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to
their all-or-nothing attitude, there di no for be any middle ground for King and ^
one of the few times during the war t ^vejt fof their dispute to President Franklin D. resolution. and
Roosevelt decided in favor of Mars a LERO.
•d
Ernie King, realizing how badly the Japanese had been beaten at Midway, wanted to strike at the Solomons while Japan was momentarily stunned. George Marshall wanted to crush the Germans first. Their armchair battles were almost as fierce and unyielding as those that would be fought on Guadalcanal itself.
American long-range strategic planning was erratic throughout the spring and early summer of 1942. There were many reasons, starting with logistics. The shortages of men and materiel would not be alleviated until the United States was fully mobilized. That would take months. The machinations preceding the July decision to invade North Africa had also disrupted orderly planning. The battles of Coral Sea and Midway were similarly distracting.
Army planners consistently gave the European theater top priority in troops, aircraft, and materiel. The Pacific, in the Army view, rated only enough for a passive defense. Naval planners, reflecting King’s way of thinking, demanded adequate numbers of combat forces in the Pacific for a limited offensive. A passive defense would permit the Japanese to consolidate their gains by default and to exploit and develop their conquests of raw materials and natural resources. If the Allies left the Japanese alone until they had defeated Germany, the eventual counteroffensive in the Pacific would become more costly as time went on. As the Battle of the Coral Sea had grown near, King had begun to fear that the Japanese spring offensive would be too strong for him to handle. His concern had shifted from mounting a limited offensive to avoiding further losses.
On 4 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had met, hoping to find a way to distribute their inadequate forces between the two theaters. King had assured Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall that he supported BOLERO, but not at the expense of danger-
1 pjjst
ously reducing American Pacific forces. feS h ity should go to holding what the Unite jjvertiI1f’ in the Pacific, argued King, rather than ^e0Sjve resources to BOLERO for an indeterminat in the future. Marshall disagreed. BOLE aCp
come first. Apparently he was willing to ^ ^j^t <l ditional territory to the Japanese if that took to keep resources flowing to Eng ^
dl- , « b“cl?
‘Bolero was the code name for the accumulation of forces
E nglan<
eventual cross-Channel invasion.
Pacific
would have to be a naval operation
K’
bad been preoccupied with Coral Sea and tbrougbout the spring of 1942. Once those his tho^1^ over’ King had a breathing spell, and realjZe^U^ts aSa'n turned to the offense. When he ^'d\v ^°w bad‘y tbe JaPanese had been beaten at
king’s instinctive response was to hit back 4tnee JaPanese were momentarily stunned. The . an victory had to be exploited immediately, ferisiv 'nsisted, before the Japanese recovered their of- p e Momentum.
'ngtonce dormant were revived, both in Wash- fhur n and 'n che Pacific. General Douglas MacAr- hosg^^ tbe first to be heard. On 8 June he pro- se[f Srandiose offensive to seize Rabaul with him- sha)i) COrnrnar>d (as he had been assured by Mar- ^*n§ studied MacArthur’s proposal and Vith r,^arshall that any amphibious assault in the under naval command—not under MacArthur. But Marshall was not listening. On 12 June he endorsed MacArthur’s Rabaul plan on the mistaken assumption that King would provide whatever ships and Marines MacArthur needed. Mesmerized by MacArthur s optimism, Marshall was edging away from his concept of a passive defense in the Pacific.
Some two weeks were frittered away in mid-June while Navy planners studied the MacArthur-Marshall proposal and made plans of their own. Finally, on 23 June, King and his chief planner, Rear Admiral Charles M. (“Savvy”) Cooke, rebutted MacArthur’s scheme as too ambitious because Rabaul was too heavily defended. The Navy’s alternative was an indirect approach through the eastern Solomons, where the Japanese were weaker. In any event, said King, he would never allow MacArthur to command any major naval forces. A naval officer under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific, would have to command whatever amphibious assault was finally agreed upon.
Impatient with further delay, King brazenly forced the issue. Not even allowing Marshall time to reply, King ordered Nimitz to prepare to seize Tulagi in the Solomons by amphibious assault, using naval and Marine forces. King’s audacity was astounding. He intended that Nimitz intrude into MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area with a major offensive with the approval of neither the President nor the JCS. King’s order also defied the President’s decision not to increase American strength in the Pacific. Once American forces had been committed under Nimitz, a call for reinforcements was inevitable.
King was too shrewd a sea lawyer to have acted without some semblance of legal justification, and he used to his advantage Roosevelt’s ambiguity in dealing with the JCS. In early March Roosevelt had approved King’s memorandum for a limited offensive into the Solomons, and it had never been canceled. Nimitz’s CINCPOA charter (drafted by the Navy and approved by the JCS and the President) could be interpreted as authorizing Nimitz to conduct amphibious assaults in MacArthur’s area. Finally, the President had not specifically forbidden King to attack in
the Pacific when he had adjudicated the King- Marshall dispute over theater priorities. Indeed, King very carefully had not ordered Nimitz in the strict sense to carry out the assault, but rather to prepare for such an assault in contemplation of eventual JCS approval. In any event, the President’s executive order had authorized King to command the Navy and Marine Corps, and, by God, King was doing just that.
On 25 June King presented the JCS with the fait accompli, then boldly asked for concurrence that Nimitz should attack Tulagi. Having promised the command to MacArthur, Marshall was in a bind. Mac Arthur added to the confusion by scrubbing his earlier plan of a bold, direct assault against Rabaul, now concurring with King’s plan for an indirect approach via Tulagi and the Solomons. Whatever the objective, Marshall still wanted MacArthur in command.
King was unsympathetic with Marshall’s dilemma in dealing with the imperious MacArthur, who had been a prewar Chief of Staff of the Army when Marshall had still been a colonel. Marshall, he believed, “would do anything rather than disagree with MacArthur.” (Nimitz was unquestionably an obe-
k Arthur
uncharted waters when he argued that a should control fleet movements in his own are£ljureSi shall’s ignorance of naval communication Pr°C^Loran- for example, was glaringly exposed in 8 ® sajd, dum to King. “His basic trouble,” King atetj,i0g “was that like all Army officers he knew n^,, about sea power and very little about air P at jn The squabble over who was to comman eS.
the Pacific went on. King argued that speec ^ re. sential; further delay would allow the Japanes ^
from their Midway defeat and to r^u^a|[ of
cover
offensive in the Solomons. Reminding their earlier agreement that the Army wou ^ qUj<l supreme command in Europe, King expecte ^rrny pro quo in the Pacific. But with or withou ^ He support, King intended to invade the So o ^ instructed Nimitz to proceed with his invas ^ jp even though “there would probably be some reaching a decision on the extent of the r ticipation.” (r thfee
Marshall pondered King’s ultimatum °^ agi- days. His mood worsened when he receiv ^ pirated dispatch from MacArthur, who was ug[jet'
most paranoid, at King’s presumptuousness saj<J
ing Nimitz into MacArthur’s area. The in
MacArthur, was conspiring to reduce ^the ^ the Pacific to no more than an occupation ^ an<l Marshall finally suggested on 29 June t a King talk about who would command the °P^ o0ly (Incredibly, the two men up to this point ^ jO exchanged memoranda.) King readily agree ^se. June they had fashioned a clever 0pef3'
MacArthur’s insistence that he comman a^pje tions in his area became irrelevant by the sl line pedient of moving Nimitz’s western k°uns thac into MacArthur’s territory. The result w.^juje Nimitz’s South Pacific Area was enlarge fc&r
the eastern Solomons, including Tulagi- ^ east' miral Robert L. Ghormley would comman ^ gpb' ern Solomons assault, identified as Tas j lU> sequent assaults, referred to as Tasks ]sle',v
would follow in the western Solomons, eaStje |pt- Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago. As Qefl'
- rhP 1
still in MacArthur’s domain,
ble
ter areas were aim m - on
eral would be in command. After nearly a
of
to
dient subordinate to King, but MacArthur’s association with Marshall would be tenuous and tempestuous throughout the war.) King also suspected that Secretary of War Henry Stimson uncritically supported MacArthur and pressured Marshall to appease the Southwest Pacific commander. This made King dislike Stimson even more.
Marshall left his element and began foundering in
finally
"***& “iiw easte^
agree on their Pacific strategy on 2 July- Solomons landings would begin on 1 Augu ^ pi- The American counteroffensive in the Pac most underway.
In retrospect, King’s advocacy of WAT ^jpult) (the code
coul (
the most dangerous of all major military °P
haggling, King and Marshall were
________ name for the eastern Solomons^^^ [i
could have been a disaster. An amphibious a ratio05'
1«
S°
"1^ p _ _ - wi/viwwuiu viti * J vyil ^ IVgUlUXCJJ
^nder USl°n and cries of alarm from the local com-
%
to
- fi/0 t^le*r joint message hit Washington, King fShr*0us- MacArthur, he said, was vacillating and ^.a^ted■ “Three weeks ago MacArthur stated e could be furnished amphibious forces and
The ■
need$riS^S ^a^ure are so great that the attacker the CVery Poss‘ble advantage in his favor: control of an<^ fhe air, superior combat power to over- COm _ e defending enemy, and secure lines of tnctjlL'n‘cat‘on- The understrength and inexperi- of 0rces King intended to employ enjoyed none Se advantages. Everything was done in haste.
i j .
^ u ^ral Richmond Kelly Turner, for example, Until | 6 t0 ta^e command of the assault forces
Tuiao' SS C^an three weeks before they landed on ^de'dGuadalcanal. Undeterred, King de- (he t^at the operations carry on, regardless of e Admiral Ghormley had gone from London all fQC Pacific to act as the supreme commander of Including Turner’s) engaged in WATCH- 8 July ^ter talking to a pessimistic MacArthur on Out w/ Ghormley doubted the wisdom of carrying '0 tlie ^TOWER in early August. Enemy activity aUd j, °l°tnons and New Guinea was increasing, that ji^^tthur and Ghormley felt—rightly so— 111. -j- Slr forces were inadequate for Tasks I, II, and ^cific^et^er t^ley urSed the JCS to delay the South V, 0^erisive until they got reinforcements. ^Quj^ s ready acceptance of MacArthur’s views 0ff,Cerse the first of many times that senior naval f’tts, . w°uld succumb to the General’s power of
C”1- two carriers, he could push right through to Rabaul,” King told Marshall. “He now feels that he not only cannot undertake this extended operation but not even the Tulagi operation.” Privately, King suspected that MacArthur was sulking because he had been denied supreme comman4 in the South Pacific. “He could not understand that he was not to manage everything,” King later said. “He couldn’t believe that. Of course he was absolutely against going into Guadalcanal, and he said so.”
Yet King could not summarily dismiss their warnings. MacArthur and Ghormley were the commanders responsible for the operation’s success, and it was their prerogative to express a legitimate concern. A classic military problem was facing them: an enemy force was growing progressively stronger, and the longer the American attack was delayed, the more formidable the enemy would become. On the other hand, a delay would also strengthen the American forces. Should the Americans attack at once, or later? Might it not be better to wait and take time to prepare properly? The latter, said King, was MacArthur’s philosophy, “to have everything ready before advancing.”2 As a student of military history, King knew that many commanders of the past had lost opportunities for victory by waiting. (McClellan at Richmond in 1862 is a classic example.) Although one’s own forces may not be entirely ready, the enemy may be even less ready. King believed he still had an edge on the Japanese in the eastern Solomons, but the advantage could turn in favor of the Japanese if the Americans did not attack immediately.
King also had another crucial reason for urging an immediate attack. He could not count on help from Marshall, so there was no reason to wait for Army reinforcements which might never appear. On the other hand, once the Americans were ashore and fighting in the eastern Solomons, Marshall might be persuaded to support the operation to avoid a potential American defeat.
The objections of Ghormley and MacArthur notwithstanding, King told Marshall that the assault was more urgent than ever. Marshall, too, wanted to move along. On 10 July they jointly ordered Ghormley and MacArthur to press on. They were not to worry about Tasks II and III, said King and Marshall, but rather they were to do what was “absolutely essential” for Operation WATCHTOWER alone, Ghormley, perhaps realizing that his hesitancy was unwelcome in Washington, replied the following day
2Ic was not MacArthur's philosophy later in the war. Realizing that he would never get the forces he wanted, he became a master of improvisation and expediency.
the
begun. A frustrating pattern had been set. paCjfjc next several days the reports from the Sou ^^jtz were garbled and confusing, because of w a| » reported as “extreme communication dirticc ^uS.
King’s duty officer, Commander George sell, entered King’s bedroom on the flags gjgt. Dauntless in the early morning hours of aftef
Something was up. One rarely disturbe [1] j^ing he had turned in. It would be a long wa’ ijdo needed his sleep, and there was nothing 1 jnrv•
in the middle of the night that would have^off0ally mediate effect on a distant battle. Bad news
that he had sufficient forces for Task I if he could count upon air support from Mac Arthur.[2]
King’s mood began to change by mid-July. He finally began to worry openly about the perils of WATCHTOWER. Ghormley probably had enough forces to get ashore, King reasoned, but could he withstand counterattacks? And what about plans to drive westward after WATCHTOWER was completed?
Where were these forces to come from? Although King once had told Marshall that he was ready to go it alone in the South Pacific, King now had second thoughts. He began to besiege Marshall and Arnold for men, guns, and aircraft to support Ghormley.
King’s pleas were futile. After King, presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, and Marshall had returned from their mid-July trip to Great Britain to nail down European strategy, Marshall had lost interest in a speck of an island in the far Pacific called Guadalcanal. His attention had become focused on the North African landing scheduled for that fall. Marshall naturally wanted all his available strength for that theater alone. General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, had always been reluctant to send his aircraft to the Pacific; now more than ever he was determined to concentrate his air power in the European and Mediterranean theaters. Mac Arthur would become entangled in the Papua peninsula in eastern New Guinea and would have nothing to spare for WATCHTOWER. King’s Navy and Marine Corps would be very much alone.
• rted t0
“At last we have started,” Nimitz re^0. jcanal King on 7 August 1942. The attack on ^eefl
and Tulagi was underway. The Japanese [3] caught by surprise. f[0rf
Several hours passed. “No report ye ^ 0f Ghormley,” wired Nimitz. The only in ^eS. activity was through intercepted Japanese r ^ sages. “No direct report from the sout , ^ j,ad Nimitz again, twenty-four hours after the at
waited until morning. eJ 03
But this time Russell woke King an *u „ sajd the light. “Admiral, you’ve got to see 1 1 ’
Russell. “It isn’t good.” T’umer' ^
It was a long-delayed report from Japanese naval force at Savo Island near u ^ had had sunk four cruisers, damaged another, j0fjty damaged two destroyers. “Heavy casualties, tjng saved,” reported Turner. The transports SLT^ the Marines ashore were not attacked, but t jjng retiring from Guadalcanal because of irn^j ap' heavy attacks.” None of the Japanese ships parently been sunk or damaged. , timeS
King read the message in disbelief sever p0r
before returning it to Russell. “I can c t^iannj bringing me this one,” said King. His t”10ned- for some explanation of what might have ^ ,, “They must have decoded the dispatch wrong- finally said. “Tell them to decode it again- ^ co3' King was crushed. “That, as far as ^ laid cerned, was the blackest day of the war, i,le- said. “The whole future then became unpre ^ cbe King slumped back into bed after Russe ^ (0 room. He knew he had suffered a terrible se^j his policy of attack, attack, attack. Savo s matured him at age sixty-four.
a s'r
The campaign for Guadalcanal became ^jc, month battle of attrition. Neither side wo ^ jeb' yet neither side could muster the strength ° allSe sive victory. King never had enough ships ari
losses, the demands of the Battle of the At a : the invasion of North Africa. The Pad ic
paign
was that there were neither plans nor forces
Kir
,eSUr>k, King’s hopes for Guadalcanal would have
n doomed.
ltlcs have charged that King had used poor S)°Uth ent choosing Ghormley to command the ba(j Pacific Area, but that is hindsight. Nimitz n0a&reed on Ghormley’s assignment, and there was *0uldson *n the beginning to suspect that Ghormley 'vben • ^ter- Performance in war is unpredictable Tjlerlr ls based solely upon peacetime reputation.
tlv 8rievously, twenty-four ships lost, including oth Carr‘ers and eight cruisers, as well as many KinerS dama8ed- At one time in the fall of 1942 p n.^. but one operational aircraft carrier in the ajr ^or were there ever enough combat troops or 0f , 0n Guadalcanal during the desperate months ^ fall of 1942. North Africa still came first.
. Us the greatest defect of the Guadalcanal cam-
availabl f UC1LI,C1
kn *e *°r 3n exten<^e4 struggle. King knew this, q W t*lat his burning desire to become involved on tL a canal was a calculated risk. Perhaps he | *■ he could get away with it if Marshall and yet ^ would send reinforcements to avoid defeat. t(j oth were ready to sacrifice Guadalcanal rather 'nvast0 d'vert forces from TORCH (the North Africa orj *°n^ even though Roosevelt in late October had re Guadalcanal held at all costs.
Gu ln^. Was undeservedly lucky when Rear Admiral afterC Klikawa decided to retire from Guadalcanal a^.^ning the Battle of Savo Island. The Japanese Pq lfa^ c°uld have destroyed every American trans- tj0at Guadalcanal, still filled with food, ammuni- been’ anc^ supplies for the Marines ashore. Had they
b, " ~ '
Griti
IHnu
Were both happy surprises and shocking disappointments. Some excelled, others failed. King later believed that Ghormley’s problem was his bad teeth which caused him intense pain and discomfort, an ailment King had been unaware of until Ghormley returned to Washington from the Pacific. Perhaps this experience influenced King to insist upon regular physical examinations for all his flag officers.
In the end, the Americans won because of their own tenacity as well as the Japanese tactics of committing their forces piecemeal rather than massing for a coordinated attack. King and Nimitz were committed irrevocably to winning Guadalcanal. When Ghormley became defeatist, they fired him. Substituting Halsey for Ghormley invigorated the Americans on Guadalcanal and led ultimately to the American victory. It was Halsey’s finest hour.
Copyright © 1980 by Thomas B. Buell. From Master of Sea Power. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown, and Company, Inc. I
Thomas B Buell
Master of Sea Power
A Biogniphyof Fleet Aihuiml Ernst). King
“It’ ■ ■ ■
^ s a solid book; a salty full-length biography of Franklin b°sevelt’s wartime Chief of Naval Operations, the boss of the most ^ u'erful Navy in history; a classic s.o.b. and an undeniably great African, who played a major role in winning the war. Ernest >nS in legend was so tough he shaved with a blowtorch, and he etty niuch comes off that way in Buell’s vigorous portrait
Herman Wouk
. ^0/543 pages/illustrated. A Co-publication of the Naval nst>tute Press and Little, Brown & Company lst Price: $22. 50 Member’s price: $18.00
^4.50 to each order for postage and handling. ease use order form in Books of Interest section.)
I A graduate of the Naval Academy with the class of
1958, Commander Buell had extensive experience SL ^ in destroyers: the USSHamner (DD-7 18), USS King
(DLG-10), USS Brooke (DEG-1), and USSJohn King (DDG-3). He commanded the USS Joseph Hewes (DE-1078). A graduate of both the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College, he has been a frequent contributor to the Proceedings and served on the Naval Institute’s board of control from 1977 to 1979. HisTheQuiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance was published in 1974 by Little, Brown and the Naval Institute Press. Commander Buell retired from active duty in 1979 and is now manager of weapons systems integration in the Honeywell advanced lightweight torpedo program. He lives in Wayzata, Minnesota.
[2]It was wishful thinking. MacArthur subsequently did not provide air
support to Ghormley.