The Naval War College Course.
By Captain W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy.
On September 30th the War College completed its twenty-seventh summer course and at the same time its first long course of sixteen months.
The attendance during the summer was larger than in previous years and the results were proportionately better, as the larger the attendance the better the work done. As the object of the courses is preparation for war, it is second in importance to no other duty, and the attendance cannot be too large. Those who have taken the courses realize their highly practical nature, and the advantages derived from them. As many officers as practicable should take the courses, and selection for them should be regarded as a compliment, as is the case in the army with the Army War College.
The long course began on June 1, 1911, and has thus lasted sixteen months. It was identical with the short or summer course of 1911 for the first four months; and a continuation of that summer course for another eight months until June 1, 1912, when the summer course began for a new class, and the long course officers took up, for their second summer, an advanced line of work distinct from that of the new comers.
The work of the War College is professional training, but it is of a kind entirely different from that given at the Naval Academy and its allied post-graduate courses.
Commanding officers, of whatever grade, have duties of two kinds. The first includes all the administrative duties relating to the care and maintenance of the command whose object is to develop efficiency and preserve safety.
Studies relating to these administrative duties are pursued at the Naval Academy, and include the technical courses relating to ships and material and the management of the same, and also drills. etc., belonging to the management of the personnel.
The second kind of duty falling to commanding officers is that concerned with leadership. To this belong all those dealing with the military employment and utilization of the force which the commander has under his control. The studies referring to this kind of duties are pursued at the War College, and, unlike those of the first kind, their ultimate object is to promote the military efficiency of the individual rather than that of his command.
The subjects of study at the War College are national and military policies, strategy, tactics, and logistics.' But as the success of strategic and tactical movements rests on a foundation of sound organization and administration, it is necessary to include these latter subjects also in the courses.
Further, the War College course includes international law. This subject, as far as it relates to naval affairs, belongs naturally to the kind of studies here pursued as it is intimately connected with strategy and tactics. These latter arts are concerned with the commander's use of the forces at his disposal, while international law deals with the limitations placed on the commander's freedom of action in carrying out his strategic and tactical plans. Thus the whole group of subjects studied here are closely knit as bearing on the practice of war.
The international law situations brought before the conference here always deal with subjects of present interest upon which the law and practice have not yet fully developed a general rule of action.
The solutions are published each year by the Navy Department. They are distributed not only to the navy, but they are called for by public libraries and students of international law, and have a high reputation abroad. They have had a marked effect in modifying recent development of international law.
In conducting the course at the College the object has been twofold; 1st to study naval and military history and to place the principles of warfare on a sound basis, and 2nd, to acquaint the service with these principles, and with their practical application to war, so that when war comes it will find prevailing among all the individual officers a common school of thought, and a common doctrine of practicing war which will ensure harmonious action and co-operation in all parts of a command.
This plan is carried out by what is known as the applicatory system, which is an employment of the principles of sub-caliber target practice in strategic and tactical situations. A series of situations are issued for study and solution by the individual members of the class.
So far as concerns the mental processes that are acquired in dealing with each situation, the conditions are those of war itself, and by handling many such situations the student becomes expert in dealing with them, so that the real war confronts him, only the physical shock of battle is unfamiliar to him.
These situations, in the way they are dealt with, form subjects for three different exercises, namely: -.
1. Formulation of orders.
2. Tactical Problems, Strategical Problems
3. Tactical Chart Maneuvers, Strategical Chart Maneuvers
The Formulation of Orders is an exercise in administration, and deals with the proper organization of the command for the special task in hand, with the proper distribution of tasks to the subordinate leaders, with the supervision and proper degree of control to be exercised, and with the freedom to be permitted to subordinates.
The Problem deals with the initial phase of a situation, and is made a means of inculcating logical methods of considering tactical situations, and of making sure that important features are not overlooked. It is also a means of exercising and encouraging boldness and promptitude of decision in emergencies.
In the Chart Maneuvers, the two sides are pitted against each other and a situation, instead of remaining an isolated phase as in the problem, is developed into a series of successive and related phases reproducing a campaign or a battle in miniature. In addition, the individual members of the class are assigned the task of writing one or more theses on various tactical and strategic subjects, which are read to the assembled conference and discussed to the advantage of all present. Officers of the navy and civilians of distinction are also invited to read papers on subjects related to the War College work.
The result of such work is no longer doubtful. It is possible to note during the course that those taking it grow in readiness to accept responsibility, and in capacity to exercise high command; and in this our experience is the same as that of other nations. No officer expecting important command can afford to forego the course at the War College. Experience in command during peace offers no analogy to it, and all officers should be ordered to the College as opportunity offers.
I desire to point out, however, that the most desirable time for any individual to come here is when he is considerably younger than has hitherto been the general practice of the Department.
I think that between 30 and 35 years is the age at which it is most profitable to the individual and to the service for officers first to attend the War College.
Before thirty years, one lacks sufficient foundation of experience, while the longer one puts off attendance after passing thirty-five, the more difficult it is to grasp and accept the new line of thought and the professional training which is presented.
Moreover, a course at the College at a comparatively early age exercises a better and more continuous influence upon the service because the earlier one comes, the longer before his retirement he is practicing, and therefore teaching, what he has learned.
At present the War College can accommodate about 45 officers in addition to the staff of the College.
I recommend that the annual detail for the College be established at 15 for the short course, beginning June 1 and lasting to September 30, and 15 more for the long course beginning at the same time and lasting till September 30 of the subsequent year. This arrangement will fill the College each summer, as the remaining 15 will consist of those of the previous summer who are finishing their long course. Of the annual number detailed. I recommend that one-half be lieutenant-commanders and lieutenants within two years of promotion.
The work of the staff is arduous, as the work of the class must be closely supervised and, besides, the staff must do original work in the preparation of situations, etc., investigation of principles, etc., which is independent of the size of the class. For this reason it is desirable to have the staff larger than at present; and, including the president, it should be increased to ten members. This would give an organization as follows:
1. President.
2. Secretary and keeper of confidential archives and general administration.
3. International law to work with professor of international law.
4. Military subjects—Marine officer.
5. Army War College detail to keep in touch with the army and army methods.
6. Historical studies in tactics and strategy for application in the chart maneuvers.
7. Instruction in strategic problems and maneuvers.
8. Instruction in strategic problems and maneuvers.
9. Instruction in tactics, problems and maneuvers.
10. Instruction in tactics, problems and maneuvers.
As officers versed in these branches are not numerous in the navy, the chief source of supply is to obtain them from the class at the College by retaining those who show aptitude in this line after completing sixteen months of study, so that they break joints with their predecessors and ensure a continuity in the development of the course. It is desirable for this reason that the tour of duty of members of the staff should not be cut short, and I recommend that the detail of members of the staff be made for three years including the sixteen months of preparation in the long course.
The above recommendations concerning the augmentation of both the staff and the attendance at the Naval War College are based upon the undisputed fact that heretofore there has not been given to the instruction of officers in the art of war the attention that its importance clearly demands. The result is that an insignificant proportion of officers have taken advantage of the opportunity to obtain this instruction which the War College offers, and as a consequence there is no unity of opinion as to how war should be conducted, either strategically or tactically.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy stated at the opening of the Summer Conference of this year:
I fear that at times the importance of the study of the art of war is lost sight of.
It is most desirable that the work of the War College be emphasized.
Only by a careful preparation on these lines (study of past wars, the experience of others, consideration of all possible contingencies, etc.) can an officer adequately supplement the technical and administrative training he obtains elsewhere. No line officer is fully qualified for command unless and until he has made such a study, and this War College was established and is maintained to afford suitable opportunity for such study.
Next to actual war, a well-planned War College course affords the best opportunity for such development thus far devised.
It is in view of these admitted facts, and of the manifest imperative necessity of establishing with the least practical delay a doctrine of war generally understood and accepted by the officers of the service, and of the fact that this can be accomplished only through the work of the War College in training officers, that I urge that the output of the College in trained officers should, at least in the immediate future, be as great as practicable.
Moreover, since, in the meantime, the instruction of the officers of the fleet in knowledge of the art of war must necessarily depend upon the knowledge of war possessed by its commanding officers, it would seem apparent that, in so far as practicable, all officers should, before being ordered to important commands, be required to take at least the short course at the College—this practice to be continued until the younger students (from 30 to 35 years) recommended above, reach the command grades.
In conclusion it is well to say that these recommendations are in accord with the policy advanced by my predecessor at the War College in his letter to the General Board of October 19, 1911.