“If we prepare voluntarily for a situation in which we can counter non-atomic attack only with atomic weapons, because we lack adequate classical forces and have failed to prepare for conventional war, we are already marked in the future annals of history as atomic war criminals born of degeneracy. If the West shrinks in the last minute, however, from resorting to the weapons, the only alternative that remains is capitulation”
Helmut Staeke
Current hue and cry from many quarters insists that no matter how much has been spent in the past to develop nuclear delivery capability it is imperative that we waste no more money and effort on other “outmoded” weapons but must immediately devote every effort towards the biggest, best, and especially the most nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The rationalization behind such pronouncements and proposed actions seems to be but a single thought: “We must increase our massive retaliation forces to such an extent that the Soviets will never attack us.”
Whereas it is agreed that we need a finite retaliation force, the authors feel that the nation is in danger of becoming so bewitched with the basic power of nuclear weapons that we have forgotten their very serious limitations, limitations which may well prove more dangerous than nuclear war itself. For we may soon find ourselves the proud possessor of a capability to retaliate which depends upon initial action elsewhere, but which is incapable of projecting national policy on any scale less than nuclear war. We dare not chase the spectre of Soviet nuclear war in such a way that we abandon those less dramatic, yet vital, requirements of a balanced program for security.
We must ask ourselves if the proposed expenditure of large sums of monies and critical increments of time are being directed toward our greatest danger. For, if the greatest danger lies in Soviet nuclear war alone, then we are on the right track. But, if the danger of Soviet nuclear war is not our greatest danger, then we must reassess our future programs so that we can meet the real threat. We dare not inadvertently place ourselves in such a position that we find ourselves so tied to massive retaliation that there is no other course of action open to us to meet Soviet expansion.
The Big Question
In assessing our present position and future course of action, we must ask ourselves one basic question:
Is our capability to contain Communist military action entirely vested in our massive retaliatory concept and, if so, is this concept fitted to our national objectives? In other words, is this all we have, and can it do what we want it to do?
To answer this question we must examine our present capabilities and our direction of development. At the present time we have some conventional forces, aircraft nuclear delivery systems vested in the Air Force and Naval Aviation, and short range tactical missile teams. We can expect, with reasonable certainty, to be armed with a family of small “clean” nuclear weapons in the near future plus an IRBM and I CBM capability.
Considering the limited size of our present conventional forces, we can readily visualize military situations, short of general war, where we would be faced with an unacceptable defeat unless we resort to the use of the small atomics. At this point, there is no guarantee that the use, by us, of “X” size weapon will not mushroom by reason of progressive build-up of each retaliation, into general war. Under such circumstances our massive retaliation force is imperative and we find ourselves tied to it, if we wish to project our national policies. In addition, any acceptance of a concept that small atomics can be used without spreading to general war not only implies, but demands, rationality and a willingness to confine the conflict on the part of both participants. It would do well for us to consider the pressures which would be exerted by an hysterical populace if the Soviets used small, clean atomics on “our boys.” If we agree that there would be some irrationality on our part, it follows that it may be extremely dangerous to assume rationality on the part of the Soviet leaders on all occasions.
Further, as we move into the long range missile era, we find inherent guidance errors so large as to preclude the use of anything but a nuclear warhead, for both economic and lethal area reasons. Therefore, we seem to be moving closer to the point of absolute reliance upon massive retaliation to back up our political pronouncements.
As our conventional forces are further reduced, we become more and more committed to an atomic capability in order to offset the conventional inequality. We find ourselves forced into the position of using the atomic weapons or backing down on our stated policy. For example, if conventional forces are incapable of preventing an unacceptable loss, then our choice is simple:
1. Use the small atomic, while accepting the risk of expansion to general war; or
2. Back down from our stated policy.
If we choose 1, the end result is conjectural at best and disastrous at its worst.
If we choose 2, we must be willing to back down not only in any one particular instance but in all future instances, until ultimately we are again faced with two choices:
1. We capitulate and the USSR wins all; or
2. We initiate nuclear general war in an attempt to pre-empt the superior status. If this is done, we may win the nuclear exchange but will lose the peoples of the world. So—in the end—we lose because of our massive retaliation.
We must also ask ourselves, “Were the Soviet Army to invade Western Europe, would we be willing to use our massive retaliation as a means of annihilating the invading armies?” Or, would we hesitate for fear of killing the populace of the “third” country? Have we not here a weapon which, as seen from allied eyes, adds a fifth freedom, not facetiously stated to be that of “freedom by atomization”? It would seem that at least some of the current anti-Americanism demonstrated abroad is a manifestation of the fear of being caught between the two Great Nuclear Powers.
What Is the Threat?
Since it appears that we are advancing further towards the concept of vesting our military capability in massive retaliation, we must now examine the military threat which confronts us, to determine whether we are moving in the correct direction.
World attention has been centered, since 1945, upon the mass destruction capability of the atomic bomb. It has been assumed that any aggressor would concentrate his attention upon strengthening his atomic capability and improving his ability to deliver such bombs in mass against his enemy. Such has been the United States’ assumption, which has been the basis for the build-up of our own massive retaliation capability. This build-up has taken place at the expense of conventional forces. Further, this military capability has been the basis for our concept—our national strategic concept—of massive retaliation.
Retaliation against what? Obviously, against a massive atomic attack against the United States by the Soviet Union.
Let us examine how accurate this estimate of ours has been. Has the Soviet Union in fact concentrated exclusively upon its atomic capability? The answer is absolutely not! Do we need a massive retaliatory capability? We certainly do! But, as this paper will show, this is not all we need.
On VE-Day, 1945, the Soviet Union had in the field a gigantic land army, characterized by heavy armor and high firepower in the individual soldier. The Navy played solely the role of protector of the seaward flank of the land army. Aviation was designed primarily to provide close support and defense of the ground forces. Two-thirds of the combat air strength of Soviet Aviation consisted of fighters and heavily armored ground attack types, the remaining one third being made up principally of light bombers plus a few antiquated bomber types falling into the then current classification of medium and heavy bombers.
In what way have these forces developed during the past thirteen years? Has our tenaciously held concept that the Soviet Union would bend every effort to develop a tremendous strategic bomber striking force at the expense of a balanced force proved correct? Or, has the Soviet Union gone instead completely into the nuclear armed missile environment, again leaving behind her reliance on conventional land, sea, and air arms? The fact is that neither of these courses of action has been taken.
The USSR has made excellent propaganda headlines over demobilization of her armed forces and removal of troops from foreign soil. The point generally overlooked is the fact that the Red Army, while no doubt having considerably reduced numerical strength, has continued such heavy emphasis towards increasing conventional firepower and mobility as to largely fill the demobilization gap. In itself the term “gap” is undoubtedly a misnomer, as the Soviet Union went through no such rapid decompression type of demobilization as did the United States and her allies. The Soviet leaders, not bothered by considerations of compassion and sentiment, carefully phased demobilization over a several year period which permitted development and production of new conventional weapons to give remaining forces an overwhelming ground punch against the demobilized West. This development program has indeed reached such a state as to permit export of excellent quality modern weapons in quantity to those countries outside the Bloc which are unaware of, or willing to accept, the implied risks of obligation for favors received.
Withdrawal of troops from foreign soil has proved an excellent progapanda medium, but without the slightest meaning as regards military advantage. The trend started with withdrawal from Chinese soil even before Chinese Communists were seen to be in firm control. Second, the several thousand “advisers” withdrew from North Korea as soon as the United States was committed to withdrawal from South Korea and as soon as native forces in the North were definitely established in a situation of incomparable military superiority over the South Korean constabulary forces. Next, the Soviets suddenly acquiesced to our long suggested ending of joint occupation in Austria. Little or no advantage was given up since the country vacated was left in a military vacuum into which the Communist forces could, and can still, jump on a moment’s notice. Porkkala Naval Base, leased under pressure from the Finns, came next on the retrenching program. This seemingly generous gesture was undoubtedly a welcome change as far as the Finnish peope were concerned. The move was, however, completely devoid of military implication, since more than adequate bases exist only 35 miles away in Northern Estonia. Finally, in 1956 and again in the first part of 1958, the Soviet Union has conducted a simultaneous noisy withdrawal and demobilization of a portion of forces in the European satellite states, size of withdrawals being directly proportional to the strength of native Communist forces and Soviet faith in their political reliability. We must therefore conclude that any reduction in numerical strength of conventional forces has only been accomplished after an absolute assurance in the minds of Soviet leaders that their advances in equipment capability and superiority in numbers and disposition after proposed withdrawals and cuts in strength were sufficient to guarantee overwhelming ground superiority. We find, therefore, continued reliance on ground forces as a prime support of national policy and a key threat in the event of war.
The Red Navy blossomed forth after the war with a large construction program emphasizing cruisers, destroyers, and long range submarines. While this naval building program has probably tapered off to a large degree, it has been responsible for the rapid movement of the Red Navy into a strong number two position in the world’s navies. Commencing with the 1952 Spithead Review, Soviet naval vessels began to be seen outside home waters for essentially the first time since Czarist days. More striking is the well publicized fact that the USSR now has more than twice as many long range submarines as Nazi Germany had all submarine types, short and long range, in 1939.
Soviet naval aviation, rather feeble in World War II, appears to have actually grown in size since the war and, as demonstrated in naval reviews, plays a prominent role in the Navy. Strength is estimated at about 3,000 aircraft, largely jet.
Thus, we conclude that the Soviet Navy, while probably suffering some numerical cuts after the war, has, through its construction program in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines and its acquisition of modern jet aircraft, moved far from the limiting seaward flank concept of 1945 into an uncontested number two position in world sea power. We find the Soviet Union has absorbed well the teachings of Mahan, and in practice thereof has developed a considerable threat in the event of war.
The direction of development in aviation of the Red Army is equally of interest. If our theory that the USSR plans all-out nuclear war is correct, then we should expect that their aircraft industry would have concentrated on only two types, namely, long range strategic bombers with which to strike us and interceptor aircraft to prevent our retaliation.
What actually happened was that shortly after the war we become tremendously impressed with the Soviet job of copying our World War II B-29 bomber and gave little or no attention to what the Soviets were doing in the way of jet fighter development, at least not until the MIG-15 began to make the headlines during the Korean war. The world’s press, egged on by public Soviet display of new jet bomber types, has continued for several years to conjure the development of an awesome nuclear striking force which only now begins to seem questionable in the light of known efforts to build modern conventional ground forces, naval forces, effective electronics detection systems, fighter and antiaircraft missile defense, and the development and launching of earth satellites.
Even this does not take into account the vast effort made in reconstruction, development of natural resources, communications media, and air transport, to name but a few fields.
At this point, the authors would like to state that it is not their intent to leave the impression that the Soviet Union has not, or is no longer devoting a considerable effort towards development of a capability to deliver some number of nuclear weapons against the United States. What we are asking for is a recognition of this threat in its proper scale. That is, to see that Soviet leaders have moved to checkmate our nuclear delivery capability while busily developing superiority in conventional forces. As a result, they have reached the position of being able to declare for cessation of nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament, knowing full well that if we agree we are left largely defenseless. At the same time, if we do not agree, we may expect to be belabored as warmongers by the Soviet propaganda machine.
New Estimates for Old?
A further word of caution. It appears we are beginning to recognize that we have, for several years, overestimated Soviet offensive air capability. At the same time, however, we see ourselves caught up by the excitement of the earth-satellite era and as a result starting to build excessive estimates of Soviet missile capability. Again we begin to buy the idea of massive deterrence at the expense of all else.
What the authors desire to point out is that this can be fully as dangerous as, and much more expensive than, our previous moves towards placing all military capability in the aircraft nuclear delivery concept. Casting aside the smokescreen of recent missile hullabaloo, we should realize that we and the Soviet Union are in about the same stage of missile development. We must also realize that in the foreseeable future missile warfare will never substitute completely for conventional warfare means.
Consideration of all the progress made in the military field by the Soviets can only lead to the observation that the primary emphasis has been on land, sea, and air defense and conventional striking power. Such progress cannot have been accomplished without a tremendous funneling of the design and production capacity of the Soviet Union. Clearly, any thoughtful analysis of the total direction and accomplishment of the Soviet Union’s military strengths during the years since the war, can lead only to the conclusion that prime effort has been placed on attaining the maximum sea and air defense capability against any attack that might be launched against her. At the same time, she is continuing primary emphasis on development of her powerful land forces for use in the event that she ever becomes convinced that she cannot complete her desired expansion plans by any other means.
Fitting Policy to Threat
In devoting so much of our effort over the past several years towards development of massive retaliation, we have made ourselves vulnerable to the Soviet military machine. This provides a constant-threat weapon which the USSR is able to wave while continuing its steadfast program of division, penetration, subversion, and absorption.
On the basis of the above, the following courses of action appear to be indicated:
1. Maintain and continue development of an adequate deterrent force, determined by military needs, capable of nuclear retaliatory delivery sufficient to keep the Sino-Soviet Bloc from initiating nuclear war. Implicit within this is that, as one guaranteed delivery system is overtaken by time and technology, we shift rapidly, with proper overlap, to a capability of greater guarantee. Not listed in any order of priority this should include:
a. Maintain a land-based and sea-based air capability for delivery of sufficient nuclear weapons against those targets determined to cause a probability that the Soviets would not institute nuclear attack against U. S. or free- world cities. Public statements on this capability should not belabor the destruction of cities and people, as has sometimes been the case in the past. Such threatening pronouncements serve only to keep the Soviet populace in a psychological state susceptible to “warmonger” propaganda. However, knowledge of this capability should be well known to those Soviet leaders who determine policy.
b. A capability for delivery of a finite number of ICBM’s with nuclear warheads at the earliest practicable date. When the operational date arrives, publicly announce the fact. Subsequently, make a limited (implies finiteness) build-up of ICBM strength to supplement, and through long-term progress eventually supplant, the manner of air delivery nuclear deterrent in “a” above.
c. Prosecute the Polaris program vigorously, placing a finite number on submerged armed patrol at the earliest possible date to supplant the foreign based IRBM and to supplement the U. S. based ICBM.
2. Immediately inaugurate a program for the development of light, conventional, nonnuclear equipment for front line use by ground forces. Rapid mobility over adverse terrain is absolutely essential. These weapons must be superior to those possessed by the Soviets, inasmuch as the only way to overcome expected superiority in numbers is with superiority in firepower and mobility.
3. Commence an augmentation of the Army and the Marine Corps to reach a point where we will have a capability, combined with allied forces, to withstand a conventional attack until mobilization and reinforcement can take place. With the prerogative of initiation on the enemy side, we must plan for and be ready to accept initial losses.
4. Develop the mobility of present and augmented forces so that the stationing of additional U. S. forces abroad will not be required. We cannot accept the premise that our troops must remain on foreign soil forever.
5. Reallocate excess industrial and personnel capacity from the overdeveloped massive deterrent concept to improve tactical and close air support plus the anti-submarine warfare capability.
Conclusion
We have thus seen that, rather than exclusively building up her nuclear long-range forces for delivery of a smashing blow on the United States, the Soviet Union has continued to maintain large, powerful land, air, and sea forces. At the same time, she has continued to prosecute her policy of world domination with subversion and infiltration by economic and psychological means.
By continually propagandizing the threat of nuclear war, aggravated by Sputnik launchings, the Soviet Union has duped the Free World into further reducing its belief in conventional forces. By so doing the Free World has become more dependent upon atomic weapons for its survival. Once having become entirely dependent on the nuclear weapon, the Free World will be able to do but one of two things: (1) sit helplessly by while the Soviets call the tune, or (2) start a nuclear war, which we are all trying to prevent.
Expensive though it may seem, on first glance, the United States has ample economic means and must now have the will, properly directed, to give it a third choice—that of standing off the Communist threat while gradually reaching real “containment.” If our stand-off capability can become balanced, that is, conventional as well as nuclear, thereby firmly supporting our political, cultural, and economic actions, then containment is a goal that we can and will reach.
Both Commander Green and Commander Burt are graduates from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1942 and are currently assigned to duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The former has had extensive service in naval aviation and was CO, VF-53, and on the Staff of Commander, Air Force Pacific, during the Korean War. The latter, a gunnery officer during World War II, has had extensive experience in patrol aircraft squadrons and was U. S. Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air in Helsinki, Finland, 1954–57.
★
IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE WHICH WAY
Contributed by Lieutenant (S) A. W. Driega, RCN
During one of the spring cruises to the Caribbean area, a Canadian cruiser joined forces with several large American ships and ships of the Royal Navy attached to CinC AWI.
The senior officer present being in the American aircraft carrier, set forth a series of exercises for the Task Group. During the first day of exercises the Canadian cruiser regretted very much that she was unable to take part because of steering trouble. The second day apologies were again sent, owing to gremlins in the fire control system, and so it went on for the next two days.
The American Admiral was a trifle annoyed and on the last day of the exercises sent the following message: “Can you do 30 knots?”
The Captain of the Canadian cruiser messaged back, “Ahead or astern, Sir?”
(The Naval Institute will pay $5.00 for each anecdote accepted for publication in the Proceedings.)