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L he only current rationale for reserve forces is 'ning for wartime mobilization. The need for re- lsts, however, exists not only in their potential '''ell'1116 Serv*ce but f°r peacetime contributory use as on | ^0met*rnes caHed “mutual support,” this sec- i- . r°^e needs to be addressed separately and not u> as it is today. Peacetime use is justified now y in terms of its value as mobilization training.
**Otyevpr • . • • l
. vcr. in most respects, peacetime use is dis-
theCt ^ different from training for wartime, although
is an overlap in that use is often good training.
now°rtUnately’ mer&‘nS the two concepts, as is done
ayW’ *eads t0 less than optimal use of the talent
j , a°le and creates management difficulties. To-
Practice also seriously limits the use of the
the etIrne work concept for advancing the “worth” of
rat./eserves- In this regard, advancing a dual reserve
°nale can open up a second front in the annual
anJteSt °f the Secretary of Defense
tar' ^°n&ress f°r scarce defense resources. The basic
u . e for maintaining reserve forces rests on eco-
0 , Ic grounds. If resources were unlimited, then
uj y ^ rhc supply of regulars could not meet the de-
^ at any price would one turn to reservists.*
v e c°ntributory use of reserve assets has been ad-
Ce,a before and without success. Even so, a prop-
The Naval Reserve Should Work
By Captain James G. Abert, U. S. Naval Reserve
Sa-f ^tructured peacetime support concept has unas- c0n *e econornic underpinnings. The “work done” has may require new legislation. But Congress has een a stron& supporter of the Naval Reserve and n°t shown itself inflexible to new thoughts as to tl)reto bring about an improved overall defense pos- jjy6.' "fhe idea of dual philosophies does not necessar-
nas
lOtv
hi
j50 lrnPly equality in the number of reservists sup- c‘d by each rationale, nor equal expenditures, but sch, a rough parity in importance in the overall
rath
er
Si °f thin«s-
t0(j uie much peacetime contributory work is done i fy* there is no single senior official spokesman
*ith
0n,v^ fbe Navy, reserve or active duty, responsible to <■ rn,anaSement structure which directs subordinates
th
for
contributory use. There is no focal point in
^h e?k °ut such opportunities for the Naval Reserve,
glle mventories the talent available, and which ar-
|j()S ^0r the utilization of reservists in this role. Op-
Var'tUn't:*eS are developed and the support given at
§OojUS rnanagement levels simply because it makes
b0: Ser>se to do it. In this respect, it is mainly ad
Cf.„ ant^ not an organized thrust. ePtion 6
Sto.
ce
If there are ex- ns to this, they are principally in the intelli- cornmunity.
'V. ^^ander James G. Abert, USNR, “Cost-Effective Reserve
r,)'ces •
Proceedings, November 1972, pp. 52-61.
One of these officers is a regular; the other is a reservist on temporary active duty, serving as a ship rider during a fleet exercise in the Mediterranean. Even though the reservist is providing useful assistance to the fleet, his service occurs only as a by-product of the training he receives. Can’t reservists be given the opportunity to do useful work which is justified solely on the basis of the contribution made?
In the past, the term “contributory support” has been used to attempt to rationalize a potpourri of different types of reserve use, many of which were not cost-effective in that it would have been more efficient to have another full-time regular or to have hired the skills in the civilian marketplace. This is probably one of the reasons peacetime work, apart from training, has had difficulty in gaining general acceptance and adoption as an official program, even though a substantial amount of such work is indeed accomplished.
There is a bit of “Catch-22” associated with present-day contributory efforts. If the Naval Reserve publicizes such contributory support, it could find some of its most useful assets taken out of drill-pay status because the individuals are too well-trained. An argument advanced by those who favor cutting the drilling reserve is that if such persons are that well- trained, they do not need to be paid to get further trained. However, while the drills are not important from a training standpoint, they are important for the opportunity they afford to do contributory work. The idea of mutual support has merit in meeting this argument. Contributory support by reservists can be generalized under two headings:
► Responding to peacetime “peak load.” requirements imposed on the active forces
\ Providing specialists in blue suits to assist the peacetime active forces in areas in which particular types of knowledge and skills developed by the reservists in their civilian endeavors are needed. In these cases, past Navy experience is seen as materially improving the value of the work product.
Bringing into being a component of the Naval Reserve whose purpose is clearly oriented to fulfilling these needs calls for an explicit management organization. The justification for continuing the personnel involved in this component of the Navy’s total force (regular and reserve) is not their need upon mobilization. They would represent a reserve increment beyond the numbers required for mobilization. Indeed, as individuals, they may not have significant mobilization potential because of age and seniority. Instead, retention, pay, and promotion would be based on peacetime contribution to the total force.
Reserve Missions: In recent years, there has been 1111 increased concern with the missions assigned to ^ Naval Reserve and a demand, particularly on the P1'1, of Congress, for a greater degree of integration 0 active and reserve manpower and missions. A br£( number of studies have been completed, leading 1 several reorganizations. The focus has been 1,11 “hardening” the requirements for reserves in ^ event of mobilization. The problem is that forec^1 ing needs for an uncertain future event is a specu‘ five endeavor. Predicting the level and compost
tio"
of active naval forces is difficult in itself. If the fu[Ufi is cloudy as to the active Navy’s requirements, ^ the task of determining reserve requirements is 11 trying to hook an anchor to a cloud. This is a w^ ness of the mobilization rationale. The proposal 3 vanced here would contribute to purposeful intefr' tion of reservists and regulars. It is an approach c ' is not susceptible to the criticism that the future C1' flict may not be the one anticipated, since peacet* contribution is much nearer and more certain.
. TV
tb£
absolute level of individual involvement. In fact) ^ many in the contributory portion of the Naval ^
Substituting Active Duty for Work for Drills. proposals advanced here are not meant to lower
serve, the involvement could be greater. It oug
hr
be possible to pay for the work done and to pefl flexibility in the use of the time allocated. It shoa
not be necessary to limit the paid periods to
foUf
four-hour segments, principally on weekends. In j feet, one would trade drills for larger amounts what may be called active duty for work. For j ample, those reservists who work in command 311
COURTESY OF NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Admiral Harry Train's Atlantic Fleet personnel regularly participate in war games conducted at the Naval War College in Newport. Even though the fleet participants change, continuity comes in the form of reservists who serve repeated tours as war game umpires.
to be reprogrammed to their “active duty for
reservists is re-
, ^sts who now put in more than 48 drills and 14 of a
strv'^0VV many reservists can and will respond with
active duty for training. Indeed, it is surpris
WoyJj , *
Pose • t0 lrtcle avail, in terms of the larger pur-
4;if
pose • r * '— ~
’ ‘‘ a flexible management philosophy and a
>n hand.
p
ti0^aCet'me Peak Load Uses: The peak load justifica- Sarn °fP63061*1116 use °f reservists is based on the p0^e Principle that keeps civilian temporary man- h Cr a8encies in business. The total force would
ty °n- It also may be difficult to defend their need stabilization day rather than later. This is the rea- these 3t Sta^ billets which most reservists rendering f,c Services occupy are among those which the Of-
°f the Secretary of Defense annually suggests
tonrr°l ^or ^eet exercises often do not need 48 drills Pupate for a 14-day active duty stint. If contrib- >y suPport is the objective, it should allow for the (lt 11 t*1C ^un<^s now expended for these individuals’
*°rk” role.
Only a relatively small number of i_________
the^ ^°r t^C contrtk>utory group. Because most of
Contributory-type activities would be tailored to
find' IC 3Ct*ve ^uty needs, it ought to be possible to
’ almost on a case-by-case basis, sufficient per-
el to meet what might be unusual time com-
ents measured against today’s requirements.
(jri^e *s at least one Naval Reserve unit that now
jnS °n weekdays during the day. It is a small unit
cientrelatiVdy ^ar£e c*ry> anc^ rhere are always suffi-
rcanclidates for the billets. Also, there are many wservj.
es how
tyhe*Ce WeH beyond the minimum requirements c0n. have the opportunity to make a useful ntnbution
che proposals advanced here were adopted, it aior tatl°n t^1£ necessary resources to carry out the
, ^ complex administrative activities did not go
"and : •
a reservist only when it needs help beyond that am i C fr°m active duty personnel. A recurring ex- f0r p|C ls reserve augmentation of command centers t^eeet exercises. The exercises impose peak loads on vid rC^u*ar staffs. Yet, the billets which these indi- pr; U<a's occupy during the exercises may have low in terms of their relative need upon mobili
^Ppitig from the drill-pay category. are ■ tyP'cal peak load case is that in which reservists in ^^grated with active duty personnel as umpires pi e Portion of the Commander in Chief Atlantic °Hc Cactlca^ command readiness program conducted l4sta quarter at the Naval War College. Over the ^4° years, on the average, a dozen reservists have involved in each war game as umpires. The once-a-quarter demand is not sufficient to justify additional staff at the War College. To meet it without the Naval Reserve would require additional duty by individuals from the Atlantic fleet. This use of reservists is thus cost-effective, and there is an additional advantage. Because of personnel shifts among the regulars, it is the reservists who constitute a cadre of umpiring experience in the games. Use of reservists in this role also avoids the adding of yet another requirement to those already levied on the reduced staffs or the overtaxed Atlantic Fleet operating forces. However, there are management problems in deciding whether to develop and stick to a cadre of qualified umpires or to rotate the assignments, because the umpire function is indeed good training. The Atlantic Fleet’s view is to stick to the tried, tested, and true; the reserve mobilization training philosophy would call for individuals to rotate. Also a problem is the fact that the billets occupied by the personnel who do the umpiring are in many different offices of the Atlantic Fleet staff. The office that runs the tactical readiness program does not have a mobilization requirement equivalent to the number of umpires needed. According to the current system, all officers whose billets are justified by CinCLantFlt’s mobilization requirements should do their 14 days of annual active duty for training in the offices in which their mobilization billets are located. This is not possible if the war game peak load is to be met.
Another peak load opportunity is on-board ship data collection. This chore is usually imposed on members of the ship’s force, and they often have only a vague idea of the whys and wherefores. Sometimes, hard-earned shore duty becomes sea duty again as junior officers are dispatched to sea, in temporary additional duty status, to assist in the data collection effort. Often contractors or civil service personnel are used. There have been recent examples of direct Naval Reserve participation in this type of activity with excellent results. Reservists are demonstrably better and less expensive than civilians on board ship. It is conceivable that Naval Reserve teams could be assembled and placed at the disposal of commands with data collection requirements. There is no need for a set number of drills, and there is no real need to have the individuals aligned with mobilization billets; they would simply be there to do particular jobs, when needed.
Peak load should not be confused with the idea of reservists coming in on back-to-back (or overlapping) 14-day active duty tours to fill a billet. If the billet needs filling all the time or even 75% of the time, a full-time regular probably is the cost-effective
<
To be sure, most reservists should continue to train for mobilization assignments, as this electrician's mate is doing on board the USS Newport (LST-l 179), but the concept of active duty for work could easily apply to enlisted men looking for summer jobs while in college.
the program should be limited in size by policy
termination. For example, an appropriation cou
ia
method. Taking into account management costs and travel and per diem, the use of back-to-back reservists is an expensive way to fill a billet. It also incurs very high man-year costs, and even though the retirement component may be less, current costs, as distinct from those that are deferred, are considerably more. It has been said that because reservists have to show their stuff in ten working days, they are quickly off the mark and more productive overall than a single full-year active duty incumbent. This may be true, but it is a more difficult argument to make than the peak load one, and for this reason is only mentioned and not strongly advocated here.
Inventorying of peak load possibilities is an important aspect of the program. In the main, the key to identification is that the demand be regular and recurring. (Crises can be handled, but they are more difficult.) Scheduled exercises have already been mentioned. The preparation for and the attendance at annual, semiannual, or quarterly meetings such as occur in tactical development and evaluation are particularly amenable to Naval Reserve contributions, since there are a fairly large number of reservists employed in civilian life in weapons test and evaluation. Another area that comes to mind is the preparation of recurring reports. In addition, we might look to temporary staffing deficits caused by sending people to short-term service schools and to the fact that leave requests are more numerous at certain times than at others. Planning for uncovered relief situations might be considered as well.
It is useful to realize that the peak load concept applies to enlisted personnel as well as officers. Suppose, on an experimental basis, that next year roughly 200 enlisted personnel, who had put in their papers for release from active duty and were headed for college, were specially recruited to replace active duty individuals who were away from their regular duty stations to attend schools for extended periods. Of course, before becoming reservists, they would have to be recommended for such a program by their active duty stations. The idea would be to return them to their ships or stations, on schedule, the next summer. Essentially, contracts would be written with the individuals—summer job offers they could rely on. There would be no drills involved during the
U. S. NAVY (JERRY BABB)
J fbf j
year, because not enough time would have elapse" ^ | obsolescence to set in. Not having to go to could be very desirable to many. They would & another night or weekend free for academics or ot aspects of college life for which they would undo" edly be making some financial sacrifice. Fin3 from a straight financial standpoint, it would Pt0^, bly be more rewarding than any other summer e ployment they might obtain.
Specialist in a Blue Suit: Contributory support P j vides an opportunity for the Navy to “hire’ . Reservists on the basis of specialized civilian sk< Examples are computer systems analysts, engine ^ educational specialists, and personnel managers- ^ many cases, from a pure cost standpoint, blue compensation is often less than the rate for the 5 jj ice in the marketplace where the regular Navy W°U otherwise have to purchase it. ^ ;
A number of objections can be raised: unfair c petition, conflict of interest, possible misuse ov propriated funds, and perhaps others. To be 5 ^ these dangers exist. But because they exist does mean they cannot be handled. First, the pt°P j should be specifically and openly managed. SeC°je,
V
earmarked explicitly for this purpose which
^ a ceiling on the amount of such support provided.
e conflict-of-interest issue is more difficult. The c°ntrol of conflict of interest would rely mainly on judgment. Clearly, occasions for direct conflict s (>uId not be allowed.
Using these specially qualified reservists should ot be done simply for cost-saving considerations, lr> a total force concept. The special reason for
even
usin
tants and advisors, and perhaps as sounding s> to senior naval officers. In effect, they could e as a check on staff. And the effect would be
b,
scry,
b,
8 an ex-blue suiter, rather than a contractor, must be that there is a particular advantage to receiv- and a^V'ce ^rom one wb° has a Navy background hi ^SSentiaI1y directs his main loyalty, while he is in ■. blue suit, to the Navy. He may be a contractor but it is asserted that putting on the blue . t takes the edge off the usual contractor market- that instinct. Note also should be taken of the fact do *n terms an a<dvisory role, even though he has l !\ned military attire, the reservist is not totally beth en t0 r^e active Navy chain of command. Even ^°ugh he will receive a fitness report, it is only one many from numerous commands as far as promo- Qp n ls concerned, and Navy pay is not his sole means .ec°nomic support. The point is, he may be more st ff and °^er counter views where regular Navy is rriernbers know, or at least feel they know, what h°hcy, or often, what the admiral wants. c- C ls important to remember that the reserve spe- lst comes to the problem with a Navy back- o^Un<J. Most readers are familiar with the solutions en.advanced by “outside” experts with no Navy Pra*enCe—3 PrePonderance theory, but little cct,cal experience to temper it. Ironically, the a dities of these blue-suit specialists would not be sj^re bad the individuals stayed 365-day regulars, eCe fbeir skills are based mainly on their civilian Hecertise‘ Note also that drills for training are not Ual,eSSary t0 iust*fy either the concept or the individ- pS refention in the Naval Reserve. requently, very talented persons in the naval war. and management areas join the reserve. Often jntlr c‘vilian positions are well above their positions ^ [ e Navy hierarchy. Nevertheless, it is possible to
^ thp^P r\flpcnnc ntrotloklp in fKpir Klllf* ClllfC ilC
>sulta
loard:
thtttr ^ drawing from the reserve talent pool rather Q^an recruiting by chance encounter or otherwise— tie^ ^ased °n the “old boy network” or “school ^as is now the case.
c Present there is no inventory of reservist skills Stained for the specialist purpose. Nor is there Q|t explicit allocation of resources to pay for this use talent. Perhaps it should be charged to the active
Navy budget rather than the Naval Reserve budget. This would make sense from a resource allocation standpoint. When it happens now, it is free to the user. Details and organizational forms for this can be worked out later, because it is essentially a matter of shifting budgets and a realignment in terms of who is charged with their justification.
Paying for Work: Use of the plan suggested here would inevitably involve a competition for budgetary resources, both within the Naval Reserve and between regulars and reservists. Unless value is truly given, the Naval Reserve clearly will not fare well. Some may question whether the comparison between reservist and regular can or will be fairly made, and this concern should not be dismissed lightly. Nevertheless, it is a matter beyond the scope of this article, which attempts only to develop and argue the rationale for a second, or dual, reserve perspective.
Paying for the work—not the training—is a “new” premise. Today’s management systems are set up to reward the achievement of the training objective and to penalize and make difficult any straying from this path. Significant actions will be necessary to organize and manage the thrust advanced here.
Summary: There are now many examples of reservists already effectively doing what is advocated here—stretching peacetime resources. The idea is to do it explicitly. Contributory support has been advanced in the past, but it has not been sold. Selling means clearly defining what the product is and what it is not. It means justifying it on its own merits and not as an adjunct which is virtually subservient to mobilization training. If sold in concept, the question then becomes “How much?” In this regard, having a second rationale should set up forces which produce not only better resources allocation within the Naval Reserve, but indeed between the active and reserve components of the Navy’s total force.
Captain Abert recently conpleted a tour as commanding officer of CinCLantFlr detachment 206, Washington, D.C., a reserve unit which supports various staff elements of the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet. In civilian life he is vice president for research and development of the National Center for Resource Recovery. He is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Evaluation at HEW. His active naval career (1954-1960) included service in the USS Midway (CVA-41), USS Boston (CAG-1), USS Hugh Purvis (DD-709), USS Sabah (SS-302), and the NROTC unit at, the University of North Carolina. He holds a Ph.D. in economics (1966) from Duke University and a B.S. in mechanical engineering (1954) from the University of South Carolina.