Recent promotion restrictions have caused the officers of the Navy to cast an inquiring eye on the provisions which control promotion. Appropriation Act limitations, a slow-down in promotion, a Presidential directive that the Officer Personnel Act be examined, and the expressed concern of the Chief of Naval Operations over the diminishing attraction of the career to junior officers are among the elements focusing attention on the promotion system. When most officers consider that system they realize that they have acquired during their career considerable promotion folklore, but a minimum of factual detail.
The statutes and administrative procedures which govern promotion in the Navy are detailed, complex, not generally understood. Yet it is important to the morale of the officer corps that they be understood. It is the purpose of the present paper to aid perspective by analyzing the principles which govern all promotion systems and tracing the development of the Navy system.
There are two basic promotion systems in our armed forces, one applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps, the other applicable to the Air Force and Army. (The Coast Guard has separate provisions governing permanent Promotion but operates temporary promotion during war or emergency in a manner similar to the Navy.)
Though there is considerable difference in the statutory and administrative techniques, Procedures, and criteria of these two basic systems, their objective is the same (as the objective of a promotion system in any military service in any nation in any age has always been) to provide qualified officers in appropriate grades to meet the needs of the service.
The Navy promotion system is the product of evolution, a steady progress through the years along courses that despite occasional “hunting” have made good at least 87 per cent of the base course. There have been major engagements en route and heated discussions. The most violent of these occurred during the 1906 to 1916 decade and centered on the question of “plucking” vs. “selection.” The Navy was divided into two camps, “selectionists” and “anti-selectionists.”
The strong feeling in the service at these critical turning points in promotion law has been healthy, an expression of honest difference of opinion on the method of achieving an end upon which all were agreed—the retention in the service of the best officers— and in which the good of the service and the nation has always been the ultimate goal.
A military service, like any operating organization, civil or military, requires a pyramidal command structure. There is one person at the head of the pyramid and increasing numbers on each level below. It is a structure inherent in command. It makes itself evident in the organization of a ship, an aircraft squadron, an infantry battalion. It exists in every phase of military command and, by adoption, in the non-military functions of a military service.
There is no ideal command pyramid. The exact shape of the pyramid as it rises from its broad base of officers in the most junior grade to a single officer at the top is a compromise among:
1. The billet requirements of the service.
2. The career attractiveness afforded the officers of the service.
3. The economy of the nation that pays the service.
4. The manpower limitations of that nation.
Three factors affect the progress of an officer up the pyramid.
1. DISTRIBUTION (the percentage of the officer corps in each grade or step of the pyramid).
2. FLOW RATE (years of service in each grade or step of the pyramid).
3. ATTRITION (separation from the pyramid, both natural and forced).
These factors are not new. They have governed the careers of leaders in military and civil organizations since before the days of recorded history. They apply to flocks of geese and herds of elephants. A promotion system will not survive unless it is a practical mean among these differing, and often conflicting, factors.
When our Navy was first organized, promotion was by favoritism, both political and personal. That the infant Navy survived this inauspicious essay into personnel administration is a tribute to the indomitable patriots led by John Paul Jones who, as much as any other, suffered from the invidious practice. Fortunately for the United States, the first recipients of such favors failed so spectacularly that it was immediately apparent to the Navy Commissioners that this was no way to officer a navy.
Organizational memories are long and although the ineptitude of some of the first captains of the U. S. Navy led to the appointment of the most capable officers for command assignments in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s, after the War of 1812 a method was sought to guarantee impartial and equal promotional treatment. The most obvious of such systems (and the easiest to administer) is promotion by seniority. Seniority promotion had, at that time, the additional attraction of appearing “democratic” in opposition to the special privileges granted the members of the nobility in the Royal Navy. Accordingly, a seniority promotion system was adopted.
Every officer who was commissioned in the service could expect to reach the top, provided that he was not separated from the service by death or sentence of court martial. Writing in the Proceedings in 1934 Admiral William S. Sims characterized the essentials of such a system, “Keep your digestion in order and refrain from striking your superior officer.”
This promotion by “age and patience” permitted no recognition of excellent performance nor did it penalize ineptitude. Length of service in the junior grades was excessive. The command pyramid is an inverted funnel requiring diminishing numbers of officers in successive grades, and since there was little separation of officers from this pyramid an individual sat long at the base before he commenced to rise, and then he sped rapidly through the senior grades in the twilight of his career.
The first step toward correction was a retirement act passed in 1841. This was limited to severe permanent physical incapacity. Later, in 1861, a retirement law was enacted to separate from the Navy list those officers superannuated as well as physically incapacitated. This was a help but was not enough to permit a reasonable flow of promotion.
Despite the slow promotion flow of this period no very great effort was made to change the seniority promotion system for two reasons. First, in our growing nation an officer who saw inadequate prospects could resign and easily make a living in some other line of business. Second, and more important, the Navy was undergoing a slow but continuous growth thus providing more room for advancement. The transition from sail to steam and the growth of the practice of “showing the flag” to open trade routes presented a challenge and made the Navy interesting even if promotion was slow.
Then in 1861 with the outbreak of the Civil War, promotion increased as the Navy rapidly expanded. Many vacancies were provided by officers who resigned to join the Confederacy.
After that war was concluded, the Navy was many times larger than before. Many of the wartime emergency service officers were transferred to the regular Navy and the prewar officers retained their wartime advancements.
This happy state did not last long, however. The inevitable reaction set in and the great United States Navy of 1865 began to wither and shrink. With a shrinking Navy and a seniority promotion system, there could be only one result—stagnation.
Sporadic attacks on stagnation were made from time to time but, with one exception, they were of little lasting benefit. The one exception was the establishment of the Navy Examining Board to inquire into the professional qualifications of officers for promotion and to recommend for separation those not professionally qualified. This board continues to function.
As a result of the accumulated dissatisfaction with stagnation and thanks to the arrival on the scene of a very forceful personality, Theodore Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a new personnel act was passed just after the Spanish War.
The Navy Personnel Act of 1899 established boards annually to designate certain numbers of senior officers for retirement, thus permitting an improved flow of promotion. These boards were known as “plucking boards” and by their very name brought dissatisfaction both in the Navy and in the Congress.
Officers “plucked” were immediately separated from the Navy. They were stamped “unfit” and this stigma provoked bitterness. Yet, even with “plucking,” separations were insufficient. In 1915, this act was repealed.
In 1916, a Navy Personnel Act instituted the principle of promotion by selection of the “best fitted,” (which was by no means uniformly popular—selectionists vs. anti-selectionists). It provided promotion by selection to the grades of commander, captain, and rear admiral. (Promotion up to lieutenant commander continued to be by seniority.) Those who failed of selection were separated when they reached an “age in grade” limit. Such separation was more palatable to the losers than “plucking,” as there was no implication that they were not qualified.
A short time later selection was extended to include senior officers of the staff corps. In 1926 the running mate system was instituted, in the so-called “Equalization Act” of that year. Prior to that time each staff corps had had a separate promotion list governed by an independent grade distribution. Consequently officers who were commissioned in the same year might at a later time be commander-line, captain-construction corps, and lieutenant commander-supply corps, dependent upon conditions in their own category.
In 1931 the basis upon which officers were separated from the service was changed from age in grade to service in grade. Until this change the officer who had entered the Naval Academy at 16 had a distinct advantage over one who entered at 19. The latter might be retired for age in grade before being considered for promotion. Under a service in grade provision they were placed on an equal footing.
After World War I, a number of emergency officers who had served ably had been transferred to the regular Navy. As these officers were all of the same date of commission (within a year or two) they, with their Naval Academy contemporaries, made up a promotional group larger than normal, which was called a “hump.” Finding appropriate duties for these officers both ashore and afloat was difficult, if not impossible, and so in 1934 promotion by selection and percentage grade distribution were extended to include the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant commander, as well as commander, captain, and rear admiral. (The act of 1899 had provided for the automatic promotion of ensigns to lieutenant (junior grade) after three years of commissioned service.)
Very heavy forced attrition to meet grade distribution in the ranks of lieutenant and lieutenant commander caused large numbers of young officers to be retired. This caused much concern in Congress. In 1938 a promotion law was enacted that provided for some of the officers who were not selected as “best fitted” for promotion to be promoted and retained as “fitted” officers. An officer could be labeled by a selection board “best fitted” (promotion in the normal manner), or if once failed he could, by a subsequent board, be selected as ”best fitted,” ”fitted and retained” (promoted, but earmarked for retirement after service in the higher grade), “fitted and not retained” (promoted and immediately retired) or he could again fail of selection (and be separated from the service). For the first time a selection law had provided a “grade B” stamp for part of the officer corps. Just what result the continued operation of this law would have reached cannot be told for World War II erupted while the system was in the infant stage.
The “fitted” or class “B” officers retained on active duty were carried as extra numbers in grade, they were outside the grade distribution restrictions imposed on the command pyramid. The question of the value of this system and the usefuless of “fitted” officers have been aptly described by Rear Admiral George Russell, U. S. Navy, in a memorandum on the selection system, which reads in part:
“Then came the promotion law of 1938 with its provision for the promotion and retention of the less qualified officers as “fitted” World War II with its changes ensued shortly thereafter and before the performance of “fitted” officers had received the test of time, but I think most informed naval officers agree that there was sufficient testing of the matter to demonstrate that a second-class naval officer is not much of an asset. Many, if not all, of the officers designated as “fitted” felt it very keenly, even though their reactions differed. Some of them were embittered, some dropped the bricks, some were just plain hurt, some had the “I’ll show ‘em” attitude, and some were entirely philosophical about it. One of the best stories of the times, I think, relates to an officer who had some calling cards made and in the lower right-hand corner where it said ‘Commander, U. S. Navy,’ he added in parentheses ‘(fitted but not retained)’.”
When the War in Europe threatened to spill over into our laps in 1940, the President declared a National Emergency. The rapid expansion of the Navy incident to this National Emergency led to the enactment of and use in July, 1941, of a law providing for temporary appointment and temporary promotion. Permanent promotion was suspended in 1942 and all promotions subsequent to July, 1942, were temporary. By the end of World War II officers had left their permanent grades far behind (some permanent ensigns held temporary commander grade, permanent enlisted status men held in some instances the grade of lieutenant commander, there were temporary rear admirals whose permanent status was commander).
The tremendous task of drafting legislation to govern the officer promotion system and restore it to balance was undertaken. The authors of this legislation, which was to become the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (currently our basic promotion law) were confined by the factors listed earlier in this paper which govern all command pyramids. They faced the difficult task of finding a workable mean, within these confines, amongst the opposing elements.
It has been said that a personnel act which lasts five years has done well. To the credit of the drafters of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 is the fact that with minor amendment the act is now in its seventh year.
The fundamental limits of careers within a military organization have remained constant over the years. Admiral J. K. Taussig writing in the Proceedings in April, 1924, in a paper entitled, “A Study of Our Promotion and Graded Retirement Laws,” called these limits to the attention of the service when he said:
“It is apparent that any satisfactory operation of the promotion and retirement laws depends on obtaining a correct ratio between four main elements. These are:
(a) The authorized percentages in grades;
(b) The ages for attaining each grade;
(c) The length of service in each grade;
(d) The number of forced retirements in each grade.
Here is a four cornered problem that requires, for its solution, certain compromises. By this is meant, we cannot have each of the four elements at its best . . . .”
The author prefers to group (b) and (c) as a single element, “flow rate” and call the elements:
(a) DISTRIBUTION
(b) FLOW RATE
(c) ATTRITION
Regardless of the labels employed, the limits are unchanging, and the history of the development of the promotion system is the history of the” certain compromises” to which Admiral Taussig referred.
Study of the process by which the drafters arrived at the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 is an aid to the understanding of present operation of the law. This process may be conveniently followed concurrently with discussion of the principles traversed.
Used as examples of promotion systems from which to work were the experiences of the Navy, the Army, a major religious faith, two large banks, and two major industries, one of which operated shipping. In general and in brief the systems of the banks and the industries were discarded as systems unadapted to the Navy’s use because, first, the same flow rate was not provided for all members of the organization, which meant that inversions of seniority resulted (considered contrary to the best interests of the service), second, physical demands were less and therefore individuals occupied the more responsible positions for long periods of time, and third, the extremes of education and ability found in a large commercial organization permit promotion methods that are not applicable to the nearly equal education and ability of the group of officers comprising the Navy officer corps. The major church system was considered not suitable for adoption (although its selection features were excellent) because of effects which separate languages and ethnic groups interjected and separation was not required. The U. S. Army system was found to be promotion by seniority, in the main, and therefore no different from that discarded by the Navy in 1916.
So after examining the command and promotion structures of other organizations it was apparent that the basic Navy promotion system (evolved from the 1916 Act) contained most of the best features of all systems studied and had the advantage of being fairly well understood by a majority of naval officers in positions of responsibility. It then remained to bring that system up to date, and in this the studies of the other systems proved invaluable. The drafting of the Act is considered within the three basic limits.
Distribution
Prior to 1900, as today, when international tension waxed and waned, the Congress provided for more or fewer ships which, in turn, required varying, but proportional, numbers of officers to man them. This was done by finite numbers as has recently been done in the so-called Davis Rider and Public Law 7, 83rd Congress. From earliest times until comparatively recent dates, the officers on active duty in the Navy were, with few exceptions, regular officers. Regular officers are difficult to dispose of, once obtained. They can only be removed by retirement, death, severance. Promotions were generally permanent and officers once promoted could not administratively be reduced in grade. For these reasons the Navy was never able to use the complements (or tables of organization) employed by the Army to determine officer promotion and grade distribution. The Congress early recognized this difficulty and authorized from time to time distribution of officers in the various grades by finite numbers. Whenever the authorized number in any grade was reduced below the number actually serving in that grade, the excess would be authorized as extra numbers but no promotions were permitted until the total in that grade was reduced below the authorized number.
In the Navy Personnel Act of 1916, the maximum number of line officers was established as a percentage of the enlisted strength, and the maximum number of staff corps officers set as percentages of the line officer strength (in the case of medical, dental, and chaplain corps as a percentage of total strength of officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps).
The 1916 Act established the proportion of officers in each grade as a percentage of the total strength of officers in the line or in each staff corps as appropriate, and provision was made for the Secretary of the Navy to distribute officers in these proportions at least once annually.
With two major modifications this distribution feature of the Navy Personnel Act of 1916 was included in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Because of (1) the increasing technical complexity of the modern Navy, (2) the growing demands for officers in joint and combined staffs and to attend senior naval and military courses, (3) the lessons learned during World War II, and (4) the experience with promotional attrition prior to 1941, the percentages of officers in the grades of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander were increased while those of other grades were lowered. Provision was made for two grade distributions to operate concurrently, one based solely upon regular officer strength (permanent promotion) and another upon active duty officer strength (temporary promotion). This latter, second modification was occasioned by the necessity of employing numbers of reserve and temporary officers on active duty to operate the ships and stations under the emergency conditions that have existed for several years and may continue.
The shape of a command pyramid for military purposes can fairly readily be determined by the simple arithmetic of adding up the allowance of ships and counting the jobs on shore that require naval officers. The resulting structure, however, could fall short in another particular, that of providing advanced command and staff education of officers, providing sufficient advancement for prestige (and, to a lesser degree, additional personal benefits of pay and perquisites) to induce capable young men to join and, having joined, to stay with the service.
In the ascending rank structure (with its concommitant separation) what distribution would produce a vital officer corps, provide an acceptable degree of security, meet the billet requirements over a wide range of circumstances, and operate with maximum economy for the nation?
From the rundown of captains’ billets for example, it appeared that for a Navy of 30,000 unrestricted line officers, about 1200 captains (4%) would be required for military requirements only. Experience under a level strength Navy in the 1930’s (particularly after the 1938 provision for “fitted” officers) was that a 50% increase in the purely military requirement was necessary to provide for an enlarged shore establishment, increasing staff requirements, and sufficient security and promotion opportunity, therefore 6%, or some 1800 captains, would be required.
Study and consideration of these aspects in each grade and the ratio amongst the grades, produced a distribution as follows: rear admiral ¾ of 1%, captain 6%; commander 12%; lieutenant commander 18%; lieutenant 24¾%; lieutenant (junior grade) and ensign combined 38½%. This then would be the Distribution.
Flow Rate
If there was no external influence on flow rate (such as distribution or attrition) optimum flow rate would be a proper combination of experience and vitality. That is to say, an officer should spend sufficient time in each grade to fulfill the duties and gain the experience of that grade, yet reach the senior grades at an age sufficiently young to enjoy the requisite physical capacity for the sea duties of that grade. Optimum promotion flow is a mean of vitality and experience. A compromise between the two must be reached.
The feature of vitality was well pointed up in the report of the Advisory Committee on Service Pay (Charles R. Hook, Chairman) to the Secretary of Defense on December 10, 1948, quoted in part as follows:
“The service must be kept young, vigorous, and efficient ... to permit youth and brains to rise to the top in time to be effective. This emphasis on youth is more important in the Military Services than in most other activities of Government and industry because of the physical demands of war conditions when the Regular Establishment becomes the nucleus around which the civilian elements are organized.”
Yet this principle of vitality must be soundly tempered with necessary experience. Lest we tend to think that principles such as these have been recently discovered, the following able statement of the relationship between these particular elements is quoted from a paper by Commander Roy C. Smith, U. S. Navy, which appeared in the Proceedings in 1906.
“The second fundamental principle is that the duties of the various grades cannot be performed efficiently unless there is some recognized relation between the age and experience of the officers and the duties to be performed. . . . The general principle is that an officer should pass a length of time in each grade sufficient for him to master the duties of that grade, and to give him the experience necessary to take up the duties of the grade above. He should not be kept in subordinate positions beyond the age at which experience teaches that the average man loses initiative and is unwilling to assume responsibility or act independently. Above all, flag officers when promoted should have enough years ahead of them to enable them to put in practice the experience they have gained in their whole previous career; which is, for them, merely the training for the work they are now called on to perform.”
It has been mentioned that in the days prior to 1916 the way to become the senior officer in the fleet was to have a healthy constitution and to avoid offenses serious enough for court martial. A way to improve one’s chances of making admiral was to enter the Naval Academy at the earliest possible age thus acquiring the most seniority prior to the mandatory retirement age of 64. The over-all result of this system was that if you lived long enough and started young enough you were certain to reach high estate, but enjoyment of that status was brief. The average length of service of officers in the grades of commodore and rear admiral between 1880 and 1900 was 1.3 years, hardly long enough to rewrite your predecessor’s standing orders! The grade of captain was traversed in almost as short a time—but not the junior grades. Prior to the Spanish War, to be promoted from lieutenant with less than 25 years’ service was most unlikely.
In the 1916 promotion act the first premise was that the total span of service from an average commissioning age of 22 to retirement at 64 (42 years) was divided by the six grades to give a 7-year period of service in each grade, as normal. This produced an age and service table about as follows:
|
Average Age Span in Grade |
Service in Grade |
Total Service When Leaving Grade |
---|---|---|---|
Ensign |
22–25 |
3 years |
3 |
Lieutenant (jg) |
25–29 |
4 |
7 |
Lieutenant |
29–36 |
7 |
14 |
Lieutenant Commander |
36–43 |
7 |
21 |
Commander |
43–50 |
7 |
28 |
Captain |
50–57 |
7 |
35 |
Admiral |
57–64 |
7 |
42 |
This table represented the promotion expectancy in time of peace of all officers who entered the regular service prior to the effective date of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (August 7, 1947). The table is pertinent to some aspects of the expressions that the “rules have been changed in the middle of the game.” True they have been changed, but here the change has been for the better.
Shortly after World War II began in Europe, reports reached this country that the older officers could not take the strain of long sleepless cruises and the rough trips in smaller ships. This was found to be true in our Navy also when the United States entered the war. (Which does not imply that these same officers were incapable of exercising other positions of highest responsibility.) Before World War II was over, captains were being selected for rear admiral who were about 47 years of age, or ten years younger than prewar.
While the above table appears to produce long service in grade, it should be noted that it was considered drastic prior to World War II by the Army. The Navy during the 1930’s accepted severe attrition in order to maintain a flow of promotion. The Army took little attrition but suffered slow-down in promotion and stagnation in grade. The result was that when World War II erupted the Army had to reach far down to obtain officers with the vitality to lead under war conditions, while in the Navy, with rare exception, every flag officer who was in the grade at the outbreak of the war served as such during the war, and the captains did likewise.
Reviewing the war experience, the boards convened in the Navy Department to study the promotion problem and recommend a system concluded that 52 or 53 was the oldest that an officer should commence the grade of rear admiral. Subtracting an average commissioning age of 22 or 23 gave a 30-year span from ensign through captain. Dividing by the number of grades, 5 (ensign-lieutenant (jg) combined as one) showed a six-year period in each grade to be normal. Since there would be times when an expanding navy would accelerate this rate of flow, a period of minimum service in grade was also established, in order that “experience” would not lose its balance with vitality. From the study the following periods evolved (now the law).
|
Minimum Service in Grade |
Normal Service in Grade |
Normal Attained Service Upon Leaving Grade |
---|---|---|---|
Ensign |
– |
3 years |
3 |
Lieutenant (jg) |
2 |
3 |
6 |
Lieutenant |
4 |
6 |
12 |
Lieutenant Commander |
4 |
6 |
18 |
Commander |
5 |
7 |
25 |
Captain |
3 |
5 |
30 |
Rear Admiral |
– |
– |
39 |
There was added a restriction that despite the above periods no officer should be promoted permanently to captain who had less than 18 years commissioned service.
Theoretically it would be possible to be considered for rear admiral after 18½ years, but to do so would be the equivalent of hitting a six-horse parlay.
This then was Flow Rate.
Attrition
Having set two of the three fundamentals (Distribution, Flow Rate) it was time to consider the third, Attrition. A very minor forced separation of officers at each promotion point is necessary to eliminate the unqualified. Something in the nature of 2 to 5% would accomplish this. Forced separation above this is the separation of officers who are qualified. It was quickly seen that the desired attrition was the minimum attrition possible. This would produce the least waste of qualified manpower and the most security to the individual. But since distribution and flow were to be fixed, the only variable was attrition. The reason for accepting attrition as the variable was expressed by testimony of Captain David Martineau before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives during consideration of the Bill.
Question—“What would be the objection to specifying, in lieu of your promotion zone plan, that attrition between grades will be 15% or 20%, thereby fixing the attrition definitely and removing any possibility of inequality of promotional opportunity?”
Answer—“The Navy does not desire forced attrition for forced attrition’s sake beyond that necessary to eliminate unqualified officers. The basic considerations are the maintenance of appropriate ages in grade and distribution. To maintain appropriate ages and the desired distribution it is estimated that the forced attrition under stabilized conditions will be about 20%. It would not be desirable, however, to fix forced attrition and let distribution vary as necessary to maintain a fixed attrition rate, when distribution, and not attrition, is the aim in view.”
Since attrition was to be the variable, the drafters set about determining just what degree of severity this variable might reach. A normal attrition (death, resignation, physical retirement, voluntary retirement) of 3% was assumed. One thousand entering ensigns were actuarially moved through thirty years’ service, applying normal attrition, maintaining the flow prescribed, and remaining within the distribution. This showed that a forced attrition of about 20% at each selection point would be required. (It came a little over 20% to commander, and under 20% to captain, and this is the reason that the flow rate was changed from six years in each of these grades to seven years in the grade of commander and five years in grade of captain.)
Attrition of 20% was considered acceptable in promotion to captain and commander, but perhaps too high in promotion to lieutenant and lieutenant commander. The points were brought up that insufficient records for selection were available on these grades, that American youth matured late, and that to eliminate an officer this early provided no career whatsoever. Attrition in promotion to lieutenant commander works particular hardship on the individual. Officers failing of selection at this point under the normal operation of the Act would have twelve years commissioned service and be 35 years of age. They would have acquired a family and considerable financial responsibility, but no retirement equity. Their point of view toward security would have taken a marked change from what it was earlier and what it would be later.
To reduce attrition in the lower grades meant that it would have to be increased (above 20%) in promotion to the higher grades. This would mean additional separation of more experienced officers in whom the service had greater investment. Proportionate loss of the junior officers meant a more balanced utilization of manpower. The drafters were of the opinion that individuals under forty years of age could with reasonable success make a new start in some field of civil life and that proportionate separation was necessary. Attrition of 20% across the board was accepted. (But remember that Attrition was left the variable.)
In the years since the passage of the Act, advancement in the medical science has increased life expectancy and the Career Compensation Act has diminished the attraction of physical disability retirement. The result is a decrease in normal attrition and, consequently, an increase in forced attrition. The accompanying diagram illustrates the attrition which the Act would impose on a Navy composed entirely of career officers. One hundred officers are commissioned in the grade of ensign and their decimation as they progress up the pyramid shown. The slope of the curve between promotion points represents natural attrition, while the vertical drops show the necessary forced attrition.
After extensive hearings and consideration by the Congress the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was enacted. The Act contains a title pertaining to promotion in the Army and Air Force, but the chief resemblance of this title to the provisions of the Navy title is the fact that they are tied in the same package.
At the same time that the Officer Personnel Act was being considered by the Congress, legislation was enacted that permitted the transfer to the regular Navy of reserve officers who had fought through the war and were selected for assimilation. The implementation of the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act and the execution of the “augmentation” program were nearly simultaneous. The bulk of the officers who entered the regular Navy in this program were of course initially commissioned in the Naval Reserve in 1942, 1943, and 1944, and so the Navy acquired a World War II “hump” of officers when the memory of the World War I “hump” and the difficulties which it created had hardly left the stage. It was considered necessary to accept this difficulty in order to obtain the necessary officer strength to man the post-war Navy which was large in comparison to the pre-war Navy.
In accord with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act, the officers of the regular service were distributed into the proportions of ¾%, 6%, 12%, etc. and permanent commissions in those grades issued. (The permanent ensign became a lieutenant commander.) All active duty officers were then similarly distributed into temporary grades. (The newly “permanent” lieutenant commander generally retained the temporary promotion to commander which he had received during the war.) In some cases the distribution based on active duty strength did not support an officer in the grade in which he was serving, and it was necessary to revert him to the next lower grade. (This happened to the class of 1930, reverted from captain to commander, and to several nurse corps lieutenant commanders.)
From 1947 to 1951 promotion proceeded under the authority of this Act exclusively. The dual system of selection, temporary promotion to fill an active duty list vacancy and subsequent permanent promotion when a vacancy occurred in the regular list, was the routine. The expansion incident to the Korean emergency necessitated some variation. With the great influx of reserve officers reporting for active duty for limited tours, it was impossible to keep track of vacancies. To meet the needs of the service, recourse was had to the temporary promotion act of 1941, which remained on the books for just this purpose. The Congress in June, 1951, authorized the President in time of emergency to suspend the operation of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for temporary promotion of officers in order that the service would not have to operate three types of promotions simultaneously. The Congress further requested the President to follow the principles of the Officer Personnel Act where possible in the use of the temporary act of 1941. The President promptly suspended the Officer Personnel Act for the grades of lieutenant and lieutenant (jg) in the Navy and all grades of the Marine Corps.
Many officers who presently hold temporary appointments in the grades of lieutenant or lieutenant commander do so under the 1941 act. Their promotions might be said to be “temporary” temporary. This includes all officers promoted to those grades since July 1, 1951. These appointments expire within six months of the expiration of the current emergency.
It is anticipated that the July, 1941, act will be again placed in standby during 1954 and both the Navy and Marine Corps will return to the 1947 act in those areas that have been in suspension. In the other areas the 1947 act has of course been continuously operative.
Promotion in the Navy is carefully regulated by federal statute. Administrative latitude is restricted. This has been done intentionally and at the Navy’s request. It is a safeguard to the uniform and impartial treatment of officers.
The promotion system today, like every promotion system in the Navy through the years, faces problems. The nature of these problems and their avenues of solution are beyond the scope of this paper. The intent has simply been, through analysis of its limits and development, to aid perspective in viewing the promotion system.
It is hoped that the officers of the Navy in discussing promotion methods and contributing to the continual development of the promotion system through the Proceedings, will bear in mind the fundamental limits, distribution, flow rate, and attrition. Change in one must be compensated by change in one or both of the others, for, in the promotion of career officers, Paul cannot be enriched without robbing Peter.