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Just as a home’s plumbing, lighting, and heating systems will wear out before the house itself does, obsolescence overtakes a ship’s subsystems before it overtakes the ship. Thus, we modernize or convert our houses and ships oftener than we build new ones.
If we are to lower substantially the dollar and time costs for ship modernization and conversion, future systems ought to be designed for easy (quick and inexpensive) replacement, as was done with a few of the Weapon subsystems of the DD-963.
A word that has become synonomous with saving *s modularity, which varies from fitting all systems into standard containers, to providing common foundations a<td connections for two different systems. But modu- larity means different things to different people.
The problem is to determine the degree of modularity which is best and the extent to which it should Be applied to new ship designs. Several current U. S. Navy programs are addressing this problem.
►The DD-963, for example, is designed to facilitate ^placing several of the weapon systems with improved systems.
► The ARAPAHO proposal would provide containerships with their own ASW helicopter capability, neatly packed in standard containers.
►The SEAMOD program is intended to address the Question of modularity by a comprehensive approach ^hich will consider the opportunity for prepackaging and factory checkout, as well as methods to reduce the ship inport overhaul period by developing container- Ued payload systems.
► The Test and Evaluation Ship (TES) program is intended to test the majority of future U. S. Navy systems and subsystems. This ship will require a capability to change systems rapidly and inexpensively.
► The Merchant Ship Naval Auxiliary Program (MSNAP) is being developed to ascertain rapid and inexpensive means of using commercial containerships as Navy UNREP ships in time of war.
The Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) accomplishes about $400 million of work annually on more than 10,000 ship changes to all active Fleet ships. When a large number of changes are made, together with a change in mission, it is called a conversion and is handled separately.
The several kinds of alterations include Ship Alterations (ShipAlts), Ordnance Alterations (OrdAlts), and Electronic Field Changes which are sponsored by NavShips, NavOrd and NavElex, respectively. Ship alterations are also designated as either military or technical according to their purpose, and as "K”, "D”, or "F” alterations according to the performing activity and funding source. The bulk of the FMP is ShipAlts, both military and technical title "K”, and the following discussion applies to those changes.
A proposed military improvement can be developed anywhere but generally comes from the cognizant systems command or OpNav. The proposal must describe the proposed improvement and give gross cost and feasibility information. After a preliminary review by the Ship Acquisition and Improvement Panel (SAIP), the approved alteration is developed further if additional information on the cost and feasibility are required. The improvement is then listed with appropriate priority in the Military Improvement Plan (MIP) for the applicable ship class. The MIP is subsequently integrated with a corresponding list of technical alterations, the Technical Improvement Plan (TIP), to yield an Amalgamated Military and Technical Improvement Plan (AMI). This document lists all proposed changes
to each class of ship with an assigned priority. Inclusion on this list authorizes the system commands to develop the alteration itself with required material listings. The next step is the inclusion in the Fleet Modernization Program which lists for each ship in the Fleet, in order of priority, those changes which will be funded in the succeeding five years, usually in connection with a regular overhaul, but sometimes during a restricted availability. The responsibility for executing the change then passes to the Ship Logistic Managers in NavShips who authorize the work by forwarding the "180-day” letter to the designated shipyard six months before the scheduled overhaul. Recent experience has shown that about 80% of the changes programmed in the FMP are actually executed within the plan, with the balance of the funds programmed to accomplish emergent alterations of higher priority.
The procedures for managing the Fleet Modernization Program have been substantially updated and improved in the last few years. A five-year forecast is now made using a recently implemented computerized data management system (SAMIS) which is undergoing continual expansion and redesign.
What is wrong with the current U. S. Navy modernization program, concentrating as it does on piece part replacement, is that it puts Fleet assets out of
service for excessive periods of time and results in high costs for system installation.
One example of a major conversion which is not part of the FMP is that of the DD-949 (DD-931 classes) to the DDG-33. This conversion removed two 5"/.54 caliber and two 3”/(50 caliber gun mounts and their magazines and fire control systems, and replaced them with a TARTAR missile system and an ASROC launcher and magazine. The cost was approximately $36,000 and each ship was out of commission for 31 months.
A similar example of mis-modernization is the DE-1052-class which is being modernized by FMP, although to a lesser extent and at a lesser expense than the DD-93i-class conversion. However, the changes required are still disturbing when one realizes that the last four of this class of ships are still building. Contractual difficulties during construction reduced opportunities for update so that many improvements had to be "saved” for the post-delivery period. The USS Trippe (DE-1075) was the first of six 1052-class ships (Figure 1) to receive the initial modernization program which consists of:
► Addition of ISSM capability by using Standard ASM fired from the existing ASROC launcher.
► Modification of the DASH hangar to carry a LAMPS helicopter. The DASH hangar height had to be increased
Designing for Change: Present and Future 33
figure 2 DD-963 Modernization!Conversion
two feet and the flight deck area enlarged.
^ Backfit of the SQS-13 sonar in the fantail area.
^ Installation of one BPDMS (Basic Point Defense Missile System) mount.
^ Backfit of two MK-25 torpedo tubes.
The need exists to improve the modernization and conversion process of major combatants not only because of the increasing amounts of time and money Necessary to modernize ships, but also because of the increasing frequency of necessity to do so. To meet this need, the ancient art of ship design will require liberal, imaginative applications of modern technology. This will not reduce the planning and budgetary process and may well complicate it. However, such design innovations may eventually reduce overhaul periods, thus precluding excessive ship costs related to nonopera- honal time.
All of this brings us back to Modularity and the key Question. Modularity—to what extent?
The DD-963 building program included the first major use of modularity technique primarily aimed at modernization cost and time savings by rapid refit.
The specifications of DD-963 require modular installation of the forward 5"/54 gun mount, the ASROC launcher group and palletized installation of the BPDMS firing panel and display consoles in CIC and of the AN/SPS-40A radar equipment. This modularity is limited to specific new installations which were in the develop
ment stage during the DD-963 design process, Figures 2 and 3.
Current conceptual design efforts such as the ARAPAHO, TES, MSNAP, and SEAMOD all incorporate modularity to different degrees. The intent is to shorten inport ship time by reducing ripout and installation time. Naturally, there will be decreases in ship useable payload weight and volume and an increase in the budgetary and planning process. If a cost/benefit exists, it will have to be in life-cycle costs.
These four advanced modular conceptual designs are discussed in greater depth in the ensuing paragraphs. It must be recognized by the reader that they are only conceptual designs and not approved programs.
The ARAPAHO concept, Figure 4, is one of several modular concepts being considered to supplement conventional Sea Control forces by providing merchant ships with their own indigenous defense.
The four basic areas of the ARAPAHO concept are: the host ship, the ASW helicopters, the Navy flight crews and support personnel, and the series of modular vans containing aviation support and maintenance equipment.
The primary host ships suitable for the ARAPAHO concept are the several classes of large, high performance containerships which have been placed in service since World War II.
The ARAPAHO plan calls for no fewer than six
helicopters and their maintenance support facilities to be deployed on board each ship. The helicopters are secured in the open and rest on a Marine Corps launching plate which is assembled atop the ARAPAHO vans.
The real system catalyst—and the engineering challenge—is the design of a series of container-type modules which will permit the basing of this entire aviation support facility in the space that normally would hold containerized freight. Numbers of containers will vary
based upon mission, duration, type aircraft, and degree to which access to shipboard spaces can be provided. Each container is to be environmentally-controlled, insulated against noise and temperature, lighted, fire- protected and configured with a primary and emergency exit.
A principal aim in container standardization and configuration is to develop the capability to readily adapt the ARAPAHO modular payload to a range of
Designing for Change: Present and Future 35
host ships without the need for costly, and in some cases, impractical changes to structure and hull fittings.
The design challenge is apparent; the selection of resources that can be maintained within strict cost limits, deployed rapidly, perform effectively against enemy opposition, and, finally, assume a low-overhead, educed profile as the crisis lessens. How can the designer attain this goal?
The intent is to outfit ships in such a manner as to eliminate the lengthy delay and dollar burden of shipyard conversion, refitting and training. The ARAPAHO systems would be maintained in substantial lumbers, in reserve, at additional upkeep cost, and Quickly brought into play when conditions demanded rapid force implementation. What has not yet been Proven is the cost/benefit related to system costs versus rapid force implementation.
The Merchant Ship Naval Auxiliary Program (MSNAP) was originated to enable modern commercial ships, particularly containerships and large cargo carry- 'ng ships, to support Navy ships at sea and deployed forces ashore. This is a requirement created by limitations on U. S. Navy ship construction and military Personnel funds.
Support of deployed forces at sea and ashore with c°ntainerships calls for capabilities to remove cargo from containers stowed in ships’ holds and transfer less
than container size quantities to U. S. Navy ships.
The MSNAP Program seeks to develop modular hardware which will give access to cargo stowed in con- tainership holds and transfer it to combatants and support ships. Refinement of developmental components is envisioned. The modular concept is to be used so as not to encumber the merchant ship fleet with large national defense features which would constrain these ships in their normal merchant trade. This program, forwarded to the CNO on 16 May 1973, is currently in a preliminary developmental stage. It is envisioned that development of vertical and horizontal cargo movement equipment, hatch cover and handling equipment, and portable ship-to-ship cargo transfer equipment provide the most serious engineering challenge.
The Test and Evaluation Ship, as its name implies, is an attempt to conduct test and evaluation of new shipboard systems and equipment in a realistic environment, Figure 5.
In the past, the Navy has conducted whole system tests at shore sites, simulating that which is economically feasible, and has used existing fleet assets to test other systems and equipment. Shrinking fleet assets, coupled with extremely high costs of refit and installation, and questionable suitability of the designated test ship itself, place severe limitations on the Navy’s ability
*%ure 5 T & E Ship Concept ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
to conduct such tests.
For the foregoing reasons, the Naval Ship Systems Command, in conjunction with all Systems Commands, OpTEvFor, BuPers, BuMed and ONR has pursued the design of a sea-going platform for test and evaluation of future ship systems. This effort is currently in a requirement analysis phase wherein essentially all ship- borne systems under development which are to be delivered in the next 15-20 years have been recorded, and an assessment made of their impact on the design of a Test and Evaluation Ship, Figure 5. In addition, feasibility studies which reflect various type hulls for specific test and evaluation systems, and cost/benefit studies which address various alternatives, including conversions, have been conducted.
The major features in the design of the TES are the capability of rapid refit, ability to conduct parallel testing, commonality of test support facilities and platform dependability.
The ability to install and remove test systems rapidly is a vitally important factor in the TES design; thus, the designer has attempted to provide:
► Maximum flexibility in order to accept new test payload candidates with minimum modifications
► Extensive use of modular concepts including checkout of modules prior to shipboard installation
► Extensive use of existing quick-acting interface con- J p nections between test payload and platform
► Extensive use of support service distribution centers
► A 25-knot speed on two shafts plus a centerline shaft for testing prototype propulsion plants and propellors
► A common payload test support center
► Ship test sites so located to permit maximum use of paralleling testing
► Hotel support services sized to meet projected requirements for the next 20 years.
The TES has developed to a stage where a preliminary design can commence upon approval of the CNO. It is anticipated that such a decision would be granted | only if cost/benefit studies prove the need for a new construction design. The TES could, if approved, serve as a very valuable tool to determine the net worth of modularity in addition to performing the vital function of testing shipborne systems in a realistic environment.
SEAMOD represents an attempt to hold down the high costs of modernizing and converting U. S. Navy ships. The Chief of Naval Material has initiated SEAMOD (Sea Systems Modification and Modernization by Modularity) concept to study engineering feasibility and cost effectiveness. This concept envisions the development of surface combatant ships consisting of relatively simple and austere platforms whose payload is
fl'
0
ft
0
Figure 7 SEAMOD Concept
pre-packaged into modular building blocks which can be built and checked out under factory or shipyard conditions, and installed rapidly on the aforementioned platforms. Thus, SEAMOD envisions uniform interchangeable packaging of most combat, support, and service systems for tailored modernization of the full span of surface ship hull types similar to that shown tn Figure 6. Since the proposed SEAMOD container (8' X 8' X 20') is considered compatible with all transportation modes and port-handling equipment, a rapid and continual modernization of the Fleet is envisioned to meet the changing threat, mission and geographic deployment burdens currently placed upon individual ship hulls. The costs of continual modernization may well increase, but the goal is to decrease the cost associated with dead inport time for crew and ship.
The SEAMOD requirement for clear functional dis- tmctions and definition of power, water, and signal ‘n ter faces between the system payloads and the ship
service utility trunks, Figure 7, contemplates a separation of the system design and development decisions from the ship hull design and fabrication decisions. Consequently, SEAMOD, if successful, could permit a much desirable asynchronous management of fleet development and integration. The proposed benefits of the SEAMOD concept are: improved effectiveness, reduced modernization time and costs, more efficient use of personnel, and accelerated innovation in research and development.
The SEAMOD Program attempts to bring all the Navy’s programs and proposals for modular design under centralized planning and management. Although numerous concepts have been considered over the past 12 years, this is the U. S. Navy’s first attempt at developing such a comprehensive program. It may well prove to be too expensive a venture for the U. S. Navy to undertake.
At present, SEAMOD is a solution to the moderniza-
tion and conversion problem which is of questionable engineering feasibility and economic prudence. If it is to move forward, it must become the most promising solution to one or more recognized Fleet problems.
This paper has attempted to provide insight into the modernization and conversion techniques of the U. S. Navy—both present and future. Changes to a naval ship as a national defense asset may be desirable or required for any or all of the following reasons:
► Changing threats or inability to correctly forecast the threat
► Changing defense priorities
► Evolving technology
► Deteriorating systems as a result of physical wear
► Changing habitability requirements
► Correcting construction or design deficiencies
► Correcting erroneous decisions made at the time of concept development
Critics may quarrel with the requirement, but history has shown that changes to a naval ship over its lifetime are a virtual certainty. Thus, there will always exist some form of FMP and its associated process. Designing for change, therefore, should become a basic requirement in ship design in an effort to provide a more rapid means of updating shipboard equipment at periodic intervals not associated with shipyard overhauls, thus extending the overhaul cycle.
Perhaps modularity can evolve over the next decade a new design methodology within the U. S. Navy. It must, however, be adequately engineered, it must maintain or improve combat or mission capability, and prove to be cost-effective. During the past ten years, numerous modular studies have been conducted which have resulted in recommendations which are either partially implemented, being partially implemented, or more often than not, still awaiting the decision to begin conceptual design.
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38 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1974
Studies to date have recognized two crucial issues of importance which must be satisfied for successful application of the modular concept: the resolution of configuration compatibility to minimize the impact of module exchange on the ships, and the necessity for standards for interface connections Navy-wide or preferably, DOD-wide. Thus, it becomes obvious that ultimately only an evaluation at the hardware interface, i.e., actually "doing it,” can provide a sufficiently valid
basis for a final assessment of the net worth of modularity and "doing it” will cost the Navy in planning and budgeting dollars as well as in hardware procurement and ship volume penalties. Furthermore, "doing it” has been and may well still be the major stumbling block in modular design since modularity will require separation of payload from platforms as cargo is now separated from the ship in a commercial carrier. This separation appears to be in conflict with current trends in destroyer design which integrate function and design for economy of volume in order to prevent ship size from exceeding that dictated by primary design and cost considerations.
Aside from the fact that specific modular appli* cations will always have to overcome the handicaps of requiring additional initial investment in order to possibly decrease life-cycle costs, there are two prerequisites for implementation of any large scale modularity:
► The actual demonstration of the technical feasibility by means of hardware testing in a realistic environment
► Extensive negotiation between all activities involved in ship design in order to agree upon interface specifications which assure compatibility yet allow for future technological growth. These basic prerequisites have not been proven to date.
Modularization of ship component systems will only reach fruition if someone becomes its champion and is willing to do the hard work necessary to resolve whether this concept can become the most cost-effective solution to some of the U. S. Navy’s significant operational problems, both present and future. Fervor will not carry the day.
Commander Jolliff graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1954. He holds an MS in Financial Management, an MS in Naval Architecture, and a doctorate in Ocean Engineering. He has served in destroyers and auxiliary ships, and in supervisory positions for ship maintenance and repair. After serving as an instructor and co-chairman of the Naval Engineering Division, U. S. Naval Academy, he was Assistant for Modular Ship Design, Naval Ship Engineering Center until August 1973, when he became Assistant for Continuing Aircraft Carrier Conceptual Design.
Mr. George D. Kerr received a BS in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from Webb Institute of Naval Architecture in 1959 followed by an MS in 1964. He has been with the Navy Department for 14 years and most recently served as Systems Engineer for the Patrol Frigate (PF) design. He is currently Deputy Design Manager for the DG/AEGIS Preliminary Design at the Naval Ship Engineering Center.
A Humble Refinement
This sign was posted outside the Coast Guard Academy’s First Battalion XO’s door: "Your First Battalion Executive Officer is now EXXOH. The name has changed, but not its insignificance.”
—Contributed by Cadet Thomas E. Graf
_______________ Nobody Up Here But Us Birds
On the October morning in 1944 when troops assaulted Leyte, carrier planes loaded for close support missions circled overhead awaiting orders from the flagship’s air controller. Enemy opposition did not develop at once. The planes’ radios were silent. Tired of waiting, a veteran pilot pushed his mike button and said. "Those guys down there are so damned fouled up, they’re getting me all fouled up.”
The flagship air controller grabbed a mike and said. "Pilot, who made that last transmission? Identify yourself.”
After several seconds of silence the same voice came on the air, "Hell, I’m not that fouled up.”
—Contributed by Rear Adm. George van Deurs, U. S. Navy (Ret.)
____________________ I_ Am The Captain
By tradition, the commanding officer of a naval vessel, regardless of rank, is addressed as "Captain.”
We had just settled down to the noon meal in the tiny wardroom of the submarine Rock when a newly reported recruit appeared in the doorway to deliver the twelve o’clock reports. Addressing the CO, a lieutenant commander, seated at the head of the table, he commenced:
"Mr. T--- , the officer of the deck sends his respects. . . .” and he continued, nervously
but flawlessly, through the familiar phraseology. When he had finished, the captain smiled and said, "thank you . . . and incidentally, I’m the captain.”
The next noon the same seaman re-appeared, and a virtually identical exchange took place.
On the third day, the seaman once again commenced:
"Mr. T------ the officer of the deck sends. . . .” With that, the captain exploded.
"Sailor,” he roared, "I’ve told you three times that I’m the captain.” With a puzzled look on his face, the man replied "Yes sir, Mr. T , I know--------------------------------------------- you’re the captain.”
—Contributed by Cdr. W. B. Hickman, USNR (Ret.)
______________________ Sea Grammar
The late Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy from 1913-21, is well known for drying up officer’s wine messes.
Not so well known were his efforts to improve the intelligence quotient of enlisted men by instituting, in all battleships, an educational system facetiously referred to as "Daniels College,” where junior officers were expected to serve as teachers. One lesson is recorded in these words:
Ensign instructor: "What are the two principal parts of a sentence?”
Coal passer pupil: "Solitary confinement and bread and water.”
—Contributed by Capt. Edgar K. Thompson, USN (Ret.)
___________________ A Bigger Target
As commanding officer of an Underwater Demolition Team in World War II, I was riding off an invasion beach in my LCPR command boat, when I noticed that one of my swimmers was drawing particularly heavy small arms fire.
Thinking he needed help, I directed my coxswain to him. As we drew alongside he said, "I’m sure glad to see you, skipper.”
It made me feel good until, with the next breath he said. "Now the bastards can shoot at you instead of me.”
—Contributed by Capt. C. E. Coombs, Jr., USNR (Ret.)
{The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)