During the past decade, as ICBMs and strategic aircraft have proliferated and have been dispersed throughout the Soviet Union and the United States, an increasing portion of the land masses of each country has been targeted by the other. Inevitably this has meant that greater percentages of each country’s population and industrial capacity have been threatened even though the specific aiming points have been, and are, ICBM sites and strategic bomber bases.
Today, with the preliminary phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) behind us, some progress toward practical limitations can be said to have been made. However, complications persist, particularly as they relate to new technological developments in the form of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses.
Even though the preliminary phase of the SALT was sported to have been conducted in an atmosphere of candor, free of polemics, it is probable that as long as ICBMs and intercontinental strategic aircraft exist in the possession of either country mutual distrust will persist. The ever-increasing resolution capabilities of reconnaissance satellites unfortunately do not, and are not predicted to include the capability of detecting the presence of multiple warheads behind the cover or heat shield of an ICBM or what is in the bomb bay of an intercontinental bomber. Accordingly, on-site inspection, which the Russians refuse to accept, will remain as an essential requirement of any meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement as long as ICBMs and intercontinental strategic aircraft remain in the arms inventory of either superpower.
With or without MIRVs, the continued existence of ICBMs and intercontinental bombers in the possession of either country demand that the other target their sites and bases. Also demanded is continued escalation of weapon system development and deployment. These two demands are built into any strategic arms concept which (1) requires the use of sites or bases within the territorial boundaries of the user’s national land mass and, (2) which depends on static defenses for its continued viability.
Particularly for the nation that can first widely deploy MIRVs, the temptation will remain to launch a pre-emptive counterforce strike against the other’s ICBM sites and intercontinental bomber bases. In no case could one nation afford to leave the ICBMs and intercontinental bomber bases of the other untargeted. Consequently, as long as such weapon systems exist, the people, the homes, the social and industrial mechanisms of both countries are threatened by either an accident or an irrational decision to launch a counterforce attack. Each country’s territory will remain an irresistible magnet for the strategic offensive forces of the other.
Static defense systems can always be defeated by an improvement in the other side’s offensive capabilities. This has been true through the ages and nothing has happened in the last two decades to indicate that the situation has, or will be, changed. At some point in the weapon system design and development process, a design-freeze has to take place if any production hardware is ever to result. When that design-freeze takes place, certain operational capability limits are locked into the system. An offensive system can overcome the defensive one by placing demands on it which exceed the latter’s capability limits. We have seen this process repeated over and over again in the last 10 to 15 years in U. S. efforts to protect ICBMs. First there were soft silos, then hard ones, then rehardened ones, now super-hard ones and the ABM. As long as technological progress can take place, there can be no end to the escalation in trying to protect a static system. Incidentally, this is not a new or novel observation but one which is often disregarded in the heat of debate over the merits and demerits of a weapon system.
Within the past and present geopolitical environments, the civilian and military leaders of the defense establishments of each of the superpowers would not be performing their duties responsibly if they did not press—did not demand—a superiority in strategic arms capability over that of the other. Under the pressure of an allegedly inferior capability, a head-of-state in either society would find it almost impossible to resist authorizing and supporting a further escalation—a further heightening of the degree of tension. Regrettably for mankind, each step upward in capability and tension also increases the probability of a miscalculation or an accident.
As pointed out recently by G. W. Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky in their scholarly article, “The Limitation of Strategic Arms” (Scientific American, January 1970), the most important objective of the SALT negotiations should be “to reduce the probability that a thermonuclear exchange will ever take place.” Additionally, Rathjens and Kistiakowsky express their belief that the “strategic arms race now has a life of its own,” being more dependent on the weapons development and procurement programs of the other country than on the level of tension between the two. Rathjens and Kistiakowsky believe it essential that the SALT negotiations achieve an understanding that slows the rate of development and rate of change of strategic systems. In turn, they place great weight on achieving an agreement that will prevent the deployment of MIRVs and ABMs.
Certainly, the primary SALT objective should be to reduce the probability of a thermonuclear exchange. And this author shares the belief that the strategic arms race has a life of its own. While it is true that the deployment now of MIRVs and ABMs might alter, quickly and significantly, the balance of strategic power, emphasis in the SALT negotiations on preventing their deployment would seem to be putting a very high priority on an issue which could be of secondary importance if still more fundamental concepts could be addressed.
Why not address, directly, one of the main roots of the problem—the very existence of ICBMs and land- based intercontinental bombers? Given the assumptions that: (1) both nations are weary of the strategic arms race and have many domestic demands for the funds, talents, and facilities now supporting it; (2) both nations wish to minimize the probability of a nuclear exchange; and (3) should an accident occur, both nations urgently desire to prevent the accident from escalating into an all-out exchange, then it makes sense to strive to take a step that would eliminate the urgent requirement for each country to target the other’s land- based ICBM sites and intercontinental bomber bases.
For this discussion, let us assume there are no reasons why the question should not be addressed. In what situation would each nation find itself if such an agreement were achieved?
► The reconnaissance satellites of each nation could police the agreement. On-site inspections would not be required.
► The land mass of each nation would no longer be a target for the other’s strategic forces.
► Each nation would retain an assured deterrent force by virtue of its ballistic missile launching submarines and surface ships.
► The cities of each nation would remain open and become hostages to the other’s assured deterrent forces.
► An attack on one of the cities by the other clearly would have to be an irrational act; for the destruction of his own in retaliation would be assured.
► Since even the “worst case” planners agree that the probability of such an irrational act is very low, the level of tension between the superpowers should decrease markedly.
► While to some degree the arms race would continue in attempts to improve sea-based systems, even this could be limited and controlled by including tonnage, type, and force level limitations in the agreement. In any case, the level of intensity of the arms race would decrease greatly.
► The probability of a nuclear attack by an emergent nuclear power on either superpower would remain unchanged. But if the superpowers can agree to such a significant move in slowing the arms race and reducing world tensions, they can also agree to co-operative arrangements for early detection and warning of a third power threat to either. Neither would want the other to believe that the attack originated with it.
The foregoing suggested SALT agenda item certainly cuts through many of the intricacies associated with attempting to control the deployments of MIRVs and ABMs, as suggested by Rathjens and Kistiakowsky. It ls a much more fundamental approach to a meaningful type of arms limitation. Such an agreement would be far less sensitive to word interpretations, and the deficiencies of satellite reconnaissance. But of even greater importance, it offers far more potential for truly significant reductions in the levels of tension between the superpowers.
One objection of the Soviet Union to such a proposal might be based on what are reported to be their current force levels of ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and intercontinental bombers versus our own. Currently, we are supposed to have 656 SLBMs versus the Soviets’ 205, 1,054 ICBMs versus their 1,350, and 2,144 intercontinental bombers versus their 600. Wiping out the latter two categories of strategic arms would leave the United States with an advantage.
One way for the Soviets to catch up quickly with SLBMs would be to convert some of their ICBMs to surface ship use. Certainly many of their new and excellent merchant ships could be modified to include a launch capability for ICBMs at far less cost than rehardening ICBM silos every five years and deploying a very sophisticated and expensive ABM system. Studies made by the U. S. Navy, Lockheed, and Boeing back in 1959 and 1960 indicated there were no particularly difficult technical problems which would prevent Minuteman from being deployed in such a fashion in U. S. merchant ships. In fact, this mode of deployment of an ICBM has so much to offer from the points of view of strategy, tactics, and costs that one wonders why such a program was not initiated in the United States rather than going through the cycle of repeated rehardening and upgrading protective SAM (now ABM) systems.
Another Soviet objection might arise from their deficiency in aircraft carriers and carrier aircraft. With the relatively recent appearance of the Moskva there is every indication that the Russians could build such ships. True, the Moskva cannot handle aircraft like the F-4, or the F-14, which is under development, but she could handle aircraft with a vertical take-off and landing capability (VTOL). VTOL-capable aircraft are thought by some to be the wave of the future for carrier aircraft. In short, in a relatively few years, our inventory of large carriers could turn out to be overdone. In any case, the Russians would have the option open to them of increasing their carrier capability. But there should be a definite agreed limit on the allowable gross take-off weight of carrier-based aircraft.
Both potential Soviet objections to U. S. superiority in sea-based power could be countered by pointing to the overwhelming superiority of the massed armies of the Soviet Union. Concessions here might lead to concessions by the United States.
Also, seaplane-type bombers of intercontinental range should be included in any agreement which exorcised ICBMs and strategic aircraft from the arms inventory of each of the superpowers. One would not want to see a revival of the P6M type of effort either in this country or the Soviet Union.
To preserve the concept of open cities, the arms limitation agreement should include a provision which bars entry to major city ports of all ships capable of launching ballistic missiles and perhaps even those capable of launching aircraft. This would create some problems associated with crew morale and ship overhauls but these would be minor difficulties to be overcome in view of the benefits accruing therefrom.
Within the United States, objections to the suggestion of eliminating land-based ICBMs, intercontinental bombers and their bases would occur for several reasons. First, the United States has a huge capital investment in these weapon systems and facilities. Many people are employed to operate, sustain, and improve them. Their elimination, therefore, would cause large dislocations. The economic impact could be substantial. Second, many thoughtful people believe that the United States must retain a mix of strategic systems in order to compound the problems of a potential aggressor and to lessen the probability that a breakthrough in defensive armament might have the potential of defeating our entire inventory of strategic offensive systems. And thirdly, some believe, on the basis of past performance, that we cannot trust the Russians and that satellite reconnaissance is inadequate to monitor their degree of compliance with such an agreement.
To some degree the economic impact could be eased by diversion of resources to the solution of ecological, housing, and mass transportation problems. And, some of the resources would be needed to develop and acquire a mix of sea-based assured retaliatory forces should efforts fail to prevent a shift of the arms race to sea. Doubtless such a reassignment of priorities would not prevent dislocation within industries and further temporary increases in unemployment. In view of what is being said and written today, however, regarding the urgent necessity to assign massive resources to the solution of the problems of mass transportation, housing, and pollution, both the personal and industrial dislocations should be transitory.
A mix of assured retaliatory forces is a necessity. Until the current environment of hostility and distrust between the superpowers has been mitigated by several years of successful, meaningful, and proven disarmament, it would be imprudent for either superpower to put all of its reliance on one type of a strategic weapon system. By international agreement having outlawed nuclear weapon space platforms, the superpowers have only the oceans to use if a similar agreement prohibits the use of land-based intercontinental strategic weapon systems. For example, the United States could use the Underwater Long Range Missile System (ULMS), a submarine-launched missile of intercontinental range, to complement the present Polaris/Poseidon submarine systems. With ULMS one would geometrically compound an aggressor’s search, detection and acquisition problems by increasing 10 to 15 times the area of the oceans which must be covered. Other ways of keeping one’s missiles at sea come readily to mind, such as placing them in surface ships, which would force a potential aggressor to divert more and different types of resources to cover them. Of course, not all ships so configured need carry live warheads or real missiles.
A nation determined to hide new installations from reconnaissance satellites probably could do so for a time. One should recall the efforts to which the Germans went in World War II to camouflage entire cities. A nation with a closed society and a controlled press could mount such an effort much more successfully than the United States. Nevertheless, it would require a major, rigidly-controlled project to camouflage either large air bases or ICBM sites to hide them successfully from the ever-increasing capabilities of satellite sensors. With time and the correlation of all available information, such deception would be revealed. Clearly, a far lesser effort would be required by a potential aggressor to disguise a MIRV re-entry body. Accordingly, without on-site inspection, any limitation agreement is a gamble to some degree. Because of the relative effort required, the odds would be far better that a deception would be detected by reconnaissance satellites if it involved ICBMs, large aircraft, and air bases rather than MIRVs.
These and still other potential objections, both Russian and American, cannot be brushed off. They are legitimate. They must be studied and evaluated. Recognition must be given to each in the form of having available pre-planned alternative ways of eliminating or mitigating. If in fact both superpowers are truly apprehensive about the ever-increasing emotional and financial burdens of the current high-wire striving for lasting supremacy in strategic arms, it should be possible for them to negotiate each objection to a point of honorable compromise, protecting the legitimate interest of the other. The urgent and basic necessity of eliminating the demand targets on each other’s land masses is far too important to mankind to permit national pride, lack of preparation, or unwillingness to take an acceptable degree of risk to stand in the way of such a significant step toward a meaningful limitation on the acquisition and maintenance of strategic weapon armaments.
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On graduating from the U. S. Naval Academy in February 1941, Commander Backus joined the Pacific Fleet. As Signal Officer, he was in the USS Oklahoma (BB-37) when she was sunk on 7 December 1941. Subsequently, he was part of the commissioning crew of the USS South Dakota (BB-57) and helped fight her through the campaigns of Guadalcanal, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. In 1946, he completed the ordnance engineering curriculum at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School. Later assignments included command of the USS Isherwood (DD-520) and duty as Assistant Naval Attaché, London. From 1956 until he retired in 1961. he was simultaneously Head of the Ballistic Missile Branch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Executive Secretary and member of the Navy Ballistic Missile Committee, and a member of the Steering Task Group of the Office of Special Projects. His essay, “Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation” won the U. S. Naval Institute 1959 General Prize Essay Contest. Commander Backus recently joined the non-profit MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts.