Late in the afternoon of April 22, 1846, the smart new sloop of war Portsmouth, 20 guns and the finest vessel of her class in the United States Navy, dropped anchor off the town of Monterey on the coast of Upper California, then a department of the Mexican Republic. Her commanding officer, Commander John Berrien Montgomery, was a general favorite, both in and out of the service. He was nearly 52 years of age, pleasant in manner, intelligent, and often described as “officer-like” in appearance. As a young midshipman he had served in the Battle of Lake Erie, receiving for his services in this engagement a sword from the government. His fellow officers and crew held him in great respect, both for his professional ability and his moral qualities. A devout Episcopalian, he personally conducted divine service on board his ship each Sunday morning.
On April 1 the Portsmouth, as part of the United States squadron in the Pacific, had been lying in the open roadstead at Mazatlan when an appeal had arrived from Thomas O. Larkin, American Consul at Monterey, urging that a war vessel be sent to the latter port at once. Larkin’s note brought the news that Captain John C. Frémont, an officer of the United States Army Topographical Bureau, who was conducting an exploring expedition through California without a passport, had, early in March, been ordered by the Mexican authorities to leave the province at once. Frémont flatly declined to go and fortified himself on the top of Gavilan Peak, some 30 miles from Monterey. It looked for a time as if blood would be shed and, fearing attacks and reprisals upon American settlers, Larkin had penned his urgent appeal to the naval authorities.
Commodore John D. Sloat, commanding the squadron, immediately dispatched the Portsmouth to the rescue, her commander under instructions to remain on the California coast until fall or longer in order to afford protection to the persons and property of United States citizens. Leaving Mazatlan on April 2, the vessel made a remarkably fast voyage of 21 days to Monterey, but long before she sailed the crisis which had called her had passed. The impetuous Frémont had quietly decamped from his position on the night of March 10, and on April 22 was far up the Sacramento Valley on his way to Oregon.
Nevertheless, Larkin was pleased to see the Portsmouth. “The people here are astonished,” he wrote, “at the appearance of this vessel in 42 days, to look into the business, which astonishment I am glad to see.”
More important to the history of California than the impression made upon the citizenry of Monterey or the pleasurable sensations of Consul Larkin, however, were the consequences of the spread of the news brought by the Portsmouth. Larkin learned that just before the vessel had sailed from Mazatlan, the Mexican officials there had received very late reports and in consequence had moved themselves and all the archives to Rosario, and published in the streets that Sloat would in all probability declare a state of blockade the next day. Furthermore, the commander of the Portsmouth was of the opinion that Sloat might, by the next mail, have received a declaration of war on the part of the United States against Mexico, in which case the Commodore could be expected any day in Monterey to raise the American flag over California.
No sooner was Larkin apprised of these rumors than he began to spread them as widely and as quickly as possible. Only 5 days before, Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the Marine Corps, posing as an invalid but known to almost everyone as a United States government agent, had landed at Monterey from a war vessel and after 2 days of consultation with Larkin had set out on the trail of Frémont. On April 23, the Consul sent a courier after Gillespie to inform him of the international developments revealed by the Portsmouth's news. At the same time he wrote to William A. Leidesdorff, the American Vice-Counsul at Yerba Buena, or San Francisco, as it was later called. “In all likelihood the States have declared war against Mexico,” Larkin rashly declared to this official, who was not renowned for his tact in handling delicate situations.
Flying by a swift rider, the news overtook Gillespie at Leidesdorff’s house at Yerba Buena on April 25. “Glorious news for Captain Freemont [sic],” was the Vice-Consul’s immediate reaction. “I think I see him smile,” he wrote back to Larkin. That same day Gillespie pushed on after Frémont. The news he bore, with its portent of imminent hostilities, must have influenced that officer in his determination to return to California to “await developments.”
Meanwhile, Larkin had been peddling the reports from Mexico about the streets of Monterey. He enjoyed stating to prominent individuals, such as José Castro, Comandante General of California, and Mariano Guadalupe Vallejo, Commander of the Northern Frontier, that, in his opinion, the United States flag might fly over the town in 30 days.
The effect of this type of conversation upon the Californians might have been foreseen. Hardly yet recovered from the excitement caused by Frémont’s stand at Gavilan, they were again aroused by the renewed rumors of hostilities. Commander Montgomery was not long in hearing that Comandante General Castro suspected him of being in collusion with Frémont, supposing that Montgomery had sent for the Pathfinder to return to Monterey. As time went on, however, and it became evident that Commander Montgomery did not intend to take possession of the port, the tension gradually wore off until, a month later, Larkin was able to describe affairs in the town as “now fair to prime,” and the Portsmouth’s officers and the local residents were exchanging invitations to picnics and balls.
But not all the time of the officers was spent in pleasurable pursuits. Important in motivating their future actions were the impressions of the political state of the country gathered during their stay at Monterey. Two of their number returned to the ship after a long ride into the interior with glowing accounts of the fertility of the country through which they had traveled. They reported that many of the inhabitants had expressed “openly their desire for and expectation of a change of government which shall unite them to the United States.” The general opinion of the officers seems to have been that the Mexican rule in California was inefficient and irksome to the populace, that the great resources of the province were not being put to good use, and that a more progressive people must soon take control.
As early as April 27, it was planned to have the Portsmouth visit San Francisco, but Commodore Stockton, in the Congress, was daily expected at Monterey, and Montgomery was loath to leave without meeting him. Thus the departure of the Portsmouth was put off from day to day, until hope of Stockton’s arrival was despaired of. Finally, on May 24, Larkin told Leidesdorff that he “presumed” the Portsmouth would leave Monterey on June 1 for San Francisco.
Late at night on May 31, Samuel Neal, a messenger from Frémont and Gillespie, rode up to Larkin’s door and handed the Consul a packet of letters. The news he bore was important—Frémont had returned to the Sacramento Valley after being overtaken by Gillespie and was planning to return to the United States from there. Gillespie was to leave Frémont’s camp at once for Yerba Buena to secure supplies for the exhausted exploring party.
The Consul at once replied, wishing Frémont a “speedy, safe, and pleasant journey to our Capital.” The next morning Neal was sent on board the Portsmouth with Larkin’s letters, and at 11:25 a. m. the ship got under way for San Francisco.
At nightfall the next day, the Portsmouth was off the Golden Gate, but did not enter the harbor until the next morning, when she came to anchor at Sausalito. In the afternoon, Neal was landed on the northern shore of the bay and rode away for Frémont’s camp. With him went a letter from Montgomery which clearly revealed the Commander’s “sincere desire and readiness to serve you in any manner consistent with other duties.”
On the morning of June 7, Gillespie reached Sausalito and at once went on board the Portsmouth, presenting to Montgomery a requisition from Captain Frémont for stores to be supplied to the explorer from “our Squadron.” The Pathfinder represented his party as being “almost entirely destitute,” and said that the “unfriendly disposition” of the California government and the “exorbitant prices” charged in the country made it necessary to secure provisions from a naval vessel. The receipt of these stores, wrote Frémont, would “very much expedite my return to the States.” In addition, Gillespie asked for $1,500 to enable the Pathfinder to purchase more horses for the eastward journey.
In view of the circumstances, as painted by Frémont and Gillespie, Montgomery felt that his duty, the public interests, and the necessities of his fellow citizens required compliance with the request. He at once ordered the needed funds and stores to be made ready for forwarding to Frémont’s camp.
During the few days required to get the provisions together, Gillespie seems to have made his headquarters at the Vice-Consulate at Yerba Buena. From that place on the night of June 7, the Lieutenant wrote to Larkin explaining his trip to the bay saying,
Captain Frémont’s party being very much in want of supplies before starting for home, and he being very desirous not to give the authorities of the country any cause to complain of his traveling to the sea coast, induced me to come to this place to make a purchase of them for him.
This was an extremely peculiar statement in the light of the fact that upon that very day, or within three days afterward, Gillespie told Montgomery that the Pathfinder was intending to proceed south as far as Santa Barbara before striking across the country for the United States and thus desired the presence of a war vessel at that port during his sojourn in the vicinity. It is evident that Frémont, once well supplied with provisions and munitions, had no compunctions about stirring up the California authorities by a visit to the seacoast!
On the tenth, Montgomery wrote to Frémont announcing his “gratification” at being able to forward the whole of the funds and the larger amount of the stores requested. He declared:
Now Sir I am happy to say that I feel myself at liberty to visit any or all ports upon this coast should the public interests require it & if on receipt [sic] of this you shall still think that the presence of a Ship of War at Santa Barbara may prove serviceable to you in carrying out the views of our Government & will. . . communicate your wishes with information as to the time you will probably reach that part of the coast I will not fail (Providence permitting) to meet you there with the Portsmouth.
The next morning the ship’s launch with 13 men under Acting Lieutenant B. F. Hunter set out on its 100-mile voyage up the bay and the Sacramento River to Sutter’s embarcadero, the site of the present city of Sacramento and the appointed place of rendezvous with Frémont. In the boat were Gillespie, Purser James H. Watmough, and Assistant Surgeon Duvall, the latter gentleman having volunteered to go to the camp to arrange Frémont’s medicine chest, and to “render any assistance in his power.” Besides passengers, the launch carried provisions for ten days and the stores for the exploring party. These last included, besides such things as flour, pork, soap, tobacco, candles, flannel shirts, stockings and canvas, a supply of munitions. Four thousand percussion caps (only half the amount Frémont had requested) and 50 pounds of lead were all Montgomery could spare.
The launch reached the rendezvous at midnight on the 12th but, as Frémont was not there, continued up the American River in search of the camp. A junction was made with the Pathfinder shortly afterwards, and the stores were delivered. On the 17th the boat began its return journey, but before it reached its mother ship, much had happened on board the Portsmouth.
On Sunday morning, June 14, Lazarus Everhart, an American resident of Monterey, visited the ship with a note from Gillespie, whom he had met on the Sacramento on the 11th. The letter informed Montgomery that a party of 12 American settlers had seized a band of some 200 horses belonging to the Mexican government. The escort of the mounts, 12 Californian soldiers under a lieutenant, were allowed to retain their arms and were given two horses each to speed them on their way. With them went a message to Comandante Castro, warning him that the foreigners had received intelligence of that officer’s sinister designs, of his plans to destroy the settlers or to drive them from the country, and of his having incited the Indians to burn the wheat in the Sacramento Valley.
This was Montgomery’s first knowledge of the seizure of Arce’s horses by the settlers under Merritt on the Cosumnes River on the morning of June 10. The report was accurate in many particulars, except that it neglected to say that the raiders had started from Frémont’s camp.
On Monday morning, June 15, still more startling information was received. José de la Rosa, a Mexican employee of M. G. Vallejo at Sonoma, came on board and unfolded his remarkable story:
At five o’clock in the morning of the preceding day a party of about 80 men under Merritt arrived at Sonoma and took forcible possession of the place, making prisoners of General M. G. Vallejo, Captain Salvador Vallejo, and Lieutenant Colonel Victor Prudon, all officers in the Mexican Army. General Vallejo requested that his captors, who said they were Americans, show their authorization from the United States government. They replied that they did not come under the authority of the United States but, having seen a proclamation of General Castro threatening to drive all foreigners out of the country, they had taken up arms in self-defense. The prisoners were then led away to the American camp on the Sacramento River. Before leaving, General Vallejo had directed De la Rosa to visit Montgomery and ask him “to use his authority or exert his influence to prevent the commission of acts of violence by this party in as much as they seemed to be without any effectual head or authority.” To this end Vallejo hoped that an officer would be sent to Sonoma, “or a letter that would have the effect of saving the helpless inhabitants from violence and anarchy.”
Montgomery’s reply was immediate and sincere. Evidently not connecting it with the seizure of Arce’s horses, he declared that he now for the first time heard of the affair. “I at once and entirely disavow this movement as having proceeded under any authority of the United States or myself,” he said, adding, “I also disavow the same on the part of Captain Frémont . . . now in the country for scientific purposes.” As an officer of the United States, Montgomery was precluded from any interference between the conflicting parties, “but,” he said, “if my individual efforts can be at any time exercised to allay violence or prevent injury to innocent persons it shall be exerted.”
In fulfillment of this latter promise, Montgomery ordered the Portsmouth’s first officer, Lieutenant John S. Missroon, to proceed in one of the ship’s boats to Sonoma on the following morning. Missroon was directed to visit the person commanding the insurgents and inform him of the state of apprehension of the populace. “Be pleased,” ordered Montgomery, “respectfully to request from me, that he will extend his protecting care over the defenceless families.” Any “satisfactory assurances” which might be received were to be transmitted to the town’s inhabitants through the local alcalde.
Before Missroon had started on Tuesday morning, however, William L. Todd, a messenger from the revolutionary party, reached the Portsmouth. Todd brought a letter from William B. Ide, commander of the rebel garrison at Sonoma, confirming in all essentials the account given by De la Rosa, but stating that the force which had taken the town numbered but 34 men. Montgomery now learned for the first time that the capture of Arce’s horses and the seizure of Sonoma were both parts of the same movement, a rising on the part of the American settlers against reported acts of aggression by José Castro. The foreign residents, said Ide, had been encouraged to make their stand “by the known presence of Captain Frémont’s [sic] command in the Valley.” But there was no intimation that Frémont had directly incited the affair. Ide mentioned the fact that, although a quantity of cannon and other arms had been seized in Sonoma, there was not enough powder to repel an attack if artillery were called into play, broadly hinting that a supply from the Portsmouth would be welcome.
When Todd heard of De la Rosa’s mission, he assured Montgomery that there had been no need for it. He stated that “a full and satisfactory guarantee for the security of the people . . . had been given by proclamation almost immediately after taking possession,” and that it was well understood that “condign punishment would promptly meet the transgressor.” Informed that one of the ship’s boats was soon leaving for Sonoma, Todd declared that he would be glad to return in it with Missroon and De la Rosa; and about ten o’clock on the morning of the 16th the party left the ship. With Todd went a letter from Montgomery to Ide, in which the Commander expressed his refusal to supply the powder on the ground of strict neutrality. He did state, however, that in a general way,
without direct application or reference to the position in which you stand; that I hold it to be the privilege of all men everywhere, by such means as they possess, to counteract the sinister designs of treachery, and resist oppression.
Missroon arrived in Sonoma about sunset of the day of his departure, finding the rebel emblem, the Bear Flag, waving over the plaza and every semblance of order in the town. He at once called upon Ide, from whom he received both verbal and written assurances of his intention to protect all unoffending inhabitants. Next, the Lieutenant visited the alcalde and the family of General Vallejo, moderating their apprehensions by presenting the pledges given by Ide. Missroon took care to make it known explicitly, “for the information of the surrounding country,” that Montgomery disclaimed any and all interference in the matter, other than was dictated by motives of humanity. These errands done, and having received the thanks of both parties for his services, Missroon left the town at noon on the 17th and was again on board the Portsmouth at sundown. His report that Sonoma was in a state of “perfect quietude and security” afforded Montgomery much satisfaction.
There is no doubt that Montgomery was strongly in sympathy with the rebels and believed at once in the justness of their cause. In his diary he recorded,
I have no doubt of the honest motives and intentions of the insurgent party in this serious movement. . . . . . Not the least important feature of their scheme, as presented in Mr. Ide’s letter, is that of declaring the independence of California, and in due time annexing with the United States.
In a note written some days later, he declared that the capture of Arce’s horses and the surprise of Sonoma were “master strokes, but should have been followed by a rush upon Santa Clara.”
But in spite of his delight in the activities of the insurgents, Montgomery religiously abstained from aiding them, “my position and duty here,” he wrote in his diary, “compelling me to abstain (much in opposition to my sympathies, I confess) from rendering aid or facilities to either of the parties.” The Commander’s neutrality, however, did not extend so far as to allow threats to be made against American citizens, even in retaliation for acts committed by the Bears. In a conversation with the captain of the port of San Francisco, he made it clear that he would take action if any indiscriminate arrests of American nationals were attempted as a result of the rebellion.
It was only natural from the appearance of things that the Californians should suspect Montgomery of secretly aiding the Bears and, especially, of rendering assistance to Frémont, who was generally thought to be connected with the insurgent movement. On June 17, Comandante Castro addressed a note to Montgomery, demanding “explanation of the conduct observed by Captain Frémont; who without the formalities established among civilized nations, invades this country with his force.” Montgomery’s reply of the next day was a masterpiece of politely phrased indignation. After expressing his “entire conviction” that Frémont was in no manner connected with the insurgent movement, the Commander went on to reprimand Castro severely for impugning the integrity of the United States government in so flagrant a fashion.
But no denials on the part of Montgomery could convince the California authorities of the innocence of Frémont, or of himself, for that matter. In reporting the seizure of Sonoma to the central government of Mexico, the Prefect of Monterey wrote that he was “well informed that this treacherous crime has been committed with the consent or by the order of . . . Frémont . . . and also with that of the captain of the . . . Portsmouth ... for said vessel has sent to the invaders of Sonoma a launch full of ammunition.” Even the French Consul, in an official report to his government, accused Montgomery of lending moral protection and tacit assent to the undertaking.
On June 20, the launch under Lieutenant Hunter returned from the Sacramento, bringing the news that the prisoners from Sonoma had been confined at Sutter’s Fort, Frémont having refused to take charge of them because of his “neutral position.” A letter from Frémont, dated June 16, thanked Montgomery for the supplies and announced the intention of the Pathfinder to abandon any further explorations and to return home immediately. “The nature of my instructions & the peaceful nature of our operations, do not contemplate any active hostility on my part even in the event of war between the two countries,” he informed the Commander, but at the same time he avowed his intention of resisting actively if attacked by Castro. “In this condition of things,” Frémont continued, “I can only then urgently request that you will remain with the Portsmouth in the Bay of San Francisco.” He also asked that Montgomery keep open a communication with him by means of the Portsmouth’s boats, and that a surgeon be detached to his command, “in case of accident here.” This letter, breathing such pacific intentions, was written two days after Sonoma had been taken by men from Frémont’s camp!
Montgomery’s reply to these requests was to dispatch two boats to the explorer’s camp. The first, leaving on June 24 under command of Lieutenant Joseph W. Revere, carried the Portsmouth’s surgeon, Dr. Henderson, who was to remain with the Pathfinder as long as his services were desired. Revere reached New Helvetia on the 26th, only to find that Frémont had left 4 days before to take over the command of the insurgents at Sonoma.
The second boat, under Lieutenant Bartlett, departed on June 27. Montgomery had not as yet heard of Frémont’s march to Sonoma and still believed the Pathfinder to be as neutral as himself. In fact, with Bartlett went a package of letters to be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy upon Frémont’s arrival in the United States.
Meanwhile, Montgomery’s neutral position was growing daily more intolerable. Vice-Consul Leidesdorff had requested him to perform some act which he felt was inconsistent with his position. The Portsmouths officers were openly in sympathy with the insurgents. Even worse, on June 19, the Cyane, Captain Mervine, arrived at Monterey. The next day both Mervine and Larkin wrote to Montgomery, informing him that Sloat was on his way northward. Without directly mentioning the outbreak of hostilities, they spoke of “important news” that “cannot be revealed,” but of whose nature Montgomery should before long be apprised. On the 23d Castro again accused Montgomery of aiding the Bears, saying that he had been advised that the Portsmouth’s boats were going about the bay armed and examining the commerce of the natives. Castro demanded an explanation of this conduct. In reply, the Commander denied all the charges, reiterated his strict neutrality, and informed Castro of the boats which had been sent to Frémont’s camp. In this reply, he told Frémont 2 days later, he had been entirely honest.
There are some indications, however, that Castro may have had some grounds for his suspicions, for on June 29 Montgomery addressed a very strange communication to Leidesdorff requesting information as to whether the large schooner then about to proceed “up the Bay to Point San Pablo” belonged to Mexican citizens and was in Mexican employ at that time. “Be particular in your reply,” he urged, “as there must be no mistake in the matter. The reason you will know in due time.”
It is possible that this letter may have been connected with Montgomery’s duties as protector of American shipping on the bay. On July 1 there were four boats belonging to United States citizens anchored under the shelter of the Portsmouth’s guns at Yerba Buena, to which anchorage Montgomery had moved on June 23.
By the evening of June 27, Montgomery’s consternation was complete. Shortly before sundown on that day, a sailboat reached the Portsmouth bringing Lieutenant Gillespie, who had separated from Frémont at San Rafael. When the Commander heard that the explorer was then at the head of 160 men and openly in pursuit of the Mexican opponents of the Bears, he learned for the first time that the Pathfinder had abandoned the ground of neutrality. He remarked in his diary,
This course of Captain Frémont renders my position as a neutral peculiarly delicate and difficult. Having avowed, not only my own but Captain Frémont’s entire neutrality and noninterference in the existing difficulties in the country, in which it can scarcely be supposed, under the circumstances, that I shall be regarded as having spoken in good faith and sincerity.
This news made Montgomery more than ever impatient with his enforced neutrality. The letters written by Larkin and Mervine on June 20 had given him strong reason to suspect that the United States was already at war with Mexico; and he felt that if he were notified of the fact he could find “opportunities of improving passing occurrences ... in such a manner probably as to facilitate the ultimate designs of our government, which my present neutral position necessarily forbids.” In other words, if he were free to aid the insurgents, he could drive the Mexican forces from the vicinity and pave the way for a quick conquest of the region by the Unites States when Sloat should arrive. In hopes of obtaining this notification of hostilities, Montgomery dispatched his launch on July 3 to Monterey, with orders to bring back a letter from Sloat which was waiting for him in the hands of Captain Mervine.
While waiting the return of the boat, be it said to his credit, Montgomery did not deviate from his policy of nonintervention, except as his services were required to relieve suffering or to protect American citizens. He refused Frémont’s request to have a surgeon from the Portsmouth indefinitely attached to the Pathfinder’s command; but he took on board for treatment two wounded men, seemingly one Mexican and one insurgent. It is worthy of note that when Frémont needed a boat and some rat-tailed files to spike the guns of the Mexican fort at San Francisco, he applied for them not to Montgomery, but to Captain Phelps, of the merchantman Moscow.
During the last few days of June and the first week of July, the Commander was constantly pestered with requests from Leidesdorff for protection from marauding bands of Californians. On the evening of the Fourth of July a small guard was actually landed to watch over the property of the American residents of Yerba Buena, but was withdrawn immediately the danger was past.
It was not until July 8 that Montgomery was relieved from his trying position. At seven o’clock in the evening of that day he received a dispatch from Monterey informing him that Commodore Sloat had raised the American flag over that port on the preceding day and ordering him to do likewise at Yerba Buena and the surrounding settlements.
The prompt and efficient manner in which Commander Montgomery carried out these instructions and made secure American rule over northern California is a well-known fact of history. His achievement, scarcely less difficult, of upholding the honor and dignity of the United States and of the Navy during the trying weeks immediately preceding the conquest has never been adequately acknowledged. During the entire period of the Bear Flag Revolt, as far as can now be determined, Montgomery’s conduct was commendable in every respect. He kept his head in a situation which would have completely confounded many another man. Pressed by his own emotions and the feelings of his officers, accused on numerous false charges, besieged by a profusion of conflicting advice, and dunned by many who wanted his aid, the Commander had followed a line of action which was strictly in accord with his position as an officer of a government at peace with Mexico.