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Being privileged is no privilege for the conning officer of let ns say, a carrier when the other fellow is a monstrous merchant vessel whose maneuvering characteristics are neither known nor predictable. At what point in a crossing situation, then, does the carrier’s conning officer chicken out and commence his own defensive maneuvering?
teristics for both vessels. As a result, their guidance to provide sufficient clearance in a significant categ1
to the most hazardous potential collision situa Only the situation regarding the privileged vessel ^ be examined. It is clearly the more agonizing f°r
ill
c
V^/ollision between ships at sea still ranks high among the hazards of the seaman’s environment despite radar and other scientific advances. One of the most common and hazardous types of collision threats originates from the "crossing situation.” By definition, this occurs "when two vessels in visual sight of each other approach each other at right angles or obliquely, so as to involve risk of collision, and when one is not an overtaking vessel as defined in the rules.”1 (See illustration in Figure 1.)
In discussing hazards inherent in the crossing situation, Farwell states:
"There is no other approach of vessels at sea or in inland waters so trying to the souls of seamen as that of two vessels on a near-collision course in the crossing situation. . . .
"It is unfortunate that under American law an approach which is naturally fraught with a certain degree of mental hazard should have been made legally so complex that some of its intracacies are puzzling even to admiralty lawyers and are completely baffling to the average mariner, whose duty is not to argue fine distinctions of law but to avoid collision.” 2
It is ironic that such confusion exists since the applicable International Rules of the Nautical Road appear deceptively straightforward:
"Rule 19. [Two Power-Driven Vessels Crossing] When two power-driven vessels are crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other.”3
"Rule 21. [Privileged Vessel Duty] Where by any of these Rules one of two vessels is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed. When, from any cause, the latter finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the giving-way vessel alone, she also shall take such action as will best aid to avert collision (see Rules 27 and 29).”4
Closer analysis confirms the old maxim that it is no privilege to be privileged. Consider the responsibility which the privileged ship’s conning officer assumes! He is bound by Rule 21 to maintain course and speed as long as possible—until such time as the burdened ship’s action alone can no longer avert collision. At that precise instant he must then initiate the action most likely to succeed in avoiding collision. Farwell summarizes:
Tor footnotes, please turn to page 32.
". . . to avoid liability the privileged vessel must not change course or speed until in the judgment of the officer navigating her that crucial moment has been reached. The situation then becomes one in extreme through the fault of the burdened vessel, and the courts will justify any error in judgment by the privileged vessel thereafter save the one error of holding on unchanged into actual collision.”5
It is the author’s hope to assist in refining an<l quantifying the privileged vessel’s judgment, thus obvi* ating the need to win such cases at maritime law. ln examining that task, it becomes clear there exists * great need for guidance superior to "seaman’s when risk of collision looms large because of the burdened ship’s disregard of the Rules. Seaman’s eye ffe' quently proves unreliable in an era when our men-O' war are spending fewer steaming days on a sei increasingly crowded by mammoth, high-speed carg0 carriers whose maneuvering characteristics bear scat11 resemblance to earlier generations of ships.
Just how is the privileged ship’s conning officer
supposed to decide when to "chicken out” and beg111
evasive maneuvering? Experienced mariners quote i
number of thumb rules accumulated over the yea*
Some comprehensive, methodical, and widely-u^
guidance concerning collision avoidance origin2te
with Commander Davis N. Lott’s book Collision Pfl
vention (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, lnC”
1947). A few years back, on the pages of the Proceeding
Lieutenant Jotham M. Myers summarized Lott’s collj
sion prevention rules, which provide avoidance gul
ance to both burdened and privileged ships. MyerS
described them as "80% to 90% effective” and "bettet
and more justifiable than any system or guideline n°^
being used to prevent collision.”6 Nevertheless, 1e
Lott rules are both complex in makeup and cu®ber
some in application. More importantly, they fall ^
account for variations in relative speeds by impbclt ■
assuming comparable speed and maneuvering chaf^
fails
off
of situations—those involving large collision ang1 combined with a moderate speed advantage by 1 burdened ship.7 „
A popular technique known as "defensive drivin$ has proved effective in alerting motorists to the care ^ or irresponsible driver. The method emphasizes the of self-defense despite unwise action by the other do The "defensive seamanship” concept which .1° .
offers the mariner simple, reliable guidance appbca
tiof5'
wf
Mariner, and naval vessels are traditionally cautious and WeU-mannered in the burdened role. The development consider the crossing situation under International u^es of the Road. Nevertheless, the concept and Methodology are far more general in scope and application and may be extended to the overtaking situation,
0 ^land Rules, and to reduced visibility wherein the Bering and Sailing Rules do not apply.
The central objective is to determine just how long (he privileged vessel should delay initiating an avoidance maneuver in the face of a rapidly closing, unManeuvering burdened vessel. As stated in Rule 21, this Maneuver can properly begin only when "collision cannot be avoided by the action of the giving-way !essel alone. ...” This represents the narrow border- dividing severe apprehension and imminent danger ot collision. The regime inside this hazy borderline tepresents in extremis, and conning officers are well acc[uainted with the term. Nevertheless, Farwell’s re- niarks support an assertion that few fully appreciate the ^reat complexity, vagueness, and confusion associated this familiar sounding legal term. Fewer still can e<!uately translate, quantify, and apply the in extremis ^ cept under the variety of situations encountered in ^dynamic environment of a ship’s bridge.
he extent of the in extremis dilemma becomes more Pparent upon observing that the dividing line is not etermined solely by the relative positions, courses, and feeds of the two vessels. It also depends in large „ asure on the maneuvering characteristics of the giving way vessel alone.” Thus the conning officer d'c privileged vessel has an untenable mandate! It u|d be manageable only if he were perfectly knowl- k °eah'e of the characteristics, not only of his own ship, co; also of every ship with which he enters "risk of ■ 1Sl0n ” Returning to the illustration in Figure 1, sextrmis could occur at two miles if ship B is a Per tanker, and P is a destroyer type. Reverse the
1 Mions, however, and the corresponding range might be as little as one-half mile.
Sb • ^demma was addressed in October 1972 by a Ml international conference of 46 nations convened ^ purpose of amending the International Rules dje Road. The conference produced an extensively med, simplified, and reorganized set of proposed natCS They will become effective when agreed to by j. °ns representing 65% of the world shipping ton- but not earlier than 1 January 1976. The new tj es wiH probably be received enthusiastically by mari- ^e *nterests since they are skillfully directed at the pte *ner’ rather than the lawyer. For purposes of the !>Cnt discussion it is necessary to quote only new u es 15 an<j 11 which replace old Rules 19 and 21, Actively:
"(New) Rule 15 [Crossing Situation] When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.”9
"(New) Rule 17 [Action by Stand-On Vessel] (a) (i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.
(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules.
"(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.
"(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation in accordance with subparagraph
Figure 1 Crossing Situation
(a) (ii) of this rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.
"(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep out of the way.”10
New Rule 15 represents a change only to the extent that it incorporates the caveat against crossing ahead of the privileged (stand-on) vessel which is contained
in old Rule 22. However, new Rule 17 is "perhaps the single most significant rule change,” 11 with subparagraph 17(a) (ii) being the most revolutionary portion.12 In summary, new Rule 17 requires (1) the privileged vessel to hold course and speed until (2) it appears that the other vessel is not taking appropriate
of this simplifying assumption is that it proves to t>e not only the most conservative choice, it also confefS full responsibility for emergency avoidance on ones own ship, whose maneuvering characteristics are we established from standard tactical data measurements- The rationale of this assumption is also strongly en' dorsed by Barrow and Duke.
. . we believe this rule tells us (or should tell us) it is more propitious to stand-on only until juSt before that point in time when you as the stand'011 vessel can, by your actions alone, no longer avert collision.” 13
The vital question then is no longer "when do I reaP. in extremis?" but rather "when must I initiate a se defensive maneuver to avert collision with a road h°£ who refuses to maneuver as required and whose charaC teristics are unknown anyway?” The solution is in c form of an "emergency maneuver range” (EMR) ™ which an avoidance maneuver must commence in °r to assure a minimum practical margin of clearance- The (EMR) is determined primarily by the nina° ness of one’s own ship in the same way that in extd is determined by the burdened ship’s characteristlCj The basic input is simply the tactical data giving
vance and transfer versus elapsed time for own
under maximum (useable) rudder angles at
ad-
ship
repre'
sentative speeds. In addition to turning capability represented by the tactical data, the major factors in encing EMR are collision angle 9 (defined as the ang of intersection, or difference, between the courses the burdened and privileged ships), the speeds of 0 ships, and the physical dimensions of both ships-^ first glance the limitless possible combinations o
.flu-
le
I
f the«e
variables suggest a computer program of signi^^ magnitude, but fortunately such is not the case. ^
key simplification results from recognition that »
Pr
■ • . ,pU‘
mately 15 knots or less). Hence all possible SP
and transfer (i.e., path through the water) are PraC. cally constant at slow to moderate speeds (appr° ,
action, (3) continues to require that she take appropriate action once in extremis, (4) suggests what emergency action is appropriate, and (5) reasserts the burdened vessel’s traditional duty.
Even though, as stated earlier, the new Rules will become legally effective at some date not earlier than 1 January 1976, this author believes that the in extremis concept is moot even under the old Rules and may be abandoned without regret or apprehension.
Suppose one simply assumes that a burdened (giveway) vessel, having approached uncomfortably close without maneuvering, will continue to shirk her duty by holding course and speed throughout. The beauty
combinations can be readily reduced to a "speed (R) of burdened to privileged vessel speeds, b . proves practical to compensate for ship’s size ^aCt°^j£ a straightforward manner. All analysis is compatl with hand calculation and plotting in a few short n for any ship. The goal is a family of EMR curves> a function of collision angle and speed ratio, suC ^ those illustrated in Figure 2. The assumed enter%e ^ maneuver is a maximum (useable) rudder turn a^'_ begun upon reaching the EMR, for which the ufl lying rationale will be examined later. >
Prior to beginning to generate the EMR curJe*jze. is necessary to account for the effects of the ships
^*th all preliminaries satisfied, the individual ship’s Curves are generated using the following steps:
cl 0ni ship’s tactical data, examine maximum turn gestctertstics both at high and medium speeds. I sug- are ^ an<^ 15 knots for combatants where the data available. In any event use both the highest practical
,lnce aU ranges are measured to the bow of the burned vessel, only the dimensions of one’s own ship fCc|uire compensation. Its finite dimensions can be ade- Suately accounted for by defining the quantity "colli- Slon clearance.” Collision clearance is a distance— ccted deliberately by the commanding officer—to L0n?Pensate for the distance between radar antenna (or 8e) and stern, as well as possible ranging errors, ^ ttlng imprecision, and degradation of turn rate since tactical data were measured. (See Figure 3). Collision France is defined as the distance (d) the antenna of
shi ’ °Wn S^'P ^rom t^ie P°‘nt (t-e-> burdened
*Ps bow) where collision would have occurred had u er ship maneuvered, at the time (tx) of that po- ’ai collision, assuming the privileged ship (P) turns tl^ at present speed upon reaching the EMR (r), and urdened ship (B) does not maneuver. (It is recog- e that at constant RPM, considerable slowing will r once the sharp turn begins. Such slowing is j matically considered through use of experimentally tjj Crni*ned tactical data.) It should be observed that c0;,closest point of approach (CPA) can never exceed tsion clearance. It will usually be considerably less q Use °f finite ship dimensions and closure subseancec t0 the potential collision time. A collision clear- f0j.e two ship lengths is suggested as appropriate ^preliminary analysis
EMr >Fr, cruising speed data, and medium speed data (i.e., that at or below the speed at which advance, transfer, and overall turn path can be considered practically constant).
► Select the appropriate maneuvering board scale for plotting. Use 125 yards per circle for destroyer types and 250 yards for larger ships.
► From tactical data plot own ship’s high and medium- speed turn patterns. Include time marks at intervals of approximately 10 seconds. (See example in Figure 4.) Preparation of a transparent template overlay greatly simplifies the steps which follow.
► After due consideration of all factors, the commanding officer determines the appropriate collision clearance distance for his ship.
► One can now begin generating data. The objective is determination of the required EMR (r) for each combination of speed ratio (R) and collision angle (6) which will produce the selected collision clearance (d). Typical results are exemplified in Tables I and II and Figure 2. It is suggested that a matrix be established using R = 1,2,3 and collision angle from 0° through 165° at 20° to 30° increments. Each (R,6) combination requires determination of that (r) necessary to provide the selected (d).
► Begin with the equal speed (R = 1) case. Use the high-speed (e.g., 25 knot) turn characteristic template. The vessels are presumed to be at equal high-speed and equidistant from the potential collision point. (See Figure 5.) The potential collision point is the center and corresponds to collision time tr Note that if both vessels are at some equal speed which is less than that assumed, or if the speed of P exceeds that of B, a modest additional safety margin will result.
Table 1
Essex-class Carrier (d — 500yds., 30° rudder)
Collision 1 Speed | Emergency Maneuver Range, Yds. | ||
Angle/Ratio | 1:1 | 2:1 | 3:1 |
0° | N.A. | 1,040 | 2,080 |
20° | 400 | 1,160 | 2,170 |
40° | 790 | 1,450 | 2,420 |
60° | 1,150 | 1,800 | 2,750 |
80° | 1,480 | 2,160 | 3,110 |
100° | 1,770 | 2,480 | 3,450 |
120° | 2,000 | 2,750 | 3,750 |
140° | 2,170 | 2,950 | 3,970 |
150° | 2,230 | 3,020 | 4,050 |
165° | 2,290 | 3,090 | 4,130 |
| Table II |
|
|
Typical World War II Destroyer |
| ||
(d-. | = 250yds., 35° | rudder) |
|
Collision/Speed | Emergency Maneuver Range, Yds. | ||
Angle/Ratio | l:l | 2:1 | 3:1 |
0° | N.A. | 560 | 1,110 |
20° | 230 | 620 | 1,160 |
40° | 440 | 780 | 1,290 |
60° | 650 | 960 | 1,470 |
80° | 830 | 1,160 | 1,670 |
100° | 990 | 1,330 | 1,850 |
120° | 1,120 | 1,470 | 2,010 |
140° | 1,220 | 1,580 | 2,130 |
150° | 1,250 | 1,620 | 2,170 |
165° | 1,280 | 1,660 | 2,210 |
► From the center | (BA, at time | t,, "back down | ” the |
privileged ship at | template speed. Plot its position at | ||
intervals of approximately 10 seconds through the | criti- |
cal interval during which the turn must begin.
► Sketch the required arc of radius corresponding to the selected collision clearance (d), centered at the potential collision point.
► Superimpose the transparent turn template (Figure 4) upon the existing plot. Through trial and error steps, locate that unique position P (corresponding to time t0) at which the turn must be ordered to safely maneuver own ship’s antenna to the collision clearance circle, position Pj, at the time tj of the potential collision. The correct position P is readily identified as that which produces corresponding time values (e.g., 82) for P and P). In Figure 5, the 25-knot aircraft carrier’s turn must be ordered 82 seconds prior to tx (tj — t0 = 82) at an EMR of 1,770 yards. (See Figure 2 and Table I.)
► Note that for the given case (R = 1), the point P is independent of changes in collision angle. To achieve 500 yards’ collision clearance at 25 knots, the examplc ship must initiate a turn (order to the helm) 82 second* in advance of the potential collision. Regardless 0 collision angle, the locus of all points B is simply circle of radius BjB. Emergency maneuver range (f) is readily measured as a function of collision angle (0) and tabulated in Table I.
► Higher speed ratio (R ^ 2) data are derived fronl the "medium” speed turn characteristics. At R = 2 d* geometry is unchanged whether actual speeds are 3<V^ knots, 10/5 knots, or any other combination of 1' speed ratio. The difference is that the 10/5 knot ca5t’ would unfold in "slow motion” at just one-third d>c faster rate. The constant-geometry, variable-time pr,n ciple permits non-dimensional simplification of an o' ^ erwise unmanageable variety of speed combinations- plotting, one merely selects a "fictitious” speed f°r
^ The R =
faedium speed template. Fictitious speeds of 45/15 ^ 3t
R may prove desirable to construct other cases, such as R
h5. Similarly, it may be appropriate to consider
c°nstrUi
,l0us speed of P is 15 knots, then the speed of B ec°mes 30 knots (45 when R = 3). See Figure 6 for j*n Cxample wherein R = 2 and 6 = 120 degrees for lartlt*°US sPeeds 30/15 knots. The geometry is simi-
t0 that shown in Figure 5 except that side BB1 ° triangle is twice side B.,P, since R = 2. In the ample shown tj = t0 + 123 (for privileged speed 13 knots).
^ e R = 3 case follows analogous to R = 2 using kn r
°ts prove convenient.
tha JctlnS action range curves for rudder angles less n the maximum available. This is especially appro- Us^ate *n the high speed (R = 1) case for ships whose e °f full rudder may often be operationally con- fed due to unsecured rolling stock, aircraft, etc.
^ C *lna^ outPut *s s^tp’s tailor-made family of tratedCnCy maneuver ranSe curves such as those illus- isln Figure 2. Practical employment of the curves complexly straightforward once the conning officer c°ns -s himself to be privileged in an essentially uati ant'^ear*ng> decreasing-range, risk-of-collision sit- tatio 0 mereIy calculates collision angle and speed pn ° a^0ng with the burdened vessel’s course and speed. n . lnS the curves provides almost instant determite ,n °F EMR, even when speed ratio interpolation is yjeed> and many minutes prior to potential collision. signsCan tFen continue to observe the other ship for to S rnaneuver, using the "doubt” signal well prior k^^ching tPe EMR- If no corrective maneuver has can n°te^ upon reaching the EMR, the conning officer SouJltiate an emergency turn and corresponding Out fSl£naP confident in his own ship’s ability to get 0 harm’s way.
the comparative simplicity of the solution ranf>Crnp,°yment a given ship’s emergency maneuver cCpt, tUrves, I believe the defensive seamanship con-
\ Acc
simJ°Unts for the numerous variables and permits e’ rehable, and timely determination of the latest O faoment (EMR) at which a positive, radical ^^ill^ must be initiated by the privileged vessel. irrat- Succeed in averting collision, barring only an VeSse°na^ (e-g-> speed increase) act by the burdened
^ Re ■
otfie^Ulres no knowledge or assumption concerning the ^ Is VCSScPs intentions or capabilities, explicable to the privileged vessel both in the liiter ^.and overtaking situations, under old and new ted,. nati°nal Rules and Inland Rules, as well as in Ced Visibility.
► Counteracts the common temptation toward excessively early (and legally culpable) maneuvering by an overly cautious privileged vessel. Such maneuvering to "play it safe” has often caused, rather than avoided, the collision, thereby compounding physical damage with legal liability.
The EMR curves and defensive seamanship concept are thus predicated simply upon averting collision by
a maximum (useable) rudder turn away from an unmaneuvering, burdened vessel. They assume no further complications imposed by additional traffic, sea room, or weather limitations (in which cases Rules 19 and 21 may well no longer be applicable). The selection of the avoidance maneuver was not made on the basis of simplifying the plotting and calculations or training, although these fringe benefits are welcome. Rather, the emergency turn away was chosen solely as the maneuver most likely to succeed regardless of the other ship’s
Fleet. He then served as executive officer and commanding officer of in the USS Intrepid (CVS-11) as navigator, then inactivation coot® ^ He is currently a student at the Naval War College and this summef assume duties as plans officer, Naval Air Systems Command.
action. It is also the most likely to be anticipated and understood by the burdened vessel. The turn away also receives implicit support from new Rule 17(c).
The advantages of turning away, not toward, are self-evident. The advantages of turning away, rather than slowing or reversing engines, may be less obvious and are worthy of consideration:
► Rate of closure is most quickly reduced.
► Rudder effectiveness is maintained.
► The stopping distance of most vessels (at other than slow speed) exceeds full rudder advance.
► The response to rudder is usually much more rapid than that to reversed engines (again at other than low speed).
► A sharp turn provides the other ship an early, visible cue regarding intentions.
► If the burdened vessel eventually does maneuver, a starboard turn to pass astern is most probable (new Rule 15). Any speed reduction by the privileged vessel degrades the potential success of such a maneuver.
Rather than slowing or reversing engines, consideration should be given to increasing RPM once the emergency maneuver has begun. This serves to enhance rudder response and rate of turn as a means of increasing the margin of safety. Inspection of Figure 2 confirms that even a small decrease in speed ratio (R) serves to increase the miss distance (i.e., to decrease the required EMR).
The foregoing theoretical development assumes that an idealized, constant (bridge or radar antenna to bow)-bearing, decreasing-range situation exists. In practice a slight bearing drift (with CPA still dangerously close) is a far more frequent occurrence. In these cases, it nevertheless appears that the specified EMR provides adequate margin—not less than the collision clearance existing in the ideal case. Likewise, any tardy slowing or turning by the burdened vessel further serves to increase the margin.
It should be noted (e.g., Figures 5 and 6) that in the situations where collision angle exceeds a certain value (approximately 105° and 120° for small and large ships respectively), a starboard turn entered upon reaching EMR will carry own ship across the burdened vessel’s projected track, although with adequate clearance. Subsequently, the turn should be discontinued to avoid closing or recrossing the track, preferably after a course change about 30° less than the original collision angle. For example, if collision angle is 130°, an emergency 100° turn would be near optimum, barring an unexpected (port) turn by the other ship.
Captain Church indicates that, according to the best available legal advice at the 1972 Conference, new 17(a)(ii) might justify maneuvering by the privilege vessel ". . . at about 5,000-10,000 yards depending °n circumstances, size, and speed of the vessels in' volved. . . ,”14 This guidance appears not only t0° general but also premature in almost all cases. M°re precise guidance can and should be available to account for the many variables involved. The defensive seaman' ship concept represents one practical, quantitative »F proach. It averts the futile and irrelevant semantlC shoals surrounding the in extremis argument of present Rules and harmonizes well with the new Ruk5, While Rule 17 specifies what to do, defensive seamal^ ship further defines when, how, and why. The meth° encourages adherence to the Rules by providing an interpretation which is not untenable and counter t0 the self-preservation instinct. In summary, defens*ve seamanship implies good, professional—and not tirni^ seamanship. It implies approaching the well-definC ’ prudent limit of collision hazard without flinching confident that a sound avoidance plan is available [1][2] [3] required.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1954, Captain Byington in the USS Hickox (DD-673) prior to entering flight training in ^ Following designation as a naval aviator, he served in Air Antisub*11^] Squadron Thirty (VS-30). He began graduate training in I960 and m ^ received a bachelor’s degree in aeronautical engineering from the U. S. Postgraduate School and in 1963 the Aeronautical and Astronautics e ^ neer degree from the University of Michigan. Subsequent assignments ^ VS-39, the department of mathematics at the Naval Academy, tbc J Yorktown (CVS-10), and the staff of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. A'b ,
®Jotham M. Myers, "When Am I Committed to Collision?” 1 3 Institute Proceedings, December 1972, p. 43. a.
7Melville R. Byington, Jr., "Comment and Discussion,” U. S. Naval tute Proceedings, August 1973, pp. 88-89. .rG,
8Captain W. W. Barrow, USCG, and Commander T. M. Duke, ^ ^ "Modernization of the International Rules of the Road,” Proceeding1 Marine Safety Council, September 1973 through February 1974. ReP as GPO 877-914.
9Ibid., p. 9.
10Ibid., p. 10.
11 Ibid., p. 27.
12A. T. Church, Jr., 'The New Rules of the Road,” U. S. Naval I°s Proceedings, March 1974, pp. 43-49.
13Barrow and Duke, op. cit., p. 10.
14Church, op. cit., p. 45.
'Alfred Prunski, Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road. Fourth E (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1971 Revision), p. 181- 2lbid., p. 301.
3 Ibid., p. 436.
[2]Ibid., pp. 436-437.
5 Ibid., p. 318.