FOREWORD. It happened that the writer was Commander of the Submarine Base, New London, Conn., when the S-51 was sunk; he was notified by telephone on a Saturday afternoon that he was to take charge of the salvage operations at the scene of the wreck. He has no other claim to be heard than that the nature of his connection with the work required him to see it in perspective as well as close up. Endeavor will be made to present this account in such a way as will enable the readers to see the whole, and as many as possible of the parts, of this undertaking. It was a Navy job!
The account will be largely in the narrative form, as detailed technical accounts will undoubtedly be available in other publications, and always in the files of the Navy Department. No claim of exact accuracy as to details is made but the main facts are correctly given even if some of the data are approximate.
The “S-51” is sunk. The U. S. S. S-51, of submarine division two, was attached to the Submarine Base, New London, Conn., for the training of officers and men for service in submarines. She left the base at about 10:30 a.m. September 25, 1925, for an “availability run” as required by the rules for engineering performances. Such a run consists of twelve hours’ surface running on the Diesel engines at a prescribed speed of about eleven knots, followed immediately by a quick dive, a three-hour submerged run, emergence, and then by the recharging of storage batteries and air banks to the condition in which they were at the beginning of the run. An “availability run” is generally begun at such time in the evening as to allow the vessel to make the required submerged run during daylight the following morning. The last message received from the S-5I- was timed 5:36 p.m. on September 25, and read “1025 Sail fifty-one beginning availability run 1736.”
The S-51 was commanded by Lieutenant Rodney H. Dobson, U. S. N., duly qualified to command a submarine, and had on board five other officers and thirty-one men. Four of the officers were students in the submarine training school but all were duly qualified in line duties including the taking of a watch at sea, and were about halfway through their course in the submarine training school. This was one of the regular methods for giving student officers practical experience.
The S-51 was sunk by the City of Rome, owned by the Ocean Steamship Company, at about 10:23 p.m. September 25, 1925, nearly five hours after beginning her “availability run” at 5 :36 p.m. Three men were saved by the vessel that sank her, but none of them were on watch, and knew nothing of the circumstances preceding the collision.
The evidence presented to the court of inquiry appears clearly to show:
- That the S-51’s lights were seen by the City of Rome about thirty minutes before the collision occurred.
- That the S-51 was on the starboard bow of the City of Rome.
- That the bearing of the S-51 from the City of Rome remained sensibly constant.
- That the City of Rome did not come into the arc of visibility of the S-51’s port running light until just before the collision.
- That the S-51’s rudder was hard right when found on the bottom.
- That the S-51’s engines were stopped and that one main engine clutch was out and the other about halfway out, indicating an endeavor to maneuver the S-51 on the main electric motors, which is normal in submarines. By way of explanation, the main motors form part of the line shafting, and in order to back, it is necessary to disconnect the main engines, as they are designed only to go ahead, hence the clutch. The motors are the only means of applying backing power.
The rescue operations. The first message to reach New London was received by telegraph at 1:20 a.m. September 26, having been sent from the City of Rome about one half hour earlier. All available vessels were immediately sent to the scene of the wreck and after some hours’ search, due to the inaccuracy of the position given by the City of Rome, the U. S. S. S-i located the S-51 by sighting the oil slick and air bubbles over her. Rescue operations began at once.
Endeavors to lift the stern of S-51 by means of two heavy derrick lighters, with a combined lift of about 270 tons, failed. It was definitely ascertained that all of the compartments were flooded, when no air was found to escape from small holes burned in the hatches of the compartments which might have been closed up by the crew. The rescue operations were then given up and the salvage operations began.
Salvage operations begin. On Saturday, October 10, the Navy Department decided to entrust the salvage operations to the Third Naval District, made the necessary preliminary allotment of funds, and issued the necessary covering orders for vessels, materials, equipment and construction required.
Construction was immediately begun on eight eighty-ton pontoons, six at the Navy Yard, New York, and two at the Navy Yard, Norfolk. Two of the sixty-ton pontoons used in the F-4 salvage operations were taken in hand for stiffening in order to stand the greater depths involved. The pontoons were shipped from New York by lighter and by derrick lighter. It was first intended to keep them at Point Judith but it was found best to unload them and rig them at the Torpedo Station, Newport, R. I. They were towed out in pairs by two of the tugs as needed.
The salvage force. The Vestal (fleet repair ship), Falcon (submarine rescue vessel), Iuka and Sagamore (sea-going tugs) and Penobscot (tug) were ordered to report for duty in the salvage force. Later the Bagaduce (sea-going tug) joined the force.
The normal disposition of vessels during diving operations is embodied in the following extract from the orders:
- All hands must keep clearly in mind the necessity for maintaining all vessels at the scene of the wreck as nearly continuously as possible. Endeavor must be made to obviate the necessity for going into port for any reason except fueling, and the tugs, in particular, must operate their evaporators and conserve their fresh water supply.
- Falcon—diving vessel—moored over S-51.
- Iuka—tender to Falcon—take such position as Falcon may direct as movable mooring—render assistance and operate generally as Falcon may direct.
- Sagamore and Bagaduce—bring out pontoons from Newport as directed and act as additional moorings for Falcon when required—regular station is at wreck.
- S-50—take station as near Falcon as practicable as model for examination, trial of apparatus, rehearsal of divers, etc.
- Vestal—supply vessel and mother ship for all craft—take station near Falcon—act as movable mooring when required—place two boats at disposition of Falcon from time Falcon begins to moor until she unmoors—keep one additional boat down for general use. Vessel requiring a boat hoist international “T.”
- Penobscot—maintain communication with Submarine Base, New London; leave New London daily after morning mail arrives (about 0830)—leave Vestal on return trip when directed (about 1630).
- When bad weather prevents diving, Iuka or Sagamore or Bagaduce (as directed) remain at wreck, keep continuous watch on pontoons (if any) and on buoys over wreck—report wind, weather and sea conditions by radio every two hours to Falcon and Vestal, if either is absent.
- All vessels maintain boilers and engines in readiness to get underway at fifteen minutes notice at all times. When out of signal distance of Vestal and Falcon, maintain continuous radio watch; when within signal distance maintain continuous signal watch.
- Whenever supply on hand of fuel, fresh water, or fresh provisions falls below fifty per cent of capacity, notify Vestal by dispatch (radio or visual) at once. Make request on Vestal for all materials of all kinds, including provisions, that may be required.
- The work must be definitely planned ahead in steps and continued during the night, weather and other circumstances permitting. The diving crews must be so organized and so managed that there are always available on board the Falcon sufficient divers and other personnel, and material, that there can be no delay in the progress of the operations.
All mail, personnel, provisions and freight were routed via the Submarine Base, New London as they came from New York or New London, in view of the fact that the service between New York and New London was quicker and better than any other available. The tug Penobscot made daily round trips and the event of the day for the salvage force was her arrival, usually about noon. During the fall-winter period of operations, the Penobscot emitted smoke which was literally a “pillar of cloud by day” and could frequently be seen before she rounded the north end of Block Island; all hands knew just where to look.
Mooring the Falcon. The Falcon was provided with six (later, seven) moorings of four thousand to eight thousand pounds (anchors, chains, buoys) which were laid approximately sixty degrees apart in a circle of about five hundred feet radius with center over S-51. This layout enabled the Falcon to be held in any position under practically any wind and sea conditions. It was, however, found advisable, and at times necessary, to have one or more of the tugs anchor directly to windward of the Falcon as portable moorings to hold her in place so that the work could go on. On several occasions the Vestal and all available vessels, even the Y-50 (sister ship of the S-51), were
anchored directly to windward of the Falcon and very close together with a view to breaking up the seas before they reached the Falcon. Endeavor to anchor the Vestal broadside to the wind and sea to act as a breakwater failed because of the size of the vessel and the inadequacy of the available stern anchors. When the Falcon moored, her lines were run by boats and, during the spring operations, use was made of a surf- boat loaned by the Coast Guard. This surf- boat was an excellent seaboat with plenty of power, stood the hard service without a breakdown and is considered worthy of adoption for naval use as it is, without any changes.
It was found that the Falcon could not be kept in her moorings in a wind of force five, or for more than two or three hours after force four had been reached. If any considerable swell was running, which was usually the case, it aggravated the conditions. The most important reason for maintaining exact mooring of the Falcon, was that when one or more divers were on the bottom at 130 feet there was sometimes two or three times that length of hose and lifeline out overside; if the Falcon carried away any of her mooring lines, the divers’ lives were in danger as they worked not only inside the S-51 but under the bottom and practically always in places where their lines could readily foul unless the Falcon maintained her exact position. Even when the Falcon could be held in position, it was not always practicable to work on account of the divers who suffer from headaches if there is two feet variation in the surface water (one pound pressure) and if this variation (sea and swell combined) reaches four feet (two pounds pressure) their eardrums are subject to damage.
The salvage operations actually began on October 15, 1925, and continued until December 7, 1925, when the weather and water temperature conditions became too bad to carry on the work. On November 30, after nine successive days when diving was impracticable, two divers had their airlines frozen up solid with ice close to the helmet expansion valves. One of these divers was half suffocated before he could be brought to the surface. A third diver experienced air difficulties which indicated that his air-line also was on the point of freezing up. This condition was due to a combination of humidity, air temperature and water temperature conditions. After extended, careful consideration it became apparent that there was no way to meet this recurring danger without making extensive alterations and additions to the Falcon’s air supply installation. Upon receipt of this information in conclusive form the Navy Department ordered the suspension of the work until the spring of 1926.
General conditions of “S-51.” The S-51 is 240 feet long and lay on the bottom in about 130 feet of water about twelve miles east of Block Island, about fifteen miles south-easterly from Point Judith, and about twenty miles southward of Rhode Island, on a heading about 350° (N. by W.). This position was in the open sea in a locality where winds and seas and ocean swells have full sweep, and might as well have been in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean in that respect. She had a list to port of about twelve degrees, was rather down by the head, though her keel was clear to abaft the submerged anchor recess (twenty feet from the stem) and as far forward as the upward turn of that after part known as the dead- wood, but in submarines called the skeg (thirty-five feet from the stem). The character of the bottom was a friable clay with coarse sand and fine gravel.
When the S-51 hit the bottom she did so with her bow (forefoot) with such force that the divers reported heavy buckling in the plating on both sides in wake of the bulkhead between the torpedo-room and battery-room, which is the point where the structure changes from double to single hull construction, and indicated that this bulkhead was probably sprung. The torpedo- room door was open, and was inaccessible from the battery-room because the City of Rome’s bow (entering the port side from well abaft the beam) had jammed a tangled mass of wreckage against the bulkhead. The battery-room itself, with a break about twelve feet long vertically by three feet at the widest and tapering to top and bottom, would have been very difficult to make tight. This break pierced the pressure hull but did not reach in to the keel nor to the top strength members.
The control-room, engine-room and motor-room were capable of being unwatered if the necessary work could be done inside the boat; the divers did it.
The control-room (central operating compartment) required: (1) the substitution of salvage hatches for the conning tower and gun-access hatches (2) the closing of the door to the battery-room (3) the closing and blocking of the main air induction or ventilating valves and (4) the closing of the door to the engine-room.
The engine-room required: (1) the closing of all out-board valves and those connecting tanks and other compartments (2) the substitution of a salvage hatch for the regular engine-room hatch (3) the closing and blocking of the battery outboard ventilation valve and the closing of the door to the motor-room.
The motor-room (including the tiller- room) required: (1) the closing and blocking of the ship’s after main ventilation valve and (2) the strengthening of the after torpedo loading hatch by means of a strongback on the outside.
Salvage hatches. The salvage hatches were heavy steel discs fitted with thick rubber gaskets and a stiff strong-back pivoted at the lower end of a long threaded stem, on which a nut screwed down (on top of the disc) to pull the strong-back into place. There was a four-inch nozzle through the hatch with a non-return screw-down valve on the top and a four-inch hose at the bottom, fitted with a strainer at its lower end which reached the floor plates of the compartment; there were small nozzles for the attachment of air blowing hoses and also for two or three small hoses used for telling how much water remained in the compartment.
“S-50”—model vessel. The U. S. S. S-50, sister ship of the S-51, was available during the entire salvage operations for examination, inspection and measurements. A great many valuable suggestions came from her officers and crew. Before any diver was sent inside the S-5T, he was taken on board the S-50 and shown what he could expect to find and where, how to manipulate the valves and gear, and, what was of vital importance, how to handle himself in getting through doors and restricted spaces. This matter of
Divers Who Salvaged U. S. S. “S-51”
Navy Yard, New York, U. S. S. “S-51” in Drydock
International Newsreel
The “S-51’s" Bow, June 22
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International Newsreel
The Gash in the “S-5i’s” Side
Courtesy of 1 e Scientific American Publishing Co
At'R H05t FROM S-5O TO ASSIST FALCON IN PROVIDING /MR FOR. QUD'UINC
the diver’s handling himself was carried to the extent that a complete diving outfit was kept on board the S-50; the divers were fully dressed in this diving gear and rehearsed again and again in their every move. Without these rehearsals the divers could not have done their work; without the work done by the divers, the S-51 could not have been raised.
Buoyancy arrangements. The dead weight of the S-51 as she lay on the bottom was figured at about 760 tons. The eight eighty- ton pontoons would give 640 tons total buoyancy. The control-room, engine-room and motor-room, when unwatered to the fullest possible extent, were figured to give about 400 tons buoyancy, but it is to be noted that none of this was available forward of the bulkhead between the battery-room and the control-room. Some additional buoyancy, about 125 tons, was gained by unwatering five or six of the ten main-ballast tanks, the after fuel tanks and some of the small bow tanks. Where the control valves could not be reached, holes were burned in the lowest parts of the tanks from the outside of the hull and the water displaced by a diver shoving an air hose into the holes.
It was originally intended to blow the 'water from the motor-room into the engine- room and to pump the engine-room and control-room by means of submersible, electrically-driven pumps. The motor-room was blown into the engine-room by means of a drain line leading from the motor-room bilges to the forward end of the engine-room where the valve bonnet was removed. The submersible pumps, could, however, only pump against a head of about seventy-five feet and so required the careful use of balancing pressures. Practical difficulties in equalizing pressures, especially while the S-51 was coming to the surface, led eventually to the development of a means of blowing the three compartments to be unwatered. All the ventilation valves in the piping which led outside the hull were designed and constructed to seat with external pressure and would lift or chatter under an internal pressure of two or more pounds. For the motor-room this required the tearing up of a part of the superstructure deck, the removal of an elbow of nine-inch piping and the blank flanging of the lead to the motor-room. For the engine-room and control-room ventilation valves, the method was adopted of flooding liquid cement on top of them by means of a special cylinder in which air pressure was applied and so forced the cement through a hose into the desired location. Enough cement was placed over the ventilation valves to make sure that they could not lift and this scheme was entirely successful in allowing the compartments to be unwatered by blowing them.
The work done by the divers. The work of the divers was beyond all praise. They were lowered away on descending lines secured to the Falcon and to some convenient place on the deck of the S-51. When working inside the engine-room they were in pairs with one man on deck tending the lines of the other at the hatch. When work was done in the control-room or motor-room three divers were used, one on deck at the engine-room hatch to tend the lines of the other two, one at (or even inside) the door leading into the control-room (or motor- room) and the third man doing the job. Practically all work inside the S-51 was done by way of the engine-room hatch as, though the battery-room hatch afforded easy access to that compartment, there was so much wreckage, floating planks of battery deck, swollen mattresses and constricted passageways to the control-room door that it was found best even to close the battery- room door to the control-room from the control-room side.
The divers therefore made their way into the motor-room by descending the engine- room hatch, going aft between the engines and through the small water-tight door to secure the ventilation valve. This valve was closed, the door secured and, after strengthening the torpedo loading hatch, air pressure was put on the compartment when it was found that there was an air leak. By examination of the S-50 and some very clever analysis the trouble was diagnosed as a leaky valve in the drain line from the ventilation valve. The diagnosis was confirmed by one of the S-51s survivors who had witnessed the yard test of the ventilation system. The motor-room door had consequently to be re- opened and the leak stopped by capping the drain pipe at a union below the leaky valve, which took rather longer than is required to tell it.
The diver whose task it was to close the valves to the engine-room reported that he was unable to close the main engine air-induction valve, which should have only required the swinging of a lever through an arc of about ninety degrees; instead, the lever came hard up in the vertical position. The trouble was decided to be something between the valve and its seat. All efforts to dislodge the obstruction came to nothing, and it was finally necessary to rip up the superstructure deck and remove the valve bonnet. The valve bonnet was secured with thirty-eight 7/8 inch bolts and was thirty- nine inches in diameter. The divers found a piece of one-inch pipe about twenty-eight inches long bent roughly to an S-shape under the valve. The pipe was badly corroded, the end being of wafer thinness, and appeared to have been left in the induction pipe when the ship was built and to have been carried under the valve by the rush of water through the pipe when the periscope shears of the S-51 went under at the time of sinking.
The work done by the divers inside the control-room may appear incredible in the telling. They entered through the engine- room door at the after end, and first worked their way through a narrow passage between the galley and the radio-room into an open space in the after part of the control-room where, on the right and over the gyro compass, was the main air induction or ventilation valve to be closed and, later, filled with cement. From this point the diver (Wilson) made his way forward and to port outboard of the periscope and so into the forward corner of the compartment where he found that one of the four banks of high-pressure air was still at about 2,000 pounds pressure and threw over the master valve for opening all main ballast Kingston valves but got no results. The accessible main ballast Kings- tons (Nos. 3, 4, and 5 port) were then opened by hand and the port tanks blown by the diver with the S-51’s air. The diver then made his way still further forward through a short constricted passage and closed the door to the battery-room. It would have been impossible to have accomplished this work without the previous thorough drills and rehearsals on board the S-50.
Of the four pairs of pontoons used, it was comparatively easy to pass the receiving lines and the pontoon chains for the bow and stem pairs as the keel of the vessel was clear of the bottom at those points. For the second and third pairs it was necessary to wash tunnels under the keel at the proper locations, as efforts to sweep wires back into position gave no promise of success. The washing was done with sixty pounds pressure, which was all that the divers could manage in the long nozzle that was necessary. Later on, a special type of re-action nozzle, devised by one of the enlisted men, was used with pressures of over 150 pounds with marked success and much greater rapidity of washing. At one time, one of the divers, intent on his job, found that the spoil from his washing had banked up behind him nearly to the bottom of the ship. He reversed his nozzle and washed a clear way from under the bottom. He then turned around and went ahead on the tunnel. The job could not fail of success with such men!
Handling the divers. After due consideration of all the factors involved it was decided that the length of dive should be one hour. This time was exceeded in many instances because the diver appeared to need only a few additional minutes to finish his allotted task. While a diver can be let down to the working depth of 130 feet in two or three minutes, bringing him to the surface from that depth required about one and one-half times the length of the dive; thus, for a one-hour dive it took one hour and a half to bring him to the surface, first to eighty feet and then by ten-foot stages with a length of time at each stage determined by tables and by experience. Here, too, the necessity of getting ahead with the job frequently required that divers be brought to the surface from the upper stages, helmet and shoes snatched off, and the diver rushed into the decompression chamber (built into the Falcon) where the decompression process was completed. This chamber was also used to treat the frequent cases of "bends” that occurred.
Divers who are to work at depths as great as 130 feet have to undergo very thorough physical examinations to determine their fitness to withstand the consequences of the air pressure in which they will have to work. It is also the usual practice, as on this job, to place them in a pressure chamber where they can be observed as to their reactions to the pressure they will have to stand, in this case about sixty pounds or approximately four atmospheres. The first consideration is as to whether they show signs of “oxygen exhilaration,” on account of the marked excess of oxygen they are breathing. If susceptible they get “happy” and, in fact, exhibit the same general symptoms as a man who is exhilarated by liquor; of course such men can not be controlled on the bottom. The second consideration is their capacity to throw off the excess of nitrogen which will, under the air pressure, penetrate to every blood vessel of the circulatory system. A good subject will throw off the nitrogen completely while undergoing the normal decompression for the depth of water and the length of dive. However, a diver’s capacity to throw off nitrogen varies almost from day to day with his physical (and perhaps mental) condition—whether rested or fatigued, whether he has a cold or other physical ailment. If the throwing off of nitrogen is incomplete at the end of the normal decompression treatment, caisson disease or “bends,” will almost surely occur. “Bends” are caused by bubbles of nitrogen remaining in the circulatory system; they usually collect in the joints where they frequently cause intense pain. The treatment is to place the patient in the decompression chamber and build up the pressure until he is relieved; the pressure is then gradually reduced and the patient usually comes out all right. If not, he needs a doctor’s utmost care.
During the latter part of the spring operations (April-July) a portable helium apparatus was used in the Falcon decompression chamber for treating some cases of “bends.” This apparatus was developed at the Bureau of Mines experiment station at Pittsburgh as a part of the research work to discover means of overcoming the dangers of “bends.” Helium, like nitrogen, is so inert and untransformable that it may be mixed with oxygen to form a synthetic atmosphere. As helium is practically free of nitrogen’s tendency to cause bubbles in the blood system, the breathing of it as a substitute for nitrogen is intended. The apparatus used on board the Falcon was intended only for the treatment of existing cases of “bends.”
The health and well-being of the divers was safeguarded by their being under the constant care of a surgeon who was familiar with diving conditions and with the cause and treatment of caisson disease, or “bends.” Arrangements were also carried out for the close supervision and control of all divers from the time they began to dress, throughout their diving time, coming up, undressing, and for after effects of diving. There was only one serious case of “bends” in some 500 dives and that case was largely the diver’s own fault.
During the winter months. None of the pontoons were down at the time the salvage operations were suspended on December 7, 1925. They were hauled into boat slips at the Torpedo Station, Newport, where the station personnel examined them daily and blew them free of water as necessary. All of the pontoons were in excellent condition when the salvage operations were resumed in April.
Some of the divers who had been employed during the fall-winter operations went south with the Falcon. Others were kept at the Navy Yard, New York, to overhaul diving gear, prepare salvage gear, learn the manipulation of the underwater cutting torch, and other like work. They also helped to train additional divers, men who were already divers but not accustomed to working at 130 feet. This and other diving was done in a water tank at the Navy Yard, which was rigged for applying pressure so as to simulate the actual working conditions.
The underwater cutting torch, as used during the fall-winter operations, was not as successful as desired. By working with it during the winter months, Lieutenant Commander Ellsburg was able to effect a tremendous improvement in its cutting rate. Incidentally, while working with it in the pressure tank, he taught himself to dive, and to withstand pressures corresponding to depths of 130 feet. During the spring operations he actually went down on the S-51 three times to inspect the condition of the gear.
The salvage operations were resumed on April 20, 1925, and continued until about 11:00 p.m. July 7, 1926, when the S-51 was delivered alongside a dock at the Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N. Y. The S-51 was successfully brought to the surface at 3:00 p.m. on Julv 5, 1926. The total time actually consumed in the salvage operations was about four and one-half months.
Placing the pontoons. Several arrangements of pontoons were considered, including placing pontoons vertically over each other, but all of these were finally laid aside for the simplest arrangement that could be had. There were four pairs of eighty-ton pontoons used. The forward chain of the bow pair was placed in the recess for the submerged anchor (whose wire was cut by torch so that it dropped down), and the after chain was passed through the bow diving rudder guards. The second pair of pontoons was so placed that its after end came at about the four-inch gun mount. The third pair was abreast and a little forward of the conning tower. Eight foot clearance was allowed fore-and-aft between the first, second and third pairs of pontoons. The after (fourth) pair had both of its chains rove under the skeg and inside the propeller shafts forward of the strut bearings.
When all available buoyancy was applied, the vessel would float without either the bow or stem pair of pontoons being in place, but these two pairs were required in bringing the vessel to the surface as well as for reserve. It will be noted later of what tremendous importance this reserve became.
No such deepwater pontoon job had before been undertaken. A trial of sinking of one pontoon soon showed that it would not do to place the pontoon accurately on the surface, open the flood valves and vents and let it sink, as it would land on the vessel or perhaps sixty feet away, and probably on one end. A spell of bad weather was then made use of to go into Narragansett Bay and conduct some pontoon experiments which resulted in the development of a technique that met every requirement. Twelve-inch hawsers were secured to either end, the pontoon was flooded to a condition of about ten tons negative buoyancy and then lowered into place on the bottom while maintaining an even fore-and-aft trim by slacking away on the above hawsers. It may sound easy but it was not so in the seaway that was always present and with the narrow gangways of the Falcon unavoidably congested with mooring gear as well as pontoon gear.
The pontoons. The eighty-ton pontoons were steel cylinders thirty-two feet long and thirteen feet in diameter, sheathed with four- inch yellow pine planking, divided into two vertical compartments by a central cross- bulk-head and weighted with cement at their bottoms to keep them upright. On the central fore-and-aft lines and in the middle of each compartment was a hawse pipe of twelve inches internal diameter, through which passed the 214 inch or 2 1/3 inch chains which were used to lift and support the wreck. These chains brought the load on the pontoons by means of chain clamps in the original plans but later the device was adopted of using toggle bars of nickel steel, which were vastly easier for the divers to handle at the working depths. The toggle bars would just pass through a link of the chain from which the stud had been removed and were long enough to bridge the bosses of the hawse pipes. They were kept from shifting their position by means of two half-inch locking bolts passing through the bars at little more than chain diameter distance. For the divers to have attempted the placing and bolting of the heavy chain clamps would have been a lengthy as well as a fatiguing and even dangerous job.
Each compartment was fitted with four valves. Two of these were at the top on the center line and were ordinary screw-down valves used as vents or for the admission of blowing air, as circumstances required. At the bottom of the flat end was a flood- valve to admit water when needed or to allow the expulsion of water when blowing. The relief (fourth) valve was near the flood-valve and was a spring-loaded valve adjusted so that five to ten pounds internal pressure would cause it to open.
Lowering the pontoons. The pontoons sent down after developing the technique of lowering (in Narragansett Bay) were, of course, dealt with in pairs. The “first” pontoons had the pontoon chains rove through the hawse pipes with the chain clamps in place and the chain bighted up along the pontoon so that the lower ends of the chain were accessible; the “mate” had half-inch wire reeving lines passed through the hawse pipes with both ends accessible. Divers passed eighteen-thread manila lines under the hull of the S-51, through the tunnels or under the bow or under the skeg as the case might be; to these lines were bent three-inch manila lines which were then hove under the wreck from the deck of the Falcon; one- inch wires were then worked into place and the lowering of the pontoons was next in order.
The one-inch wires were shackled to the free ends of the pontoon chains, the chains lowered to their full length (about ninety feet), and the wires then hove taut from the opposite side of the Falcon. The twelve- inch manila lowering lines were secured to the ends of the pontoons by heavy pelican hooks and the lines made ready for lowering on specially fitted bitts. Blowing hoses were attached to the middle vents of each pontoon compartment with sufficient lengths of hose to more than reach the bottom. The end vents of the pontoon compartments were kept closed. The vents and the flood valves of the pontoons were opened until enough water had entered the pontoon to give the pontoon a negative buoyancy of about ten tons. The flood valves and vents were then closed and the lowering begun by easing away on the twelve-inch hawsers while heaving in on the one-inch wires on the opposite side. A hitch frequently came when the pontoon chains were due to start under the keel and caused delays, difficulties and danger. In the later pontoon lowering operations this trouble was obviated by another method of attack. By this means the pontoons were accurately placed, though the lowering process never went as smoothly as this account may read. When the “first” pontoon was down it was highly desirable to get its “mate” in place in order to clear the Falcon of the mess of gear so that she could leave her moorings, as was frequently necessary. Sometimes the sea and swell would increase between times and make the operation hazardous from every point of view; but it was always done.
When the “first” pontoon was on the bottom and its chains taut under the keel it was flooded full and the twelve-inch hawsers were cast off. The “mate” pontoon was then taken in hand and the one-inch main reeving wires were passed through its hawse-pipes and hove taut. The arrangements for lowering were then carried out in the same manner as for the “first” pontoon except that this “mate” pontoon was “threaded” down the one-inch reeving wires and so down the pontoon chains to the bottom. The divers then went down, placed and secured the toggle bars at the proper points in the chain where a link stud had previously been removed on the surface before lowering or, in some cases, by the under-water burning torch, after the pontoon was down. Upon completion of the work with a pair of pontoons, they lay in their proper locations on the bottom with chains secured and each with a pair of blowing hoses leading to the surface and buoyed off clear of the Falcon. All four pairs of pontoons were placed in this manner. Later, they had to be brought into their proper lifting positions.
Adjusting the pontoons. When all else had been made ready for raising the vessel, the first stages of adjusting the pontoons were taken in hand. The flood valves of a pair of pontoons were opened and the blowing hoses connected to the Falcon’s air supply. Enough water was blown from the pontoons to cause them to become buoyant and to rise in their lifting positions in relation to the wreck, where their bottoms were somewhat above the deck. It was always necessary to juggle the pontoons so that they rode at the same height. Lashings of one- inch wire were then secured athwartships at deck level of the S-51 between both pontoon chains. In the case of the second and third pairs of pontoons, these wires were so led respectively in regard to the four-inch gun mount and the gun access hatch as to prevent fore-and-aft movement of the pontoons. Additional fore-and-aft lashings were placed where it was practicable to do so. The stern and bow pairs of pontoons required only athwartships lashings as their chains were so placed (see above) as to prevent longitudinal movement. This operation of adjusting and lashing the pontoons was a tedious and often an exasperating and even dangerous task. The second pair of pontoons gave the most trouble here and so maintained the vogue of the saying about the cussedness of inanimate objects.
The twenty-second of June. On the night of June 21 at 10 o’clock work was still being done in setting the second pair of pontoons and it was apparent that at least two hours’ more work was required. As all hands had been at the work since four o’clock in the morning, it was decided to knock off for the night and clean up the next morning, when everything could be finished up and the vessel would be entirely ready to be brought up. There were reporters, moving picture operators and camera men standing by to record the actual raising. The pontoons had only enough air in them to maintain them in their lifting positions.
The early morning of June 22 proved wholly unsuitable for the attempt at raising
The last thing wanted was for the S-51 to come up at that time and above all, to have the bow come up first. The three compartments to be unwatered (control, engine and motor-rooms) all had to be unwatered from their forward ends. With the bow emerging the angle of the vessel was about twenty- eight degrees so that nearly one half of the water could not by any possibility be blown from the compartments. Again, if the bow was up there was a decided tendency for the chains of the forward pontoons to ride forward due to the tapering form of the hull.
The bow was up, the wind and sea were rising and there was a considerable swell, but there was nothing to do but go ahead and attempt to get the stern up even under
and even inadvisable for the divers to work. As the conditions grew worse it was decided that the only practicable work to be done was to have the Falcon go into her moorings, pick up the blowing hoses and boost all the pontoons to overcome leakage and so ensure that they would keep their buoyancy. The sea conditions were then such that the Falcon had to moor with her bow over the stern of the S-51. Several of the pontoons had been boosted but not the bow pair when huge bubbles began to break under the stem of the Falcon, whose captain immediately got the stem out of the way just in time to keep it clear of the bow of the S-51, which appeared with four pontoons (the bow and second pair) in a proximity which showed that the second pair had moved forward from their proper position (see photo).
the wholly adverse conditions. Blowing was begun on the third and stern pairs of pontoons and on all three compartments. In about three-quarters of an hour, ebullition over the stern of the wreck began and presently the stem pontoons appeared, and floated off with the wind and sea, as the pontoon chains (24 inch) had parted, probably in succession. While blowing on the three compartments was continued some time longer, it was obvious that the stern could not be raised at that time.
The wind and sea were still rising and the four bow pontoons were crashing and booming and battering each other badly. Consideration was given to attempting to drag the wreck but this was seen to be useless. It became evident that the one chance of saving the situation was to open the flood- valves of the four thrashing bow pontoons and let the bow down to the bottom again. A call for volunteers was made and met with ample response. The utmost possible care was taken to safeguard these volunteers and they were not allowed to board one of the pontoons at all. After a lot of extremely hazardous and difficult work they succeeded in opening one flood valve on each of three of the pontoons. The bow of the S-51 sank from sight at about noon after having been up for three and one-half hours. It was this incident that the newspapers insisted on calling the “first attempt” and labeling it a failure. It is thought that the condition of the wreck was such that the heavy ground- swell broke the bottom suction and there was just enough buoyancy forward to start the bow up; once started, of course it kept coming.
After the twenty-second of June. It was not until the afternoon of the next day, June 23, that the weather and sea conditions permitted the sending of divers down to report on the condition of the wreck. The S-51 was found in good shape in all respects as to her hull, which listed about twenty degrees to starboard, but the four bow pontoons presented such a jumbled mess that it was necessary to bring all four of them to the surface. The reporters wanted an estimate of the time it would take to get the S-51 again ready for raising; the estimate was given as two weeks; the S-51 was actually brought up in one day less.
In preparation for the raising about June 22, the 100-ton derrick lighter United States had been brought from the Navy Yard, New York, and kept at Point Judith in case there should be need of it and if the necessary calm and smooth sea conditions for its use should occur. This derrick lighter was now placed alongside the Vestal and the six eighty-ton pontoons were “dry-docked” thereon while the Vestal’s repair force worked twenty-four hours a day replacing valves and sheathing, patching punctured plates and welding up leaking seams and rivets. To such advantage did this arrangement work out that the Falcon never had to wait an hour for a pair of pontoons ready for lowering.
In the meantime, the Falcon, after getting up the four bow pontoons, began washing new tunnels (with the balanced nozzle) under the wreck and burning holes low down in the main ballast tanks and in the other tanks available for buoyancy purposes. When the new tunnels were run through an improved method of handling the pontoons and their chains was employed. New pontoon chains (2^ inch) were procured and these were worked into place under the hull of the wreck without any pontoons attached in any way. Each chain had one-inch wire on each end of sufficient length to be worked on board the Falcon. The chains were middled under the wreck and then laid out at right angles to the keel with buoyed weighing lines until wanted. When the pontoons became available, each of a pair was then dealt with exactly as related above for a “mate” pontoon.
Arrangements for towing “S-51." It was necessary to install the towing arrangements before the wreck left the bottom. These arrangements comprised two bow towing pendants (main and preventer) and a stern pendant, or stern-fast. The main towing pendant consisted of a loop of 1/2 inch chain around the base of the four-inch gun mount shackled into a length of inch wire which led forward along the superstructure deck to a point over the bow diving rudders where a second loop of the same size chain was led under and around the hull to fix the point of tow. From the shackles at this point a fifteen-fathom shot of ½ inch chain led forward clear of the stem and to it was shackled another 1 1/2 inch wire pendant about 150 feet long. This pendant was laid out taut ahead of the S-51 and its end buoyed with a weighing line.
The preventer bow pendant consisted of a large shackle specially made on board the Vestal and locked into place in the stem chock of the S-51. To this special shackle was secured a length of about fifteen fathoms of 11/2 inch chain into which was shackled about 150 feet of 1 1/2 inch wire. This pendant was laid out and buoyed as was the main pendant.
The stern fast consisted of a loop of fifteen fathoms of ½ inch chain passed under the skeg inside the propeller shafts forward of the struts, the ends being shackled to a 150-foot length of 1-1/2 wire which was laid out and buoyed astern of the wreck.
Dispositions for raising “S-51The Falcon was moored on the starboard (eastward, weather) side of the wreck and headed in the same direction, about north by west. The Sagamore was moored ahead of the S-51 and picked up the ends of both main and preventer towing pendants. The Iuka was moored astern of the S-51 and picked up the end of the stern-fast. The Bagaduce and Mallard were anchored on the starboard (eastward, weather) bow and quarter of the Falcon, respectively, to tend the Falcon’s mooring lines and to act themselves as moorings. The S-50 and the S-3 with fully charged air banks, took station on the starboard beam of the Falcon in readiness to give their air to her in order to expedite the blowing operation. The Penobscot stood by to drag out of place the north and northwest moorings in order to clear the way for the wreck to move in tow. The Lark (which with Mallard had been loaned by Control Force) stood by at Point Judith with the 100-ton derrick lighter United States.
The definite plan involved the bringing up of the stem first, in order that the three compartments might be fully unwatered and so that the chains of the three bow pairs of pontoons would encounter resistance due to the increase of girth of the vessel from forward aft. The raising of one end first was always heavily counted on in breaking the “suction” of the bottom, but after the experience of June 22, the extent and the amount of the suction was somewhat discounted. It would have been wholly impracticable to get the S-51 off the bottom on an even keel, as the forces to be kept in equilibrium could not have been maintained sufficiently under control.
The “S-51” is raised. Sunday, July 4, was a fifth good diving day in succession. A change in the weather was “due” and was predicted by the Weather Bureau. Practically everything was in readiness except completion of the lashings of the second pair of pontoons and a few minor jobs which were highly desirable but not essential. About ten o’clock that night it was decided to raise the S-51 the next day if the weather remained good and the indispensable work could be completed before noon, as seemed practicable.
On Monday morning, July 5, the Falcon went into her moorings about five o’clock and diving was underway by seven. All necessary work was completed during the forenoon and blowing began just after noon. The stern came up, as per plan, about two p.m. The bow came up as per plan, at almost exactly three p.m.
Only the A-frame on top of the periscope shears was visible and the S-51, as she lay in the cradle composed of the eight pontoon chains, had a list to starboard of about ten degrees. All of the pontoons rode well except the port pontoon of .the second pair whose lashings seemed to keep it nearly submerged. The draft of the tow was about thirty-three feet, perhaps a few inches more.
The “S-51” tow gets 'underway. The Falcon was shifted from her position to starboard of the S-51 to a position astern, receiving the stern-fast from the Iuka and bringing it in over her bow. A new ten-inch manila hawser was led from the Sagamore’s quarter to the bow of the Falcon as a preventer. Over a special U-frame mounted on the stem of the Falcon were led twenty blowing-hoses. Of these twenty blowing- hoses, sixteen led to the eight pontoons (two to each), one to the control-room via the gun access hatch, one to the engine room via its hatch, one to the after fuel tank group via the engine-room hatch and one to the motor room via the after torpedo loading hatch. Heavy rope fenders were placed between the pairs of pontoons and over their ends. The Sagamore shackled her own wire towing hawser into the S-51’s main towing pendant and a nine-inch manila hawser to the preventer towing pendant. The Penobscot dragged the north and northwest buoys away to the westward. The Sagamore’s engine began to turn over and presently, at about four p.m., the S-51 tow was underway. The Iuka took position ahead of the Sagamore in a tandem tow. The Vestal took station ahead of the tow as guide vessel to lead the tow over the previously selected route. With the Vestal’s size, gyro compass, and excellent facilities for navigating, all that the towing vessels had to do was follow her.
The course was laid directly toward Point Judith where, at a distance of about eight miles from the scene of the wreck the sixty-foot depth curve was reached at about 7 p.m. Thereafter, endeavor was made to keep the tow inside of depths of sixty to ninety feet so that in case anything went wrong the work of the divers would not be so hard. The wind and sea being northeasterly the tow was kept going until to the westward of Point Judith where there was some lee. The tow was then stopped and the flood- valves of the port pontoon of the second pair were closed as this pontoon was barely awash. Further blowing of this pontoon was done by building up pressure in it until the relief valves (with which all pontoons were fitted) opened, at a pressure of five to ten pounds. This work was dangerous and took some time in the fading light but it was, as usual, accomplished. Monday, July 5, was being celebrated instead of Sunday, July 4. No people anywhere in the United States enjoyed the fireworks as much as did those of the S-51 salvage force as the tow proceeded at about three knots speed towards New York.
The tow passed through The Race at about 3130 a.m. on July 6, having been subjected to cross seas after passing Watch Hill. While the booming of the pontoons and grinding of the chains was clearly audible, close watch showed all pontoons keeping their normal height of flotation and the blowing-air pressure did not increase. The first difficult and dangerous passage (on account of currents and depths of 300 feet) had been made. The day was overcast and cloudy with some rain but the tow proceeded as planned, at such speed that at night, when to westward of Stratford Shoals, two or three wide sweeping circles were made to lose distance and gain time in order not to arrive at Execution Rock too early. It was deemed better to circle and so to keep the tow underway with everything in adjustment than to stop and invite difficulties with towing gear and blowing hoses.
The Mallard and Bagaduce remained at the scene of the wreck as “lightships” until the Falcon’s mooring buoys could be removed. The Lark got underway with the derrick lighteri United States in tow for New York. The Chewink was kept in company for possible emergencies.
Execution Rock to Man-of-YVar Rock. At about three a.m. on Wednesday, July 7, the navy yard pilot and the East River pilot arrived by tug from New York and came on board the Falcon for conference and for orders. The Iuka shifted her towing position from ahead of the Sagamore to the latter’s starboard side. A jury flagstaff was lashed upright to the A-frame of the S-51 and colors were hoisted on it at half mast. The colors of all vessels in company were displayed at half mast. The East River pilot, specially requested in order to take no possible chances with the tow in those waters, took his station on board the Sagamore and was formally placed in charge of the tow. The navy yard pilot remained on board the Falcon and was to take charge of the tow when it had passed under the Williamsburg bridge. The Vestal was relieved of her duty as guide vessel but, at her own urgent request, was allowed to precede the tow on its way to the yard. The two navy yard tugs took position off the quarters of the Falcon in readiness to come alongside later to assist the Falcon in swinging the stern of the tow in making the several large angled turns that had to be made.
The tow, in readiness for the final leg of the trip which included the passage of Hell Gate, passed Execution Rock at about 5 40 a.m. No difficulties of any kind were experienced; the tow made all the turns without any trouble; even an eddy at the southern exit from Hell Gate caused only a slight sheer which the Falcon broke at once.
After passing under Queensboro bridge and the southern end of Blackwell’s Island, the wide and deep water channel is along the Manhattan shore until below Ferry Reef when it slants over to the Long Island shore. Just before coming abreast of Man-of-War Rock it was noted on "board the Falcon that the Vestal bore a point or so on the starboard bow as she continued in the deepwater channel. Before the reason for this unlooked-for situation could be investigated the tow struck on Man-of-War Rock, at high water and at about 9:15 a.m.
The East River pilot later maintained that yachts and shipping anchored to the southward of Ferry Reef would have been side- swiped by the tow in making the turn to cross the river and he therefore was attempting to take the tow between Man-of-War Rock and Ferry Reef. While the latest available charts did not show a practicable channel for the draft of the tow, the Army engineers had widened and deepened it so that there was perfectly clear passage even for the S-51 tow. The pilot has yet satisfactorily to explain, however, why he carried the tow so far to the east side of the deep water channel that the small sheer, which he claims to have occurred, should have caused the wreck to strike.
In striking the rock, the chains of the second pair of pontoons carried away. The Sagamore parted both the bow towing pendants and the ten-inch manila line to the Falcon. By prompt, daring, and skillful handling of the Falcon she was kept secured to the wreck by the sternfast and with the blowing-hoses intact. The S-51 heading about S.S.E. before striking, was slewed by the ebb current to head about E.N.E. The goal, the navy yard, was in plain sight, but the S-51 was on the bottom again. It is not too much to say that all hands were stunned by the grounding, but, in the spirit that had already overcome every difficulty and conquered every set-back, they took a deep breath and might have said, “Well, here’s another job—let’s get at it!”
The "S-51” comes up again. Derrick lighters were forwarded from the Navy Yard and were used to take the strain on the chains of first one and then the other of the bow pair of pontoons. When a strain had been taken the toggle bars were unlocked and removed, the flood valves and vents of the pontoons were opened and the pontoons flooded down the pontoon chains until their tops were awash. The toggle bars were then inserted and secured. By this operation there was made available at the bow the full buoyancy of the bow pair of pontoons which previously (see above) had been practically in excess. The same operation was performed on the third pair of pontoons though the additional buoyancy to be gained was not very great. It was estimated that at high water the S-51 would float with perhaps fifteen tons buoyancy to spare at the bow.
The Army engineers of the New York district were prompt to offer assistance. They furnished the blue-prints showing the latest depth data and cut in the position of
the S-51 on the bottom so that it could readily be seen that it was essential to pull her off in the direction opposite to that she had upon the instant of striking.
All preparations having been made in advance, divers went down at low water slack (about 2:30 p.m.) to pass reeving lines under the hull in readiness for putting down the second pair of pontoons again, should it be found necessary to do so. The work of the divers here, as always, was a clear manifestation of their skill and their grit, as the working conditions were extremely bad; the reeving lines were passed.
In adjusting the third pair of pontoons, a wire strap parted and an officer and three men on top of the pontoons were in very great danger of being swept under the derrick lighter. Their thoughts were on the job and two of them stuck their thumbs in broken vent pipes until wooden plugs could be substituted, so that the pontoons might not sink and perhaps endanger the final success of the job. Can it be wondered that the S-51 was raised and delivered to her destination?
High water slack was due to take place about nine p.m. and, while not everything was as ready as could be desired, it was decided to make the attempt to get the S-51 afloat again. Only the sternfast was still secured to the wreck and this led over the bow of the Falcon, so two tugs were placed alongside her with their bows to her stern, and a line was led to her from the Sagamore anchored about in mid-channel.
At about 9115 p.m. the attempt was begun. The S-51 first slewed on the bottom and was so turned nearly to her heading at the time she struck, then the pull was taken on the opposite heading. A range of lights on shore was carefully watched; it appeared to open a little; it did open a little; it opened wide; the search lights showed the end links of the bow pontoon chains. The S-51 was afloat again.
Duty completed. The tow was taken, Falcon and S-51 both stern first, via the deepwater channel to the westward of Ferry Reef (as originally expected) across the river to the Long Island shore and under the Williamsburg Bridge. When the time came to make the turn into the Navy Yard basin, the ebb tide was running so strongly that the tow became almost unmanageable and was swept around and down stream until the heading was reversed. For long minutes there appeared to be no headway but eventually enough power was gradually brought into play to stem the current. The turn into the Navy Yard basin was made at last. There followed a good deal of maneuvering in order to place the S-51 where the Navy Yard wanted her and on a heading that would facilitate her entry into dry-dock early the next morning.
At last, about 11:30 p.m., Wednesday, July 7, 1925, the S-51 tow was made secure in her appointed berth, and the vessel was in “dockyard hands.” The job of the S-51 salvage force was finished.
Weather and sea conditions. The percentage of “diving days”—days when diving was practicable for any length of time— ran about fifty per cent through October to Friday, November 13, when a very heavy southeasterly gale set in and seemed to bring the “break of the weather,” as after that date the percentage fell off to about twenty- five and finally there came a spell of nine days without any diving being practicable. On November 30 occurred the experience of having the diver’s air lines freeze up and all diving was suspended. To the best of our information there were no further “diving days” until well on toward Christmas. Upon resuming the salvage operations late in April, the percentage of “diving days” went up to about seventy until the first eight days in June, during which there was only one diving day. After that period of bad weather, the percentage again rose to about seventy and remained practically the same until the job was finished.
While bad weather prevented diving operations, it by no means meant idleness for anyone. The opportunity was made use of to fuel, water and provision the vessels in readiness to remain continuously at the scene of the wreck. The divers were drilled and rehearsed on board the S-50, diving and salvage gear was overhauled, work went ahead on repairs to the machinery of the vessels of the force. In fact, every effort was made to prepare all vessels and all hands to continue the work as soon and as long as the weather and sea would permit. After trying the east and west sides of Block Is- 151
land as a bad weather rendezvous, use was finally made of the harbor of refuge at Point Judith, which served all purposes in excellent fashion, and was only about two miles further from the wreck than Block Island Harbor.
During the fall and winter operations of 1925 one of the pontoons was kept for some time secured to a buoy at the scene of the wreck. During the southeasterly gale on Friday, November 13, this pontoon broke adrift but was later found undamaged but high and dry on Horsehead Beach. The Sagamore was sent to salvage it and after a couple of days’ work succeeded in getting it afloat, chiefly by use of parbuckles to roll it down into the water.
Credit to whom credit is due. While this account of the salvage of the S-51 has none of the aspects of an official report, it is deemed fitting and just that service and other readers of the Proceedings should be told something about the personnel who carried through the work to its successful completion. Stated concisely, the salvage operation consisted of raising a water-logged submarine hulk from a depth of 130 feet in the open sea twelve miles eastward of Block Island and then towing it 145 miles to the Navy Yard, New York.
First, all hands gave their best and their utmost, day and night, in good weather and bad, in order that the work might progress with all practicable dispatch.
Second, the divers encountered the hazards of their work with unfailing readiness, with the greatest skill and frequently with the greatest intrepidity and daring; it is trite to say that the job could not have been done without them; it is true to say that none could have done more than they did.
Third, the commanding officer of the Falcon, Lieutenant Henry Hartley, whose seamanship was of the highest order, whose advice in all matters was invaluable, whose judgment was eminently sound, displayed a devotion to duty which was unceasing and a constant example to all hands.
Fourth, Lieutenant Commander Edward Ellsberg, Construction Corps, the salvage officer, was in direct personal charge of the actual salvage work and diving operations; his technical knowledge and resourcefulness were adequate for all of the innumerable set-backs and difficulties; he developed an improved underwater cutting torch, worked out the technique of handling the pontoons, learned to dive during the months the actual operations were suspended and actually went down on the wreck some three times during the spring operations; he was the embodiment of perseverance and determination.
Last, but by no means least, Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, Commandant of the Third Naval District, gave to all hands unfailing support, constant encouragement and an unceasing faith that were very real forces in carrying on with the work and were essential factors in its final successful completion. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy he saw fit to say:
The record established by these officers and men is a full and complete answer to any and every criticism of the service in general, involving lack of knowledge of their business, their skill, or their devotion to duty and willingness to risk their lives
These salvage operations were carried on under the most discouraging and physically exhausting conditions. These were met by steady and determined men who showed themselves examples of leadership and preparedness to seize every opportunity to carry on. In this way alone was a high state of morale maintained, and without it the task must have been abandoned. Nothing could have demonstrated the so-called Navy spirit more thoroughly and completely than the repeated return to the scene of operations, when driven away by the most unfavorable weather, and again taking up the task even when these conditions hardly warranted the attempt.
The Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Curtis D. Wilbur, sent this dispatch the day after the S-51 had been delivered at the Navy Yard, New York:
The Secretary desires to express his commendation of the most excellent work on the part of the personnel engaged in the task of salvaging the U.S.S. S-51. This work has been carried out with greatest skill and all possible dispatch notwithstanding its arduous and dangerous character. The great difficulties overcome and perils encountered in raising the ship from a depth of 132 feet in the open sea, and often under severe weather conditions, reflect great credit on the judgment, initiative and stamina of the officers and men of the forces engaged in the work. The undaunted persistence and unparalleled endurance of the divers merit very great praise.
It is desired, in closing this account, to leave in the minds of the readers the clear thought that the divers cannot be given too much praise.