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Lieutenant Donald B. Whitmire, usn. ' Fully realizing that the Naval Institute is generally recognized for its authenticity of reporting, I bring to your attention for possible correction and clarification the statement made on page 1224 regarding the Submarine Trout. In the caption referring to the USS Trout (SS-566) as a unit of the post war Tang-class submarine, it was stated that these ships displace 1,615 tons and mount four bow and two stern tubes.
I was in the commissioning detail of the USS Gudgeon (SS-567), and she mounted six bow and two stern torpedo tubes. There were six submarines of this class, the USS Tang (SS-563), USS Trigger (SS-564), USS Wahoo (SS-565), USS Trout (SS-566), USS Gudgeon (SS-567) and the USS Harder (SS- 568). The Tang, Wahoo, and Gudgeon were built by Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Trigger, Trout and Harder by the Electric Boat Company, Groton, Conn.
I may not remember correctly, but I feel certain that all six submarines of this class have six tubes forward.
(Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Whitmire’s comments were forwarded to Mr. Vernon J. Miller, Baltimore, Md., the compiler of the article referred to. Mr. Miller’s reply follows.)
I found your comments relative to the tube armament of the Tawg-class of special interest since they seem to verify a suspicion which I had not been able to ascertain. Considering that the World War II types mounted six bow tubes and four stern tubes, it seemed to me that the armament of this post-war class was light in comparison if there were but four bow tubes and two stern tubes. I would have assumed that there were six bow tubes even if there were only two mounted aft.
I attempted to go into this matter as much as possible. Jane’s listed four bow tubes, but since that publication sometimes unfortunately is not entirely accurate, I did not consider this information as final. However, several other reference sources, both local and foreign, gave the same data. It now seems possible that these sources may have taken their information from Jane’s although this, naturally, is but a matter of opinion.
Since you were a member of the commissioning detail of USS Gudgeon and know for certain that six bow tubes were mounted, it certainly seems feasible that the same arrangement is present in other units of this class. I will therefore change my notes accordingly and include this corrected data in the final summary.
I appreciate your interest in calling this matter to my attention, and I am quite pleased that your efforts will prevent this error from appearing in the future.
Motto for Deck Officers
(See page 1255, December, 1956 Proceedings)
Irby F. Wood, Master, S.S. Alcoa Runner.—-It has been with abiding interest that I have read my copies of the Proceedings. However, I would like to write that perhaps the most enjoyment I have ever gotten from the Proceedings was the reading of “The Operators” in the December, 1956 issue.
There is one paragraph on page 1257 that could well be used as a desk or bulkhead “Motto” for all Deck watch-standing officers be they U. S. Navy or U. S. Merchant Marine officers. The last two sentences in that paragraph are absolute and superlative in thought; “If he really is a sailor, the tides,
the current, the wind will not unnerve him. He will either make them his friend or neutralize them by his seamanship.”
I do not any more believe that Mr. Stanley originated those sentences and thoughts than I believe that Abe Lincoln was the author of “That government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” but I do declare that Chief Quartermaster William J. Stanley used his words just as aptly and appropriately as Mr. Lincoln used his at the dedication on the field of Gettysburg.
Best wishes for the continued success and public interest in the Proceedings. I do my part by trying to interest my passengers in its aim.
Royal Navy Monitors of World War I
(See pages 1000-1001, September, 1956 Proceedings)
Oscar Parkes.—Having been interested in the recent reference to the Royal Navy’s World War I monitors, I venture to make a few corrections and add some notes on these little known ships. Apropos of Lieutenant R. S. Pattee’s comments on the Furious’ 18in. guns and the monitors in which they saw service, may I point out that although the Prince Eugene is usually credited with having carried the third gun, it was never mounted in her. I served in the second ship to be so armed, the Lori Clive, during her last days off the Belgian Coast, and as her Captain was most anxious to get the gun into action, he accepted the General Wolfe’s calibration tests although our projectiles had an additional long cap fitted to secure extra range. Full elevation was 45 degrees as shown in the accompanying photograph, which was taken forward of the bridge and shows the ammunition boxes in the centre and shields for two 4-in. guns on the left—specially fitted to deal with possible cutting-out operations should the enemy have been sufficiently enterprising to have attempted them.
The elevation was the highest ever given to a gun of this order and permitted a range of 60,000 yards, if my memory is correct. Deviation was limited to a few degrees only and confined to the starboard side. The gun- house was of thin plating with an open back, the breech sinking below deck at full elevation. The discharge had no effect on the ship’s structure, blast being experienced only
right up in the bows. We were only able to loose off five rounds at the submarine base and docks at Bruges when “cease fire” was ordered, the fall of none of our shells having been observed by the spotting aircraft; goodness knows where they got to far beyond the target. As a shell was left in the gun this was afterwards fired at sea into a minefield with a single bag of cordite instead of the usual three. It fell about 20,000 yards away.
A year or so later the Lord Clive aroused considerable interest when seen leaving Portsmouth with three 15-in. guns in an open mounting in place of the 18-in. She was to test its efficacy for the triple 16-in. turrets to be carried in the battle cruiser of the 1921 Programme.
The width of the early bulges fitted to the monitors can be appreciated in the photo of Prince Eugene (see page 550) on the stocks just before her launching in July, 1915. These 15-foot projections were closely divided into air and water spaces, and in the three ships mentioned were fitted with strongly built guard rails along the water edge to divert or hold up distance-controlled boat torpedoes such as hit, but did not disable, the monitor Erebus.
In his list your correspondent mis-spelled a 12-inch monitor, which should be Craufurd, and omitted the small monitors M.15 to M.18 which were armed with a 9.2/45; M.19 to M.28 carried a 9.2/30 to start with, but in 1917, M.23 to M.27 had their forecastle built up and were re-armed with a long 7.5in. except the last which had a 6-in./50. For service up the Dwina River in Northern Russia this was replaced by one of the triple 4-inch spares for the battle cruiser Renown, as being more suitable for inshore bombardment. The breeches of the three guns can be seen in the shield on the built-up forecastle.
The Gorgon and Glatton only appeared at the end of the War and had been considerably modified for naval service with wide bulges and 45° elevation for their 9.4-in. and 6-in. guns, a heavy tripod mast, additional bridgework, etc. The photo of the Glutton (see page 550) proceeding to sea from the Elswick yard on completion is thought to be the only one ever taken of her before she was sunk by a torpedo in Dover Harbor when on fire, to prevent her blowing up and wrecking the town.
These monitors are little known but were hard-worked and short-lived warriors whose shades will appreciate these reminders of their humble existence.
The Eugene attained her greatest speed going down the slipways, as six knots was the best she subsequently attained. In the Lord Clive we raced the Marshal Soult back from Dunkirk to Sheerness, and passed her when making our six knots to her four. Our big gun shield aft gave us a tremendous weather helm, and when entering Dunkirk it was usual to allow any wind to swing the ship round so that we could make fast with the bows pointing seaward. The Soult and Ney were known to enter Dover harbor sideways more often than not.
(Editor’s Note: The above contribution comes from the former editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships.)
“Why We Are Losing Our Junior Officers”
(See page 127, February, 1957 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander G. P. Steele, U. S. Navy.—The stimulating article by Commander Crenshaw, “Why We Are Los- mg Our Junior Officers,” should be studied by all commanders. His comments on the lack of fun in the operating forces strike to the heart of the problem. My two-year command tour in submarines has just been completed. For the preceding two years, I was executive officer of a submarine. I have had plenty of recent opportunities to visit destroyers, fly with patrol aircraft, and drop in the wardrooms of many types of ships— particularly during my deployment last fall with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Many of the people I saw were tense, including many in command. You could tell at a glance that the pressures were such that they were not having fun. When the captain of a ship isn’t having fun in his job, you can bet that his wardroom isn’t having fun, either; certainly the crew is not having fun. If the ship is away from home, the cruise becomes a long, dreary separation from loved ones. It is reflected in letters home, and it is reflected in letters from home. But why just complain about it? We can do something about it!
People are the heart and soul of any enterprise. Failure to put their needs above desirable operating schedules, desirable materiel repairs, desirable training, or above any other factor is eventually poison.
Competition in administration between units brings meticulous attention to unimportant detail. It has produced unprecedented refinements and stressed many things besides attention to personnel and materiel. Desirable programs to which the commanding officer is to give “command attention” continue to multiply, as for example, the safedriving program. We are overorganized— look at any DD officer roster and the list of collateral duties. Why not make the only grades on administrative inspections “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory”?
Many crews are not told the mission of their ship for the day, or the purpose, scope, or units participating in fleet exercises—often little attempt is made to give crews a blow- by-blow description of maneuvers in progress. Why not always take time at the end of fleet exercises for a critique by seniors so that junior officers can be instructed and interested in the proceedings?
The operating forces of the Navy are overcommitted when the pace is so frantic that time to pursue professional study, make beneficial contacts in other units, or even time
to play a peaceful game of Acey-Deucy has vanished. A reduction of operation schedules by a flat 20% for all types of operations would go far towards easing the tension which converts a professional man anxious to escape to his home, his basement hobbies, and when he can, to the civilian world.
An excellent article some years ago in the Proceedings recommended that general Navy Department paperwork be directed to type commanders for screening and implementation instead of being sent direct to individual commands. Type commanders can evaluate the over-all work load of their individual units; the Navy Department cannot.
Certainly it is not the Navy’s intention to disrupt family life unnecessarily. Yet, absences from home of six to nine months cannot be considered normal in today’s life. We have a married Navy down to seaman apprentice. Junior line officers face the first long sea tour of six years just at the wrong time for their families and see three more years of frequent separations just when they are at the point of decision of making the Navy a career. And on ships finally back in home port, watches are generally stood one in three so that the point is constantly kept in mind. It would be a lot of trouble, but worthwhile, to rotate junior officers ashore for two years upon completion of their first three years at sea.
Why not decrease the frequency of all inport watches to one in four? I cannot agree with Commander Crenshaw’s recommendation that we re-establish permanent foreign fleets or squadrons since this would make the Navy dependent on a foreign base and destroy that mobility which gives naval forces so much unique value today. Instead we should have a faster rotation. Could we not make tours with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets no more than four months in duration for large ships and three months for small ships? We have our choice: a fast rotation of ships or a fast rotation of personnel in the ships.
The Navy is making much progress today in coming back towards the professional spirit which was once so much in evidence. An example of our own short-comings, such as Commander Crenshaw’s article, is periodi-
cally necessary. There should be no such word as “can’t” when we face the answers to the problem of the massive continuing personnel turnover. When ships can only fight when the first team has the watch, we are only 30% effective or less.
If a captain of a ship decides that he is having fun, and if he is determined to have his people have fun, and if he actively seeks ways to make his cruise and everything that the ship does, fun, then, he must and will make progress.
Lieutenant Wayne P. Hughes, usn.— Junior officers must have been pleased and a little surprised to read Commander Crenshaw’s accurate exposition of their objections to a naval career. Most of us junior officers wondered, I think, if senior officers, who never faced the decision for or against a career as it presents itself today, could understand what the real roots of the problem were. Commander Crenshaw summarized the complaints—lack of prestige, the promotion system, the administrative burden, and unstable operations—so eloquently that his article is sure to evoke many and lengthy comments. It is a minor triumph of selfrestraint for me to restrict myself to one short comment on one of his points.
Of all the topics of conversation in junior officer gripe sessions, the favorite is the one they feel every day, the subject of too much correspondence, too many reports, and overadministration. Some of them are real gripes, some are not, but every ensign could talk for thirty minutes extemporaneously on the subject and interject at least six concrete illustrations. So could every lieutenant, and I fancy, so could every captain. Instead of an illustration, let me emphasize the significance of its effect with an analogy:
Every city has speed limits. They are usually rigidly enforced, but of course there are always a few gay blades who still exceed the limits. Yet, nobody contemplates putting governors on cars every time they enter the city to eliminate all speeding. If somebody bothered to analyze why, he’d probably give these reasons: First, it would take a great deal of time and money to rig and unrig the governors. Second, everybody being mechanically prevented from speeding, you’d never find out who were the irresponsible drivers until they were not just arrested for speeding, but for killing or breaking the law in some other reckless fashion. Third, everyone is being penalized for the actions of a guilty few. Fourth, in case speed is needed in an emergency, it would not be there. Fifth, people wouldn’t live in the town.
That’s what administrative overcontrol does in the Navy:
1.It takes valuable time and costs money.
2. It prevents the Navy from uncovering and weeding out the weak links—until a major disaster occurs.
3. It stifles the initiative of the energetic, the thinking, and especially the creative young brains in the Navy. It binds their minds in such a mass of details that they can’t see through the white paper fog to the most important thing—improving battle readiness.
4. If war comes, initiative is no longer there. The mind that has been drilled to think that a misplaced comma is a major sin is slow to risk a life, a ship, a battle.
5. Last, and the main point of course, bright young men don’t stay in such an organization.
No, I’m not advocating anarchy. My 'imaginary city isn’t going to abolish speed laws; neither is it going to dissolve the police force. I am echoing the cry for fewer and shorter reports, fewer and shorter directives, less repetition of directives and reports down the chain of command, and shorter administrative inspection check-off lists (but not shorter or less frequent inspections). Let us concentrate on operational smartness that is demanding to the utmost, but in an administrative atmosphere of such freedom as to permit growth of confidence that will only develop when there is the knowledge of confidence “down” of which Commandor Crenshaw so wisely remarks.
German Articles in the Proceedings
(See page 509, May, 1956 Proceedings)
Richard Hanser.—I began reading “Hitler and the German Officer Corps” in your May issue under the impression that the Proceedings was offering some historical insight into a serious problem by a writer in a position to speak with authority. What I found instead was a wretched rehash of threadbare evasions and falsifications which would be contemptible in a German illustrated weekly, let alone under the imprint of the United States Naval Institute.
Merely to outline Assmann’s calculated omissions and deliberate distortions would take as much space as the article itself. The very footnotes were marvels of obfuscation. What a windfall for a writer with “close personal contact with the Germans in high command” to find an outlet for his justifications of the Nazi High Command in such a journal as the Proceedings which bears the imprimatur of the United States Navy![1] It is a propagandist’s dream.
An officer of the Assmann stripe would naturally not understand an officer of the calibre of Henning von Tresckow, who is, of course, denigrated in the article. After the plot of July 20th had failed, Tresckow faced death with the words: “Now they will fall upon us and vilify us. . . . When I am shortly called on to give an account of myself before God I am confident that I can justify my action against Hitler with a clear conscience.
. . . The moral worth of a man begins at the point where he is willing to die for his convictions.”
Viewpoint on Logistics
(See page 97, January, 1957 Proceedings)
Commodore Dudley W. Knox, usn (ret.)—Professor Albion is quite wrong in asserting that the “oldtime naval line” officers regarded logistics as “something rather beneath them” and took it “for granted that the necessary materials would be on hand when needed, but were not particularly concerned with how they got there.” (“Bibliographical Survey of Logistics,” January, 1957 Proceedings.) In fact, the truth is precisely opposite. Necessarily their cheerfully accepted duties were largely logistical and scrupulously performed.
The assumption that the oldtime Pursers and Paymasters carried the main logistic
burden is erroneous. Their mainly fiscal duties were supplemented with supplying food, clothing and “small stores.” But the vast bulk of logistics was handled by the line—with Engineers and Constructors, since amalgamated with the line. Beginning about 1910 our efficient Supply Corps gradually took over cost accounting, general store-keeping, and inventory control. Notwithstanding such creditable advances the line retained the major logistic tasks.
A few illustrations should suffice to clarify this. When coal was indispensable in huge quantities, its procurement, storage, and distribution were exclusively line functions. After a term as President, Naval War College, Admiral W. L. Rodgers, usn, chose to command the first “Fleet Train” of auxiliary vessels for logistic support of the fleet. The great logistic category of ordnance has always been exclusively under the line. The greater logistic category of ships is now similarly a line function. Manifestly logistics are not “beneath” the line.
Professor Albion’s assertion that “The tone in which an oldtime naval line officer spat out the word paymaster was anything but complimentary” seems also grossly misleading. Any large organization may easily contain a few persons deserving of derogatory tones. Such special cases among old paymasters were no doubt spoken of in that fashion by line and other officers. Similarly the writer has often heard oldtime paymasters use derogatory tones about line officers. Nevertheless, in general, the feeling between oldtime line and pay officers was excellent.
IIMS Revenge
D. R. Overall Hatswell.—Mr. Frederick J. Hoertz has unfortunately marred his delightful picture of HMS Revenge, which appears on the cover of the January, 1957, issue of United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
The Royal Standard worn at the main is of the pattern not introduced until the accession to the Throne of HM Queen Victoria, which is manifestly absurd since this event occurred in 1837.
The Revenge (441 tons; 34 guns; launched 1577; lost 1591)*should have worn the 1411 pattern Standard which was in vogue until
the accession to the Throne of King James I in 1603.
In lay, not heraldic terms, this Standard may be described as follows:
First quarter: Three gold fleurs-de-lys, two and one, on a blue field (France); second quarter: Three gold lions (or leopards) on a red field (England); third quarter: as the second quarter; fourth quarter: as the first quarter.
The inclusion of the French arms dates from 1340 when H.M. King Edward III asserted his claim to the Throne of France. They remained part of the British coat-of-arms until 1801 when they were eliminated by King George III.
Ration Reporting under Adverse Conditions
Commander E. D. Wichels, usn.—I recently was given a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in June, 1942, by then Lieutenant W. J. Giles, Jr., usn, CO of the USS John D. Edwards. I believe Proceedings readers will find it interesting.
(Editor’s Note: Agreeing with the above comment, we requested and received from Captain Giles (now retired and residing in Walnut Creek, California) permission to print the letter.)
* * *
BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS NAVY DEPARTMENT
| Washington, D. C. L10-5(l)DD216(ASA-X-26) 25 March 1942 |
From: | The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies |
| and Accounts |
To: | The Commanding Officer USS John |
| D. Edwards |
Subj: | Ration Record for October 1941 |
References: Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual Article 512-3(b) of subject manual
1. Ration records for October 1941 and subsequent months have not been received in the Bureau. Information is requested as to when they will be forwarded.
2. In this connection, attention is invited to instructions in reference which require the rendition of ration records within five days after the close of the month.
By direction of the Paymaster General * * *
USS John D. Edwards (216)
DD216/L10-5(0122) June 28, 1942
From: The Commanding Officer To: The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts
Subj: Ration Records
Ref: (a)BuS&A ltr L10-5(1)/DD216/(ASA-S-
25) dated 3-25-42.
1. The Commanding Officer is grieved and astonished to receive reference (a).
2. The Commanding Officer is fully cognizant of the instructions contained in Article 512-3(b) of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual, and believes that his close compliance with the provisions outlined therein is the probable reason for non-receipt in the Bureau of the records.
3. On November 5, 1941, the ration record for the month of October, 1941, of the USS John D. Edwards was placed in the mails in Manila, Philippine Islands. The Commanding Officer has no knowledge of what happened to this correspondence, but reminds the Bureau that mail from Manila was subsequently irregular due to the outbreak of war and suggests the possibility that, if it ever left Manila at all, it might have been placed in a vessel later captured by the Nipponese.
4. The ration record for November, 1941, was placed in the mails on December 5, 1941, in Balikpapan, Dutch Borneo, N.E.I. The Commanding Officer has no definite knowledge as to the fate which befell this record, but respectfully reminds the Bureau that the Dutch of Balikpapan came actively engaged in war but two (2) days later, and very few mail steamers left that port before its capture. It is highly within the realm of probability that the industrious Dutch may have placed these records in the SS Ruth Alexander of American registry, known to have been sunk on December 9, 1941.
5. The ration record for December, 1941 was placed in the mails on January 5, 1942, at His Majesty’s Naval Base, Singapore, Straits Settlements, Malaya, likewise, in this case, the Commanding Officer has no knowledge of the fate of these records, but believes it possible that the rapid retreat of the Australian troops for four hundred miles down a jungle-covered, swamp- infested peninsula, with only four per cent casualties, may have allowed the Japanese to arrive and beseige this citadel before the slower moving British Naval mail clerks were able to put these records aboard an outbound steamer.
6. The ration record of this vessel for January, 1942, was placed in the mails in Koepang, Timor, N.E.I., on Feburary 5, 1942, and later transferred to a Royal Australian Air Force plane which took off in the general direction of Port
Darwin, Australia. This plane failed to reach its destination, and its fate is unknown, but the pilot’s bullet-riddled body was later recovered from the sea. It is believed the record was lost.
7. The ration record for February, 1942 was placed in the mails on March 1,1942, in Soerabaja, Java, NAT. The Japanese captured Soerabaja twenty-four (24) hours later, and on the afternoon of March 1, 1942, a direct hit with a one-thousand pound bomb was made on the post office of that city—it is rumored. The Commanding Officer is at a loss as to whether these valuable records were useless paper work kept by the avid Japanese.
8. Reports for March and subsequent months have been regularly forwarded from Australian ports, but usually ten (10) days to two (2) weeks late due to the difficulty encountered in waiting for prices to be furnished from Royal Australian Naval victualing Yards who were under the impression that we were fv.hting and in return they were supposed to be feeding. Information is desired from the Bureau if any of the above records were received prior to the end of the fiscal year. This vessel is forwarding corrected copies of all ration records commencing with February, 1942 in order to claim ten cents per night, ration authorized in BuS&A dispatch 281600 of January, 1942, which reached this command on June 5, 1942.
9. Information is further requested from the Bureau if copies of ration records prior to February, 1942, are desired or if the Commanding Officer may continue to consider these as useless paper work inasmuch as there was so little food available that reminding commissary personnel of their past difficulties in their present state of high nervous tension seems scarcely desirable.
/s/W. J. Giles, Jr.
BUREAU OF SUPPLIES & ACCOUNTS
Washington, D. C.
8 August 1942
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies
& Accounts
To: The Commanding Officer USS John
D. Edwards
Subject: Ration Records
References: (a) BuS&A ltr L10-5(1)DD216
(ASA-I-25) dated March 25, 1942 (b) CO Ltr DD216,L10-5(0122) of 28 June 1942
1. In view of the statements in reference (b), which were read with profound interest and appreciation, the Bureau will take no further action on the missing ration records.
/s/W. J. Carter
[1] (Editor’s Note: The U. S. Naval Institute is a private organization, and its publications do not bear the imprimatur of the U. S. Navy.)