant we are necessarily unappreciative, and so Porter is remembered for the gallant fight the Essex made against overwhelming odds.
The particular purpose of this paper is to draw attention to what one of our greatest naval captains did in the Pacific Ocean 95 years ago. Recent American history has justified that act and his judgment. It is due his memory that credit should be given him now.
The limits of this paper forbid digression into a most interesting field, the events which led to Porter's official annexation of the Marquesas Islands. But to understand the reason and the necessity for this it seems advisable to quote a part of his letter which outlines his cruise to the Pacific. This same letter includes the report of the Essex' defeat, in neutral territory, by two British warships.
AT SEA, Essex Junior, July 3, 1814.
Sir. I have done myself the honor to address you, repeatedly since I left the Delaware; but have scarcely a hope that one of my letters has reached you, and, therefore, consider it necessary to give you a brief history of my proceedings since that period.
I sailed from the Delaware on the 27th of October, 1812, and repaired, with all diligence (agreeably to the instructions of Commodore Bainbridge) to Port Praya, Fernando da Noronha, and Cape Frio, arriving at each place on the day appointed to meet him. On my passage from Port Praya to Fernando da Noronha, I captured his Britannic majesty's packet. Nocton and after taking out about eleven thousand pounds sterling in specie, sent her under command of Lieutenant Finch for America. I cruised off Rio de Janiero, and about Cape Frio until the I2th January, 1813, hearing frequently of the commodore by vessel from Bahia. I here captured one schooner with hides and tallow; I sent her into Rio. The Montague, the admiral's ship, being in pursuit of me, my provisions now getting short, and finding it necessary to look out for a supply to enable me to meet the commodore by the first of April, off St. Helena, I proceeded to the island of St. Catherine's (the last place of rendezvous on the coast of Brazil), as the most likely to supply my wants, and, at the same time, afford me that intelligence necessary to enable me to elude the British ships of war on the coast, and expected there. I here could procure only wood, water and rum, and a few bags of flour; and hearing of the commodore's action with the Java, the capture of the Hornet by the Montague, and a considerable augmentation of the British force on the coast, several being in pursuit of me, I found it necessary to get to sea as soon as possible. I now, agreeably to the commodore's plan, stretched to the southward, scouring the coast as far as Rio de la Plata. I heard that Buenos Ayres was in a state of starvation, and could not supply our wants; and that the government of Montevideo was very inimical to us. The commodore's instructions now left it completely discretionary with me what course to pursue, and I determined on following that which had not only met his approbation, but the approbation of the then Secretary of the Navy. I accordingly shaped my course for the Pacific; and after suffering greatly from short allowance of provisions, and heavy gales off Cape Horn (for which my ship and men were ill provided), I arrived at Valparaiso on the 14th of March, 1813. I here took in as much jerked beef, and other provisions, as my ship would conveniently stow, and ran down the coast of Chili and Peru. In this track I fell in with a Peruvian corsair, which had on board twenty-four Americans as prisoners, the crews of two whale-ships, which she had taken on the coast of Chili. The captain informed me that, as allies of Great Britain, they would capture all they should meet with, in expectation of a war between Spain and the United States. I consequently threw all his guns and ammunition into the sea, liberated the Americans, and wrote a respectful letter to the viceroy, explaining the cause of my proceedings, which I delivered to her captain. I then proceeded for Lima and recaptured one of the vessels as she was entering the port. From thence I shaped my course for the Galapagos Islands, where I cruised from the 17th of April until the 3d of October, 1813. During this time I touched only once on the coast of America, which was for the purpose of procuring a supply of fresh water, as none is to be found among the islands, which are perhaps the most barren and desolate of any known.
While among this group I captured the following British ships, employed chiefly in the spermaceti whale fishing, viz.:
LETTERS OF MARQUE.
| Tons | Men | Guns | Pierced for |
Montezuma | 270 | 21 | 2 | … |
Policy | 175 | 26 | 10 | 18 |
Georgiana | 280 | 25 | 6 | 18 |
Greenwich | 338 | 25 | 10 | 20 |
Atlantic | 355 | 24 | 8 | 20 |
Rose | 220 | 21 | 8 | 20 |
Hector | 270 | 25 | 11 | 20 |
Catherine | 270 | 29 | 8 | 18 |
Seringapalam | 357 | 31 | 14 | 26 |
Charlton | 274 | 21 | 10 | 18 |
New Zealander | 259 | 23 | 8 | 18 |
Sir A. Hammond | 301 | 31 | 12 | 18 |
As some of these ships were captured by boats, and others by prizes, my officers and men had several opportunities of showing their gallantry.
The Rose and the Charlton were given up to the prisoners; the Hector Catherine, and Montezuma, I sent to Valparaiso, where they were laid up. The Policy, Georgiana, and New Zealander, I sent for America; the Greenwich I kept as a storeship, to contain the stores of my other prizes, necessary for us; and the Atlantic, now called the Essex Junior, I equipped with twenty guns, and gave the command of her to Lieutenant Downes.
Lieutenant Downes had convoyed the prizes to Valparaiso, and on his return, brought me letters, informing me that a squadron under the command of Commodore James Hillyer, consisting of the frigate Phoebe, of thirty-six guns, had sailed on the 6th of July for this sea…The Racoon and Cherub had been seeking me for some time on the coast of Brazil, and on their return from their cruise, joined the squadron sent in search of me to the Pacific. My ship, as it may be supposed, after being near a year at sea, required some repairs to put her in a state to meet them, which I determined to do, and bring them to action, if I could meet them on nearly equal terms. I proceeded now, in company with the remainder of my prizes, to the island of Nooaheevah or Madison's Island, lying in the Washington group, discovered by a Captain Ingraham of Boston. Here I caulked and completely overhauled my ship, made for her a new set of water casks, her old ones being entirely decayed, and took on board for my prizes, provisions and stores for upwards of four months, and sailed for the coast of Chili on the 12th of December, 1813. Previous to sailing, I secured the Seringapatam, Greenwich, and Sir Andrew Hammond, under the guns of a battery, which I had erected for their protection. After taking possession of this fine island for the United States, and establishing the most friendly intercourse with the natives, I left them under charge of Lieutenant Gamble of the marines, with twenty-one men, with orders to repair to Valparaiso after a certain period.
I arrived on the coast of Chili on the 12th of January, 1814; looked into Conception and Valparaiso, found at both places only three English vessels, and learned that the squadron which sailed from Rio de Janeiro for that sea had not been heard of since their departure, and was supposed to be lost in endeavoring to double Cape Horn.
I had completely broken up the British navigation in the Pacific; the vessels which had not been captured by me were laid up, and dared not venture out. I had afforded the most ample protection to our own vessels, which were, on my arrival, very numerous and unprotected. The valuable whale fishery there is entirely destroyed, and the actual injury we have done them may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars, independent of the expenses of the vessels in search of me. They have supplied me amply with sails, cordage, cables, anchors, provisions, medicines, and stores of every description and the slops on board them have furnished clothing for the seamen. We had, in fact, lived on the enemy since I had been in that sea; every prize having proved a well-found store-ship for me. I had not yet been under the necessity of drawing bills on the department for any object, and had been enabled to make considerable advances to my officers and crew on account of pay…"
This letter continues with the report of the battle between the Essex and the British ships Phoebe and Cherub, an event outside of the purpose of this paper. This particular purpose is to recall the memory of Porter's annexation of Nukahiva. We have a graphic account of this in Porter's journal, published in 1822.
From beginning to end, this journal is a stirring account of storm and battle, of discovery and conquest. Had Porter been an Englishman he would have ranked with Drake. To-day he would be celebrated in song and story. But as an American, except as the Essex' captain in battle, we have almost forgotten him. We remember him in the battle against overwhelming odds, in a neutral port that should have given him protection, where he was defeated. We have but hazy recollection of his stirring services in the French naval war against the Barbary pirates. Of his important duties as senior naval officer at New Orleans in momentous times. Of the protection afforded American ships by the Essex, of the injury done British commerce during war time, and finally of that remarkable judgment which indicated to him the future importance of the Pacific, which induced him to seize the island of Nukahiva, in his country's name.
Porter's Journal convinces one that he was a man much of the type of John Paul Jones. He never evaded responsibility and was quick to act in an emergency. In a time of mutiny, surrounded by savages, he controlled the situation, though it would have appalled a less determined character. He did not find it necessary to hang anybody, as did so causelessly, so needlessly, and to our everlasting regret, a later American naval officer. The act of the annexation of Nukahiva is described by Porter in his journal as follows:
Everything now bore the appearance of war; the Taeehs and Happahs could talk and think nothing else, and I found it policy to keep this spirit alive, as it was likely to secure their friendship. Apprehensive, however, of a change of disposition on their part, I now conceived the design of constructing a fort, not only as a protection to our village and the harbor, but as a security to the Taeehs against further incursions; and while it enabled us to give to them the most ample protection, would place them perfectly in our power, in the event of any hostility on their part…But before the commencement of this undertaking, I considered it advisable to obtain the consent of the tribes of the valley. I had for some time past intended leaving my prizes here as the most suitable place to lay them up, and this fort would give them additional security, besides, I believed that the possession of this island might at some future period be of importance to my country, and I was desirous of rendering her claim to it indisputable. With these objects in view, I called on Gattanewa, and inquired of him and his people, who had assembled, whether they had any objections to my constructing the fort. They informed that they were much pleased with my intention, as it would enable me to give them more effectual protection, and requested that they might be permitted to assist in its construction. I now required to know of them whether they would always be faithful to the American flag, and assist us in opposing our enemies. They replied that they had placed themselves entirely under my protection and control, that our enemies should be their enemies, that they would always receive my countrymen as brethren among them, and as far as lay in their power prevent our enemies from coming among them, knowing them to be such. I had frequently informed them of our being at war with Great Britain, and now explained to them the nature of our government, on which Gattanewa requested (that they might not only be our friends and brothers, but our countrymen. I promised them that they should be so, and that they should be adopted as such as soon as the fort should be completed, when a salute should be fired on the occasion.
On the 19th of November, the American flag was displayed in our fort, a salute of seventeen guns was fired from the artillery mounted there, and returned by the shipping in the harbor. The island was taken possession of for the United States, and called Madison's Island, the fort, Fort Madison, the village, Madison's Ville, and the bay, Massachusetts Bay. The following declaration of the act of taking possession was read and signed, after which the prosperity of our newly-acquired island was drank by all present. The object of this ceremony had been previously and was again explained to the natives. They were all much pleased at being Melleekees, as they called themselves, and wanted to know if their new chief was as great a man as Gattanewa.
DECLARATION.
"It is hereby made known to the world, that I, David Porter, a captain in the navy of the United States of America, and now in command of the United States frigate the Essex, have, on the part of the said United States, taken possession of the island called by the natives Nooaheevah, generally known by the name of Sir Henry Martin's Island, but now called Madison's Island. That by the request and assistance of the friendly tribes residing in the valley Tieuhoy, as well as of the tribes residing on the mountains, whom we have conquered and rendered tributary to our flag, I have caused the village of Madison to be built, consisting of six convenient houses, a rope walk, bakery, and other appurtenances, and for the protection of the same, as well as for that of the friendly natives, I have constructed a fort, calculated for mounting sixteen guns, whereon I have mounted four, and called the same Fort Madison.
"Our rights to this island being founded on priority of discovery, conquest, and possession, cannot be disputed. But the natives, to secure to themselves that friendly protection which their defenceless situation so much required, have requested to be admitted into the great American family, whose pure republican policy approaches so near their own. And in order to encourage these views to their own interest and happiness, as well as to render secure our claim to an island valuable, on many considerations, I have taken on myself to promise that they shall be so adopted; that our chief shall be their chief; and they have given assurances that such of their brethren as may hereafter visit them from the United States, shall enjoy a welcome and hospitable reception among them, and be furnished with whatever refreshments and supplies the island may afford; that they will protect them against all their enemies, and, as far as lies in their power, prevent the subjects of Great Britain (knowing them to be such) from coming among them until peace shall take place between the two nations.
"Presents, consisting of the produce of the island to a great amount, have been brought in by every tribe in the island not excepting the most remote, and have been enumerated as follows, viz.:
"Six tribes in the valley of Tieuhoy, called the Taeehs, viz., 1 Hoattas, 2 Maouhs, 3 Houneeahs, 4 Pakeuhs, 5 Hekuahs, 6 Havvouhs.
"Six tribes of the Happahs, 1 Nieekees, 2 Tattievows, 3 Pachas, 4 Keekahs, 5 Tekaahs, 6 Muttewhoas.
"Three tribes of the Maamatwuahs, 1 Maamatwuahs, 2 Tioahs, 3 Cahahas.
"Three tribes of the Attatokahs, 1 Attatokahs, 2 Takeeahs, 3 Paheutahs.
"Nieekees, one tribe. Twelve tribes of the Typees, I Poheguahs, 2 Naeguahs, 3 Attayiyas, 4 Cahunukokahs, 5 Tomavaheenahs, 6 Tickeymahues, 7 Mooaeekas, 8 Atteshows, 9 Attestapwyhunahs, 10 Attehacoes, 11 Attetomohoys, 12 Attakakahaneuahs.
"Most of the above have requested to be taken under the protection of our flag, and all have been willing to purchase, on any terms, a friendship which promises to them so many advantages.
"Influenced by considerations of humanity, which promise speedy civilization to a race of men who enjoy every mental and bodily endowment which nature can bestow, and which requires only art to perfect, as well as by views of policy, which secure to my country a fruitful and populous island, possessing every advantage of security and supplies for vessels, and which, of all others, is the most happily situated, as respects climate and local position, I do declare that I have, in the most solemn manner, under the American flag, displayed in Fort Madison, and in the presence of numerous witnesses, taken possession of the said island, called Madison's Island, for the use of the United States, whereof I am a citizen; and that the act of taking possession was announced by a salute of seventeen guns from the artillery of Fort Madison, and returned by the shipping in the harbor, which is hereafter to be called Massachusetts Bay. And that our claim to this island may not be hereafter disputed, I have buried in a bottle, at the foot of the flagstaff in Fort Madison, a copy of this instrument, together with several pieces of money, the coin of the United States.
"In witness whereof I have hereunto affixed my signature, this 19th day of November, 1813.
"Signed, DAVID PORTER.
"Witnesses present:
"Signed, John Downes, lieutenant, U. S. N.
James Wilmer, lieutenant, U. S. N.
S. D. M'Knight, acting lieutenant, U. S. N.
John G. Cowel, acting lieutenant, U. S. N.
David P. Adams, chaplain, U. S. N.
John M. Gamble, lieutenant, U. S. Marines.
Richard K. Hoffman, acting surgeon, U. S. N.
John M. Maury, midshipman, U. S. N.
M. W. Bostwick, acting midshipman, U. S. N.
William Smith, master of the American ship Albatross.
William H. Odenheimer, acting surgeon master U. S. N.
Wilson P. Hunt, agent for the American North Pacific Fur Company.
P. de Mester, Citizens of the U. States.
Benjamin Clapp, Citizens of the U. States."
The most formidable tribe in the island Porter annexed were the Typees. They were the greatest in number and in wealth. Hardly had the act of annexation been accomplished than they regretted their alliance with Porter, and in a few days they were guilty of hostile acts. They, the Typees, made war on Porter's particular friends, the Taeehs and the Happahs, and Porter made an attempt to effect reconciliation; instead of this resulting peacefully, Porter was attacked by the Typees, and for his own protection, and for the sake of the friendly tribes, he made war upon them. His first attack, from seaward, was unsuccessful.
Porter's force consisted of thirty-five of his own men, and five thousand native warriors; he supposed this would be sufficient. But the fierce Typee warriors descended upon him with fury, and in a short time all of his native allies had deserted in a panic, and Porter had a difficult task, which was to beat a safe retreat; this was successfully accomplished.
But this temporary defeat rendered it vitally necessary, either to subdue the truculent Typees, or else to abandon the island. The Typees were now triumphant, and the friendly tribes became lukewarm.
Porter now gathered his whole force of Americans, two hundred men, and marched upon the Typees. The latter, many thousand strong, assaulted him furiously, but were everywhere defeated. In three days Porter had marched sixty miles, had destroyed the Typee forces, and had laid waste their country. The march was full of difficulties. It was over knife-edged mountains, down headlong valleys, under the pelting of torrential rains, and through tropical jungles. But at the end the warlike Typees had no greater ambition than to be on terms of friendship with Porter.
For the rest of Porter's stay peace reigned on the island.
Porter in the meantime had been refitting his ships, preparatory to another descent upon the British interests in the Pacific, and on December 9, 1813, he set sail for Chili.
Three officers and twenty men were left on the island, Lieutenant Gamble being in command. Some of these became enamored of the lazy island life and restive under the discipline enforced by Lieutenant Gamble. These instituted a mutiny, in which some natives joined them. Murder and anarchy followed, and Lieutenant Gamble and seven men were barely able to escape in the Sir Andrew Hammond, all except two of them wounded or ill.
Thus vanished American authority over the Marquesas Islands. Nukahiva was never reoccupied by an American force. Some thirty years later it was annexed by France without notice being taken or protest made by the United States government.
Had Porter's annexation been followed by permanent occupation the United States government would to-day be in possession of islands commanding the south Pacific with respect to its American shores as Hawaii commands the north Pacific. These islands, with their fine harbors, and directly in the line of future travel from the Panama Canal to Australia and New Zealand, would be invaluable to a country that intended to have a share in the trade of those regions.
It is present day conditions that make one regret that the value of Porter's forgotten act of sovereignty was not appreciated by his government.
Becoming much impressed with the far-sightedness of Porter's conception, the writer has endeavored to ascertain what his contemporaries thought of it; and it must be regretfully recorded that there is no evidence whatever obtainable that Porter's act of annexation was even considered by them. A long search was made without results of any nature.
Every encyclopedia was examined; the few that even referred to it used Porter's Journal as their authority. In the 1,500,000 volumes in the congressional library, but five or six touch on the Marquesas islands, and these, except Porter's Journal, hardly refer to the American annexation; and where they do their facts come from the journal. Of these five or six volumes in that great library that are written about the Marquesas Islands, it is only the one entitled "L’'les Marquises," by Vincendon-Dumoulia and Graz, that speak of Porter's annexation. These Frenchmen got their facts from Porter's Journal, and from their comments it is fair to presume they were not sure the American rights to Nukahiva were extinguished. The purport of their comments is unmistakably to enforce the view that Porter had done nothing which Dupetit-Thouars, who seized them for France, was at all bound to respect.
The comments referred to are as follows:
Page 44: "Le but du capitaine Porter etait de mettre en surete les prises qu'il avait faites sur les Anglais et de procurer quelques repos a son equipage, lorsque le 23 octobre 1813 il vint former un etablissement temporaire dans la baie Taio-hae."
Page 177: "La plage de Test est depourvue d'habitations et d'habitants; c'est celle que les Americains avaient choisie pour etablir leur camp, auquel ils imposerent le nom pompeux de Madisonville."
Page 367; "Le contenu emphatique et pompeux de cette piece (Porter's declaration of annexation) nous a engages a la produire comme un specimen remarquable du style americain. Nous aurions pu annexer a cette note d'autres documents de cette nature; car, Dieu merci, les iles Nouka-Hiva n'ont pas manque de decouvreurs et de prises de possession; mais le temps nous manque, et nous les croyons, pour le moment du moins, inutiles a notre sujet."
The archives of the Navy Department were carefully searched. In them many letters to and from Porter were read, but no reference whatever except the one already quoted in the report of the battle where the Essex was defeated by the British, is to be found.
The archives of the State Department were examined, with the sole result of the following letter:
CHESTER, February 27, 1815.
Sir. I have the honor to enclose you the original declaration of taking possession of Madison's Island (called by the natives Nooaheeva) situated in the South Pacific Ocean.
The climate, fertility, local situation, friendly disposition of the natives, and convenience of this island promise to make it at some future day of great importance to the vessels of the United States navigating the Pacific. And under this impression I considered it a duty I owed my country to use every effort in my power, to secure to her an indisputable title to it.
Allow me to request of you an acknowledgment of the receipt of this paper, and be pleased to accept assurances of my highest respect and consideration.
I have the honor to be,
Your ob't. Hble Servt, D. PORTER.
HONBLE JAMES MONROE,
Act'g Sec'y of State.
The original declaration referred to in the above letter is missing.
This letter, unlike the letters that are preserved with it, has no endorsement of having been answered.
To us, to whom the United States has always meant the continental width of America, with the Pacific as much home water as the Atlantic, it comes as a shock when the eye falls upon the name of the principal officer of the Cabinet to whom this state paper is addressed. A document which we should estimate as one of the great national muniments of title from which the chain of sovereignty was to devolve seems to have been considered unworthy of even so much recognition as would be involved in a perfunctory acknowledgment of receipt; and its essential enclosure was not secured against the drift to the shakings barrel. Yet James Monroe, so blind to the Pacific which Porter had swept of the foe and delivered to his native land as a solemn possession, was that Monroe whose eye upon the Atlantic blazed with the inspired prevision of an America from Baffin's Bay to the Horn upon whose soil European might should set no hostile foot.
Contemporary publications of the State Department have been examined, as were also congressional records, and foreign and domestic magazines of the time; the purpose was to ascertain what our government, or what other governments thought of Porter's annexation of the Marquesas, and what our citizens at home thought about it; but it must be regretfully recorded that from an exhaustive examination of all evidence and sources obtainable, nothing whatever was thought of his far-sighted, patriotic act. And but for his own journal, published in 1822, and now seldom read, it would be entirely forgotten.
The writer believes this paper to be a definitive statement of a remarkable though forgotten chapter in this country's history. Had Porter's compeers equaled him in breadth of vision, to-day the United States would be in possession of a magnificent harbor on the trade routes to be established midway between the Panama Canal and Samoa, which would have given us a commanding position with reference to the commerce of that Canal, and a most valuable naval station.
It was not Porter's fault that his annexation of Nukahiva was not followed by permanent occupation, nor is it just to his memory that this really great and far-sighted act should be forgotten.
Mr. William Churchill, formerly United States Consul-General to Samoa, who spent many years in the South Seas, studying the various languages of that region, of which he is probably the greatest philological authority that has ever lived, has inspired this paper. At one time in a visit to Nukahiva, Mr. Churchill dug up the remains of Porter's old fort, hoping to find the copy of the declaration that Porter buried there. In this he was disappointed, Herman Melville, many years ago drew attention to Nukahiva by his charming book, "Typee," which was the story of a beach-comber's experiences on that island! But it is evident that Melville was in ignorance of Porter's occupation.
Appended to this paper is a letter written by a British naval officer in 1816. Though rather long it is well worthy of perusal because it proves that there were others besides Porter who foresaw the future importance of the Pacific. The particular purpose of this letter was to acquaint the British government with this importance, and to urge it to establish its authority over the Hawaiian Islands. But the British government of the day was as deaf to Commander M'Konochie as it was ignorant of its own interests. Had Commander M'Konochie's advice been followed, to-day the Hawaiian Territory would be British instead of American. As proof that both Porter and M'Konochie, who were contemporaries, possessed wisdom far in advance of their day, it may here be recalled that in his "Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition" of the early forties, Captain Wilkes went to some length to prove that possession of the Hawaiian Islands could never be of naval advantage, strategically or otherwise to the United States.
This letter has recently been republished in the "Fourteenth Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society." It as follows:
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF ESTABLISHING A COLONY ON ONE OF THE SANDWICH ISLANDS.
BY ALEXANDER M'KONOCHIE, ESQ., COMMANDER ROYAL NAVY.
(Written in 1816.)
Submitted to the consideration of the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
That the views of the government of the Linked States are fixed on the rebellion of the Spanish colonies in their neighborhood, will not appear doubtful, when we consider many particulars in their conduct, the supplies which they covertly afford them, and, still more, the avidity with which, even in their present distressed circumstances of finance, they would seem to court a rupture with old Spain. The vain and empty acknowledgment of their sovereignty over West Florida would not alone seduce them to this deviation from the Pacific line of policy best suited to their situation, were it not reinforced, by the prospect of other, and more considerable advantages, connected with the right of openly assisting the insurgent colonists and of profiting by their success.
These advantages are indeed not illusory, nor the prospect of their acquisition vague and uncertain, should the present contest end either in the emancipation of these colonies, or in a compromise in favor of their trade. The communication with the South Sea, which is now maintained by a painful and laborious passage round Cape Horn, would be abridged by the acquisition of a free passage for commerce over the Isthmus of Panama, in a degree which would seem to warrant even the most sanguine anticipations. The distance to China would receive a proportional diminution, at the same time that the equivalents, furs and specie, which are offered in the Chinese markets for their commodities, would be presented under advantages which would very peculiarly contrast with the circuitous and expensive route by which our East India Company convey thither the same articles. The supply of Europe with East India produce must be speedily engrossed by a commerce thus supported; nor should we have any reasonable prospect of success in competition with it, unless either by a precarious share in its advantages, dependent upon a thousand casualties of favor, interest or ambition, or by an appeal to that last resort, the force of arms, to which, without an established port on the spot, we should supply under very serious disadvantages, and with very alarming responsibilities. Success might, for a time, and at very considerable expense, sustain our own more circuitous line of commerce; but the maritime resources of the western shores of America are considerable, and would be peculiarly pointed against us by the habits, the animosity, and the policy of the United States; nor would the consequences of failure probably rest in the Pacific Ocean.
While such is the alluring prospect on which the views of the government of the United States would seem to be fixed, we, on the other hand, are precluded by the peculiarity of our circumstances, from interfering in our position to them on the spot to which they are most immediately directed. In the contest between Spain and her colonies, we can neither league our fortunes with the feeble exertions of the mother country, nor, consistently with our alliance with her, and still more with the benefits we have so recently conferred on her, can we imitate the perfidious policy of France towards ourselves in 1778, which, in the importation of republican principles into her own bosom, was visited by so severe a measure of chastisement on her head. But though thus precluded from opposing them in their immediate direction, it is both imperiously our interest, and most unquestionably our right to prepare to cope with them in their ulterior operation.
It is the object of the following considerations to show, that such preparation will materially consist in establishing a colony in the Sandwich Islands; while, at the same time, such a settlement, even if not required in that point of view, would seem to hold out to us the prospect of commercial advantages of the most important and alluring nature. The interests of this country would therefore seem equally connected with it, whatever may be the result of the present contest in New Spain; while upon the question of our right to take such a step, in addition to our claim on the Sandwich Islands arising from the priority of discovery, the usual foundation of such claims, we superadd the voluntary and solemn cession of the sovereignty of Owyhee to this country, which Captain Vancouver received in 1794 from Tamaahmaah, its supreme chief; a transaction precisely similar to that on which Spain so long founded her claim on Noottka, to the prejudice of the more ordinary plea.
The arguments by which I would endeavor to recommend this settlement I have thus the honor to propose, naturally divide themselves into a consideration of the military and commercial advantages which would seem connected with it.
I. Military Advantages.—1. The first military advantage is best illustrated by a reference to what has been already advanced; a recapitulation of the circumstances, attending the commerce and navigation between New Spain and the East Indies; and a consideration of the geographical position of the Sandwich Islands in relation to them. The intercourse between New Spain and the East Indies is confined in its passage to the westward, to the strength of the trade winds, in about 12 and 14 north latitude, and to the eastward, to that of the westerly winds which prevail in from 35 to 40 or more, also north latitude. It is to be further remarked that the passage from China to the eastward is more peculiarly confined to the high north latitudes thus denoted; because, although westerly winds equally prevail in the high southern latitudes, yet the calms under the line, currents and prevalence of northerly winds at all seasons, under the high land of New Spain, render it not merely inexpedient, but even utterly impracticable to establish a habitual communication in this direction. The Sandwich Islands, lying in about 20 north latitude and 155 west longitude, placed about one-third over from America towards China, and between these two tracks thus appropriated to the intercourse between them by the laws of nature, the Sandwich Islands, in this situation, equally command both passages, form the key to the whole communication, and stand to these several coasts in nearly the same relation which the British Isles themselves bear to the north of Europe; the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon to India; more and Gibraltar to the shores of the Mediterranean, and the Bermudas to those of the Atlantic.
The occupation of such a post must indeed be interesting to Great Britain, whose whole monopoly of the supply of Europe with East India produce, must be at the mercy of the masters of the isthmus of New Spain, unless she be possessed of the means of arresting, modifying, or engrossing also their supply. Were their intercourse with China and the East Indian Islands extended by their own means, or by those of a rival power, so that Porto Bello or Vera Cruz became entrepots of their productions, the convenience of the voyage, and the cheapness of the merchandise, would attract thither all the speculation of Europe; and the blockading of these ports, the only resource left to us if excluded from the Pacific, would only again make our belligerent rights the subject of angry and invidious discussion among the neutral powers. The intercepting this commerce in the Pacific, would not be productive of the same effect; the precarious nature of the supply would keep, up the prices in the isthmus; and while, in time of peace, our own merchants and colonies would equally profit by the shorter passage, in time of war its advantages would be equally forfeited by our commercial rivals.
2. The security of our East India possessions would seem to require an outpost to the eastward. The exaggerated importance attached by public opinion to the French expedition to Egypt, and the consequent depression of East India stock, are both within our immediate recollection; but our alarms have never, in an equal degree, been excited to the eastward, from the supineness of the adversary whom we have there had to encounter. Yet had the Isthmus of Panama belonged to either the French or the Dutch; had the first consul transported thither the army he sacrificed at St. Domingo, and thereby acquired the command of the immense maritime resources of its western shores, the weakness of our barrier in this direction would have long since excited our jealousy and alarm. We can now neither calculate on the restoration of this isthmus to its former possessors, nor on their continued supineness; it is time therefore to look to our own strength only for security.
3. As I shall presently endeavor to show, such a settlement would immediately give fresh life and vigor to our now languishing commerce in the Pacific Ocean. A new and extensive nursery would be thereby formed for our seamen; an object of peculiar import at a moment when the reduction of our fleet has dismissed many from our public service, and much discouragement, and even distress, have in consequence ensued among them.
4. Besides a nursery for British seamen, a very important supply of natives would be procured for our service. The Sandwich islanders show a marked propensity to nautical pursuits, and instead of reaping only disease and desolation from their intercourse with Europeans, have made a leap towards power and consequence in these seas altogether incredible. In 1794, Captain Vancouver laid down for Tamaahmaah, their chief, the keel, thirty-six feet long, of his first vessel; in 1803, Mr. Turnbull found the same prince in possession of twenty vessels of from 25 to 70 tons burthen; and in 1810 Campbell describes him surrounded with native artisans of almost every description, and numbering a navy of fifty sail, of which one was a ship of 200 tons burthen. The acquisition of the resources, moral and physical, by which such a miracle had been accomplished, is indeed an object of secondary, but yet considerable importance.
Lastly. The possession of a settlement in the Pacific Ocean becomes daily more interesting, both in a military and commercial point of view, from the progress of the Russian settlements on the southeast coast of Tartary, and northwest of America. Dependent as we are in a great measure on Russia for our naval supplies, it becomes most interesting to us to know by what arms she may be assailed to advantage, or by what means the effects of her hostility may be eluded, should the friendship and confidence now subsisting between the two powers ever suffer diminution. In this latter point of view, the more particular survey and application of the maritime resources of New Albion, of which Captain Vancouver speaks in very high terms, become objects of considerable relative importance; and it is worthy, too, of record, that the Russians have already directed their attention to the Sandwich Islands. In 1809, when Campbell was in Alexandria on the island of Kodiak, encouragements were held out to adventurers willing to form a settlement in them; and though the plan proved then abortive, probably from deficiency of population to sustain an emigration, it yet holds out too many allurements to be altogether laid aside. A timely interposition now, in favor of our unquestionable rights, may save some future angry discussion; and as the Russians only look to the Sandwich Islands for supplies of provisions, the acquisition of that branch of commerce might prove a new bond of union between the two empires.
II. Commercial Advantages. To explain the full extent of these, it will be necessary to consider the prevailing obstacles which have hitherto paralyzed our commercial exertions in the Pacific Ocean. These arise principally from the isolated object, and limited range of resources with which, on account of the extreme distance, and utter want of a colonial court, merchants have been obliged to prosecute their speculations. The fur trader is unable to combine any secondary object with his principal pursuit; his time on the coast is equally limited by the season and by his inability anywhere to recruit his supplies. He is dependent on Canton for a market, on the East India Company for a homeward bound cargo, and should he lose any men by sickness or desertion, he is utterly unable to replace them. The whaler, in like manner, makes the tour of the globe to catch nine or ten fish, happy if the result of his voyage, administered in all its details with the most scrupulous economy, reward his enterprise by even a moderate profit. So uncertain is he of this result, that he pays his seamen, not by fixed wages, but by shares in the net proceeds, a method not less dictated by the uncertainty of his returns than by his desire to ensure their continuance in his service, and to interest them in the success of their perilous employment. He is nearly equally limited with the fur trader in his range of speculation, and equally destitute of the means of supply in cases of accident or distress.
Under such circumstances it is not extraordinary that the British share of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean should be small; that the fishing of the spermaceti whale should be alone pursued, that of the black whale being utterly unable to defray its expenses; and that of the fur traders who enter the port of Canton, four-fifths should be Americans, who are encouraged to this perseverance, partly by greater economy in the details of their voyages, partly by their higher appreciation of minute profits, but more than all by their habitual application of the resources afforded by the Sandwich Islands. In 1793, Captain Vancouver found three American seamen left by their employer at Waohoo, on permanent wages of eight dollars a month, to collect for him a cargo of sandal wood, and the necessary refreshments on his return. In 1803, Mr. Turnbull found several of them established about the person of Tamaahmaah, and holding positions of trust under his government; and in 1810, Campbell counted at one time sixty white persons at Waohoo, now become the residence of that prince. It is true, they still respected the British flag displayed by him ever since his acknowledgment of the supreme sovereignty of Great Britain; and equally true, that the greater number of these men were English deserters and refugee convicts from New South Wales. But it cannot be doubted that among a rude people personal affection, cemented by the interchange of commercial benefits, will far outweigh any abstract attachment to a flag; and we are not now to learn that renegade Englishmen, of whatever description, become in principle and views, Americans of the worst and most hostile description. The proof and extent of. the danger are contained in the comparative statement of the intercourse maintained. In 1810, of twelve ships which touched at these islands, two were English, one Russian, and nine Americans.
The following are some of the principal commercial advantages which would seem attached to the establishment of a British settlement at the same place. They are calculated principally on the supposition of the Isthmus of Panama remaining shut to commercial enterprise; the supposition on which the acquisition of some of the military advantages above detailed would seem least conspicuously desirable.
1. The whale fishing would be prosecuted in vessels belonging to this new colony. The fishermen would also belong to it; and these bold, adventurous seamen would be constantly employed in those functions, of which their skill and intrepidity secure to them the monopoly instead of passing, as they do now, the greater part of their time in a laborious passage to and from the scene of employment. They would boil their oil and purify their spermaceti on the spot, and reduce them to their most portable state before embarking them in the vessels destined to convey them to Europe.
2. Vessels destined for cargoes of oil and spermaceti would proceed to a known port for their lading. They would carry out with them the goods destined for the prosecution of the fur and other traffics, which would be either the venture of their owners, or consignments for the colony. In either case, the profits on their sales or freight would form an important item in the credit-account of the voyage, would reduce the scale of its relative expenses, and would enable the black whale fishery to become again a lucrative object of mercantile speculation.
3. The expense of carrying the goods to the place of barter would be proportionally diminished, when their transport became no longer the sole object of the voyage. Higher priced goods might consequently be sent, and a demand created for the more expensive and profitable productions of the British manufacturer's industry. At present, the whole gross profits of the trade, exceeding in many cases 2000 per cent, are absorbed in the merchant's bill of expenses; he is unable to export more than the coarsest articles, which sustain a severe and even successful competition from the imperfect Russian and American manufactures.
4. The fur trade, conducted under the immediate inspection of those most interested in its success, would discover new channels of communication, both with the places where furs are procured, and where they are disposed of.
The establishment of furriers and manufacturers on the spot would enhance the value of furs in the Chinese market, and probably increase their demand.
5. A considerable portion of the price paid by the East India Company at Canton for their investments, is in specie. This specie is presented in the Chinese market under every possible disadvantage. It is purchased in the English bullion market, subjected to the multiplied expenses of two or three times landing and reshipping, and it is then transported to Canton by a voyage exceeding 20,000 miles in distance, and demanding from 4 to 6 months in its prosecution. Under such circumstances, it is not to be doubted, that it costs the company at least double its nominal value at Canton. A portion of this disadvantageous exportation would be obviated by this new colony. The colonists would obtain a very large credit in China from their importations of furs, naval stores, etc., beyond what they would require to vest in commodities, and would very gladly complete the circle of their communications with the mother country, by accepting the company's bills on terms mutually advantageous. The progressive growth of this resource, interesting even in its infancy, would become peculiarly so, when the increased intercourse with the Spanish colonies in America should open that rich and inexhaustible market for East India manufactures and productions, with which accordingly, instead of bills, the company would soon purchase this accommodation. Without an intermediate establishment, our East Indian possessions, situate so far to the westward, would have no chance of obtaining this vent for their productions; the supply of the Spanish colonies would either again revert to the Philippines, or pass to the Dutch islands; by means of it, our activity, capital, and superior maritime resources would secure to us its almost exclusive possession.
6. The necessity under which all vessels bound for the Pacific now labor, of equipping in England for two or three years, is one of the greatest hard ships imposed on them, and would be, by means of this settlement, obviated. In voyages of such duration, more stores are expended by rot than by service, and of those which remain to be brought into use half the efficiency is perhaps cancelled by want of some corresponding article of equipment. The obviating this embarrassment is not less a military than a commercial object; and in the event of a future war with either of the Americas, with Spain, with Russia, with China, in a word, with any conflicting interest in that hemisphere, may prove of an importance it may be impossible too highly to appreciate, and proportional only to the stake for which we may be called on to contend.
It would be very easy to extend this enumeration to an indefinite length; to include in it the extension of hydrographical science, the communication of the instruments of luxury and convenience to the rude nations of the Pacific, the consequent increased demand for our manufactures, with many other objects of equal importance to this country. But if I am correct in what I have already advanced, my argument would acquire no additional strength from such a trespass on the attention with which I hope to be honored. I will only solicit permission to make one more remark. These commercial advantages are only calculated on the improvement of already well-known objects of mercantile speculation; but it is beyond a doubt that the establishment of a vigorous and enterprising colony on the spot would soon create or elicit many more. The demand which the liberal supply of the Spanish colonies would occasion on our East Indian possessions for their manufactures and productions; which the existence of this colony would create our New South Wales for its surplus agricultural produce, our New Albion for naval stores, on South America for the precious metals; the facilities it would afford for a contraband trade with these coasts, while they continue subject to the exclusive restrictions of the mother country; for its free prosecution on their repeal; these form a very imperfect enumeration of the various sources of lucrative traffic, which an attentive examination of the statistics of these regions would suggest, and to the pursuit of which such a settlement would give immediate vigor and activity. Nor can its distance be a reasonable ground of objection. Should a passage ever be granted to commercial enterprise over the isthmus of New Spain, the facilities of communication would be infinitely superior to what we enjoy with any of our East India possessions; and even should that remain forever shut, the passage round Cape Horn, divested as it now is of its imaginary terrors, if provided with a good colonial port at its conclusion, would become the mere object of every-day undertaking.
To conclude, I believe I may not with propriety enlarge on the many circumstances in the present state of politics in the world, not merely favorable to the execution of such a measure as this of which I have thus considered the advantages, but also incentive to its undertaking. I may be allowed, however, to make the three following remarks:
First. Spain, uncertain of ever recovering her colonies, can now neither feel nor testify the same jealousy of such a settlement as she expressed on occasion of those at Nootka and the Falkland Islands. Secondly. The dispersion and animosity of the French exiles render the importation of politics hostile to the interests of Great Britain into New Spain now more than ever probable, particularly when connected with their favorable reception in the United States. And lastly, the chain is at present broken between New Spain and the Philippine Islands, while, by our recent treaties, those islands in the Chinese seas are restored to our old and active commercial rivals, the Dutch, which, from proximity of geographical position, will more naturally fill up the chasm than our East Indian possessions, unless supported and assisted by some strong measure on the part of the government. That measure can only be the interposition of an intermediate settlement.
In the memoir of government, of which I have thus detailed the substance, it would not have become me to propose limits to the scale on which such a plan should be undertaken; and I indeed professed my inability to speak with precision on the point. I presumed, however, to state, that I BELIEVED I could undertake to answer some of the civil and most of the military demands, of the peaceful infancy of such a settlement, from the resources of one of our large troop-ships aided either by one or two men of war, or furnished with such additional number of officers and men as might enable me to equip two or three tender for the conveyance of orders and maintenance of authority among the islands. I beg permission to represent that very few of the difficulties would intervene here, which made the infancy of the settlement of Port Jackson so burdensome and expensive. This would be a commercial, not an agricultural, colony. The inhabitants are already friendly, provisions already abundant, nor would the increase of the permanent population be so rapid as to preclude the necessary preparations. I beg leave here to repeat the sanguine belief which I there state, that from the first hour of our settlement we should depend on the mother country only for her manufactures and her protection.
These opinions and speculations may be erroneous, and I now submit them with the diffidence of one unaccustomed to hazard the communication of his sentiments on public service. I hazard them, however, actuated by a most sincere interest in the greatness and welfare of my native country; by an intimate conviction of the importance of the revolution now under contest in New Spain, and by the belief, that however that may now terminate, Spain can only long retain her influence in that country, by the improvement and encouragement of its many natural and commercial advantages, not by their oppression. With these concurrent motives, I will not deny, there is also mixed up a very ardent desire of recommending my own personal services to those who alike dispense the toils and the rewards of individual ambition; a very anxious wish to be employed in the execution of this, or of any other plan which His Majesty's Ministers in their wisdom may adopt, for the maintenance and promotion of British interests in these seas.
ALEX. M'KONOCHIE.