Historical
Germany, as the world knew her in 1914, was a young nation. A review of her short history prior to 1914 throws some light on the evolution of her naval war plans and reveals several factors that influenced her naval strategy all the way down to the end of 1918.
In the middle of the nineteenth century Germany fought three victorious wars in rapid succession. These wars took place in 1864, 1866, and 1870. In 1864 the German Fleet was smaller than that of Denmark and was not used in this war. In 1866 the Austrian Fleet was engaged with the Italian Fleet and the German coasts and commerce were not endangered. In 1870, in view of the great superiority of the French Fleet, the German Navy was assigned a coast-defense role. Due to the swift and completely surprising German successes on land, the French did not have an opportunity to use their fleet.
These wars resulted in the consolidation of the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia. They were almost exclusively army affairs which affected the people very little and, as a result, the study of war was relegated more and more to the Army and the Navy.
Another result of these sharp and decisive conflicts was an unbounded confidence in the military leaders on the part of the nation as a whole and a tendency on the part of everyone to accept the decision of the General Staff as final whether or not this decision concerned army affairs.
The Navy of the German Empire came into existence after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The first Chief of the Admiralty was an army officer, General von Stoch, who remained in this position from 1872 until 1883. At this time France was considered the most probable enemy, and her Navy was greatly superior to that of Germany. General von Stoch assigned to the German Navy a role of coast defense, emphasizing, however, the necessity of offensive action as a necessary part of a defensive strategy.
General von Stoch was succeeded by General von Caprivi, who served from 1883 until 1888. Caprivi’s war plans, like those of von Stoch, favored an attack on the northern French coast before the French Fleet, which was based in the Mediterranean, could interfere. He estimated that it would take the French Fleet from 12 to 14 days to reach the Channel ports from the Mediterranean and the attack would be made before the fleet could arrive. The motive behind this plan, expressed in his own words, was:
The Navy must have a record of success in service—not mere heroism in going down gloriously—if it is to develop on a larger scale after the next war.
Thus it is shown that, during the first eighteen years of its existence, the German Navy was directed by army officers. What a profound influence these two army officers had upon the following war plans for the Navy can be realized only when the War Plan issued by the Kaiser in 1914 is read. In this order a coast defense role was assigned to the Navy.
In 1888 General von Caprivi was replaced by Vice Admiral Count von Monts, the first naval officer appointed as Chief of the Admiralty. Von Monts died early in 1889 and the Admiralty became a divided office with three heads. These were the High Command of the Navy, the Imperial Navy Office, and the Navy Council. Plans for operations were assigned by the High Command of the Navy, the first Chief being Commanding Admiral, Baron von der Glotz, who served in this office from 1889 until 1895. His successor was Admiral von Knorr, who served from 1895 until 1899. In 1899 the High Command was abolished and replaced by six officers known as the Admiral’s Staff. From 1899 until the outbreak of the World War, seven admirals succeeded each other as Chief of the Admiral’s Staff.
Plans for operations against England were studied for the first time in 1896. The original plan called for an immediate offensive. This plan was based upon the assumption that a raid could be carried out against the coast of England and the German Fleet could escape before the British Fleet, which at this time was based in the Mediterranean, could arrive. This plan was dropped in 1897 because the Chief of the Admiral’s Staff did not believe that England could be caught unawares and because the German Fleet had been weakened when vessels were detached for duty in the Orient at the establishing of Tsingtao.
In 1900, Admiral von Dietrich, Chief of Admiral’s Staff, demanded security for Borkum and the islands along western Holstein so that the French could not seize these islands and establish bases for blockading craft. This is the first time that a close blockade of the German North Sea ports is mentioned in the War Plans, but it made such a profound impression on the German naval officers that they regarded it as a likely step on the part of an enemy until 1915, almost a year after war was declared.
In a memorandum attached to the German Navy Bill of 1900, there appears the 39 following statement:
Even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have attained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.
This quotation forecasts the German strategy of the war; an inferior fleet aiming at attrition so to weaken the enemy as to destroy his position in the world.
In 1909 it was decided that, in case of war against France and Russia, England should always be reckoned as an enemy and plans prepared accordingly.
Each year the German Navy held exercises which simulated a war against France and England. The instructions for these operations were issued by the Chief of the Admiral’s Staff with the approval of the Kaiser. The instructions for these operations in 1905-8 called for concentrations in the Elbe as soon as possible, to inflict losses on the enemy blockading vessels by raids, and, above all, to avoid a battle. Battle was to be accepted only in case the enemy risked his ships by advancing within gun range of the shore batteries or if certain victory was guaranteed (1905) or after the Chief of the Admiral’s Staff had consented (1906-8). In the instructions for 1905-6-7 it was specifically stated that the date after which full freedom of action would be given to the Commander in Chief would be decided upon according to conditions of the situation as a whole.
In 1908, Vice Admiral Count Baudissin became Chief of the Admiral’s Staff. With the approval of the Kaiser, he changed the plan of operation to the offensive. The relative strength of the German and British navies in 1909 was 1—3.5. At the outbreak of the World War it was 1-2.5. Baudissin considered this necessary for the following reason:
The necessity for risking the Fleet was justified by the fact that England would cut us off from communication with the world by an advance on German waters or by closing the outlets to the North Sea and preventing our sea forces from going out. In both cases the situation could not be changed without risking the Fleet and, inasmuch as time plays against us, involving a long interruption of communication with the world, sapping the resources of the nation in general, it was necessary to be on the offensive at once.
In 1909 Baudissin was relieved by Admiral von Fischel, who remained in office until 1911. Fischel retained Baudissin’s offensive plan.
At this time the Kiel Canal was not completed and the vital question of assembling the Fleet in the North Sea or in the Baltic came up for discussion. In arguing for the North Sea, Admiral von Tirpitz said:
In the first place, we obtain a chance to fight a battle not far from Heligoland. This chance is psychologically determined by the pressure of the English Admiralty and the English Government to fight a battle, by all means, as soon as possible.
This is the first time, but by no means the last, that the assumption that the British would attack immediately is accepted as a fact.
In 1911 a meeting was held at which the first attempt was made to effect a joint plan of operations for the Army and the Navy. The naval officers suggested that the Navy be given the mission of preventing the British Army from reaching France. General von Moltke, Chief of the General’s Staff, stated that he considered it desirable to have them come to the mainland. He also made it clear that he considered it best for the land and sea forces to operate independently of each other. He said that the most effective support the Navy could give to the general conduct of the war would be to damage England at sea to the extent commensurate to Germany’s forces.
From von Moltke’s statement it can be seen that the Chief of the German General Staff considered the British Expeditionary Force a negligible quantity, but later events showed that this force was composed of almost exactly the same number of troops as the German Force which was withdrawn from the Western Front and sent into East Prussia—a circumstance that was of the greatest importance in the outcome of the Battle of the Marne.
In 1911 Vice Admiral von Heeringen became Chief of the Admiral’s Staff and held this office until 1915.
In 1912, Baudissin’s offensive plan was changed to a defensive one. The orders issued for the exercises of that year were issued to the Commander in Chief in dispatch form. They read:
Damage enemy transports from—to—preferably by U-boats and mines. Do not engage major forces without orders.
In the winter of 1913-14, a war game was played in which the German Fleet, immediately after the beginning of the war, undertook a raid on the Firth of Forth. On its return, it was engaged by superior enemy forces. Submarines were used with the Fleet in this war game for the first time. At the subsequent critique, the Commander of the “English” side stated:
In view of the efficiency of the German submarines, the Firth of Forth can no longer be considered a suitable point of support. Under present conditions, it would be better to establish one considerably farther north, somewhere in the neighborhood of Scapa Flow.
The general conclusions drawn from this war game were, in part:
With our present relative strength, the offensive should not be pushed so far as was done in the war game. For the present we shall have to be content with employing only our U-boats and mine-layers for distant offensives extending to the enemy’s bases, but soon we shall use our major forces in a persistent and energetic campaign against the enemy ships patrolling German waters. Thus, we must constantly push the enemy blockading line farther out, because we thereby compel the enemy to engage more and more ships on a distant, naturally weak and easily broken line, and we thus prevent him from observing our bases and concentration areas and render difficult any raid by his submarine and light surface craft.
The order issued by the Kaiser on July 30, 1914, stated:
- The aim of the operations should be to inflict losses on the English Fleet by raids on the patrols or the forces blockading German waters as well as by unrestrained mine laying operations and, if possible, submarine offensive carried on on the British coast.
- After the forces have been equalized by such warfare, and after the necessary preparations and organization have been effected, an effort should be made to engage our Fleet in battle under favorable conditions. Should a favorable opportunity for battle arise earlier, advantage should be taken of it.
A third paragraph concerned the war on commerce.
Before proceeding, the assumptions in the original German Estimate of the Situation should be examined and their source traced. This is done with the view of showing the danger of giving too much weight to an assumption in an estimate.
In 1900, von Dietrich first spoke of a close blockade around the German North Sea ports. At this time France was considered the most probable enemy but the assumption was carried on when England was considered. This assumption again appears as a fact in the orders issued to the fleet at the outbreak of the war.
Major General Maurice of the British Army says: “The master of any art is he who adapts most skillfully new methods to established principles.”
What the Germans failed to see was that new inventions and improvements in the weapons of naval warfare enabled the British to blockade their ports from Scapa Flow just as effectively as they could have done with a close blockade in 1900. The improvements in aircraft, the submarine, the mine, and the radio-direction finder had all contributed to this change.
Another assumption was that the British would carry out an early offensive. This belief caused the fortifying of the North Sea islands, the destruction of navigational aids, the destruction of vast rows of houses in Cuxhaven to open up a line of fire against an enemy seeking to penetrate the Elbe, and the heavy mine fields in the river mouths behind which the German Fleet waited with darkened ships and loaded guns for the British Fleet to appear. This was in accordance with the teachings of Clausewitz: “When two armies oppose each other, the stronger will immediately assume the offensive in order to hold the initiative.”
The British concept of “pursuit of the enemy until he is found” and the “shifting of our own frontiers to the enemy coast,” as a result of the battles of the Nile, Trafalgar, and the English-Dutch wars, were other reasons that led the Germans to believe that the British would assume an early offensive. What they failed to see was:
(1) The destruction of the French Fleet in Aboukir Bay disrupted their vital line of communication and thus caused the collapse of Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign.
(2) The Dutch Navy was based directly on the British lines of communication and the offensive against this force to destroy or contain it was the only way in which the British could protect these lines.
(3) The strategy of the Campaign of Trafalgar was defensive while the naval tactics were offensive. The mission of the British Navy was to protect England from invasion by the armies of Napoleon.
In closing the historical period it should be noted that there was no joint plan between the Army and the Navy and, apparently, the diplomatic policy of Germany exerted no influence in shaping the plans of operation of the High Seas Fleet. The Imperial Chancellor was informed of the Naval Plan in 1913 and at the outbreak of the World War. In both cases he merely acknowledged receipt of these plans. Whether or not he would also have been in accord if the plan of operation provided for an immediate engagement of the Fleet must remain an open question.
In August, 1914, the Imperial Chancellor said that the Fleet should be preserved as a means of diplomatic pressure even to the end of the war.
To what extent this idea influenced the decision concerning the use of the Fleet is unknown.
1914
The Schlieffen Plan which covered the operations of the German Army at the outbreak of the World War called for the defeat of France, then Russia, before the sea power of the Allies could be brought to bear against Germany. A similar plan had smashed France in 1870 when the French Navy was greatly superior to that of Germany.
The Admiral’s Staff copied their plan after that of the Army. The Naval Plan called for the major forces in the west and only a small force against Russia in the Baltic, this force to be strengthened from time to time as conditions demanded.
It soon became apparent that England did not intend to establish a blockade but only a submarine coastal patrol. Until the end of September no large enemy ship had been sunk. Submarines and mines had gained some success but this had not gone far towards accomplishing the equality of forces called for in the Kaiser’s Order of July 30, 1914.
In September, the Commander in Chief, Admiral von Ingenhol, planned a dash into the Skagerrak with the battle cruisers to capture enemy cruisers believed to be there. Capital ships were to go as far as Horn’s Reef in order to cover the return of the battle cruisers.
When von Ingenhol’s plan arrived in the Admiralty, the Kaiser asked von Tirpitz to express his views on an offensive use of the Fleet. On September 17, von Tirpitz replied in writing:
For the time being we must postpone battle until Turkey has finally struck her first blow and until the main decision has been reached on the Western Front.
Turkey entered the war in October. The main decision did not come until 1918.
In his reply to von Ingenhol, the Chief of the Admiral’s Staff, von Heeringen, disapproved the plan saying that an advance to such remote meeting point might lead to a battle under unfavorable conditions.
The events of the first six weeks of the war convinced the Commander in Chief that the conduct of the war had to be changed. At the end of September he suggested that he be given permission to take the entire Fleet outside of German waters even if this involved risk of clashing with superior enemy forces. He also called attention to the disadvantage resulting from blocking the Belts and proposed that they be reopened. These proposals were refused.
It is interesting to note that after the Battle of the Marne, when the race to the sea had begun, the Army Command, for the first time, asked that submarines be sent against the British troop transports. Other circumstances pointed to a change to the offensive: the abandonment of the hope to occupy the French Channel ports; the intention to have von Spee’s squadron come home; and, later, the information that two battle cruisers had been in the Falklands, thus weakening the British Fleet. Another thing in their favor, but not known by the Germans at this time, was that the battleship ratio, upon which they counted so much, was at this time nearer equal than at any other time during the war. Due to the loss of one battleship and the unavailability of five others for repairs, the British could throw only 22 battleships against Germany’s 19.
On October 1 the Commander in Chief received orders to avoid action that would lead to appreciable losses, that the Fleet was not to be exposed to engaging in battle with superior forces, that the moment for engaging the entire Fleet had not yet come. Limited warfare with submarines, torpedo boats, and mines was to be encouraged, but even these craft should be carefully preserved so that they would not be lacking after the occupation of the Franco-Belgian coast. Opportunities to do damage to the enemy were to be utilized, but in so doing considerable losses were to be avoided. Raids into the North Sea with the battle cruisers were permitted. The reason given for this restricted use of the Fleet was that it released a large number of troops which would otherwise be needed for coast defense and the influence it exerted on neutrals.
The battle cruisers were sent out in November and December to bombard the British coast in the hope that the British would thus be induced to send her fighting Fleet or part of it into the southern part of the North Sea and thus expose it to submarines and mines.
It should be noted that these raids had no strategical relationship with what had developed ashore earlier in the year.
On both occasions the High Seas Fleet accompanied the battle cruisers about half way.
At the end of October the Audacious was sunk.
The failure of the Army to seize the French and Belgian Channel ports caused the Admiralty to change the orders to the Commander in Chief. The new orders arrived in January, 1915.
Admiral Groos, Imperial German Navy (Retired), states:
It should have been appreciated that after the foundering of the first German offensive on land we were confronted with a prolonged war in which material would play a hitherto unsuspected part, therefore also the importation of supplies, and therefore naval supremacy.
1915
In January, 1915, the following instructions were issued to the Commander in Chief:
The Commander of the High Seas Fleet is authorized to undertake, at his own discretion, more frequent raids in the North Sea with the object 43 to cut off advanced enemy forces and to attack them with superior forces. In doing so, he is to avoid, as far as possible, encountering superior enemy forces as, in view of the existing general situation, in which the High Seas Fleet has such important significance as a diplomatic instrument in the hands of the Commander in Chief, a sea battle with unfavorable results would have an unfortunate influence. Any plans for more extensive raids on the enemy coast should be previously reported to His Majesty, the Kaiser.
The first of these authorized raids resulted in the Battle of the Dogger Bank and the loss of the Blücher. As a result, both the Chief of the Admiral’s Staff and the Commander in Chief of the High Seas Fleet were relieved. Admiral Bachmann relieved von Heeringen as Chief of the Admiral’s Staff and Admiral von Pohl relieved von Ingenhol as Commander in Chief. By order of the Kaiser, Bachmann submitted, on March 1, 1915, a memorandum concerning the conduct of sea warfare. It said, in part:
The engagement of our Fleet under conditions that must lead to the danger of being essentially destroyed is not, in my opinion, justified in view of the unfavorable influence that it must have on neutrals, because there would no longer be any guarantee for the security of the German coast and the Navy would cease to act as a diplomatic instrument. The supposition that, even after a decisive victory over us, the English Navy would cease to consider itself as the first in the world, should not, in my opinion, receive as much consideration as the glaring fact of the annihilation of our fighting power at sea. The present overwhelming superiority of the English Navy and the vast resources of England will render possible the restoration of her superiority over the next largest navy in question in a relatively short time, while we shall require years before we can again have any navy worthy of the name. This general viewpoint, however, does not exclude the raids allowed by your Majesty as advocated by the former Chief of the Admiral’s Staff.
In this memorandum the words “there would be no longer any guarantee for the security of the German coast” shows that the coast-defense role was still considered proper for the German Navy. As a matter of fact the possibility of invasion had disappeared after May, 1915. Everyman that the British could spare from the Western Front was at the Dardanelles and the Russians were too busy in Galicia to consider an overseas expedition.
The new Commander in Chief carried out seven raids in 1915 with the entire Fleet. Nothing but submarines was sighted. In these raids the Main Body did not go farther than 120 miles from Helgoland and only that distance when air scouting was possible.
It was in this year that English mines were discovered for the first time off the entrances to the German North Sea ports. As soon as the mine fields were discovered, von Pohl, like his predecessor, recommended that the Belts be opened so that the Fleet would have two routes for returning to its base. This request was refused.
Cruiser Warfare on Commerce
While the cruiser warfare was not completely ended in 1915, by the end of that year the seas had been practically cleared of German commerce raiders and the cruiser warfare will be discussed briefly here.
The fact that the Allied cruisers were able to concentrate their efforts undisturbed on the chase of the German cruisers was due solely to the protection accorded from the distance by the British Fleet in the North Sea and the French Fleet in the Mediterranean. Only once was this control seriously challenged and that was at Coronel. In their operations, the Germans neglected to establish the necessary reciprocal action between the organized force in their home waters and the forces on foreign stations.
The best way to show the results of this failure is by figures. From August 1, 1914, until December 31, 1915, the Allies lost 178 vessels with a total tonnage of 488,645. In the same period, the Central Powers lost 313 vessels, the total tonnage being 906,101 tons. This figure does not include the vessels interned or blockaded. When these are considered, the total loss for the Central Powers was 724 vessels, the tonnage being 2,873,533 tons. From these figures it can be seen that the Central Powers lost four times as many vessels and six times as much tonnage as was lost by the Allies. This illustrates the principle that, “Only the belligerent who controls the sea is able to dominate the overseas communications.”
1916
In January, 1916, Admiral von Pohl died and Admiral Reinhard Scheer became Commander in Chief. Scheer drew up a program of operations which was approved by the Kaiser when he visited the Fleet in February. It provided:
- Basic Principle. Present relations of strength forbid us to seek a decisive battle at once with the whole English Navy. Our submarine operations must prevent the enemy from forcing such battle upon us.
- Conclusion. By persistent systematic provocation we must eventually force the enemy to advance some fighting forces against us from his present waiting position, which would give us favorable opportunity for attack; on the other hand, we must prevent the enemy from getting such feeling of superiority as not to hesitate to force us to fight at his pleasure. The extensive areas of attack offered by the enemy give us the advantage of always being able to be on the offensive with our inferior forces.
This change of policy resulted in the Battle of Jutland. After this battle, raids were planned and executed, always with air scouting. Scheer was forbidden to go out when air scouting was impossible.
In 1916 unrestricted U-boat warfare was suspended at the request of the Chancellor but permission was not given to assume the offensive with the U-boats acting in conjunction with the Fleet.
1917
The policy drawn up by Admiral Scheer remained in force until May, 1917. At this time the Kaiser replied regarding a proposed raid:
I shall accept your recommendation of the enterprise on condition that the Chief of the High Seas Fleet retain well enough in hand the choice of causing a timely cessation, so as to be sure of obviating a battle against superior forces under conditions tactically and strategically unfavorable. Such a decisive engagement of my fleet is reserved to my own orders, to be determined by the general war situation.
Thus the engagement of the Fleet was again made subject to the decision of the Admiralty. Two reasons were given for this decision: (1) The British superiority in capital ships was 2-1, (48-24), and the entry of the United States into the war would probably augment this; (2) the Germans had high hopes for the success of the unrestricted U-boat warfare.
1918
In July, 1918, Scheer became Chief of the Admiral’s Staff and Hipper was appointed Commander in Chief. The order issued by the Kaiser in May, 1917, remained in effect and there was no change in the employment of the Fleet.
In October, 1918, Hipper received orders to engage in battle. This order was not executed due to the mutinies on October 29, 1918.
Submarine Warfare
The submarine warfare on the part of the Germans had been neither foreseen in time of peace nor prepared for. The German submarines had been designed for employment on the high seas and had a relatively higher cruising radius than those of other nations in 1914. Groos states:
The German naval officers were fully aware, as were all others, that history has repeatedly shown that commerce warfare, when conducted to the exclusion of all others, results in inevitable failure.
If this is true, why did not the German naval officers present this idea to the Chancellor? Either they did not realize it at the time or the Army overrode the suggestion.
The failure of the submarine as well as the cruiser warfare was due to the violation of a well-known principle that:
A headlong offensive with a specialized type of vessel is sure to fail if it is met by a counter defensive backed up with capital ships. The reason for this is simply that the principle of the offensive in the situation is falsely given a higher valuation than the principle of superiority.
Conclusions
All wars have been conducted with a definite aim in view. There has always been some goal which can be reached only by overcoming the resistance of another. For this reason the Principle of the Objective is always placed first in importance when the Principles of War are listed. The outstanding flaw in the German naval strategy in the World War was the failure to realize the proper objective.
Considered geographically, Germany’s position at the outbreak of the World War left much to be desired. Outside of the Homeland there was but one real naval base—Tsingtao—and this base was so far away that it was of no value to the High Seas Fleet, could not be supported, and was doomed to an early destruction after Japan entered the war.
Germany had two outlets to the Atlantic. One was from Norway north of Great Britain and the other through the English Channel. Both were flanked by Great Britain.
There were two sea entrances to Germany, one east and one west of Denmark. To better her strategic position, the Kiel Canal had been rushed to completion so that the Fleet could move against an enemy in the North Sea or in the Baltic without going around Denmark. At the outbreak of the World War the German diplomats succeeded in having Denmark close the Belts and the Sound with mines. While this gave the Germans a large area protected by mines in which to hold target practices and drills, it closed one of the two lines of retreat open to the High Seas Fleet if superior enemy forces were encountered. It has been noted that both von Ingenhol and von Pohl requested that these mines be removed and both were refused.
From the standpoint of international law, the blocking of the Belts with mines had no legal foundation. Passage through the Belts and Sound had to be accorded to belligerent warships. Denmark and Sweden, as neutrals, had only the right and duty to prevent these waters from being used as bases. The mining of the Belts by Denmark could have been contested by England. So far as is known, no such thing happened, obviously because England could not see in this blockade any disadvantage to her war operations.
Both sides used mines freely during the World War and this war has shown that a mine field is not a serious obstacle to a resolute enemy.
Hall King, an English writer, defines the mission of the Navy in war as follows:
It is the business of the navy in war to so operate that a situation is created in which we are able and our enemy is not able to use the sea for transport purposes.
In the position which it occupied in 1914, the German Navy was of no strategic value unless coast defense be considered. From its bases it flanked the most important lines of communication leading to Russia, but Germany’s lines of communication were both controlled by the British Fleet. The Fleet offered no protection to the German arteries of commerce nor did it defend any position which the British wished to seize. It is interesting to note the course of action which the British expected the Germans to follow. Prior to and during the early stages of the war the British plainly showed nervousness over the annual Norwegian cruises of the German Fleet. A base in Norway for the German Navy would have afforded real protection for the commerce lane north of Scotland. Apparently the Germans never considered establishing a base there, and after the war started the German Navy received orders to avoid carefully anything which might violate Norwegian neutrality. This for the Navy while the Army was quickly given permission to violate Belgian neutrality.
The British also realized that Germany could better her strategic position by seizing a base on the English Channel. After the Battle of Mons the British Grand Fleet was directed to give up the position at Scapa Flow in case the Germans gained a footing in Calais and to move farther to the southward. If this had happened, then not only would the British blockade of German commerce and the protection of their own by means of blocking the waters north of Scotland have lost its firm control but more especially the eagerly desired aim of the German naval command that the British Fleet be exposed to the attacks of German naval forces would have been realized. The only real threat to British strategic superiority, the loss of Cherbourg and Brest, was dispelled after the Battle of the Marne.
From the beginning of the war the position of the British Fleet in northern Scotland dominated the sea lanes. The position of the German Fleet in the Bight dominated nothing of real importance.
In order to gain or maintain control of the sea, the enemy fleet should be the objective. The British realized that so long as the Germans held their fleet in the North Sea, control of the sea was in British hands and it was not necessary to seek battle as the Germans expected them to do. It was only by shifting their fleet to a position where it threatened the British vital lines of communication that the Germans could have forced the British to fight. Groos says:
Both the Army and the Navy recognized only one goal, that of seeking battle with the main forces of the enemy on land or at sea, independently of each other, without considering by what means one service could and must assist the other in this task. Neither recognized the importance to the combined conduct of war of concerted action against the Channel position and for this reason it was never made the subject of operative deliberations.
In naval warfare, the ultimate aim is control of sea communications in order to further the war in its larger aspects. This control can be attained either by destroying or nullifying the enemy’s sea forces.
Great Britain apparently realized that, so long as Germany continued to tie her fleet to fortified bases, its power for controlling the sea was nullified and the desired result was being attained without risking the fleet.
There are many reasons for this failure on the part of Germany. It has been pointed out that the study of war had been confined to the army and naval officers, with the Army casting the deciding vote. Decisions involving strategy were sidestepped by the statesmen and left to the Chief of the General Staff for decision. When, and only when, the Army had reached a deadlock or desired a breathing spell, they called on the Navy for assistance. It was the Army that asked for the unrestricted U-boat warfare when the war on the Western Front had reached a deadlock in 1914 and it was von Hindenburg who cast the deciding vote for unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1918 when he wanted an opportunity to prepare his armies for the last big drive.
The original coast-defense role assigned the Navy was purely an army idea for protecting the flank. History has repeatedly shown that this is not the proper mission for the Navy.
The use of the fleet was never ordered by the High Command until it was too late. During the greater part of the war it was forbidden. The orders sent to the Commander in Chief always stressed the importance of preserving the fleet. They demanded results without risk. In October, 1914, they demanded results without any considerable loss, a demand impossible to comply with and contrary to all experience. If the offensive was considered possible in 1909-12, it was also possible in 1914. If the orders for offensive of 1909-12 had been retained, no objection would have been raised against them. Once the idea was launched about equalization of forces, the engagement of the fleet only under favorable conditions, and the preservation of the fleet as a means of diplomatic pressure, the task became difficult and, as evident from results, no success could be attained in due time in the efforts to have a different conception prevail at headquarters.
Von Tirpitz said: “The goal of our entire military and administrative procedure in the past twenty years has been the battle.”
This seems to be as far as the German naval officers had gone in 1914. They had built a navy that was second only to that of England and, when the war broke out, they did not know what to do with it. When the Navy accepted the coast-defense role the officers showed that they knew little about the strategical lessons of history. Lieutenant Commander Grassmann, I.G.N. (Retired), in his essay “The Nature of Naval Strategy” says:
A remark frequently heard in the officers’ mess: Naval strategy? There is no such thing. We simply put out to sea until we encounter the enemy at some point which we cannot determine and then fight.
From the activities of Admiral von Tirpitz in developing and training the German High Seas Fleet one of the lasting lessons of the World War can be drawn. It is:
That it lies in the very nature of naval warfare to overestimate the technical forces to the detriment of others which are no less vital to success.
From the beginning the German Navy was imbued with a sense of inferiority which forbade them to plan offensively except from 1909 until 1912. One of the things that helped to keep this feeling alive was the game board where, post-war writers state, the side with the greatest number of capital ships was always victorious. After the sinking of the Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue had shown how vulnerable the older British ships were to submarine torpedo attacks, the number of capital ships was not the true ratio of the opposing fleets’ strength. However, the German Fleet was not given permission to operate offensively with the submarines until it was too late.
Another flaw in the German strategy was the lack of co-operation between the statesmen and the military and naval leaders. One writer has pictured the Kaiser as a man who liked to parade as a war lord in times of peace but who side-stepped every possible decision in war. It is interesting to note that Scheer, the only Commander in Chief whose plan was approved by the Kaiser, was the only one who presented his plan personally to the Kaiser.
The nature of a war must be considered carefully from all angles and due consideration given to the views of all concerned. Then the plans should be prepared accordingly. In Germany this was not done. The Army decided upon the plan to be followed, allowing the others to fit in as best they could.
To say whether this was due primarily to the confidence which Germany had in her military leaders, the weakness of the High Command, or a lack of strategical knowledge on the part of the naval officers would be mere guesswork.
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We may safely coin for ourselves the strategic aphorism, that in naval war the fleet itself is the key position of the whole. Pertinent to this it may be noted that the Japanese in the recent war began by landing much of the supplies of the fleet at their protected permanent base in the Elliott Islands, but later, as an administrative expedient, found it better to keep a large part afloat. That which is afloat can be kept in vessels capable of accompanying the fleet, which thus carries its base with it, and so can occupy a convenient harbor, though unfortified, its own strength affording for the moment the necessary protection.—Mahan, Strategy.