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120 Collision at Sea in Fog:
The Common-Sense Approach
by F. J. Wylie, Captain,
Royal Navy (Retired)
128 Geomagnetism
by Elliott Roberts,
Captain, U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (Retired)
130 European Rescue Cruiser
by Oscar G. Costa,
Commander, Italian Navy (Retired)
132 Mine Warfare Channel Markers
by John V. Bowers,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy
136 Notebook
Edited by H. A. Seymour Captain, U. S. Navy
By F. J. Wylie, Captain, Royal Navy (Retired)
COLLISION AT SEA IN FOG:1 THE COMMON-SENSE APPROACH
Recent correspondence in the shipping . press brought to mind many of the sayings, writing and judgments of the last ten years and stimulated thought once more in search of some basic weakness in the partnership between the seaman and his radar which, all too often, turns the risk of collision into the fact.
Re-examination of the circumstances of some of the better annotated and sometimes more publicized cases is frustrating, partly because of the lack of personal detail in the evidence and partly because some of the conclusions which may be drawn point to failure of bridge personnel to understand the obvious fundamentals and so suggest that there must be undisclosed and more complicated causes. This latter, it is believed, is debatable.
In the motoring world most people subscribe to the doctrine that risk increases with speed and with reducing range; that close passing is dangerous and, at speed, it is madness; that all these risks are accentuated by factors which limit visibility and the sources of information; that operating skill is essential and that behavior which involves increased risk demands greater skill in appreciation and operation. They would no doubt agree that intentions should be made clear early and unmistakably, so as to avoid last minute spasmodic and mutually destructive action.
It will at once be said that these are obvious principles of common sense, applicable to any man-directed movement, including pedestrian. They are-mentioned for that very reason and to suggest that almost every collision at sea in fog has been due to neglect of one or more of them.
To discover the extent to which these principles have figured in encounters which have led to collision at sea in fog, an examination based on published evidence has been made of 16 well-known and fairly well-documented cases. Table I contains an analysis of the
1 Reprinted with kind permission of the author and of ‘‘Lloyd’s List Annual Review.”
evidence as it affects the points mentioned. The times given are in minutes before the collision; in some cases they have had to be assessed from other evidence and should not be taken to be exact. In 11 of the encounters both ships were using radar; in five of them, only one was. .
Taking the various principles separately:
(a)A close passing is dangerous at any time in fog.
Evidence:
It appears that in every case one ship and in most cases both ships accepted the close passing, although sea room does not seem to have been restricted. Certainly, in none of them did either ship make any serious attempt to disengage at an early stage.
That a close passing was developing must have been obvious to any of the ships using radar, particularly if they were using the relative display.
Comment:
The unpredictability of ships’ actions and reactions under the stress of close passing in fog must, by this time, be well known, yet some of these ships seemed to press on to the meeting as if there was no difference between a radar encounter and a visual one and as if, with every mile of approach, the risk was not increasing more and more steeply.
The human element seems to make the risk of mutually destructive action greater when sea room is unrestricted than in narrow waters.
(b) Intentions must be shown early and unmistakably.
Evidence:
There is no evidence that action of this kind was taken in any of the cases quoted. Three of them include a series of small alterations of course by one of the ships. This is referred to as a cumulative turn and has been called “nibbling.” In two of these, the succession of small changes covered the whole period of the approach; in the third, a slow prolonged turn was made in the latter part of it.
Comment:
The effect of this is to confuse the individual who is making the changes, particularly if he is using his radar “Ship’s head upwards” and is observing relative bearings only. To the other vessel it is confusing to his plot if he is keeping one; if he is not, it presents him with a dangerous illusion that the encounter is proceeding safely. This is dealt with in more detail later.
(c) A close passing in Jog at high speed is madness.
Evidence:
Nearly half the ships involved maintained full or nearly full speed up to the moment of collision or just before it. Several maintained it until 2 or 3 minutes before collision and yet others maintained half speed to the collision or to sighting.
Comment:
When, at last, realization of imminent disaster comes, events and the ship are moving so fast that the situation becomes out of hand; the radar picture seems to become confusing,
TABLE 1
Type of ship | Initial closing rate (knots) | First detected at (miles) | Full speec until (min) | 5-speed until (min) | Slow until (min) | Stop engines at (min) | Remarks |
Cargo | 20a | 7 | C —21 | C |
|
|
|
Cargo (NR) |
| — |
|
| C |
| a/c Port on F.S. |
Passenger | 23 | 8 | C |
|
|
| Cumulative turn |
Cargo |
| 8 | C |
|
|
| a/c Port on F.S. |
Cargo | 17 | 5 | C —9 | C —7 |
| C —7 |
|
Cargo |
| 6 | C |
|
|
|
|
Passenger | 14 | 2} |
| F.S. | C |
|
|
Cargo (NR) |
|
|
| F.S. |
| F.S. |
|
Passenger | 15 | 2 |
| F.S. |
| F.S. | No range record |
Cargo (NR) |
| — |
| F.S. |
| F.S. | a/c Port on F.S. |
Cargo (NR) | 18| | — | F.S. |
|
| F.S. | a/c O.S. |
Cargo |
| 2 | C |
|
|
|
|
Cargo | 21 | 6 |
| C— 12 | F.S. | F.S. |
|
Cargo (NR) |
| — |
| F.S. | C |
| Hard-a-starbd. on F.S. |
Cargo | 18 |
| C |
|
|
|
|
Cargo |
| 4 | c |
|
|
| Hard-a-starbd. C —i. |
Cargo | 29 | 15 | C—15 |
| C —7 | C —7 |
|
Tanker |
| — | C-2 |
| C |
| Radar switched on C —5. |
Cargo | 18 | 5 | C |
|
|
| Hard-a-port O.S. |
Cargo |
| 2 | C |
|
|
| Hard-a-starbd. O.S. |
Passenger | 39 | 17 | C |
|
|
| Hard-a-port O.S. |
Passenger |
| 12 | c-i |
|
| c-i | Hard-a-starbd. O.S. |
Passenger | 18 | 1 | C-2 |
| C | c |
|
Coaster |
| 4 | C— 15 |
|
| C—15 |
|
Passenger | 30 | 71 | c-i |
|
|
|
|
Tanker |
| 2* | C —35 | C —5 | C-l | C-l |
|
Passenger | 35 | 5 | c-i |
|
| c-i | Plotted. |
Tanker |
| 8 | C-2 |
|
| C-2 | Cumulative turn. |
Cargo | 25 | 91 | C —39 | c-i |
| c-i | Cumulative turn. |
Tanker |
| 10 |
| c |
|
| Hard-a-port on F.S. |
Cargo | 22 | 5 | C — 3 | c |
|
|
|
Tanker |
| 81 | C —3 |
|
| C — 3 |
|
F.S. = on hearing fog signal O.S. = on sighting
C = Time of collision NR = Not fitted with radar
particularly in relative motion. Any change in the behavior of the echo, whether misinterpreted or not, seems to start a chain of action and reaction from which there is no time to escape. In some cases the echo was lost in clutter at the vital moment, even as far away as two miles, but even this did not evoke a speed reduction.
If speed is high and ships are large, the distance at which such a chain, once started, may make collision inevitable, may be as much as 3-4 miles. This point is enlarged on below.
Speed reduces the chances of hearing fog signals on account of the increased wind and water noises. When, eventually, they are heard there will be less time for effective action. In collision, damage is proportional to speed.
(d)The very small alteration of course and the large last-minute swing have a poor record of success.
Evidence:
The table includes three examples of the useless small alteration and eight of the despairing and fatal last-minute turn.
Comment:
For actions to become evident quickly on the radar screen they need to be bold. If they are also early, everyone should have a little more time to think. The small turn seldom outweighs the errors normally made in the appreciation and so is a waster of valuable disengaging time. The uselessness of the spasmodic swing at the end is well demonstrated, particularly those carried out by nonradar ships on hearing the fog signal. This is the subject of later paragraphs.
(e) Intelligent radar watch and skillful interpretation of the radar picture and appreciation of the developing situation are essential if behavior is based on the use of radar.
Evidence:
In each of these encounters the ships were approaching one another at high speed and were shaping for a very close passing. Neither great skill nor extensive plotting was needed to discover the risk, but there is little evidence of competence of radar operation or appreciation of the situation developing.
Comment:
Every ship in fog in these cases was acting in a manner which would be highly improbable without radar, yet only one or two ships kept even a simple timed record of ranges and bearings from which fundamental and obvious conclusions could have been drawn. Continuity or even regular periodic observation was hardly ever apparent.
Evidence:
The radar information in the table includes the range of first contact. In some of the cases and in others not recorded here this range is so short that it suggests that watch was being kept on a dangerously short-range scale.
Comment:
Particularly at high speed, the use of a short range-scale invites surprise and, hence, probably trouble.
It would seem that each of these collisions was caused primarily by ships choosing to go too close and too fast. Although circumstances may force ships to accept passing close to others, there seem to have been no factors in these cases tending to prevent disengagement and certainly none other than expediency against reducing speed. Obviously, the most intelligent use of radar was not made by every ship. On the other hand, the simplest possible observations would have disclosed in most cases (and did in some) the crucial information that the bearing was rather steady and the range closing rapidly.
This criticism is easy enough to make on the evidence available, but it is not desired to suggest that conducting the maneuvers of a ship based on a picture of bright dots on a dark background, on a scale about 1:144,000 is something that any sailor is born to! The picture which confronts the student of collisions is confusing because in some respects the behavior which resulted from the radar observations was what would be expected only if the other ship was in sight and bound by the Steering Rules, while in other respects it was completely different, e.g., the cumulative turn. There is, therefore, something irrational present, some failure on the master’s part to break through to realism. He seems to be saying “echo-range 5 miles, well that’s
still a long way off,” instead of “Stop Engines; Range to collision point is only 2 miles!” (Which it would be with a speed ratio of 3 to 2.)
The cumulative turn is one feature of these encounters about which insufficient is probably known. The temptation to use it seems to occur in the not quite end-on encounter when the ships are on each other’s opposite bows. The radar observations suggest a port- to-port passing to one ship and a starboard-to- starboard passing to the other. Each successive alteration is invoked by the failure of its predecessor to make the bearing draw aft on the chosen side and each should shout aloud that the action being taken is wrong!
The importance of this dangerous habit makes it worthwhile to examine it in detail in a situation in which one ship makes a cumulative turn and the other maintains course and speed. This is illustrated in Figure 1 above.
A description of such an encounter, very similar in character to two or three actual collisions, might run as follows:
At 0948, ship A proceeding at 10 knots, detected ship B by radar 15.4 miles 17^ degrees to starboard and, after brief observations, formed the opinion that the ships were on nearly opposite courses and that there would be a safe starboard-to-starboard passing. At the same time, B, going 7J knots, detected A about 10 degrees to port and, 6 minutes later, making the same assumption regarding opposite courses, decided to alter course 5 degrees to starboard to facilitate a port-to-port passing; this changed the relative bearing to 14J degrees. At 1006, B observed A at 10.4 miles 13§ degrees to port; as the bearing had closed a little, B altered a further 5 degrees to starboard, making the bearing 18§ degrees. At this time B’s bearing from A had opened to 19J degrees.
At 1018, A was 7.1 miles 17 degrees to port from B who, then deciding that A was converging slightly, made still another 5 degrees alteration to starboard. At the same time B’s bearing from A had opened another 2 degrees. Twelve minutes later, A’s bearing having closed from 22 degrees to 19 degrees, B felt that stronger action was needed and went 10 degrees to starboard.
A should have realized by 1018 that B’s bearing was drawing aft too slowly for a safe starboard passing. However, he was deceived by the fact that it was moving in the expected direction and he maintained his advance. His observation at 1030, which showed the bear-
C,£SpJc
JO..
REL 19t‘
- " •— SPmp _
8'
REL. 18i° ~~-JlEL. 17*°^-
1012
1006
1000
0954
0948 SHIP A CO. 270° 10 KN.
ing had opened another 3 degrees encouraged him to continue.
B should have realized by 1018, merely from the behavior of the bearing, that A was crossing his bow and, hence, that his alterations were making things worse, but he continued the process until at 1042, with only J mile separating the ships, he realized that collision was imminent and, as A’s bearing was still to port, went hard-a-starboard and was rammed amidships at 1045J.
Tables 2 and 3 show the statistics of the encounter and illustrate how the simplest record of ranges, bearings and times could have set the red warning lights flashing. In the foregoing description, relative bearings have been used as that is unfortunately the habit in many ships. Table 2 shows how clear are the indications of the compass bearing compared with the relative bearings, which are made somewhat confusing by the ship s alterations of course. Table 3 illustrates the viewpoint of ship A and gives a comparison between the described encounter and what would have been the case if B had maintained her course and speed. If the relative bearings for the two cases are compared, it will be seen how obvious should the warning have been to ship A from 1018 onwards, had the master been aware of the significance of bearing change.
The encounter described was not a particularly difficult one because the bearings were well clear of the fore and aft line and we were moving quite perceptibly. All the indications and warnings mentioned could quite easily have been seen without plotting or using true motion radar. Plotting, of course, would have put the ships in a far stronger position much more quickly and made the choice of action more obvious. The analysis will make it clear that, if plotting is not carried out, the need to keep at least a timed record of ranges, bearings and alterations of course is vital; without these, the correctness of the most simple deductions may be uncertain and it
Time | Range miles | Relative bearing (Port) Before A/c After A/c | Compass bearing | TABLE 2 | |
0948 | 15.4 | 101° | — | 107*° | |
0954 | 13.8 | 9*° | 14*° | 108*° | SHIP A from SHIP B |
1006 | 10.4 | 13*° | 18*° | 109*° |
|
1018 | 7.1 | 17° | 22° | 111° |
|
1030 | 3.8 | 19° | 29° | 114° |
|
1042 | 0.7 | 25° | — | 118° |
|
Compass bearing
_ Rel. bearing
Ran9e (starbd.)
Time
0948
0954
1006
1018
1030
1042
287$° 15.4'
288*° 13.8'
2891° 10.4'
291° 7.1'
294° 3.8' 24°
298° 0.7' 28°
17*° 18*° 19*°
Estimated relative bearing
and range if B had main-
tained co. | and speed |
17*° | 15.4' |
18*° | 13.8' |
20° | 10.4' |
24*° | 7.0' |
36*° | 3.7' |
102° | 1 .6' (closest) |
TABLE 3
SHIP B from SHIP A
is most surprising how few ships which get into trouble have such a record in evidence. However, the main point of this description is to show that the cumulative turn is a bad maneuver from everyone’s point of view and it is not surprising that it comes in for special mention in paragraph 5 (c) of the Annex to the proposed 1960 Collision Regulations.
The question of last-minute avoidance upon which some ships seem to rely is another subject of some complexity about which a little more should be said.
Apart from the question of the time required to obtain the radar data on which to base an appreciation and the time then required for choice of action, the question of last minute avoidance was the subject of an article by Captain Helmers in the July 1962 issue of the Journal of the Honorable Company of Master Mariners. Although the article was not written mainly in the fog context, the insight it gives into the effects of drastic helm and engine action is most interesting. It shows diagrammatically the “Maneuvers of the Last Safe Moment” for a variety of ships and thus indicates the least distance from another ship on a collision course at which the most drastic action available may be successful.
This distance is shown to depend upon the size and speed of the avoiding vessel and the size, speed and direction of approach of the other ship. For the present purpose it will be advisable to assume that the other vessel is large and fast and is coming from fine on the port bow, as these are the most dangerous conditions. If own ship is also large, say, 17,500 tons deadweight, and is going at 14J knots, the distance will be about 1,300 yards if maximum starboard helm action is used and 2,200 yards if the engines are put full astern and course is maintained. Although these figures may be more realistic for alterations by one ship only, there will, in fact, be no significant difference in the general case if drastic alterations are made by both ships.
To be on the safe side in fog, it may be taken that a distance of 1J miles represents the last possible moment for successful action to achieve the barest minimum separation. This permits two conclusions to be drawn; first, that violent changes of course when ships are less than 1J miles apart and in danger of collision may well bring catastrophe and, secondly, that any passing vessel which takes action within this range which puts her on or near to a collison course will be extremely difficult to avoid. The latter conclusion suggests that, in open waters, one should never choose to pass within \\ miles of another vessel underway and closing, without taking special precautions, the principle of which will be to reduce speed well in advance of reaching the critical range.
These remarks may be more easily interpreted if some statistics on the stopping and turning of ships are added. Tables 4 and 5 contain typical information of this kind.
It will be noted that, surprisingly, the 65,000-tonner in question, with her particularly large rudder, is far the handiest under helm of all those shown. On the other hand, if she stops engines and runs off her way without altering course, she advances six miles and takes an hour to do so. Again, surprisingly, under astern power she is as good a “stopper” as any.
Although these details are no doubt familiar to those who have to do with such ships, the ways in which they fit into the picture of an encounter with another vessel are probably not so well known. It will be noted that none of the ships mentioned in Table 1 attempted to take her way off before the collision by going astern. A study of Table 4 will suggest that the course of events might have been changed considerably by so doing.
However, the idea that 1J miles may be taken generally as the least distance for the last safe maneuver needs to be followed up, because some premeditation on that action must obviously be undertaken. The appropriate maneuver will have to be selected on a basis of radar observation and some form of computation of the other ship’s movement. The time required for this depends on the individual, but it would probably be unwise to allow less than three minutes, even for a vessel whose previous movements had already been ascertained. In this time, with a closing rate of 30 knots, range would decrease another 1| miles. Hence, a range of three miles would represent the point at which readiness to detect a false move by the other ship should reach a most acute phase and certainly one at which own ship’s speed should have been reduced to proportions which would permit
|
|
|
| Turning 90° | at |
| ||||||||
Type and size of ship | Data |
| (Speed) |
|
| |||||||||
| Uons a.w.) |
| Slow | Half | Full |
| ||||||||
Cargo. . . | 9,300 | Time (mins) | — | — | H |
| ||||||||
|
| (Advance (yds) | — | — | 583 |
| ||||||||
|
| Transfer (yds) | — | — | 400 |
| ||||||||
Tankers. . | 18,000 | Time (mins) | 5 | 3 | 2 | TABLE 5 | ||||||||
|
| Advance (yds) | 650 | 560 | 540 |
| ||||||||
|
| Transfer (yds) | 360 | 400 | 440 | TURNING WITH FULL RUDDER | ||||||||
Tankers. . | 33,000 | Time (mins) | 4* | 3 | 21 |
| ||||||||
|
| Advance (yds) | 640 | 750 | 730 |
| ||||||||
|
| Transfer (yds) | 360 | 560 | 500 |
| ||||||||
Tankers. . | 47,000 | Time (mins) | 5 | 4j | 21 |
| ||||||||
|
| Advance (yds) | 660 | 720 | 760 |
| ||||||||
|
| Transfer (yds) | 440 | 430 | 420 |
| ||||||||
Tankers. . | 65,000 | Time (mins) | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| ||||||||
|
| Advance (yds) | 470 | 400 | 640 |
| ||||||||
|
| Transfer (yds) | 360 | 200 | 400 |
| ||||||||
| Type and |
| From “stop engines" | From " | full astern” |
|
| |||||||
| Size of | Initial | to stopped in the | to stopped in the |
|
| ||||||||
| ship | speed | water |
| water |
|
| |||||||
|
|
| Distance | Time | Distance | Time |
|
| ||||||
| (tons d.w.) | Knots | (miles) | (min.) | (miles) | (min.) |
|
| ||||||
Cargo... | 11,355 | 19 | — | — | 0.87 | 4.9 | TABLE 4 |
| ||||||
|
| 16 | — | — | 0.62 | 4.2 | DECELERATION |
| ||||||
Tankers. . | 18,000 | 7 | 1 .4 | 32 | 0.25 | 5.5 |
|
| ||||||
|
| 15 | 3.0 | 48 | 1 .0 | 10.0 |
|
| ||||||
Tankers. . | 33,000 | 7 | 2.1 | 28 | 0.4 | 6.5 |
|
| ||||||
|
| 15 | 5.0 | 47 | 1 .0 | 10.0 |
|
| ||||||
Tankers. . | 47,000 | 6 | 1 .5 | 15.5 | 0.4 | 5.5 |
|
| ||||||
|
| 17 | 4.0 | 30 | 1.3 | 9.25 |
|
| ||||||
Tankers. . | 65,000 | 7 | 2.5 | 34 | 0.25 | 6.0 |
|
| ||||||
|
| 17 | 6.0 | 60 | 1 .0 | 11 .5 |
|
| ||||||
taking the way off the ship well within, say, one-third of the radar range. The three-mile and 1 J-mile range circles have been included in Figure 1 to illustrate this point. It might help to think of three miles as the “critical” range. With high speeds it may be greater, perhaps one-tenth of the rate of closing in knots.
It would seem peculiar to conclude an article of this kind without more than a cursory reference to plotting and the proper use of radar. The article, however, is devoted mainly to the cause of common sense. To pass through the experience of an encounter comprising 30 to 45 minutes of increasing drama without keeping even a timed record of radar observations may sound unlikely, to put it mildly. Yet it is done time and again and not in circumstances of heavy traffic, which makes selection and continued identity of the dangerous echoes difficult, but when the other participant in the close quarter situation is quite obvious and often nearly alone on the screen. Regular and recorded observation is the essential basis of effective use of radar. Continuity of attention by the same person is much to be desired.
To compute these observations so as to discover from them the risk of collision and the movement of the other vessel is a highly desirable process on which to base the choice of action. This may be extremely simple, as with a reflection plotter, or more refined and accurate if time and man power permits. However, the time is certain to come in every close encounter or series of successive encounters when plotting is impracticable, other than perhaps the simple marking of echoes on the reflection plotter. It is then that knowledge and experience of the meaning of bearing movement, of the importance of the compass bearing as a guide of the realities of speed in relation to echo range (or better still to the distance to collision point) and of the maneuverability including deceleration, of one’s own ship come into their own. All this is seamanship, sea sense or common sense and is what the dynamic teaching of the simulator courses is able to emphasize.
There can be no doubt that fewer collisions would occur if:
(1)Radar observations were recorded and compared.
(2)The temptation to the cumulative turn was resisted.
(3) The existence of crisis was realized
before reaching the critical range.
(4) Speed was related to distance to collision point and to the ship's stopping power.
(5) Violent last minute turns were avoided.
(6) Simulator training was more widespread and included emphasis on these fundamentals.
Epitaph
“TOO FAST TOO CLOSE”
By Elliott Roberts,
Captain,
U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (Retired)
GEOMAGNETISM
Geomagnetism, steeped in mystery and the subject of one of the most persistent of all scientific quests, surrounds the earth. Today we recognize it as one of our most important natural phenomena—still we do not fully understand it.
Geomagnetism tells us of unseen ores or rock formations harboring petroleum. It signifies radio communication conditions, helps interpret solar events, and for nearly eight centuries it has controlled compass needles and thus in part has controlled the course of world civilization.
Exceeded in importance only by gravity—■ and indeed a stronger force by far—magnetism is among the most elusive facts of nature. We can measure it instrumentally, but we cannot explain it much better than our forefathers, who guessed that the magnet has an “appetite” for iron. Einstein found gravity a manifestation of inertia, but he could not dispose so easily of magnetism. The ancients wondered until it colored their folklore. The Arabian Nights tells of a ship set so near a magnetic rock that the nails were drawn from her and she fell apart. Medieval mariners believed in a magnetic mountain in the north. The compass was a subject of great awe—it was held to cure dropsy, gout, fever, even domestic discord. Mariners avoided onions and garlic, the odor of which they believed would surely destroy the needle’s power.
A Chinese account from the 11th century A.D. tells us, “A geomancer rubs the point of a needle with the lodestone to make it point to the south . . . the best method is to hang it by a thread ... it may happen by chance to point to the north . . . and no one could as yet find the principle of it.” The Chinese appar- antly failed to exploit the idea at the time.
The certain invention of the compass in the 12th century was a far-reaching accomplishment. The ancients had feared the sea, dependent as they so often were upon the master’s precarious judgment of wind, wave, and tide. Mariners originally floated bits of lode- stone on wooden chips.
In 1269, Petrus Peregrinus discovered that the pieces of broken magnets became complete magnets themselves. In 1600, William Gilbert wrote the classic “De Magnete,” suggesting'that the earth itself is a magnet. And in its grand form the geomagnetic field does resemble that of a bar magnet of intense field, 342 kilometers off the earth’s axis, and tipped at 11 degrees. But such a dipole cannot exist, for the earth’s'core is far too hot to retain permanent magnetism.
The best present theory ascribes geomagnetism to electrical currents within the earth, generated by motion of interior materials. The sun was formerly believed to have an intense main field. Now this seems doubtful, though we know of strong local fields about the tornadic storms known as sunspots. Incomplete attempts have been made to detect and measure an improbable lunar magnetic field, using rocket-borne magnetometers.
The geomagnetic field has a pattern portrayed as “lines of force.” These shroud the earth in great curves sweeping from one polar region to the other. Within small areas near 75° North, 101° West, and 67° South, 143° East, the lines are essentially vertical to form the so-called “magnetic poles,” which are merely places of no horizontal component. Nearby field intensities are between 0.6 and 0.7 gauss, slight compared to the thousands of gauss found in electrical machinery. The lines of force indicate the directions assumed by free, magnetized needles. Restricted to the horizontal plane, such needles are compasses. Near the “poles” magnetic compasses will not work, of course.
The compass remains simple. Inexpensive and reliable, it accompanies all vessels, even alongside the most elaborate gyros. Aircraft carry fluxgates and other devices suited to the accelerations of flight. Explorers still tread jungles and plod across deserts relying upon compass guidance.
In Columbus’ time, the compass was thought to point true north, the declination (which mariners call variation) being near zero in southern Europe at the time. As the Admiral went westward, his needle failed to be true to the pole star, causing near-mutiny aboard. One tale has it that he hid bits of metal nearby to improve its behavior and quiet the crew. Actually, the needle points out no pole—showing only the orientation of the local field, reflecting anomalies due to irregular motions of material within the earth and to local attractions in the crustal rocks.
Present declination ranges from about 22 degrees West in Maine to some 23 degrees East near Puget Sound. Compass directions vary by 9 degrees within a few miles in Delaware. Near Kursk, south of Moscow, the polarity is almost completely reversed by the attraction of local magnetites. The discovery of Michigan iron followed the noting of compass irregularities by early mappers.
Magnetometer surveys on land disclose the local anomalies in a pattern of large and small configurations. At sea, the problem is more difficult. Carnegie Institution scientists started surveys of the world oceans with the nonmagnetic vessel Carnegie, but she was lost in 1929. Ocean surveys now employ airborne magnetometers, as in the Navy’s Project Magnet program.
The geomagnetic field is no frozen image. It is an undulating form with long swell-like changes modified by wavelets and ripples. Observatories record the slow changes and the restless play, so the adjustment of magnetic mines can be determined, pools of hidden oil found, failures of radio communications foreseen, new magnetic charts compiled, and compass roses oriented.
The secular change is too slow to have practical effect in a year or two, but it may continue during hundreds of years to change the declination drastically. Its greatest known rate outside the unstable polar regions is some 15 minutes per year in Madagascar. Secular change rates are utterly unpredictable.
The transient changes result mostly from ultraviolet light and elementary particle streams of solar origin. These radiations disturb the upper air ionization, the ionospheric current patterns, and the geomagnetic field. When the sun is badly disturbed, the magnetic field becomes stormily excited, and auroral displays decorate the upper-latitude skies. Magnetic storms indicate disturbed ionospheric layers which cannot then reflect radio signals beyond the turn of the horizon. Radio signals fade. There is one fairly regular transient' effect, a daily change associated with solar heating of the atmosphere, air mass movements, and systematic current patterns.
Through rockets and satellites we are learning much about the ionosphere and its properties. Some of the fluctuations indicate remarkable happenings far above our atmosphere. The gases and particle streams shot from the sun are molded by our magnetic field. One dramatic result is the Van Allen radiation zone, many earth diameters out, where free particles spiral back and forth along the lines of force. It is these lines that guide particles released in high nuclear shots, producing auroral displays at predictable places where none occurred before.
★ ★ ★
With all we know about geomagnetism the question remains—what is it, and why?
EUROPEAN RESCUE CRUISER
A fter World War II, the sea-rescue service of fl West Germany was- completely reappraised and revamped. The service faced the following environmental constants:
(1)Open-sea operations during the most severe winter gales, which, especially in the Dogger Bank, cause the seas to peak up considerably; hence the need to have craft with outstanding seakeeping qualities.
(2)Inshore operations in shallow, sandy, muddy, or rocky areas; hence the need for craft of very light draft.
(3) Distant, offshore operations, since both sea routes and air routes are rather far out; hence the need for craft capable of high sustained speeds and capable of long radius-of-action.
These diverse operational requirements could be accommodated by either of the following alternatives: maintain several rescue stations, each with various types of craft, each conceived for fulfilling singular operational tasks in the general area—or maintain several rescue stations with a small number of a standard craft capable of carrying out both inshore and offshore missions.
Economy measures dictated the choice of the second solution.
Maierform S. A., a naval architecture firm in Geneva, was entrusted with executing the hull design and conducting the model basin tests. For propulsion it was decided to adopt three independent diesel engines; one on the centerline, reversible, of 1,350 b.h.p. and two outboard, each one of 180 b.h.p. With this system the following propulsion combinations are possible: (a) as a single-screw vessel, using only the centerline plant when the most economical speed is required; (b) as a twin- screw vessel, using the two outboard engines— when the normal speed is required and for maneuvering; (c) as a triple-screw vessel
when maximum speed is required.
All engine controls are on the bridge, so that engine room manning is eliminated. The outboard propellers are both variable-pitch. Designed maximum speed is 21 knots, almost double that of craft used in the pre-World War II rescue service.
The craft is fitted with three rudders, each aligned with the propeller shaft, thus considerably improving the maneuverability of the rescue-cruiser. The rudder control is centralized on the bridge. In this way, one person has complete control of the craft. In the main cabin there is a sick bay and, below, 12 berths for survivors. The craft has a carrying capacity of over 100 persons. Forward there are accommodations for a crew of four.
The rescue-cruiser has some additional features that are rather unique. In the forepeak there is a tank for releasing oil in order to calm the waves near a wreck.
In addition, the cruiser is equipped with a “daughter boat,” conceived and constructed for operating in shallow waters or in surf. The daughter boat is carried in the stern section of the rescue-cruiser, which has a hinged stern gate. She is launched by gravity, because she is mounted on rollers mounted on an inclined chute. Recovery is performed by a hydraulic winch. Moreover, swimming survivors can be recovered through the stern chute. This rescue daughter-boat augments the efficiency of the cruiser.
The prototype cruiser made a successful trial trip from Helgoland in the North Sea to Lisbon, Portugal. Since then she has been out on several missions, some ranging over 320 miles. In heavy sea conditions with only the outboard engines running, speed fell off only slightly. It has been possible to maintain under these conditions about 9.5 knots, with a corresponding speed in calm water of 10.75
knots. The rolling and pitching were perfectly bearable. The bow lines, in particular, have proven excellent under any sea condition. At speeds above 12-13 knots, the cruiser performance is different from normal craft; with a sea state of 5 or 6, the cruiser is very steady. With a following sea it has always been easy to maintain course. Very often the sea-keeping qualities were better at 15-18 knots than at 10 knots. The maneuverability of the cruiser has proven very satisfactory. At high speed she can be brought on an opposite course in about 20 seconds.
In the past on the Mediterranean shores, owing to the happy meteorological and hydrographic conditions, there never seemed to be a need for a state-operated and maintained sea-rescue service. During the last few years, however, calls for help have increased, owing to the greater popularity of nautical sports and to the great number of planes flying over the sea. It is thought that some rescue-cruisers of the German type would be welcomed in the Mediterranean in a combined mission of sea- rescue and fishery survey. Some preliminary steps in this direction have been taken.
MINE WARFARE CHANNEL MARKERS
In mine warfare the problem of marking swept channels and danger areas has always existed. The full-fledged buoy is the obvious answer as float, wire, and anchor are just not sufficient. Wind, weather, tides, current, and sea greatly affect the reliability of most buoys and especially those used in mine warfare. The problem is to design a marker with the characteristics of a regular channel buoy and the additional portability required by mine-sweeping operations.
The tendency of buoys to drag is serious and, in mine warfare, can be deadly. It may be that some of the ships sunk by mines during World War II and accused of wandering outside safe channels actually fell victim to markers that wandered into mined waters. The holding power of the anchor is an important design factor.
If the anchor wire is greater in length than the water depth, a resultant “watch circle” may have a radius of several yards, allowing the buoy to lie away from the plotted drop point. Like a balloon on a long string, the buoy circles the anchor with the changing direction of wind, current, and sea. This drift permits errors in the precise navigation required in minesweeping, varying in degree with the size of the watch circle.
Ships must be able to see the markers especially when prior knowledge of location is not held. A convoy arriving in the vicinity of a marked minefield would be at a severe disadvantage if the buoys were not easily sighted. To increase the range of visibility, the buoy’s surface area above the water is enlarged by flags, lights, and radar reflectors. The effects of surface winds on these aids produce expanding watch circles and an increased inclination to drag.
There are other requirements varying in importance: the buoy must endure the strains of heavy weather and the corrosion of the sea; it must be reasonably portable, not so large that a minesweeper could not lay several without severely interfering with sweeping capabilities and without continual replenishment. Time to rig, lay, and recover must not be unduly long. Finally, the expense of construction and maintenance must be considered.
All these, then, are the requirements that designers must keep in mind when developing a mine warfare channel marker—tenacity, accuracy, visibility, durability, portability, time consumed in handling, and expense.
The Navy now employs three types of mine warfare markers: the Mark 5 and Type III dan buoys, and the new U. S. Navy Mine Defense Laboratory Master Reference Buoy.
Of the three, the Mark 5 dan buoy is the heaviest, most complicated mechanically, and the most expensive. It is a semi-permanent marker, designed to watch for long periods of time in heavy seas and gales. There are three components—a buoy, a float, a semi-automatic depth device with wire settings from zero to 200 feet, and the heavy 2,000-pound concrete anchor.
The length of anchor wire desired is preset into the depth device, and the entire buoy assembly is mounted on specially constructed rails extending over the fantail of the launching ship. When the buoy is dropped, wire is pulled from a spooling device until the anchor rests on the bottom or until the preset length of wire has unreeled and the wire is locked in place. If an underestimation of water depth is made, the buoy will be below the surface. If the water is shallower than expected, the watch circle will be too large. The anchor is heavy so that dragging is reduced, and the buoy is large so visibility is good. An added “extra” is a buoy indicator (a half-white, halfblack octagon) mounted on three sides to
show direction of mined or dangerous waters.
If the depth is set accurately and the depth mechanism operates properly, the watch circle will be relatively small. This dan buoy is constructed much like a moored mine and, unless the anchor wire is placed under undue strain, it proves durable.
Aside from cost, the greatest disadvantage of the Mark 5 is size and weight. Over a ton of bulk must be mounted on the fantail of the launching ship. Although the Mark 5 buoy is designed for launching in large numbers from tracks of a minelayer, the MSO-type sweeper can plant about six without inconvenient replenishment, but the rail installation required for launching interferes with minesweeping capabilities. However, the Mark 5 buoy can also be launched from a boom.
A reversal of characteristics is seen in the Type III dan buoy. Constructed of balsa wood, it weighs, fully rigged with anchor, slightly over 300 pounds. It is anchored by a 185-pound concrete clump and tends to drag if the current is strong. A back-up anchor is used to reduce movement.
There are no mechanical devices installed on the buoy. Depth is set, when rigging, by attaching wires of various lengths between the anchor clump and the float. A depth of 740 feet may be reached by using a “double-dan”
rig (two floats attached to a single wire). Because the depth cannot be set into the buoy just before launching, accurate, early prediction of planting depths is necessary. In actuality, enough slack is normally left in the wire to produce large watch circles.
On the other side of the balance sheet, the dan is easy to rig, launch, and recover. Its bright orange color and large flagstaff make it visible within a reasonable range. The Type III is good for close-in work, especially when the buoys must be launched and recovered repeatedly during operations.
About six years ago, the U. S. Navy Mine Defense Laboratory at Panama City, Florida, developed a lightweight channel marker, the NavMinDefLab Master Reference Buoy, which appeared to outstrip its competition in design characteristics. The “Super Dan,” as it was nicknamed, was tested and proved easy to handle, moderate in cost, and, most important, tenacious and accurate.
The Super Dan is less expensive and bulky than the Mark 5 and more reliable than the Type III. The design is simple. Halfway down a 40-foot lightweight pipe, three tubular Styrofoam floats measuring ten feet in total length are attached. A 90-pound counterweight of 2-inch iron bar is partially inserted in the lower part of the pipe and navigational aids—light, flags, and radar reflector—are secured to the top. The rig, from counterweight to reflector, is about 50 feet long and weighs only 150 pounds.
The key to the Super Dan’s success as a channel marker lies in two design features. First, the dan is long and thin and offers little surface resistance to the action of wind and sea. Second, a small hand-operated winch is located from two to three feet above the floats. The winch pendant, led down through the floats and against the pipe, is secured to the anchor wire so that slack in the wire after planting may be removed by cranking. With little surface area and a taut anchor wire, the dan sits directly above its 500-pound concrete anchor. It virtually ignores the effects of wind and sea, and, when properly laid and cranked down, the dan seldom varies more than 15 per cent of anchor wire length from the center of its watch circle; it can be used as a reliable reference point for minesweeping navigation.
The Super Dan can be laid from the smallest minecraft, but space limitations make the larger MSC-MSO vessels more desirable. Rigging the dan is somewhat time-consuming but, once ready, it can be launched by only a few men. Theoretically, a successful plant can be made’ by simply manually dumping the entire rig over the side. Practically, it is necessary to ensure that the anchor wire does not foul, and this may be done by feeding a bight of wire into the water, after which the clump and dan are launched a few seconds apart. There is no speed limitation on the launching vessel.
The dan must be rigged with a recovery pendant. A wire slightly longer than the winch pendant is secured at one end to the anchor wire and at the other end to the buoy’s flagstaff. Approaching the dan from downwind, grapnels or a boat hook may be used to attach a line to the recovery pendant. Heaving in, as the ship is set away from the dan rig, the anchor is recovered first. Once the cement clump is aboard, the lightweight dan may be recovered by hand.
The Super Dan is a healthy step forward in mine warfare. It now costs about $650 to build, and production has begun for general use in the Mine Force. Future refinements will add to its value. In the future, when a reliable, tough, and tenacious channel marker is needed, the Super Dan will be available.
Notebook
U. S. Navy
Navy Ship to Race in Valuation Test
(Werner Bamberger, New York Times, 27 June 1962): A race between two powerful but unevenly matched sea horses will begin next month. The distance is the North Atlantic and the prize the extensive military traffic in wheeled and tracked combat vehicles.
The entries are a 5-year-old, the Comet, bearing Navy silks, and a yearling riding under commercial colors. The object of the race is to discover whether the Navy entry—a specially designed roll-on-roll-off ship—is a match for the faster but conventionally designed merchantman.
The Comet has a sea speed of 18 knots, while the commercial freighter, a ship of the Challenger-class of seven United States lines freighters, normally travels at 20 to 21 knots.
However, the Challenger-class vessels hold both Atlantic and the Pacific freighter speed records with crossings at up to 24.42 knots. This type of ship is said to be capable of steaming along at 26.5 knots under emergency conditions.
The two ships will be pitted against each other in a joint Army-Navy-shipping industry evaluation experiment between Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Bremerhaven, West Germany.
A number of voyages between the two ports is planned between 15 July and 1 October, and special attention will be paid to the speed of loading, unloading and delivery of combat unit vehicles.
Unloading will take place alongside piers and offshore, with cargo to be discharged by lighters. The experiment will be watched with interest by both military and private shipping experts as it is expected to have far-reaching effects on the relations between Government shipping and private shipping interests.
Roll-on-roll-off vessels, of which three are now being operated by the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service on the Atlantic route, can carry up to 700 vehicles each. However, ships of this type are being viewed with disfavor by commercial operators because of smaller cargo space utilization than can be obtained on a conventional, lift-on-lift-off cargo vessel.
The commercial Challenger-class ship is one of 300 new merchant vessels delivered or on order under the fleet replacement programs of the subsidized segment of the merchant marine.
Their high speed is combined with modern and efficient cargo-handling gear, including a special 70-ton boom, quick opening hatches and large holds.
At stake for the military, it is understood, is the future of the roll-on-roll-off vessel concept, a type of ship that is essentially a floating garage.
Long-range plans of the Army envision the eventual construction of 25 such vessels, whose mission is to provide point-to-point sea transportation for the Defense Department of self-propelled, fully loaded, wheeled, tracked and amphibious vessels.
Sources close to the situation said the Navy might delay an award for the construction of a larger and faster, 20-knot version of the Comet. Bids were opened last month and a West Coast shipyard submitted the lowest of four offers of $15,895,500. A 12,100-ton sister vessel is also planned within the next two years.
By contrast, a Challenger-class ship costs $10,400,000 to build.
The outcome of the experiment is expected to give Defense Department officials a clearer picture of the capabilities of modern commercial vessels to lift military “rolling stock” during an emergency.
Defense Chief Creates New Military Medal
(The Baltimore Sun, 29 June 1963): A further modest step emphasizing the unification policy in the Defense establishment was announced today. It creates the Joint Service Commendation Medal, to be awarded for outstanding performance by military personnel, not singularly for Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine Corps, but exclusively for work upon a joint staff or in other joint activities.
It is the first award, granted in the name of the Secretary of Defense, which can be given by the unified commanders without going through channels of a single service. Others authorized to grant it are the deputy secretary, the chairman of the joint chiefs, and the directors of the Defense Supply Agency and of the National Security Agency.
The decoration is of four hexagons in green enamel, an eagle grasping three golden arrows, 13 gold stars, and a gold base, the whole encircled by a gold laurel wreath, supported by a blue-green-white ribbon.
Satellites As Sub Detectors {The Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1963): Senators learned that the U. S. Navy is considering use of satellites to help keep an eye on the Soviet Union’s submarine fleet.
James H. Wakelin, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, told a Senate appropriations sub-committee about possible use of the “spy in the sky” detection as he asked for more than $1.5 billion to continue naval research in the fiscal year which begins next month.
In testimony made public by the sub-committee, Mr. Wakelin said, “We must evaluate the part that a satellite might play in surveillance to facilitate, for example, communications from many widespread sources on and under the sea.”
He indicated that the Soviet Union is pushing production of its nuclear-powered submarines in an effort to match the U. S. Polaris missile-launching and the killer-attack submarines.
Mr. Wakelin said this makes the antisubmarine warfare efforts of the Navy “both difficult and vitally important.”
“While we are able today to fight all-out war against submarines as we did in World War II, we must recognize that such an engagement will still be a war of attrition much as it was then,” Mr. Wakelin testified.
“By this I mean that there have been uncovered no means of turning antisubmarine warfare into push-button warfare.”
Other U. S. Services
Atlantic Ice Patrol Expands Warning Services (The New York Times, 22 June 1963): The Coast Guard is about to make far-reaching changes in the organization and operation of the International Ice Patrol.
The patrol, closed its 50th anniversary season on Thursday after one of the lightest ice- hazard periods for transatlantic shipping in recent years.
The patrol’s reorganization, according to Coast Guard sources, has two objectives to improve and expand the patrol’s ice warning duties and to strengthen the service’s contribution to the national oceanographic effort.
The permanent patrol headquarters will be moved on 1 July to Argentia, Newfoundland, from Woods Hole, Mass., where it had been since 1959. The Argentia Naval Station is the patrol’s command post during the patrolling season, which normally lasts from February to July.
Patrol headquarters are being shifted, the Coast Guard explained, to provide year- round aerial scouting in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and in Arctic waters where ice is a permanent navigational hazard.
The Coast Guard expects, for instance, that the annual Arctic resupply missions of military bases will benefit greatly. These missions are undertaken by the Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service.
Aerial ice surveillance on a year-round basis will be furnished by the Coast Guard air detachment at Argentia. The detachment has two C-130 Hercules aircraft. Its primary mission is search and rescue work.
While the six-man permanent Ice Patrol staff will be sent north to Newfoundland, seven oceanographers will be moved from Woods Hole to Washington. There they will join a larger group of Coast Guard experts in the service’s newly established oceanographic unit at the National Oceanographic Center.
The center, at the old Washington Navy Yard, is staffed by specialists of several Fed-
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eral agencies. These include the U. S. Weather Bureau, the Naval Oceanographic Office, the Smithsonian Institution, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
The Center will be the headquarters for a major drive to unlock the secrets of the vast ocean domain.
During the ice season, personnel of the oceanographic unit will be assigned to the patrol’s oceanographic survey ship. Whenever the ice season is more severe than usual, an officer may be assigned as assistant ice operations officer and ice observer upon request by the patrol commander.
The current patrol season, which ended last week, was described as “very light.” About 200 icebergs, or only half the number in an average season, were said to have drifted into the Atlantic shipping lanes. None drifted far south.
As a result, it was not necessary to assign a surface unit to “ride herd” on floating ice. All ice search work was performed by aircraft.
Maritime General
Deepsea "Piggy Back” Tug (New York Herald Tribune, 23 June 1963): A deepsea tug with a detachable “piggy-back” pilot house is scheduled to make her debut here in the fall. She will be the Esther Moran, now being completed for the Moran Towing and Transportation- Company.
Her extra control station will be a fully equipped miniature pilot house atop the regular pilothouse. It is being added to give the captain an unobstructed view over the giant barges he will be pushing up and down the Atlantic coast.
The 3,500-horsepower tug, will be one of the world’s most powerful. She will be 120- feet long and will be powered by Diesel- electric motors and driven by twin screws controlled by an electric-hydraulic steering gear system.
The Esther Moran was launched last week by the Jakobson’s Shipyard, Oyster Bay, L. I.
Five Supertankers Ordered (New York Times, 16 June 1963): Two major U. S.- based oil companies and a leading Japanese
Special Notice... 1964
GENERAL PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
.^Lny person, civilian or military, is eligible for this contest. A prize of not more than $1,500, a gold medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute shall be offered annually for the best essay on any subject entered in this contest which contributes toward the mission of the Naval Institute, “.the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy,” subject to the following conditions. If no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the prize, an “Honorable Mention” may be awarded in lieu thereof. Regardless of whether or not a prize is awarded, additional essays of merit may receive “Honorable Mention.” The author of an essay awarded “Honorable Mention” shall receive a silver or a bronze medal dependent upon the quality of the essay, similar in all other respects to the gold medal, and such compensation as may be adjudged by the Board of Control, but not including a Life Membership.
In the event that the author of a General Prize essay is adjudged a medal and already holds this medal, he shall be given a bar suitably engraved in lieu of a second award of the medal. In the event that the recipient is awarded a medal of dissimilar metal to that which he holds, he will be awarded the new medal. If an author awarded a Life Membership is already a life member, his cash award shall be increased by the commuted value of a Life Membership in his case.
In the event that no essay is adjudged of sufficient merit to receive the “Prize” or an “Honorable Mention,” the best essay submitted may receive a special award in lieu thereof.
The following rules will govern this competition:
(1) Essays should not exceed 5,000 words.
(2) Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer on or before 1 November, 1963.
(3) The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay, and each essay must have a motto in addition to the title. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, (b) on the outside of a sealed envelope containing identification of the competitor, (c) above the name and address of the competitor inside the envelope containing this identification. This envelope will not be opened until the Board has made the selections. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large sealed envelope marked “General Prize Essay Contest.”
(4) The selections will be made by the Board of Control, voting by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors.
(5) The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors at the annual meeting on Thursday, 20 February, 1964.
(6) All essays must be typewritten, legible, double spaced, on paper approximately 8y2" X 11", and must be submitted in duplicate, each copy complete in itself.
(7) Essays awarded the “Prize,” “Honorable Mention,” or “Special Award” are for publication in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS. Essays not awarded a prize may be published at the discretion of the Board of Control, and the writers of such essays shall be compensated at the rate established for articles not submitted in competition.
(8) Attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay should be analytical or interpretive and not merely an exposition or personal narrative.
R. T. E. Bowler, Jr. Commander, U. S. Navy, Secretary-Treasurer
shipowner last week placed orders for a total of five supertankers.
Texaco, Inc., signed a contract with the Harland & Wolff shipyard of Belfast for an 88,000-deadweight-ton vessel. The 16.5-knot ship is designed primarily to carry crude oil from the Middle East to a British refinery now under construction. The tanker is scheduled for delivery late next year.
According to James V. C. Malcolmson, vice president in charge of Texaco’s Marine Department, the new vessel will be the largest built at Belfast. The ship is the sixth fast new tanker ordered recently by Texaco directly or on its behalf for long term charter.
An affiliate of Esso International, Inc., the international marketing and supply subsidiary of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) ordered two 64,650-ton motor tankers from one Japanese shipbuilder and a 65,000- ton tanker from another Japanese yard. Mitsui Shipbuilding & Engineering Company will build the diesel-powered ships and Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., the steam- powered vessel.
The three vessels, will be scheduled by Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Company, Ltd., an affiliate of Esso International.
Also ordered in Japan for a Japanese shipowner was a 92,460-ton tanker, the third largest oil tanker to be built in Japan for operation under the Japanese flag.
The vessel was ordered by Tokyo Tanker Company, a subsidiary of Nippon Oil Company, Ltd. A 132,000-ton tanker, the world’s largest ship of that type, was placed in service last year by Idemitsu Kosan Company, Ltd., which has a sistership on order.
Canada Scans Hovercraft (The Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1963): An aluminum craft-—neither boat nor plane—skimmed at 70 miles an hour on a cushion of air up the white-capped Lachine Rapids of the St. Lawrence River near Montreal recently.
It was the first look fqr Canadians at what has been heralded as the transportation of the future for the Great Lakes and undeveloped territory of the Far North. Called a hovercraft in its native Great Britain and a ground effect machine in the United States, it skims over land and water.
It was a sort of Canadian homecoming for the Westland Aircraft SR.N2, built in Britain of aluminum from Canada’s Aluminium, Ltd.
Westland is one of three British companies which have been pioneering this type of transportation. The others are Vickers-Armstrongs (Engineers), Ltd., whose VA-3 operated last year on a scheduled commercial service across the 19-mile-wide Dee estuary on the North Wales coast, the Britten-Norman, Ltd., who built the Cushioncraft CC-2.
The cushion of air on which these craft glide is created by drawing air into the top and blasting it out the bottom with powerful fans.
The Canadian demonstration was arranged by Autair Helicopter 'Services, Ltd., of Montreal to demonstrate to industrialists and government and military officials the vehicle’s possibilities on lakes and over snow and muskeg.
Among important features of the craft is its ability to dispense with costly harbor and dock facilities, to operate irrespective of tides, and to navigate shallow waters inaccessible to shipping.
The SR.N2, weighing 30 tons, has a central cabin capable of accommodating from 56 to 76 passengers, depending on layout. Additional space is available for luggage. On a freighter version of the craft, up to nine tons of payload could be carried.
It has an all-aluminum structure, with negligible use of other materials except for engines and similar equipment, capitalizing on aluminum’s light weight for added payload. The craft was assembled by normal aircraft production techniques. Its frame structure of bent sheet or extrusions is covered by a thin aluminum skin.
The craft’s load-carrying platform is attached to buoyancy tanks to permit landing on water. Cabin superstructure and engine installations are mounted on the platform.
The SR.N2 was used for a test passenger service between Portsmouth, England, and the Isle of Wight in the summer of 1962. These tests established that it would clear wave heights up to five feet and carry 70 passengers at a speed of 72 knots.
Hovercraft Development, Ltd., British Government-financed concern sponsoring all such development in Britain, has said that a 300-ton craft with a capacity for 80 cars and 600 passengers could be available by the mid- 1960’s. Speeds up to 200 miles an hour are considered possible.
Japanese Shipyards (Walter Hamshar, N.Y. Herald Tribune, 23 June 1963): Japanese shipyards are scheduled to begin soon an expansion program to build an increasing number of giant tankers and ore carriers.
The Japanese shipping and Shipbuilding Rationalisation Council recommended last week to Tokyo that long-term low-interest funds be supplied to finance the expansion.
The government is expected to approve the move despite the huge investment involved according to an official in the Japanese Transportation Ministry. It is felt that there must be expansion for the Japanese yards to remain competitive.
The trend in Japan has been from huge expansion investment because government economists have warned of a drain on the nation’s foreign exchange reserves.
But the shipping council also warned that construction facilities for large ships should be expanded because it fears present facilities will be insufficient by 1970.
The expansion will be to build ships of more than 50,000 deadweight tons. The council said that the Japanese industry at present could build about 360,000 tons annually. But by 1970, it was predicted, the industry will probably be required to build about 835,000 tons of giant ships.
The council said that Japanese shipyards are likely to have a surplus capacity for ships of less than 20,000 tons by 1970. It was suggested that this capacity should be either scrapped or diverted to the construction of larger vessels.
Japan jumped from eighth to fifth place in tanker construction last year, according to a Sun Oil Company analysis of world tanker fleets. In 1962 Japanese shipyards produced 855,100 deadweight tons of tankers for the Japanese tank fleet in addition to building tankers for other nations.
Orders Slowing for New Tankers (Werner Bamberger, New York Times, 15 June 1963): The steady rate of growth in the non-Communist world of the tanker fleet engaged in international oil transport is slowing down and may stop in 1966.
This prediction by W. G. Weston, Ltd., British shipping analysts, is based on known orders for new tanker tonnage at the beginning of this year and a projection of the retirement of older and uneconomic vessels.
Free world tanker fleets, the Weston study observed, have grown in the last decade at an annual rate of 11.2 per cent as measured in terms of T-2 equivalents.
The T-2 tanker, a 16,765-deadweight ton United States standard tanker built in World War II and capable of 14.75 knots, is used in the tanker industry as the yardstick for estimating oil transport potential.
On 1 January, free world tanker fleets aggregated 4,316 T-2 equivalents, or 2,561 vessels totaling 63,177,000 deadweight tons.
By the end of this year the free world commercial tanker fleet is expected to have grown by 6.3 per cent to 4,586 T-2 equivalents and with an estimated growth rate of 5.1 per cent, the fleet is to reach 4,818 T-2 equivalents by the end of 1964.
During 1965 a net gain of only 47 T-2’s, or a one per cent increase, is projected and during 1966, when the amount of new tanker tonnage scheduled to be delivered is “negligible,” the world fleet will slide to 4,765 T-2 equivalents.
The current level of tanker construction orders for private free world account was reported at 208 ships aggregating 11,171,000 deadweight tons.
The study noted that the Soviet Union’s tanker fleet had grown and was expected to grow at a much more spectacular rate than free world tanker shipping.
Last year, when free world tankers increased at a rate of 4.9 per cent, the growth rate of the Soviet fleet was 21 per cent. At the beginning of this year, the Soviet tanker fleet was reported as 94 vessels aggregating 1,453,000 tons. And, according to reliable estimates made in this country, the Soviet tanker fleet is expected to reach the 3,200,000- deadweight-ton level by the end of 1965.
The British study found that the average size of commercial private tankers to be delivered by 1965 was close to 55,000 deadweight tons. Ten years ago only one 38,000- ton vessel was in operation, it added.
Though there is not technical reason for building 132,000-ton tankers, as was recently done in Japan, there are economic factors limiting the size of supertankers to the 85,000 to 100,000-ton range, the study said.
“The economies of using large vessels increase at a diminishing rate,” the study declared. In addition, investment in port improvements to allow calls by tankers over 100,000 tons was described as uneconomical in view of high dredging costs.
With the trend toward larger tankers, the average deadweight of the world fleet has increased in the last 10 years from about 13,800 tons to about 23,000 tons, the study said.
This rise in average size has been accompanied by a rise in average speed. Before World War II the speed of deep-sea tankers was about 11 knots. The average speed of the present free world fleet was reported as 15.2 knots.
The slowing down in the rate of tanker growth appears to go counter to projected increases in free world petroleum consumption. It has been estimated that oil demand between 1960 and 1970 will rise at an annual rate of 4.5 per cent. Oil consumption by 1970 is expected to reach a daily level of 29,400,000 barrels.
In the free world tanker fleet of the future, vessels of 25,000 to 60,000 tons will predominate. Vessels in this range in 1966 will make up 58 per cent of the total fleet. Only 30 per cent of the 1966 fleet will be tankers below the 25,000-ton size and 12 per cent will be vessels between 60,000 and 130,000 tons.
Space
Twin U. S. Mars Shots (The Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1963): The United States is planning a doubleheader spaceshot to the neighborhood of the planet Mars in the autumn of 1964, it was reported here.
It would be the first trail-blazing for a manned shot about another decade later at the very earliest.
The twin-bill firings would consist of two successive launchings of unmanned, 570- pound identical payloads within about a month on a seven-month, 300-million-mile journey to within some 14,000 miles of the red planet on “fly-by” missions.
That is, the second shot would be launched when the first had traveled, at the most, only about one-seventh the distance required to intercept Mars at a time when it would be only about 35 millions miles from the earth. Mars, of all the other planets, is rated as having the best chance of supporting some form of life.
Details of the planned doubleheader came on the eve of a two-day symposium on “The Exploration of Mars,” for which many of the nation’s top space scientists are gathering. They plan to assess all possibilities for landing an American expedition on Mars at least by some time in the 1980s".
The symposium is being staged by the American Astronautical Society, with the cosponsorship of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and three other space-conscious scientific groups.
The idea of the twin-bill firings, NASA scientists told a reporter, is to have maximum insurance that at least one of the planetary probes would successfully hurtle to the vicinity of Mars.
And they would both have to be fired within 30 to 40 days beginning in late November 1964, in order to come within the launching “window” when Mars and the earth will be in favorable relative positions.
Failure of both would mean a wait until 1966 when the two planets would again be in favorable position.
Each payload would consist of a 570-pound “Mariner C” spacecraft—somewhat different and heavier than the 460-pound Mariner 2 that achieved the historic fly-by of the planet Venus last December.
The spacecraft, resembling a giant octagonal pillbox topped by four wings containing solar cells, would be packed with scientific gear designed to get (1) the first close-up look at the planet’s surface and its tenuous atmosphere and (2) further information on interplanetary space between the earth and Mars.
A special television camera in each craft would be designed, even at the 14,000-mile fly-by distance, to define surface areas as small as three miles in diameter, compared with approximately 50 miles as the best achievement of earth-bound telescopes.
Foreign
Norwegian Main Naval Base Dedicated
CNews of Norway, 13 June 1963): Haakons- vern, which has replaced Horten as the main base of the Norwegian Navy, was dedicated by King Olav on June 7. The seven-hour ceremony was also attended by Crown Prince Harald, Defense Minister Gudmund Harlem, the Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Aimar Sorenssen and West Norway Naval Chief, Rear Admiral H. Voltersvik.
Located near Bergen, the new naval base covers an area of 250 acres. Construction began in January 1955. Fully developed, it is estimated to cost Kr. 215 million. In case of war, Haakonsvern would serve as operating base for Allied naval forces.
NATO will pay 75 per cent and Norway 25 per cent of the Kr. 172 million cost of military installations, which include the rock-protected submarine station and supply depots, as well as workshops, piers and drydocks. Norway is also paying Kr. 37 million for school and administration buildings, dormitories, bomb-proof shelter, and hospital. The new Naval Academy at Haakonsvern, which cost Kr. 7.4 million started its first classes for cadets in 1960.
Russia Building Fleet (The Baltimore Sun, 13 June 1963): The United States Navy chief of information declared today that the Soviet Union “has not allowed the glamour of space to obscure the importance of the oceans” and is busily engaged in building a sizeable fleet of men-of-war and merchant ships.
“The ‘wet war’ is real,” said Rear Adm. John S. McCain, Jr., in a speech before convention delegates of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs. “Recent world events have announced its presence so emphatically. It is a ‘war’ we cannot afford to lose.”
Admiral McCain said Soviet leaders are “well aware that the channels of commerce throughout this world are absolutely necessary to our own survival.”
The admiral pointed out that all four bottlenecks of the world of commerce lie in areas of unrest and uncertainty—Cuba and the Panama Canal; the Straits of Gibraltar; the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and the Straits of Malacca—the channel between the Indian
Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific.
“Every day there are more than 2,000 merchant ships steaming the North Atlantic sealanes,” Admiral McCain said. “There are 1,700 in the Mediterranean and a comparable number in the Western Pacific. The lowly freighter has to get through otherwise we are not going to have a B-58, a nuclear-powered submarine, or the very coffee which is so necessary to our own creature comforts.”
Admiral McCain said Russia has nearly 900 merchant ships today and intends to double this by 1965 and multiply it by three or four by 1970. The Communist bloc as a whole has 1,200 merchant ships some of which carried the missiles, bombers and technicians to Cuba.
“The aspects of sea power are basic,’ the admiral said. “We must control the seas for many reasons—scientific, political, economic and military. Our sea power must have sufficient strength to give us the capability of applying just sufficient pressure to defeat any particular move at the moment that the Communists commit.”
Australian Navy Submarines (“Spun Yarn,” April 1963): Australia is to purchase 13 Oberon class submarines now building in Britain. One is already in service, the others will be commissioned within a couple of years. Britain has 13 boats of this class in commission and the 13th is being built in Chatham dockyard. These boats displace 2,030 tons surfaced and 2.410 submerged and arc equipped with eight 21-inch tubes for homing torpedoes. No details are available as to submarine detection equipment. Said to have a high submerged speed, these boats are capable of long endurance at sea without outside support. A feature of their construction is the adaptation of glass fibre laminates in the superstructure while in some of them, a light aluminum alloy replaces glass fibre.
12-Mile Sea Limit for Canada (New York Herald Tribune, 5 June 1963): The Canadian government said yesterday it will bar American and other foreign fishing vessels from operating within 12 miles of the Canadian coast as of mid-May, 1964.
The Canadian action in extending the territorial waters limit to 12 miles is expected
to bring a sharp reaction from Washington, which contends that the three-mile limit should be adhered to.
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, in announcing the planned extension to the House of Commons, disclosed that talks will be held with the U. S. government to determine the nature and extent of American fishing rights that might be affected by the new 12-mile limit.
Similar discussions will be opened with other countries affected, notably France. “It is our hope and belief that we will be able to reach agreement with such countries on mutually satisfactory arrangements,” Mr. Pearson said.
Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, whose government had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a 12-mile fisheries zone by international agreement, warned that the Pearson government’s action “may have serious consequences to Canada’s economy.” He hinted at the possibility of U. S. retaliation when he noted that “some 70 per cent” of Canada’s fish exports goes to the U. S.
The Canadian action was forecast in the communique issued at the end of Mr. Pearson’s meeting with President Kennedy at Hyannis Port on 11 May.
“The Prime Minister informed the President that the Canadian government would shortly be taking decisions to establish a 12- mile fishing zone,” it said. “The President reserved the long-standing American position in support of the three-mile limit. He also called attention to the historic and treaty
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fishing rights of the United States. The Prime Minister assured him that these rights would be taken into account.”
In explaining his government’s decision to the House of Commons, Mr. Pearson said that foreign fishing operations off Canada’s East Coast “have increased enormously over the past five years . . . depleting our offshore fisheries resources” and there are indications also that Canada’s West Coast fisheries may soon be threatened.
He noted that more than 50 countries exercise fisheries control beyond the old three- mile limit of territorial waters.
Hipper Centenary (Robert Langdon): This month, September 1963, marks the hundredth anniversary of the birth of one of modern Germany’s most revered naval figures, Franz Hipper of World War I fame. Born on 13 September 1863, in the little town of Weilheim in landlocked Bavaria, young Hipper chose a naval life before ever having seen more water than the Danube in its upper reaches. But once he had arrived at Kiel, had passed his entrance examinations, and had entered the Imperial Navy with the 1881 contingent, he soon proved to himself and to his naval comrades that the sea was truly his natural element. For the remainder of Hipper’s life (he died a bachelor in 1932), the sea and the naval service remained his first loves.
The coming of World War I in 1914 found Rear Admiral Hipper in command of the scouting forces of the German High Seas Fleet, and it was in that role that he several times encountered his British opposite, Beatty. Of major importance, of course, was the Hipper-Beatty clash of 31 May 1916 which signalled the opening phase of the Battle of Jutland. Soon after that engagement, the former shopkeeper’s son was elevated to the nobility by his Bavarian King Ludwig III, and he became Baron von Hipper.
In August 1918, when Admiral Reinhard Scheer became Director of Naval Operations at General Headquarters, Hipper succeeded him as Commander in Chief of the High Seas Fleet, the post he held when the war ended three months later. Late in November 1918, Hipper was granted retirement.
In April 1939, the heavy cruiser Hipper was commissioned, and for the next six years that name was most prominent among the fighting records of Kriegsmarine’s heavy surface ships. A few days before World War II ended, the Hipper was sunk by Allied bombs at Kiel.
In December 1959, the British transferred to West Germany’s Bundesmarine the former Black .Swan-class frigate Actaeon, a 1,400-ton, 300-foot ship that had been laid down in 1944 and completed in July 1946. On 10 January 1959, she was named the Hipper (F-214) and became a cadet training ship based at Kiel.
Research and Development
Air Bubble Boat (New York Times, 14 June 1963): The Navy’s first public demonstration °f an experimental boat that rides on an air bubble was a success today after five failures.
After the earlier unsuccessful tries, engineers traced the trouble to a slipping fan belt. They corrected the slippage and the boat made six perfect runs, achieving a top speed °f 33.6 knots, almost the limit of the desired speed.
The captured air bubble vessel, a square shaped barge driven by a 1,700-pound thrust jet engine, is being developed j'ointly by the Naval Air Development Center in suburban Johnsville, and the Naval Air Engineering Center here.
The Navy is interested in this kind of boat because it would permit doubling of the speed and range of ships, compared with conventional power plants.
Allen Ford, the physicist who developed the process, explained that a huge air bubble is trapped beneath the boat by providing her with sides that extend down into the water and ski-like planes that contain the air fore and aft. A large fan pumps air down into the hollow cavity under the boat and the jet engine provides thrust to move it forward.
Exploring the Skagerrak Bottom (News of Norway, 23 May 1963): The upper strata of the earth crust under the Skagerrak, an arm of the North Sea between Denmark and Norway, are the subject of a joint investigation by Norwegian, Danish and West German scientists. The primary objective is to study the geological structure, especially across the Norwegian Channel. This is the area which international oil companies reportedly are exploring for possible pockets of oil and natural gas. There is no direct connection between this search and the scientific study which is subsidized by NATO’s Civilian Sub-Committee for Oceanographic Research.
Dr. Hans Holtedahl, of Bergen University, reports that preliminary results of the three- nation investigation conducted last summer indicate that the geological submarine border between Denmark and Norway extends farther north than previously presumed. This summer, planes flying from Kristiansand, Norway, will take magnetic measurements of the Skagerrak bottom. The research project is due to be greatly expanded next summer when scientists will examine the composition and the thickness of the earth crust under the Skagerrak as well as in the land areas ol Norway and Denmark.
NORTHERN ORDNANCE INCORPORATED
Meanwhile, Norwegian authorities are considering inquiries from five international consortiums concerning possibilities for oil drilling in North Sea areas within or outside Norwegian waters.
New helicopter hangar—The U. S. Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind is evaluating a telescoping, aluminum- section hangar designed to house the ship’s two helicopters. The heated hangar, invented by the Royal Canadian Navy, is 20 feet long telescoped, 70 feet when extended, 21 feet wide, and 23 feet in height.
U. S. Coast Guard
USCG Station Annapolis—Two, experimental, floating stations have been placed in commission by the U. S. Coast Guard at Annapolis, Maryland, and Fort Myers, Florida. The 28-foot by 60-foot, rescue- unit houseboats are each manned by a crew of ten and each tends a 30-foot rescue boat as well as a 16-