A Perspective On Sea-Based VTOL
By Wynn W. Whidden, U. S. Navy, U. S. Navy, Navy Carrier Study, Nuclear Powered Carrier Program, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
The acquisition of the Hawker-Siddeley Harrier AV-8 by the U. S. Marine Corps is significant for both sea-based and land-based air forces. It is the first step in operational evaluation and mission application of a pure jet vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft by an Armed Service of the United States. Because the VTOL aircraft is nearly ready to supplement, but not yet replace, current conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft, it is time to consider the impact of VTOL applications specifically upon carrier design and operations, and generally upon sea-based air in all aspects.
The realities of future VTOL applications are more problematical than generally conceived by some enthusiasts. The interactions of the projected potential enemy threat with operational requirements, the actual progress of technology, hardware procurement lead times, and budget constraints, are some of the realities which must be dealt with before formalizing a Navy VTOL program to include specific mission applications and the supporting aircraft procurement.
The Navy’s primary and secondary missions, control of the sea and support of the land battle, cannot be performed unless we control the air over the sea and its approaches. The potential air threat to our Navy is, and will continue to be, a large force of high-performance, sophisticated aircraft and various antiship cruise missiles. The Navy needs to develop carrier-based CTOL aircraft with sufficient performance, armament, and range to counter the threat.
The operational characteristics of these high performance CTOL carrier aircraft have, until the present, been the primary determinants of attack carrier size and general configuration. Because technology has now arrested the historical trend toward higher aircraft landing and take-off speeds, further growth in carrier size is now, and is projected to be, primarily dependent upon the aircraft numbers, weight of ordnance, and combat range and endurance, which we decide to incorporate in the air wing of a single carrier.
Although VTOL aircraft can readily be based in and operated from aircraft carriers, both attack (CVA) and antisubmarine warfare (CVS) types, a conversion from CTOL to VTOL aircraft (assuming equal mission capabilities for both) would not, standing alone, alter the remaining determinant factors for establishing the size of future carriers. Let us assume that we replace the CTOL aircraft in a carrier air wing with the number of jet VTOL aircraft required to retain the air wing mission effectiveness. The number of VTOL aircraft would approximate the number of CTOL replaced. The requirements for combat consumables, such as fuel and ordnance, would not be reduced. VTOL aircraft are just as complex and sophisticated machines as CTOL. Therefore, spare parts, servicing, maintenance and shop support, and personnel requirements would be as much as, or greater than, for CTOL. The general dimensions of the attack carrier flight deck would still be required to accommodate a large number of aircraft, and to exploit the short take-off (STO) feature of VTOL with an overload to maximize available payloads and combat range whether or not catapults are used. Thus, even with a complete switch to VTOL, the effects on carrier design and configuration would not be substantial. The elimination of arresting gear, with the possible exception of a barrier arresting system for emergency recovery of VTOL in conventional mode, would be the most significant change.
A more realistic projection shows that the maximum possible influx of VTOL in the carrier air wing by about 1985 would result in a mix of VTOL and CTOL aircraft. This is true because new aircraft, such as the F-14 and S-3, that will join the Fleet in the mid-1970s will be with us in strength at least until then. In addition, the long lead time required to develop, procure, and introduce new, higher-technical risk VTOL aircraft in substantial numbers, under an austere budget, will stretch beyond the next decade. It seems evident that any significant VTOL influence upon carrier design, configuration, and employment falls beyond a presently useful planning range in time.
So far as price goes, it is significant that, per aircraft, the cost of a carrier decreases as the operating aircraft complement increases. Moreover, the lifetime (30 years) cost of a carrier is only about 20% of the total system cost. This includes the acquisition and operating costs of the ship and the aircraft in her air wing over a 30-year period. For any given level of carrier system effectiveness, therefore, the cost per aircraft and the number of aircraft required in the air wing are the dominant factors in the cost of the carrier system. Variations in acquisition cost of the carrier herself are then very small marginal changes to the total system cost. This means that to realize any meaningful economic efficiency for the total carrier system, in a conversion from a CTOL to a VTOL air wing, either the VTOL aircraft must be as effective (mission capable) as the CTOL, and cheaper per unit, or the VTOL must be more effective per unit and cheaper in air wing aggregate than the CTOL.
Current VTOL aircraft cannot match either the range or the payload of the high performance CTOL carrier aircraft now in the Navy inventory. To accept lower performance in the face of high quality opposition would not only affect aerial tactics, but would also increase risk of defeat in the air. Technological forecasts from the aircraft industry now indicate that improved power plants, with greater thrust-to-weight ratios and advanced design applications, will combine to produce VTOL aircraft that will compete favorably with CTOL for fighter and attack missions. Unfortunately, the size and cost of those VTOL aircraft which are predicted to attain this goal by the early 1980s, will be about 10% greater than equivalent CTOL aircraft at that time. Under the expected severe military budget constraints, and considering what must be achieved to gain any significant economic efficiency for the carrier air system in a switch to VTOL, we seem to be running into a fiscal barrier. There is no doubt that feasible and effective carrier mission applications for VTOL will be forthcoming, but analyses of cost, effectiveness, and risk, point to a deliberate evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary one for carrier adaptations.
The versatility of basing possibilities for jet VTOL aircraft has aroused widespread interest in sea-basing systems other than attack carriers. The Marine concept for the Harrier may envisage an air support role in which it will initially operate from amphibious assault ships for short range missions in support of the landing force, then stage ashore to austere operating sites as soon as possible. This concept would employ VTOL in a role supplementing the CTOL aircraft, which will still be required for gaining initial air superiority and making heavyweight deep strikes—both accomplished at long ranges with necessarily heavy pay loads.
Other sea-based VTOL mission applications could include basing or staging in cruiser, frigate, destroyer, and auxiliary types for early warning, surveillance, anti-ship, anti-missile, anti-snooper, and antisubmarine missions—all supplementing carrier air power. These sea-basing applications are faced with numerous technical problems which must be solved before an effective VTOL program can be implemented.
The dispersal of aviation support in terms of maintenance hardware, spare parts, and personnel, which would necessarily accompany, basing one or two complex VTOL aircraft on board each of numerous surface ships would obviously be costly and possibly an inefficient use of supporting assets. To attain the necessary operating and support capabilities in many of these ships will require configuration changes that involve weight and stability problems. For instance, the Harrier needs about 25 feet of freeboard for a landing deck to avoid the generation of sea spray, which reduces pilot visibility for landing and is damaging to the engine if ingested. This calls for a relatively high deck which is constructed for dynamic loads of about 20,000 pounds. For a minimally useful amount of combat consumables to be stowed in a sea-base for the Harrier, as much as 20% more tank space for jet fuel may be required, depending upon the type of ship, and in any ship other than a carrier, a substantial increase in magazine volume for aviation ordnance would need to be provided. Shop space and test equipment peculiar to air systems would also have to be installed. The problem of high velocity, high temperature jet exhaust downwash against the ship deck and surrounding structure needs to be minimized for the sake of VTOL engine efficiency (reduced ingestion of jet exhaust during lift-off and landing) and preservation of the ship’s structure. A grated deck and vaned overboard vent system will probably be necessary to properly minimize the problem.
We have no frigates or destroyers in the Fleet with flight decks capable of operating the Harrier or larger VTOL aircraft (based on a minimum requirement for 75 x 50 feet platform dimensions at a height of 25 feet above the waterline). The DD-963 class destroyer will be the first of that type with flight deck dimensions and location approximating the minimum Harrier requirements. Support installations, as well as space and weight allowances for spares, maintenance, personnel, and combat consumables for an acceptable degree of operational independence, will be needed in the DD-963 class to base and operate the Harrier type of VTOL aircraft.
Large auxiliaries, such as combat store ships (AFS) and fast combat support ships (AOE) may not require too many changes to accommodate jet VTOL aircraft, such as the Harrier, on a contingency or marginally-operational basis to provide air combat support to an underway replenishment group.
In the amphibious forces, the general purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA) (when commissioned), amphibious assault ship (LPH), amphibious transport, dock (LPD), and landing ship, dock (LSD) are adaptable (in descending degree) to jet VTOL operations, provided appropriate support spaces and installations are made available. The Marine acquisition of the Harrier has focused attention on these ships as possible sea-bases for it. The austere outlook for sufficient modern amphibious sealift generates a competitive situation, for space and weight, between the Harrier and the vertical assault ground forces on board these ships. Nevertheless, the potential value of jet VTOL in support of Marine assault operations and their possession of the Harrier, militate a priori toward mission development in the amphibious force as the first step in VTOL sea-based evolution.
From all of these “real world” considerations, it would appear that for the near term, the sea-basing platform, most easily and cheaply adaptable for operating jet VTOL aircraft under all conditions, is the aircraft carrier (CVA or CVS). The carrier then should be the vehicle from which operational experience and mission applications are evaluated—first in support of amphibious assault operations, using Marine-operated Harriers. Staging and trial basing of the Harrier on board LPHs, LHAs, and other amphibious types could logically be a next or concomitant step in the evolution as fiscal and technical constraints will allow. Further expansion of sea-basing concepts to other ship types should then follow as properly configured ships can be adapted or constructed, through determination of requirement priorities and conversion or procurement funding.
Long-term development of VTOL sea-based mission applications may well lead to the design and procurement of new “air-capable” ships, somewhat differently designed aircraft carriers, or both. However, it seems improbable that all-VTOL aircraft carriers, with the mission effectiveness of our latest carriers of today, will be possible before the end of the 1980s.
This brief analysis of VTOL, in relation to aircraft carriers and other sea-basing platforms notwithstanding, the remarkable capabilities of jet VTOL aircraft to take off from and land in small areas, to maneuver in relatively small radii at high and low speeds, and to hover when desired (all of which the AV-8A Harrier has ably demonstrated), are promising virtues for sea-based adaptations wherever mission applications are both needed and feasible. The intent here has been to present, in perspective, some of the technical and cost problems that must be faced in the development of short and long-term VTOL mission applications. The competition of new weapons systems for the scarcer procurement dollar promises to stiffen further, and VTOL, like other air systems, must meet firmly justified requirements through feasible applications within recognized constraints.
Those Capricious Ladies
Commander Marvin L. Duke, U. S. Navy, Former Commanding Officer, Airborne Early Warning Squadron One
At a recent Tropical Cyclone Conference, the Seventh Fleet staff meteorologist explained the importance of accurate forecasting for the 80,000 personnel, 700 aircraft, and 200 ships of the Seventh fleet. He emphasized that his biggest problem concerned the large concentration of ships in the “box canyon” of Gulf of Tonkin, and that erroneous forecasts could result in a catastrophic loss of men and ships or cause important operations to be needlessly cancelled.
The threat is real, as hurricane Camille proved so vividly, when it struck the Gulf Coast of the United States in August 1969. Each year, these intense tropical cyclones, named after ladies because of their capricious and unpredictable nature, spread death and destruction and hinder military operations throughout the world.
The reason for the destructive forces becomes apparent when one considers the energy associated with these storms. The amount of power generated by just an “average” typhoon is indeed awesome, equal in a 24-hour period to the energy of about 500,000 Nagasaki-size atomic bombs. A typhoon with a 500-mile diameter can produce the equivalent of about ten trillion horsepower for a period of as long as ten days, or 16 trillion kilowatt hours per day. In one day, it can generate sufficient power to provide, at 1960 consumption levels, electricity for the continental United States for 22 years.
U. S. Navy aircraft have been penetrating tropical cyclones since 1943, and they perform low-level aircraft reconnaissance (below 1,500 feet). The Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3144.2 states that:
It is often the only reliable method by which the essential weather and oceanographic data can be obtained and made available to analysts and forecasters in a timely manner so that appropriate warnings may be broadcast. Low-level data for tropical cyclone (hurricane and typhoon) analysis are urgently required in order to:
(a) Accurately “fix” the center; (b) Determine the maximum sustained winds and the windfield structure; (c) Ascertain, with precision, the direction, and speed of movement of the center; (d) Obtain the detailed structure of the vortex; (c) Accurately measure the meteorological intensification factors in the “eye” and in the storm periphery for forecast purposes.
In the Western Pacific, weather reconnaissance missions are performed by WC-121N Constellation aircraft of Airborne Early Warning Squadron One (VW-1) and WC-130 Hercules aircraft of Weather Reconnaissance Squadron 54 (WRS-54), both based on Guam.
Reconnaissance reports are sent to the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) at Guam. Low and medium level fixes—made at 0900 and 1500Z—are reported by VW-1, and medium and high-level fixes—made at 2100Z and 0300Z—are reported by WRS-54. These reports assist the JTWC in forecasting storm movement and intensity.
Since U. S. Air Force regulations do not permit low-level penetrations of a typhoon, they are all flown by the Navy, and normally, night penetrations are also flown by the Navy. Penetrations flown between 700 and 1,000 feet place the aircraft above the severe surface turbulence, amplified by eddy effects of strong surface winds over a heavy sea, and below the base of the clouds.
During low-level penetrations, the airborne meteorologist makes every effort to locate the various cyclonic centers contained within the geographic storm center: the pressure eye area of lowest pressure; the wind eye, calm area where all winds converge; the temperature eye area of maximum temperature; and the cloud eye area where spiral clouds converge and generally present a small clear area.
These meteorological centers are not normally coincidental, and orbiting the aircraft within the geographical storm center is the most advantageous method of locating them. All of these parameters are used by the JTWC in preparing their storm warnings and forecasts for the Fleet and for civilian communities in the Western Pacific.
During penetration, two integral systems, the APS-20 long-range search radar and the APS-45 shorter-range, high-frequency radar, used when adjacent to and inside of the cyclone, determine the weakest quadrant of the typhoon. The aircraft is then vectored between or through the less intense spirals of cumulo-nimbus clouds surrounding the center. These spiral clouds are called “feeder bands” and merge about the eye to produce a solid cloud mass called the “wall.” Normally, the typhoon will appear on radar 200 miles away, and the aircraft will then position itself to fly an arc of approximately 150 miles about the center, obtaining radar information on the size, intensity, and physical structure of the typhoon.
After collecting this data, a penetration conference is held by the aircraft commander (AC), Meteorologist (Metro), combat information center officer (CICO), and the navigator concerning the penetration and tactics to be used if penetration is to be attempted
When an initial point (IP) is selected, the aircraft descends to between 700 and 1,000 feet. The CICO conns the aircraft by radar, while the Metro announces wind direction and velocity, and visually cross-checks the ClCO’s heading, verifying that the wind is slightly ahead of the aircraft’s port beam. The aircraft will fly a spiral track into the wind center, which affords the shortest and least hazardous path into the eye. The co-pilot visually verifies all information passed, and the AC concentrates on stable instrument flight. Often, turbulence encountered is so severe that aircraft control becomes difficult, and the vibration makes the instruments unreadable.
If proper drift is not maintained by the aircraft, it can be easily pushed into a more dangerous typhoon quadrant. If this occurs, or if any dangerous situation becomes apparent, an abort heading is flown. Quite understandably, this heading, normally the reciprocal of the inbound track corrected for drift, is updated and passed by the CICO to the AC at frequent intervals.
As the aircraft approaches to within 30 to 50 miles of the cloud wall, a significant change in engine operating conditions will evolve, first gradually, and then suddenly since the pressure gradient changes so rapidly when the center is approached. For example, the density altitude rapidly increases, and as a result, the barometric altimeter reads higher than the actual aircraft altitude. Constant reference to the radar altimeter is therefore mandatory to keep from flying into the water. Care must also be taken when the aircraft enters the hot, low-density air of the eye, for the bottom can literally drop out from under the plane as it enters the chimney.
Generally, after entering the eye, the aircraft will encounter an air mass that is clear and free of turbulence. The wind, however, will continue to be a factor, especially in the vicinity of the circumferential “wall.”
To achieve as low a ground speed as possible, a clockwise orbit is normally flown as the aircraft ascends to approximately 10,000 feet while collecting data.
On one occasion, during exit from an eye, on transiting a particularly heavy portion of the wall cloud, extreme turbulence was encountered in an updraft. The port wing tank of a WC-121, containing 600 gallons of fuel, was torn from the wing. Four minutes later, there was another jolt, and the starboard tip tank, containing 600 more gallons of fuel, was also ripped off. The badly-shaken crew, however, managed to return the aircraft to base. Teamwork is crucial to the success of a penetration.
Since no two typhoons are alike, each typhoon must be treated as an unknown quantity throughout the mission. In addition, five to six hours will normally elapse between penetrations, and so the same typhoon must once again be treated as an unknown because its characteristics will have changed in the interim.
Most Pacific typhoons display a general east-to-west movement in their formative stages. The greatest difficulty in forecasting is that of predicting typhoons that recurve or move irregularly. Those which loop and move with southerly components prove particularly troublesome. Another factor which adds to the complexity of forecasting is related to the number of tropical cyclones existing at the same time. Multiple typhoons disrupt normal flow patterns in the tropics, and may interact with one another in a variety of ways.
Better forecasting will eventually come from improved techniques, but still using the data at hand. Reconnaissance fix data is considered by all tropical forecasters to be accurate within the most narrow limits. This is not to say that aircraft follow-on replacements, with improved instrumentation, will not be required in future weather reconnaissance. The new Data Logging System, by which meteorological data is transmitted from the aircraft almost at the same time it is collected, is a case in point. Such modernization, however, will serve only to make the existing task easier and will not make significant improvements in the accuracy of the data that is presently being collected.
Presently being investigated are new techniques such as Numerical Weather Prediction. Here, meteorological parameters are solved by computer in terms of hydro-dynamic equations governing atmospheric motions. In an attempt to improve prognosis techniques, the computer is also used to analyze tracks of old typhoons that have parameters similar to existing tropical cyclones whose movements are being forecast. Until a significant technological breakthrough is made, however, aircraft will continue to provide the best information available to the forecasters in making their predictions regarding the whereabouts of “those capricious ladies.”
The P-3 Orion: A Politico-Military Instrument
By Lieutenant Commander William R. Westlake, U. S. Navy, Political Science Department, U. S. Naval Academy
The Soviet Union has been fully aware of its dilemma for many years, but has only just recently begun doing something about it. Strangely enough, the solution it has adopted is a program which has proven successful for the United States for over 150 years. The Russians have initiated a systematic and highly sophisticated program of ship and aircraft visits to various places in the world. The countries include friend and neutral alike, and are not confined solely to underdeveloped and new nations.
The increased presence of the Soviet Navy has been felt in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean. One U. S. operational commander evaluated this activity as follows:
The apparent absence of offensive or defensive exercises during the Soviet Indian Ocean Operations and the port visits to Mauritius, Tanzania, Aden, and Kenya suggests that the maneuvers were motivated primarily for political reasons, to collect intelligence and, possibly, to accomplish some multi-ship training. Furthermore, the Soviet politically-motivated establishment of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean would, logically, require extending their sea legs and the establishment of supply ports around the Indian Ocean littoral.
If the Soviet activities are actually politically motivated, but with a definite operational end in mind, then it would seem only natural that some effort be made to offset this move with one of equal and opposing strength.
Since U. S. Navy ships have been, and are continuing a program of port visits, an increase in this particular activity is not necessarily the answer. This program does not open many new ports nor gain access into areas that do not have adequate harbor or water facilities. There is, however, one vehicle that could visit new ports and enter previously inaccessible regions—the P-3 “Orion” aircraft.
Of all the operational units that could perform such a politico-military mission, the P-3 is perhaps the most acceptable. Innocuous in appearance, yet highly versatile from an operational standpoint, the P-3 is ideally suited for this role. To the uneducated observer, it looks like an airliner or cargo aircraft. It causes no great commotion on take-off or landing, and is actually quieter than an aircraft with reciprocating engines. Its straight wing, clean configuration, lack of guns, and four propellers give an impression of harmlessness. More importantly, it has a variety of operational capabilities that can be used independently or in conjunction with other ships and aircraft. The ability of the aircraft to perform singular and self-sufficient ASW operations in any area for extensive periods of time, to carry out long range reconnaissance, to mine coastal waters and harbors, to carry relatively large numbers of people, and to operate from short runways, makes it unique among naval aircraft. Especially significant, is the ability of the aircraft to do all these things on a self-sustaining basis, with little support over lengthy periods and no support over brief periods.
Herein lies the secret of the P-3 as a politico-military instrument. Through a series of discreet and informal visits to little unknown and little used air facilities in various locations, it can open new areas to American visits. And, it can do this without the offensive stigma or public display associated with any other combat-type aircraft.
A recent P-3 operation in the Indian Ocean area made clear the need for logistic support fields in certain strategic areas, not for long periods of time, but for brief intervals when the need arises. Because we had neglected informal visits in these areas in the past, it became very difficult and time-consuming to obtain clearances to land, operate from, or even fly over some areas. In one instance, it took 18 days to obtain diplomatic clearance into a field. In another case, permission for a trans-African overflight was refused, causing a somewhat lengthy transit via Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
During the operation, P-3 aircraft flights were made out of Mozambique, the Malagasy Republic, Ascension Island, and Maldive Islands, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Most of the people in these areas had never seen a P-3, and the pilots had never seen the airfields nor operated in that part of the world. This, coupled with the diplomatic difficulties encountered in obtaining clearances, made the event a major operation instead of merely the tactical exercise it should have been. The key to this problem is the laying of proper politico-military groundwork ahead of time. Had these areas been visited sometime during the prior year, most of the problems would have been solved, or at least anticipated in advance. Similarly, the high interest and concern displayed by the people and governments involved would have been minimized, and the surprise and delays reduced considerably.
Fortunately, these considerations did not go unnoticed by the operational commander. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, he made these comments:
The continued exercise of our diplomatic processes and aircrew familiarization in the area is considered to be, operationally, highly desirable—the occasional operations of VP aircraft have the advantage of demonstrating flexible and rapid response (without a great show of force) over a large area not accessible to surface units.
A Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean/Commander Antisubmarine Force, Sixth Fleet, directive to the first P-3 squadron permanently deployed to the Mediterranean was, “I want to see P-3s all over the Med.” These should be the marching orders of the VP Navy, not just in the Atlantic, but worldwide. We should be ready, willing, and able to send one-, two-, or three-plane detachments to any place in the world as the needs dictate.
It is apparent, then, that the following certain specific efforts on the part of patrol aviation should be considered.
Every effort should be made to direct flights into inaccessible or heretofore avoided areas that are considered to have potential strategic and operational use. In this way, the diplomatic processes can be exercised, problem areas can be singled out and resolved, time parameters for such events can be determined, and area conditions can be evaluated. More importantly, the newness, or unique aspect of such flights would diminish and the sight of a P-3 in certain areas would not be worth comment.
We should take advantage of every opportunity that arises for a P-3 to show itself in a foreign airport, be it military or civilian. Advantage should be taken of invitations, ceremonies, holidays, celebrations, and obvious lack of inhibiting regulations, to establish precedents and to develop international relations and contacts. The opportunities for such occasions are plentiful and should be co-ordinated with the Politico-Military Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. They in turn co-ordinate with the State Department. During this author’s two-year tour in that division, there were at least six occasions when the State Department initiated requests for some Navy representation at foreign ceremonial functions.
We should continue to use the P-3 in the annual UNITAS Exercise. The Southern Atlantic is typically one of those areas in which our operational capabilities ate severely limited, not only by distance but by the absence of bases for our use. The P-3 is ideal for use in this part of the world. Its “long-leggedness” and independence of operation would be necessary if the United States were required to conduct air operations in the far reaches of the Southern Atlantic. Recent Soviet submarine and surface ships operating in this area, have already caused special operations out of Ascension Island and Fortaleza, Brazil. Future operations out of the Falklands and Argentina are by no means inconceivable. Visits by P-3 aircraft in conjunction with UNITAS, or other operations, could reap untold political-military benefits for future operations, by opening up a variety of airdromes on both the east and west coast of South America. Likewise, the many contacts made with the navies of these countries would prove invaluable, just as they did during World War II.
In areas where a U. S. presence has already been established, such as in the Mediterranean and in Europe, operational flights should be made to and from civilian airports and foreign military fields. The Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and Denmark are typical examples. Discretion and infrequent use would be vital here, just as has been the case for such flights in the past.
The P-3 is an effective politico-military instrument, and it should be fully utilized to this end. As a result, our operational capabilities would be unlimited our prestige abroad enhanced, and the Soviets challenged at every sea-air cross-roads.
Notebook
Soviet Maneuvers Summarized
(La Revue Maritime, June 1970)
Soviet naval maneuvers began 14 April and ended 5 May, with Admiral Gorshkov listed as being in personal command of the overall program from Moscow. The principal theaters were in the Pacific and the North Atlantic.
In the Pacific some 20 units carried out antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and anti-aircraft (AA) exercises. Amphibious landings were executed near Vladivostok by forces of the Far East. The principal operations of the Okean took place in the North Atlantic in three phases: preparatory, maneuvers, dispersal and return to port. At least 60 units, combatant, logistic, or auxiliary, comprised the three groups: South, Baltic, and North.
Preparatory plan (14-20 April)—Group South, including the helicopter-carrier cruiser Leningrad, the missile cruiser Dzerzhinsky, and three destroyers (two of them “Kashins”) from the Black Sea squadron, headed for the Faeroe Islands carrying out exercises, covered by long-range heavy bombers of Bear type.
The Baltic group with some ten ships, including the cruiser Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsia and the “Kashin” class missile-firing destroyer Obraztsovy, took up their positions in the Skagerrak.
Group North, consisting of six missile units (three of them “Kresta” cruisers), alike number of conventional units, and ten or more submarines, some nuclear propelled, headed southwest towards the Faeroes on ASW and AA exercises. This phase seems to have ended 20 April.
Maneuvers (20-28 April)—Group North set up surface and submarine ship barriers to prevent Group South from crossing the Faeroe and Shetland-Norway passages. The South and Baltic groups constituted two “striking fleets” of aircraft carriers whose object was to try to penetrate the Sea of Norway. Group North opposed them by submarines, surface units, and shore-based bombers. A high point was reached on 23 April. Long-range attacks from missile cruisers and submerged submarines, according to the Soviet press, were directed against the Baltic and South groups. This would confirm the reports that Soviet submarines do not have to surface for missile firing. Heavy night attacks were carried out by Badger aircraft, firing long-range missiles “Kipper” or “Kelt” type.
Dispersal—North group, less a few units on special missions, headed for the Barents Sea, while the Baltic group returned to the Baltic Sea where it was attacked by missile and torpedo boats as soon as it had crossed the Belts. On 27 and 28 April, landing exercises were completed under naval artillery and nuclear fire support in both the Barents (Fishermen’s Islands) and the Baltic. The Leningrad took part in these phases.
Three Nations To Take Part In Major Maritime Operation
(Australian Navy News Information, 9 June 1970)
Australian, British, and New Zealand ships and aircraft will take part in a major maritime exercise off Western Australia in November.
The exercise, nicknamed Swan Lake, will be under the operational command of the Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral H. D. Stevenson, who will be embarked in the Royal Australian Navy flagship, the air craft carrier HMAS Melbourne.
Phases of the exercise will involve the initial deployment of maritime forces from the east coast of Australia to the Indian Ocean. This will be followed by mine countermeasure, submarine, weapons training, and aircraft exercises. Swan Lake will be the third major maritime exercise in which Australia, Great Britain, and New Zealand have taken part this year.
Ships of the three Navies joined other allied forces in the annual SEATO exercise in April, and Australian, British, and New Zealand ships and aircraft took part in Bersatu Padu in Malaysia in June.
Glass Reinforced Plastic Minehunter For Royal Navy
(Naval News Summary, Royal Navy, March 1970)
The contract for a new minehunter for the Royal Navy to be constructed of glass reinforced plastic (GRP)*, has been signed by John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, and Alan Griffiths, of Messrs. Vospers, Ltd.
* See Notebook item, “Use of Plastics In Ships Is Being Tested by Royal Navy,” U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, April 1970, p. 132.
The new material is more costly than steel, but less expensive than laminated wood which is the only other alternative material for use in a minehunter. GRP offers a special advantage for ships designed to destroy mines because it exerts no magnetic influence.
As a first step in evaluating glass reinforced plastic in an operational setting, it has been considered prudent to produce a prototype vessel to the existing minehunter design. The effort is aimed at providing an efficient hull for a future generation of mine countermeasures ships.
Glass fiber technology in the Royal Navy has previously been confined to use in small naval craft, sailing boats, and the casing and fins of Oberon-class submarines. The new ship, with a length of 153 feet, will be much larger than any previous vessel constructed of glass reinforced plastic.
Second Reserve Mine Squadron Commissioned In California
(Commander Naval Reserve Training News Release, 1 September 1970)
The second active Reserve Mine Squadron* in the history of the Naval Reserve has been commissioned at Long Beach, California.
Commander Gerald P. Shabe, U. S. Navy, assumed command of the new Squadron on 1 September 1970.
Comprising ten Navy minesweepers, Reserve Mine Squadron Five will be homeported in Long Beach, California, and will extend the mine warfare capability of the Naval Reserve on the west coast of the United States. The first active Naval Reserve mine warfare squadron was commissioned on 1 July 1970 at Charleston, South Carolina, as Reserve Mine Squadron Twelve.
Both coastal reserve mine squadrons are under the operational control of Rear Admiral Edwin M. Rosenberg, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Reserve Training.
Each ship in Reserve Mine Squadron Five will be commanded by an inactive Naval Reserve officer, but the crew will be made up of both regular and Reserve officers and enlisted men.
The Squadron will be made up of three divisions—Reserve Mine Divisions (ResMineDiv) 51, 52, and 53. The Division assignments and homeports are as follows:
ResMineDiv 51 (Long Beach, California)—USS Widgeon (MSC-208), San Diego; USS Phoebe (MSC-199), USS Peacock (MSC-198), and USS Embattle (MSO-434), Long Beach.
ResMineDiv 52 (San Francisco)—USS Whippoorwill (MSC-207), USS Thrasher (MSC-203) and USS Reaper (MSO-467), San Francisco.
ResMineDiv 53 (Seattle, Washington)—USS Vireo (MSC-205) and USS Warbler (MSC-206), Seattle; USS Cormorant (MSC-122), Everett, Washington.
Ranging from 145 to 172 feet long, the ten minesweepers in the new squadron are of the coastal and ocean minesweeping classes. They are equipped with the latest minesweeping equipment, and have the capability to clear all known type mines. The coastal class mine sweeper has a complement of five officers and 33 enlisted men. The ocean class minesweeper is manned by six officers and 67 enlisted men.
Reserves And National Guard Get Emergency Buildup Roles
(Michael Getler in The Washington Post, 9 September 1970)
In a major reversal of policy, the Defense Department has announced that any big, emergency buildup of the Armed Forces in the future will be met with Reservists and National Guardsmen rather than draftees.
During the huge expansion of fighting forces for Vietnam, the Johnson Administration and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose not to mobilize the nation’s 980,000 paid Reservists and Guardsmen, but to leave them in reserve and rely instead on increased draft calls and on enlistments induced by the larger draft.
The shift in policy was ordered into effect by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on 21 August. In advising the Services of the move, Laird called for increasing the readiness of the Reserves, bringing all units up to fully authorized strength, and outfitting them with the same type and amount of equipment given to regular active duty units.
Laird linked the new directive with Continuing Presidential requests for reduced defense spending. “These economies,” he said, “will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.”
The Secretary indicated that from now on military manpower needs would be viewed in a “total force concept,” relating regular units to improved Reserve units able to be called up quickly.
There are just over three million men in the Service, and Laird has projected a 100,000-man reduction by next June. Counting combat-ready Reserves as part of the projected 2.9-million-man force could help bring down the cost.
Fourteen Ships Pass Seamen Awaiting Rescue From Life Raft
(Baltimore Sun, 27 July 1970)
Three fishermen who spent seven days in a rubber liferaft, surrounded by hungry sharks, watched “no less than 14” ships go by before being picked up by a Swedish ore carrier.
The crew took to a six-by-eight-foot liferaft 15 July when their wooden trawler Sea Star began leaking about 25 miles off the New Jersey coast.
They lost a supply of warm clothing and their water the first day because of rough seas, and spent the rest of the time without food or water.
“During our week at sea no less than 14 ships passed us without seeing us,” Captain Tom Ellis, the skipper, said. “One other vessel, a Spaniard, I think, came almost alongside the day before we were picked up. An officer opened the bridge door, looked at us, and the ship sailed off without the slightest effort to assist us.”
When the three men sighted the Swedish freighter Sonette, “It was either this time or never for us all,” Captain Ellis said, adding:
“We were badly burned by the sun and the salt water had played hell with us. We tore our clothing into shreds and waved frantically. The Swedish vessel pulled alongside and took us on board. They were marvelous.”
Israeli Fleet Outnumbered
(Baltimore Sun, 28 August 1970)
Egypt’s fleet of fighting ships, built up by the Soviet Union, outnumbers the Israeli Navy by more than three to one, according to statistics published by Jane’s Fighting Ships.
It listed 148 ships, including submarines, in the Egyptian Navy and 45 in the Israeli Navy.
The Egyptian Navy consists of 16 submarines, eight destroyers, four frigate-type escorts, six minesweepers, 20 missile boats, two corvettes, 45 torpedo boats, eight patrol boats, 24 amphibious ships, and 15 fleet auxiliaries, Jane’s said.
Smaller, Sophisticated Navy May Hurt Some Small Private Yards
(Marine Engineering/Log, July 1970)
Small private shipyards may be hard hit by the U. S. Navy’s plans to develop a smaller, more modern fleet. This view was expressed by Rear Admiral Nathan Sonenshein, U. S. Navy, before a meeting of the board of directors of the Shipbuilders Council of America at Newport News, Virginia.
As an indication of this trend, Sonenshein cited reductions in fleet size—175 ships since the end of 1968. He also pointed out that more sophisticated naval ships will be built in larger yards that have the capability to install nuclear power plants.
Pass-Down-The-Line Notes
Rear Admiral William W. Behrens, Jr., U. S. Navy, has succeeded Rear Admiral Odale D. Waters, Jr., U. S. Navy, as Oceanographer of the Navy. Rear Admiral Waters has served as a member of the U. S. Naval Institute’s Board of Control for the past two years.
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Graduate programs of study in maritime and military history are offered at the University of Maine. Study leading to a Ph.D. degree is offered in U. S. history, Canadian-American studies, and in the history of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, Candidates for M.A. and Ph.D. degrees may complete courses and seminars in maritime and military history in partial fulfillment of degree requirements. These are supported by the extensive Clinton Cole Maritime History collection in the Folger Library of the University. Inquiries may be directed to the Chairman, Department of History, 170 Stevens Hall, University of Maine, Orono, Maine, 04473.
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Plans to open a Navy-wide amphibious museum at the Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base at Norfolk, Virginia in December 1970 have been announced. The museum will depict past and present roles and accomplishments of the Navy’s amphibious forces, from 1776 to 1970. The fleet landing building will be the new home of the Amphibious Museum, and it will be open free to the public. Participation in museum functions by both civilian and retired and active-duty military is encouraged through an Amphibious Museum Association, and gifts of personal property or money up to a value of $500 will be accepted.
Notebook
Navy Re-enlistment Rates Lowest Of All Services
(Michael T. Malley in The National Observer, 1 June 1970)
The re-enlistment rate among Navy enlisted men who have completed their first tour of duty now is 9%, the lowest rate for any Service and a rate as low as that for draftees who decide to stay in the Army.
The statistic points up only one aspect of a critical personnel problem that has developed in the Navy in the past few years. Other Services are having trouble, too, in getting lower-ranking men to re-enlist. But the problem is most serious in the Navy, where it has spread to the officer corps and even to the elite submariners and aviators who provide the Navy’s principal offensive punch.
The Navy’s principal solution is money. It has officially asked that sea pay be increased and given to officers as well as enlisted men. Other proposals may soon surface to give re-enlistment bonuses to more sailors. They now go only to nuclear submarine officers and enlisted men completing their first tour of duty.
Navy personnel officers concede that money is not the whole answer, but they hope it will keep enough experienced men on the job to make it possible to reduce the amount of sea duty for all of them. Some sailors now spend 83% of their time at sea, and the resulting family strains are believed to be the main cause of the Navy’s personnel problem.
“We could always depend on keeping 55% of our pilots for as far back as we have had records,” says Captain E. H. English, Jr., U. S. Navy, who heads a small Navy team charged with seeking solutions to the drain of experienced sailors. “Since 1967, it has gone to close to 25%.”
Nuclear submarine officers are such a close-knit elite corps that as recently as five years ago, 84% of them chose to stay in the Navy after finishing their obligations. That rate has tumbled to 45%. Captain English says it would currently be 35% if the Navy did not compel many submarine officers to serve an extra year after they hand in their resignations.
“The reduction in retention of our officers aggravates the problem because it makes the people who stay bear a greater burden,” says Rear Admiral O. H. Perry, Jr., U. S. Navy, who commands the nuclear submarine base at Groton, Connecticut.
Repeated sea duty means that a young officer misses out on the varied assignments and postgraduate study that traditionally help pave the way to an admiral’s stars.
Unlike the submarine and aviator ranks, the retention rate for line officers on surface ships has been low for years. It was only 20% five years ago. It is 19% now, and Captain English projects a drop to 17%. The surface officers do not get the $100 to $245 per month in extra pay that their aviator and submarine colleagues receive, but they may be away from their families for just as long. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1 Retention Rates
The Navy’s retention rates for officers and men have been falling until they now are well below the goals the Service sets for these categories of men:
| 1965 | Now | Goal |
Surface officers | 20% | 19% | 41% |
Pilots | 56% | 26% | 49% |
Nuclear | 84% | 45% | 62% |
First-term | 23% | 9% | 31% |
In the enlisted ranks, the re-enlistment rate for those completing their first tours in the Navy was 23% as recently as 1965. The decline to 9% reflects in part the infusion into the Service of would-be draftees who are vulnerable to few re-enlistment inducements but it also is a measure of the declining attractiveness of the Navy as a career for enlisted men. The decline is especially serious because of the lengthy training devoted to specialized sailors like radar operators and electricians. Because of this big investment, the Navy’s goal is to keep 31% of its first-term volunteers, compared with a goal of only 12% in the Marine Corps.
The Navy tries to hang onto its most highly skilled enlisted sailors by paying bonuses that can range as high as $10,000 for a six-year re-enlistment by a particularly valued technician. But the re-enlistment rate for even these highly prized men is down to 15%.
“In recent years we’ve run into a new phenomenon,” reports Commander James Talbot, U. S. Navy, who works in Captain English’s unit, “That is the employability of men who have finished second tours. Traditionally, if he shipped over a second time, he was really a careerist. But now industry is finding these guys highly desirable. You can fill that man’s billet with a first-timer, but he cannot do the job as well and he puts more responsibility on another man and helps drive him out of the Navy.”
He says the $15,000 bonus approved by Congress last June may already have helped the nuclear submarine service. Only 30 resignations were turned in by nuclear submarine officers from October through January, compared with 105 in the like period a year earlier. This helped make it possible to free 12 submarine officers for postgraduate school.
Naval officers get no extra pay for sea duty now, and enlisted men get a negligible monthly bonus that scales up from $8.00 to $22.50 per month depending on rank. The Navy’s proposal would start sea pay at $30 per month and increase it $15 for each two years at sea, regardless of rank. It would be paid to officers as well as men. The extra pay would cost taxpayers $90,000,000 per year.
Other proposals circulating within the Navy, but not yet formally proposed to the Defense Department, would provide for retention bonuses to officers in all scarce fields, costing about $31,000,000 a year, and re-enlistment bonuses to enlisted men who have completed two tours in the Navy, costing about $35,000,000 per year.
Captain English believes the officers’ bonus would pay for itself in two years, simply by eliminating the enormous cost of training new officers to replace the men now leaving. Aviators and submariners train for two years after becoming officers before they go to sea.
“And nobody can put a price on combat readiness,” says Commander Talbot. “You can continue to train replacements, but what is the real cost of having an inexperienced man in the cockpit? What would it cost to national defense if we had another Pearl Harbor?”
NATO Fleet Growth Unlikely
(Baltimore Sun, 28 August 1970)
Proposals to enlarge NATO to counter the growing Soviet naval threat are highly unlikely to be taken seriously at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels, informed sources said.
Though NATO officials declined to comment on the proposals made in the new edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships, the sources said. The idea of widening NATO to include the South Atlantic was not realistic in political terms.
Hudson River Reserve Fleet Being Phased Out
(Martin Gansberg in The New York Times, 4 August 1970)
The mothball fleet of gray troopships, submarine tenders, and radar vessels anchored in the Hudson River since the end of World War II is being phased out.
Bids will be opened in Washington for the sale of 16 of the ships from Stony Point under a program set up by the Maritime Administration to save on the costs of maintaining the ships.
At the peak of storage after World War II, more than 1,200 ships that had carried men and supplies around the world were in six mothball fleets, awaiting activation if new emergencies arose. The Maritime Administration, which operates the fleets, said there were now 504, and 64 would be sold in the next few months.
In addition to eliminating the fleet, Stony Point, New York, the Administration will give up the one at Mobile, Alabama.
The Administration plans to retain mothball fleets in Beaufort, Texas; Suisun Bay, San Francisco, California; Olympia, Washington; and on the James River in Virginia. These sites will remain because it is felt they do not interfere with shipping or shoreline beauty.
Although there are still five months to go on the phaseout, Stony Point already resembles a lost port. Only 76 of the 189 ships here are left.
Buyers have paid as much as $41,000 a vessel, and most of those tied up on the Hudson are Liberty Ships of World War II vintage. Buyers are not allowed to use them for shipping under the specific terms of the contract of sale.
The mothball fleet cannot match the speed or cargo capacity of today’s freighters, but the Maritime Administration said . . . . “they earn their keep while standing ready to serve as a vast reservoir available for any emergency.”
Some of the ships were activated for use in the Korean War and, as recently as 1967 in Vietnam.
West German Defense Posture For NATO Is Reviewed
(International Defense Review, June 1970)
The Federal Defense Department has published a White Book giving the defense program for the coming year. Within the framework of collective defense measures for the Western countries, the following forces are assigned to NATO: 12 Army divisions split into 33 brigades, 28 of which are armored; three missile groups and 18 fighter bomber squadrons; four reconnaissance squadrons, and the air defense units, consisting of four interceptor squadrons; 24 Nike-Hercules batteries; 36 Hawk batteries, including radar and control installations; three destroyer squadrons (one fitted with guided missiles), one escort squadron, four high-speed patrol squadrons, one submarine squadron, six minesweeping squadrons, and one assault landing squadron; three naval fighter bomber squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, and one long-range ASW squadron.
Some difficulty has been experienced in bringing the F-104G Starfighters, the HS-30 APCs, and the submarines to operational readiness. Air Force and naval losses of the F-104 totalled 118 aircraft as of 1 April 1970, of which 105 had crashed, killing 57 pilots.
MarAd Indicates World Shipbuilding Surge Slowed
(Baltimore Sun, 24 August 1970)
The worldwide surge in shipbuilding leveled off last year, according to statistics released by the Maritime Administration.
The world’s merchant fleet increased by only 209 vessels to 19,570 ships, and their deadweight tonnage climbed 24.3 million tons to 297.5 million tons.
The rate of growth of the merchant fleet was only 1.1%, the agency said.
The United States remained second, behind Japan, in the number of ships in the merchant fleet, and fifth in deadweight tons registered under its flag. But the 1,937 ships with 245 million dw.-tons, carried as the United States fleet, include more than 1,000 vessels of over 9 million tons in the government-owned reserve fleets, most of which are destined for scrapping.
Liberia continued to rank first in terms of deadweight tonnage registered under its flag, with 1,707 vessels of 52.1 million tons.
Japan, with 1,989 ships, jumped into second place with deadweight tonnage amounting to 34.6 million.
Then, in order, came the United Kingdom, 33.1 million tons; Norway, 30 million tons; the United States; Greece, 14.4 million tons; the Soviet Union, 12.8 million tons, West Germany, 9.9 million tons; Italy, 9 million tons; Panama, 8.7 million tons; and France, 8.3 million tons.
Twenty-four ships were added to the U. S. flag fleet during 1969, but 140 were scrapped, two were lost at sea, and 17 vessels were transferred to flags of other nations.
In the last two years, the report said, the U. S. merchant fleet has sustained a net decline of 215 vessels, a reflection of the steadily advancing age, and increasing inefficiency and obsolescence of many of the ships comprising it.
British Carrier Launches Planes While Steaming Astern
(Navy, London, June 1970)
The largest warship ever built for the Royal Navy, the carrier Ark Royal, has achieved what is believed to be something unique in naval aviation history. A few miles off the Dorset coast, the ship steamed at five knots astern while launching Phantom fighters from Ministry of Technology, Boscombe Down. The purpose of steaming astern was to create nil wind conditions over the flight deck. The still air conditions for the launches were a test which the new longer waist catapult and the Spey engines in the Phantom easily overcame. Buccaneers have also been launched downwind.
Plans Are Approved For Royal Navy Harrier Carrier
(La Revue Maritime, June 1970)
It has been announced that plans for a new helicopter and Harrier aircraft carrier, mentioned in the last Ministry of Defence White Paper, have been approved.
She will carry helicopters and aircraft of short or vertical take-off. The ship is expected to be in the 15,000 to 20,000-ton range, with gas turbines for propulsion to give her a speed of over 30 knots. The forward deck will be reserved for Sea Dart surface-to-air missiles, and perhaps surface-to-surface missiles. She will have a complement consisting of 750 officers and men.
Submarine Oil Tanker Economics Questioned
(Baltimore Sun, 2 July 1970)
A high maritime official has expressed doubt as to the economic feasibility of moving petroleum from Alaska’s oil rich North Slope out through Arctic in giant submarine tankers.
Helen Delich Bentley, chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, said that private discussions she has had with several oil companies involved in the development of the Alaska reserves, indicated they are not persuaded of the cost effectiveness of such a transportation system.
General Dynamics, which is proposing to build submarine tankers in the range of 170,000 to 250,000 tons, said the oil companies interest in the concept seemed to be increasing.
But, responding to questions at a press conference, Mrs. Bentley, who was on board the tanker Manhattan last fall when it became the first commercial ship to sail through the Northwest Passage, said, “The economics do not match up.” Mrs. Bentley said she had been briefed by both General Dynamics and the oil companies on the problems of shipping Alaskan oil across the Arctic to the East Coast. The cost estimates of the two parties “do not go side by side,” she said.
Based on what she regarded as informed reports from sources outside General Dynamics, Mrs. Bentley said the cost of the first giant submarine tanker would be about $200 million, with a decreasing cost for each additional vessel ordered.
Mrs. Bentley agreed with General Dynamics’ estimate that an icebreaking surface tanker would cost $80 to $100 million.
Japan To Complete Largest Ship In The World By 1973
(Captain Thomas L. Lewis, U. S. Navy (Retired) in The New Orleans Times-Picayune, 31 July 1970)
Japan Report, published by the Information Service, Consulate General of Japan, New York, says the Transport Ministry of Japan has given permission to a shipbuilder to construct a “super mammoth tanker which, when completed in 1973, will be the largest ship in the world.”
Approval was given after special committee of the Ministry found such a ship to be “technically feasible to build and safe and navigable in operation.”
The ship, a 470,000-dw.-ton tanker, had been ordered by the Globtik Tanker Company of London, the report says, and is to be built by Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Shipyard in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture, at a cost of $33 million. She will be 1,144 feet long with a 202-foot beam, “and 117 feet deep.”
The full load draft was not mentioned in Japan Report, which mentions that the largest tanker ever built is of the 326,000-ton class.
Explaining the reason the Transport Ministry set up the special committee for study prior to giving its approval, Japan Report notes there have been several unexplained sea disasters in the Pacific Ocean during winter months. “The committee looked into the effects of waves on large ships and other matters before deciding that the plan to build the super mammoth tanker was feasible,” the report added.