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Are Critiques Critical?
Commander R. L. Farrell, Jr., U. S. Navy.—We have all witnessed the classic fleet exercise wherein weeks are spent preparing the operation order, umpire rules are laid on, and units from both sides are briefed on exercise conditions and conduct. At 0800 on a Monday morning all hands get underway and take stations for the event. During the ensuing several days the basically canned exercise takes place and much frenzy and effort are expended to achieve planned objectives prior to the end of the operation.
Following the signal “FINEX” everyone becomes a “friendly” and proceeds independently to port and to the club. The next day is provided to “smooth up” logs and track charts and, in general, to align ducks for the scheduled critique. The critique itself is a canned exercise with 15 minutes allowed for each unit presentation, a few remarks by unit commanders, and a closing remark by the officer scheduling the exercise. Everyone sighs relief, is thankful it’s all behind, and files out with thoughts ahead to the next scheduled employment for his unit or command.
What happens to the findings and recommendations of this critique? It was the culmination of great planning, effort, physical movement, and expense. Were the several innovations and mistakes analyzed in detail, in the same way steps of a scientific experiment would remain under scrutiny for as long as it would take to wring out all usable intelligence? Were the results of this exercise compared with those of similar exercises? Would such comparison add to a stockpile of the effectiveness of individual “friendly” and “enemy” tactics or actions, so that future exercise planners would have this wealth of knowledge in the planning stage? Would these and future element commanders be advised of analytical discoveries? The answer to these questions is regrettably, and tragically, in the negative.
An anti-submarine warfare exercise was
To gain real results and long range benefits from exercises at sea, mistakes and innovations must be analyzed in detail, and all usable intelligence extracted.
held just prior to the Korean War, in which the carrier task group was to make a submarine-opposed approach and entrance to the port-of-call, to pass through one point at the start of the exercise (COMEX) and another at the finish, some eight hours in all. It was decided to reverse the pattern of the subs winning consistently and take advantage of their limitations and frailties. A sea going tug was sent off to the east to make radio transmissions similar to those heard on a carrier’s land-launch frequency, and flights of aircraft were assigned to orbit the tug in a typical landing pattern. Meanwhile, the carrier and destroyers took a northwesterly heading, employed visual signalling, and observed total radiation silence. (That meant sonars, fathometers, the works.) Sure enough, at COMEX plus two hours, the tug broadcast S1ghting two periscopes nosing around her. One sub was attacked by the aircraft and killed.” The other got away and took course f°r the point of FINEX. Approaching the 1INEX point, the carrier radiated two sweeps °n her SP radar, picked up the snorkel 2,000 yards ahead of the screen, and vectored a can ln for a “kill” and a clean sweep. The carrier force members were collectively beside themselves with the rare flush of AS W victory. That elation lasted only until the final ruling at the critique, that since the subs had to carry all their exercise torpedoes back into port, the exercise had afforded very little training and was all-in-all pretty unsatisfactory! The carrier task group members slunk away from that critique wondering what the “A” in ASW stood for.
The antithesis of this type critique evolved in ASW circles with the inception of Task Group Alfa. This group was formed to accelerate the development of tactics and means for countering the out-sized threat imposed by Russia’s 500 submarines. Time was not on our side. The “state of the art,” in ASW, had become more state than art in the previous 15 years and much catching-up was in order. No catalogue or library of modern ASW information existed and the task group had to start pretty close to zero. Mistakes made in exercises had to be put under an absolute spotlight in post-exercise critiques, in order to glean usable information for the immediate modification of tactics and procedures. Many weeks and trips to sea were required before the basic mistakes were eliminated and the group began to function as an effective team. Opposing exercise submarine crews responded magnificently to the needs of the task group, pulled out more and more typical exercise “stops,” poured on the criticism of task group tactical errors, and indicated which new or modified tactics or procedures had the most merit and should be pursued. Steady progress and task group effectiveness bore out the desirability of keeping units together on a permanent basis. The findings of this group flowed to other ASW commands in the form of Tactical Notes and annual report sum- marizations of operations. Other task groups could benefit directly by the findings of this first permanent-type ASW task group. The capability existed to form other task groups in an emergency, and allow them to start with the newest information rather than vintage WW II.
The ability of this group to accelerate knowledge at better than a war-time rate was due to many things. These included the status of permanency of forces, priority approval of needs, and the acute interest and ready cooperation of shore-based commands. One of the more startling discoveries, however, was that such improvement was effected with typical people and standard equipment. Valley Forge, flagship for the task group, was about the oldest carrier on the line, and had not received the modernization and new installations most of the .ExtrAr-class had. The other units were similarly typical or nonexotic. The personnel in the group were those that happened to be so serving when the group was designated.
The key to this progress was the intensified
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy may be exchanged.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
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search, yea demand, for criticism of group procedures and tactics. Errors or short-comings were pursued with vigor at least equal to tasks done well. Following one of the first exercise periods as Alfa, a destroyer commander included in his post-exercise report that the transmissions to and from the carrier led him to believe they were apparently being paid by the word instead of by the month! This is cited as a typical example of constructive criticism that must be the basis of thanks, vice censure.
Post-exercise critiques should not be limited by a presentation schedule resembling a dentist’s appointment book. If it was felt necessary to expand the effort and money to hold an exercise, it should be mandatory that the critique and reports bring out new knowledge and/or recommendations. Aviators say that every flight imparts new knowledge. Surely a week-long venture by a task group makes available a wealth of new findings. Critique results should be analyzed in such a methodical way, as to confirm or question the results obtained in similar exercises. This information should be sorted, resolved, and then stored in catalogue manner, to be provided to all subsequent exercise participants.
Participants should carry out future exercises with fore-knowledge of happenings in given circumstances, and they should maintain a critical eye to plus or minus variations while such exercises are in progress. Variations, serious sliort-comings, and new phenomena should form the basis of post-exercise critiques. These critiques should last as long as necessary to ferret out all available new information. If nothing is learned, the exercise was either largely a waste, or the results of given conditions can be considered stable and predictable. Critiques must be critical, and all attendees must be receptive to criticism as the best vehicle supporting progress.
"The Closed Ice Box of East Siberia”
(See pages 54-58, July, 1961 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Lyle C. Brown, U. S. Naval Reserve.—In his timely article on the Sea of Okhotsk region, Lieutenant Colonel Edwards emphasizes that “only the northern coast of Hokkaido remains to prevent the area from becoming the complete captive of
Communist powers.” Therefore, it seems significant to point out that Stalin recognized the importance of this coastal region and at the end of World War II he vainly sought to persuade President Truman that Russian forces should occupy the northern half of Hokkaido.
In Volume I of his Memoirs, Truman relates that copies of General Order No. 1 (the surrender order drafted in Washington and subsequently issued by the Emperor to Japan’s military forces) were transmitted to the British, Chinese, and Russian chiefs of state in mid-August, 1945. Stalin immediately requested that the order be modified to direct the surrender of Japanese military personnel in the Kuriles to the Russians, thus guaranteeing that the Yalta agreement concerning Soviet acquisition of these islands would be implemented. Also, he proposed that the Russians should receive the surrender of Japanese forces located in that part of Hokkaido lying north of a line drawn from Kushiro on the east coast to Rumoi on the west coast. Both of these cities were to be included in the Soviet zone, but of greater importance was the fact that such an arrangement would have resulted in Soviet domination of the Japanese side of strategic La Perouse Strait. Furthermore, it would have given the Russians control over all of Hokkaido’s northern coast, thus completing the Communist encirclement of the Sea of Okhotsk.
Truman answered Stalin’s message with the blunt statement that all Japanese forces on the four major islands would surrender to General MacArthur as originally planned. However, the President did agree to modify General Order No. 1 so that Japanese troops in the Kuriles would be directed to lay down their arms to the Russians; but at the same time he notified Stalin that the United States desired “air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some of the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial use.”
In his reply the Russian dictator expressed astonishment that his request for a share in the occupation of Hokkaido had been rejected. Also Stalin declared that there had been no discussion at Yalta or Potsdam concerning American air base rights in the Kuriles; and
he denounced Truman’s notification of America’s interest in obtaining such a concession as a demand which could be presented only to a defeated enemy or to a weak ally. He also assured Truman in no uncertain terms that the U.S.S.R. could hardly be considered to belong in either of those categories.
Truman has written that he was angered by the tone of Stalin’s message and at first was inclined to leave it unanswered. Nevertheless, a reply was drafted in which the President indicated that United States interest in the Kurile Islands was limited to obtaining landing rights for military planes during the occupation of Japan and for commercial aircraft over an unspecified period. Ambassador Averell Harriman delivered Truman’s message and assured the Soviet chief that the United States did not wish to establish a Permanent fortified military base in the Kuriles.
Subsequently Stalin informed Truman that there had been a misunderstanding in regard to American .objectives and he expressed a willingness to grant landing rights for emergency cases for the duration of the Japanese occupation. Concerning the matter of landing privileges for American commercial aircraft, Stalin stated that such a concession would be granted if the United States was prepared to reciprocate by allowing similar use of one of the Aleutian Islands by Soviet commercial airplanes.
Thus President Truman made only a weak effort to alter the Yalta decision concerning the disposition of the Kuriles; however, his firmness in rejecting Stalin’s bid for Russian occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido prevented the Soviet Union from achieving complete domination of the “Ice Box of East Siberia.”
Philip O’Brien, Oakland, California. I would like to point out the following error in the map on page 56 of the July issue of the Proceedings. The line that is designated as being 70° North latitude is actually 50° North. During the period between the Russo-Japanese and Second World Wars, this parallel marked the border between Soviet Sakhalin and the Japanese possession of Karafuto.
Editor’s Note. Our thanks to Mr. O'Brien for bringing this error to our attention.
"Sledge Hammers, Lance Bombs and Q-Ships”
(See pages 76-81, April, 1961, Proceedings)
Frank Griffith, Fort Wayne, Indiana.— Commander Mercer describes the action of the Q-ship Barralong sinking a U-boat, in which its survivors swam toward Nicosian, some of them reaching it and climbing aboard, and scattering all over the freighter, even up the rigging. Ten well-armed marines, aided by the crew, eventually ran them down and wiped them out to a man. It seems the crew of the Q-ship had seen hundreds of corpses floating in the water from the torpedoed liner Arabic.
Many were the versions invented and circulated concerning the notorious “ Baralong incident,” but I am offering the following facts from The German Submarine War 1914-18 by Gibson and Prendergast.
After the U-boat had sunk, about a dozen Germans swam towards their late prize. There was nothing to prevent them from scuttling Nicosian with her valuable cargo of, all things, mules. Lieutenant-Commander Herbert, captain of Baralong, ordered guns and marines to open fire. Nevertheless, four managed to climb aboard and disappeared below. They had no arms, but plenty were available in the chart house of the abandoned steamer. Baralong pulled alongside Nicosian and the marines were ordered to recover possession of the ship. The Germans were at last discovered in the engine room, and were all shot on sight by the marines, who believed they had to deal with the assassins of Arabic.
The fact that 44 were lost in the sinking of Arabic, not hundreds as supposed, did not save the four Germans from their fate. Actually, they were from U-27, and it was their sister ship U-24 that sank Arabic.
The action of Prince Charles with U-36 was on July 24th, not 12th, and the U-boat was alongside the Danish Steamer Louise, not a British vessel.
Pargust’s action was with UC-29 and was on June 7, 1917, not 17th. The Q-ship did return to port, but was towed there.
Dunraven’s action was with UC-71 on August 8, 1917. In attempting to save the battered Q-ship, the U. S. armed yacht Noma arrived on the scene first, followed by
the British destroyers Attack and Christopher.
The article also lists a total of 190 U-boats destroyed by the Allies during World War I. It is generally assumed 178 German U-boats were actual war losses. Total enemy submarines of all nationalities lost on war cruises are summarized at 186.
Thirteen U-boats were destroyed by Q- ships as noted, but an additional eight were destroyed by decoy means.
H. Lovell Carr, Elizabeth, N. J.—As an eye witness and a member of the crew of USS Noma commanded by Lieutenant Commander Lamar F. Leahy [now Rear Admiral (Retired)] at the time of Dunraven’s unfortunate encounter with the enemy, I feel that in justice to the United States Navy and to Noma and her entire crew that certain discrepancies in the article should be corrected.
Noma arrived at the scene several hours before the two British destroyers arrived. The U-boat was giving Dunraven a good shelling. Upon our arrival, the U-boat submerged and Noma dropped a depth charge on it. Unfortunately the charge failed to explode.
Dunraven requested medical aid and a doctor was rowed over to her and was there several hours. Our lifeboat brought back to Noma three severely wounded men.
May I suggest that Chapter V, pages 168— 197 inclusive and page 194 of “The Victory at Sea” by Rear Admiral William S. Sims, will give a very good and detailed account of this action.
H. George Fletcher, Brooklyn, New York.—Commander Mercer, mentions the late Admiral Gordon Campbell, v.c., r.n. (1886-1953) and his experiences in “Q- ships” during World War I. In 1929, Campbell's account of his services aboard these ships was published in this country by Doubleday. This book, My Mystery Ships, had been published in Britain the year before, and in it, Campbell makes mention of our own Admiral Sims and an American mystery ship, the USS Santee. Since Commander Mercer has not included any notice of this ship in his article, I thought the matter worth reporting. Campbell writes (pages 218 and 220):
“The United States was now in the war, and since several of her ships were based on Queenstown, Admiral Sims, the American admiral in command, was a frequent visitor there; in fact, for some days on one occasion he flew his flag there as Commander-in-Chief while Admiral Bayly was away. On our arrival he came on board with Admiral
Bayly. We were anchored in the Roads with a lot of other merchant ships. Admiral Bayly had had no description of us, and the two admirals, much to our amusement and joy, steamed round our ship, examined us with glasses, and decided we were not the mystery ship they were looking for. They then went to nearly every other ship in the anchorage before finally coming to us. When on board, they had not much difficulty in finding the 4- inch gun and the tilting ones, as they were fairly visible to anyone walking on deck, but the two cabins quite defeated them. In fact,
I was standing with Admiral Sims within a foot of the bulkhead of the cabin and told him there was a 12-pounder a few feet off. He thought I was pulling his leg, till, by a prearranged wink of my eye through the scuttle, down came the cabin and the admiral found the muzzle of a 12-pounder at his chest. With a loud shout of ‘Gee whiz’ he took a smart step to the rear.
“Admiral Sims from this time onward always took a great interest in mystery ships, and later in the year the Americans fitted out a ship of their own at Devonport, called the Santee. She was the very last word in fitting out. I had the honour of being invited to go over her and make comments, but it was impossible to suggest any possible improvements. I was particularly struck with a large periscope they had, which looked like a stovepipe, but which enabled the officer, in safety below, to have a good all-round view. As bad luck would have it, this very fine ship was torpedoed on her first trip out of Queenstown, and the submarine never came to the surface.”
"USS Florida at Veracruz”
(See pages 158-159, August, 1961 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Herndon P. Coloney, U. S. Navy (Retired).—There is a misleading picture and at least one incorrect statement in the article regarding USS Florida.
The statement is made that USS Florida at that time, April 1914, was the largest battleship in the world. Florida and Utah carried 10 twelve-inch, 45-caliber guns in five center line turrets. The Wyoming and Arkansas carried 12 twelve-inch, 50-caliber guns in six center line turrets. USS New York and Texas the last of our coal burners—carried 10 fourteen-inch, 45-caliber guns in five center line turrets. Our two Delaware class ships, preceding Florida, also carried 10 twelve-inch, forty-five caliber guns in five center line turrets.
The photograph accompanying the article is not one of USS Florida. From the eight- inch turret visible, it appears to be one of the Rhode Island class which, along with the Connecticut class, carried both eight- and twelve- inch turrets and preceded our “dreadnought” type ships.
During World War I, USS New York, Wyoming, Florida and Delaware joined the British Grand Fleet in December 1917, forming the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet. USS 7 Mar joined this squadron in February of 1918 and Delaware was relieved by Arkansas in August of 1918. The Sixth Battle Squadron was present at the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918.
I served aboard Wyoming as an enlisted man from May 1916 through February 1920 and was rated as a First Class Turret Captain when I left the ship.
Lieutenant Commander J. F. Peck, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I, at the time, was in USS Arkansas and have a much better memory of that landing than the author, Mr. Cash Asher.
I can’t imagine an action so severe that it would induce a sea heavy enough to roll a Marine out of his bunk.
Our battalion from the “Arkie” was on the move to take the so-called “Military Academy” at dawn. The first man killed in that action was a Marine, Sammy Messner from Chicago. The first man killed on our ship was a coxswain named Fried.
It is hardly likely that the Commanding Officer of Florida would let all medical officers off the ship with a seriously ill man in the sick bay.
I was a Fireman First Class at the time and engineer of a 50-foot sailor and was in most of the shore action with our senior engineering officer, Lieutenant Commander Earl Jessup. Jonas Ingram, later vice admiral, was a Lieutenant (j.g) and was also from Arkansas.
R. M. Crosby, Los Angeles, Calif.—Forty- seven years is quite a long time to remember details, and memory plays strange tricks. As another old-timer who was there, I would like to make a few comments on Mr. Cash Asher’s story of the Occupation of Veracruz.
The incident of the arrest of the Navy men occurred at Tampico rather than at Veracruz. As I recall, a paymaster and a navy mail clerk, together with a boat’s crew, were arrested and held by the Mexican police for a short time, then released. An apology and a salute to the flag were demanded, but the demand was disregarded. Arkansas, in which I served, sailed from Hampton Roads for Tampico. A few hours before she was due to arrive, she was diverted to Veracruz.
If my memory is correct, the German merchant ship Yperanga had attempted to land a shipment of arms for the Mexicans. Florida sent a landing party ashore to prevent the material being put ashore. The landing party was fired upon and withdrew to the beach. This was at Veracruz.
About 0200 the following morning Arkansas anchored outside the breakwater and her landing party of Bluejackets and Marines embarked immediately. As the boats passed Sir Christopher Craddock’s cruisers, Berwick and Bristol, which were anchored near by, the British sailors lined the rails and called, “Give’em hell, Yanks!”
At daybreak the landing parties of our ships started up through the city, fighting their way from house to house. The cadets in the Mexican Naval Academy put up the strongest resistance and a warning was sent them that if they did not cease, the Academy would be bombarded. When the warning was ignored, one of our scout cruisers, I believe it w*as Chester, under the command of Commander (later Rear Admiral) W. A. Moffett, moved into the inner harbor and opened fire. No doubt her five-inch guns were used. Single guns, not broadsides, were fired, and quite slowly. Heavy destruction of the city was not desired, but rather pin-pointed targets.
It is a little difficult to see how the “swell then set up gave Florida enough motion so that the delirious Marine rolled out of his cot onto the deck.” Florida, even though not the largest battleship in the world, was somewhat heavy to roll violently from the effects of another ship’s relatively light guns. Then too, as I recall, all the battleships, including Florida, were outside the breakwater, while the scout cruiser was inside, quite near the beach.
As Mr. Asher indicated, we lost a number
of men killed and wounded; two from Arkansas, Seamen Watson and Fried. The Mexicans must have had scores killed. Later it was rumored that the Tderanga landed her cargo of arms unmolested at a point further
South.
I now wonder just how accurate my memory is.
Matt Hensley, Koloa, Kauai, H.—At the time of the desecration of the flag at Tampico, the Secretary of State was William Jennings Aryan, and the three U. S. Navy vessels at Veracruz were presently ordered to send a landing party ashore and take the town.
The senior naval officer present at Veracruz on the day we landed was not Captain Knapp as stated in Mr. Asher’s article, but Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, and Florida was his flagship. He had transferred his flag from Rhode Island several months earlier, taking me, Flag Lieutenant Steve Rowan, and the flag yeoman along with him.
The commanding officer of Florida was Captain William R. Rush, and nobody who ever served under him will ever forget it. The word “martinet,” which we lifted from the French language, does not adequately describe him, but it will have to serve.
That day in April, 1914 when the landing parties went ashore we had only three U. S. Navy vessels in the vicinity of Veracruz; Florida was anchored outside the breakwater, Chester was tied up alongside the dock, and Utah was just offshore carrying out some training exercises.
Several other units of the Atlantic Fleet were enroute with an expeditionary force under General Fred Funston.
There was also one British man-o-war (I believe she was Hermione) and one German light cruiser anchored outside the breakwater at the time.
When Admiral Fletcher ordered Florida's landing party ashore, he recalled Utah, and her landing party went ashore as soon as she dropped anchor.
If memory serves, Chester was the only vessel to open fire. It was her stern chaser that wrecked the Mexican Naval Academy (and the cupola of a dwelling house just to the left of it). I do not recall that Admiral Fletcher ordered Utah to open up, and I am sure
Florida did not commence firing then.
Admiral Fletcher sent Captain Rush ashore in command of the landing party, and he stopped a bullet in the leg. He tied an oversize handkerchief around his leg and went on with the mopping up. Several crew members of Florida, upon hearing he had been hit, fervently hoped it would prove fatal, because he was most unpopular with his crew. But he captured the town, turned it over to General Funston, and came back to Florida—just as hard to get along with as before.
Florida's crew, officers and men alike, had one special uniform which they set aside solely for Saturday Captain’s Inspection. It was never" worn on any other occasion and was carefully laundered after each inspection. The sleeves had to hit the wrists at exactly the right spot, and other measurements were exactly as Captain Rush said they should be.
The specially-fitted wherry Captain Rush used for fishing and sailing trips was undoubtedly the cleanest small boat in the Navy. The race boat crew won all the races, because the Captain had wangled Chief Turret Captain Brooks’ transfer to Florida to train them. Brooks had a reputation for turning out winners. Battleship skippers fought over him but Captain Rush got him.
The reason Chester was ordered to demolish the Mexican Naval Academy was because a detachment of our landing party marched up to it and demanded the cadets inside to surrender. Their answer was to open fire, causing our men to break ranks and take shelter, and call for artillery support. So Chester was ordered to teach the cadets a lesson.
She wrecked the place with a few shells, and our men moved in and took over. An ensign from Florida (now a retired rear admiral) George M. Lowry, was in command of one of the Florida's units ashore, and received a commendation.
One radioman from Florida, Eddie Gis- burne, got a bullet in the knee and his leg was amputated.
Florida lost 19 men killed instead of 18. The number of wounded was considerably larger, but I did not keep a record of it.
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher has been dead for years. He was a gentleman of the old school, well-liked by all hands, especially the members of his staff. The taking of Veracruz was just a minor chore so far as a man of his STATURE was concerned.
Rear Admiral George M. Lowry, U. S. Navy (Retired).—I was an officer on USS Florida prior to and during the engagement and occupation of Veracruz in April 1914, and commanded the First Company, USS Florida—the first company ashore on April 21, 1914.
USS Florida, Utah, and Prairie—units of the Atlantic Fleet—HMS Good Hope, the German Gunboat Dresden, and the French Cruiser Jeanne d’Arc had been in the outer harbor of Veracruz since January 1914. No destroyers were present.
The arrest of a United States naval officer and his crew while loading gasoline drums on a launch from USS Dolphin took place on April 9, 1914, at Tampico, Mexico. The prisoners were soon released with regrets. Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, demanded an apology and a twenty-one-gun salute to the United States flag. Huerta refused.
President Wilson later ordered our naval forces at Veracruz to land primarily to seize the customs house to prevent the discharge of a cargo of arms from a foreign ship for the Huerta forces.
I was present at the planning conference for the landing operations in Captain Rush’s cabin on April 19th. Florida was anchored in the outside harbor and there was no thought or necessity of using her 12-inch guns to shell the defenseless city. Four companies from Florida were to land for the seizure of the customs house, power plant, and railroad station.
The Atlantic Fleet, with the Hospital Ship Solace, arrived off Veracruz during the night of April 21. Mr. Asher refers in his article to one of the marines suffering from a ruptured appendix en route, with peritonitis developing when the ships arrived at Veracruz. As previously stated, Florida had been at Veracruz since January.
USS Chester, commanded by Commander William A. Moffett, U. S. Navy, moved into the inner harbor during the night of April 21. During the forenoon of April 22, when detachments of the just-arrived Atlantic Fleet were landed and encountered stiff resistance at the Mexican Naval Academy, Chester shelled the Academy and nearby buildings.
Captain Rush commanded the naval forces on shore during the two days’ engagement.
I believe Mr. Asher’s memory may be at fault as to the name of the commanding officer and ship to which he was attached as the “marine” in question.
Editor's Note: The editors are now sadder and. they trust, wiser concerning USS Florida at Veracruz•
Consuls and Confederate Raiders
(See pages 104-106, July 1961 Proceedings)
J. K. Holloway, Jr., Washington, D.C.— There is an interesting slip in Lieutenant Clegg’s fine review of Captain Waddell’s diary of his command of the CSS Shenandoah. The review mentions the “vigorous efforts of the American counsel (sic) at the port of Liverpool” to stop the outfitting of the raider. It was, of course, the American Consul at Liverpool, Thomas H. Dudley of Camden, New Jersey, who led the on-the-spot efforts to stop the Confederates from building a Navy in England. But, as the review article’s slip underlines, Dudley’s work has not received as much note as it perhaps deserves.
The basic problem that Dudley faced was to get enough evidence to convince the British authorities that ships being built or fitted out at Liverpool were intended for the South’s Navy. The British Foreign Enlistment Act forbade the building or equipping of vessels in Great Britain for use of a belligerent power. But because of their pro-Southern sympathies and a defect in the Act, these officials required a very high standard of proof. To obtain this, Dudley organized a network of informers and agents numbering over a hundred. He got affidavits from pro-Northernshipyard workers, deserters from Confederate crews, ship chandlers and, in some cases, disgruntled Irishmen seeking free passage to the United States. As Dudley noted in a despatch to the Secretary of State in 1861, “They [the informers] are not as a general rule very esteemable men but are the only persons we can get to engage in this business. ...”
The pro-Southern sentiments of Liverpool, then the world’s largest cotton importing port, made Dudley’s work more difficult. He was subjected to sneers, insults, threatening letters and even an attempted assault. The Union flag at the Consulate was often found festooned Wlth tin kettles and other items tied to it as objects of contempt. The problem of obtaining affidavits was made more difficult by the threat of shipyards to dismiss any worker giving evidence to the consul. After the Alexandra case a carpenter named Neil Davis '''ho had given evidence not only lost his job 3ut found himself blacklisted at other yards. Dudley, exhibiting a characteristic diplomatic ambivalence toward the name of Espionage, reported to Washington in 1863, The cry they have got up against me and the spy system which they say I have inaugurated has driven almost all my men away.”
The climax to Dudley’s efforts actually came before the Shenandoah escaped. In September of 1863 the patient work of Minister (not Ambassador) Charles F. Adams at London, using Dudley’s affidavits and reports, had finally convinced the British Cabinet that the two rams then building at Laird’s shipyards for the Confederates should be seized as a matter of policy. These vessels, which would have been the most powerful warships in the world of their day, could have challenged Union naval supremacy. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, W. G. Fox, had written, Vou must stop the rams at all hazards as we have no defense against them.... It is a ntatter of life and death.”
Dudley’s work has echoes a century later in the reports of American diplomatic and consular officers, as well as naval attaches, on the possible transfer to Iron Curtain countries of merchant ships with characteristics in excess of limitations agreed upon by the United States and its allies. In addition, these officers are also alert to the sale of any vessels m which there is an American interest to Communist China, North Korea or North Vietnam in violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
"Superior Star Position,
'Cartwheel or Square’ ”
(See pages 132-134, August 1961 Proceedings)
Captain Howard C. Duff, U. S. Naval Reserve.—Captain Rhoads has trapped himself by star sights that are not representative.
In his “cartwheel” plot all of the stars lie to the east of the meridian, and hence the assumed error will be cumulative to the east. In his “square” plot he has compensated for the inherent error by taking opposing star sights. By taking opposing star sights the errors cancel out and his actual and fixed positions coincide.
For an assumed constant error the difference between the actual position and the fixed can be determined vectorially by plotting in the direction of each star the assumed error.
The basic rule in taking star sights should be not the shape of the plot but to compensate for a constant error by taking sights on opposite azimuths whenever possible.
Atomic Uniforms
Bryan G. Howard, Chief Aviation Electronics Technician, U. S. Navy.—A large percentage of any swift, massive, atomic attack is going to be directed toward destroying or making useless just as much of our retaliatory power as possible. Therefore, the adequate protection of our Armed Forces personnel should be the first item for consideration. There will be no time to re-train replacements for our highly specialized fighting teams, and some men will be going into action at reduced efficiency caused by needless burns, or excessive radiation.
A truly atomic fighting force should be equipped completely, not just with the ability to dish it out but to take it as well. As an example, examine our present day military uniforms and ask yourself if it wouldn’t be better to design them for atomic war rather than tradition? If we were to design an atomic uniform we could markedly reduce some of the effects of thermal radiation.
NAVPERS Navy Training Course Manual 10097 quotes the effects of thermal radiation upon a man wearing the blue uniform versus a man wearing white clothing. Using a nominal atomic air burst on a clear day the man wearing “blues” would suffer burns if 6,300 feet from ground zero, while the man wearing “whites” could be as close as 3,150 before being burned. In addition, the blue uniform would be difficult to decontaminate.