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Convenience is in the eye of the beholder, so that operation of a merchant ship under the Liberian flag may be convenient for the shipowner but decidedly inconvenient for the government and people of the United States. It lSn ’t convenient for this country to have ships unlikely to respond in wartime; ships that are safety and pollution hazards; or ships that damage our balance of payments in foreign trade.
Tn the June 1980 issue of the Proceedings, Captain AAlbert Church, Jr., discussed the flag-of-conve- n,ence controversy, defending the existence of run- ^ay fleets. Our article argues that reliance on flag- 'Convenience shipping has serious economic, mil- ,ary, and environmental disadvantages for the Un'ted States.
tli nama, Liberia, and Honduras (PanLibHon) are •j,® niost prominent flag-of-convenience countries. ,tle term “runaways” is probably a more accurate ^criptjon of the U. S.-owned ships which have au,en transferrcd to convenience flags in order to run ay from U. S.-flag operating costs, employment quirements, and safety standards—while still car- t^ln8 U. S. trade. Defenders of the practice prefer p e terrn “flags of necessity,” contending that ship- rs need to operate under foreign flags for eco- atic reasons. The Greek fleet, while not regarded of mhari,y as a flag-of-convenience fleet, has some the attributes of such registry. Its enormous g0*th in recent years has resulted from a shift in ruernrnent policy to encourage the registration of 0t,away ships under the Greek flag. Cyprus is an- jn fler nation which has experienced a large increase peet size because of convenience registry.
Pin >°kr °Ut ^ve tons °f flag-of-convenience ship- Qj.t’ nave beneficial ownership in the United States, of r Ce’ Hong Kong, Japan, or the Federal Republic ermany. In the case of the United States, the
beneficially owned U. S. tonnage exceeds that registered under the American flag. As runaway shipping has increased in scope, U. S.-flag carriage of this nation’s maritime trade has decreased. In 1950, we carried 42.3% of our total oceanborne trade; this amount slipped to 11% in 1960, 5.6% in 1970, and to roughly 4% for 1979. The loss has occurred in conjunction with a greater than sixfold increase in the total tonnage of U. S. maritime trade since 1950. In 1979, Panamanian and Liberian vessels together carried 37.2% of all U. S. foreign commerce, more than nine times the total carried in our own ships.
Operators of flag-of-convenience fleets claim that the foreign-flag arrangement serves the best interest of American consumers, because reduced transportation costs are reflected in lower prices of products. This argument, though, does not consider the adverse effect of runaway shipping on our balance of payments. We suffered a deficit of $2-2.5 billion in 1979 because of Panamanian and Liberian-flag ship carriage of U. S. trade. The money which might be going to U. S. companies and crews is winding up in foreign pockets instead.
In an effort to justify the existence of its flag-of- convenience fleets, Exxon has published a background paper titled “Tankers and the Flags They Fly.” Among the economic advantages from runaway flags are lower wage and freight costs on nonAmerican ships than on U. S.-flag vessels. In addition, Exxon states its preference for foreign-built ships on the grounds that lower wages and automation in overseas shipyards make construction more economical. Presented with Exxon’s economic analysis, one finds clearly that the corporation’s desire for profits outweighs most other considerations. In addition, Exxon gains advantages in the form of independence from governmental and union interference.
Aside from economic advantages for itself, Exxon also cites “flexibility in transportation arrangements” as a reason for using convenience shipping. This supposedly means that Exxon’s ships can keep the supply of oil flowing despite boycotts, wars, and other international crises. While it is true that a boy-
strated that U. S. foreign policy can be serious^ affected by a reliance on flag-of-convenience co
cott of U. S.-fiag ships could be circumvented by Exxon’s use of foreign flags, it is also true that the Arab oil embargo during the 1973 Middle East War succeeded in placing severe strains on the American economy and on American national security. For example, the oil companies were forced to cut off deliveries to the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. We were still on friendly terms with Iran then, a situation which has obviously changed since. If there is a next time, we would probably have even fewer alternatives than before. Thus, corporate policy could have disastrous effects on American security, particularly in the event of a Soviet-Ameri- can naval clash. Considering their reliance on the protection of the U. S. Navy, the oil companies should be prepared to sacrifice some financial gains for the sake of national security.
Defenders of flag-of-convenience shipping point out that the United States retains “effective control” over the PanLibHon fleets. Theoretically, the idea is that this country can call upon these ships for wartime purposes. However, the development of the runaway flag fleets has seriously damaged the U. S. merchant marine’s ability to serve as the fourth arm of defense. Despite the fact that American corporations own these vessels, developments in any of the politically hostile or unstable flag-of- convenience countries can jeopardize whatever control U. S. Government foreign policy directives may have had in the past over their regimes’ foreign and maritime policies. In addition, various incidents at sea, ranging from the rebellions of foreign crews during supply runs to Vietnam to the capture of U. S.-owned Panamanian-flag ships by Cuba, have demonstrated the unreliability of foreign-flag ships. Finally, it is not clear what action the United States would or should take in the event that one or more of the foreign governments involved seized and/or nationalized several U. S.-owned ships at the same time.
The AFL-CIO Maritime Committee has suggested that believing U. S.-owned ships would necessarily be available to this nation in an emergency is analogous to the notion that American-controlled oilfields and other strategic assets overseas would also be available. Considering our dependence on imported oil and our undermanned Navy, it is highly doubtful that the United States has the naval capabilities to defend flag-of-convenience tankers. It is also dubious that the corporate owners and flag- of-convenience countries would comply with our foreign policy demands quickly enough to avert military catastrophe.
Owners of runaway ships, especially those under Panamanian and Liberian registry, have operated under conditions established by governments with serious political differences with the United States. Ever since the anti-American riots in Panama in 1965, the U. S. and Panamanian governments have developed serious differences over political relations with Communist and pro-Communist regimes, particularly Cuba and Nicaragua in recent years. For example, Panama supported the rise of the antiAmerican Sandinista revolutionaries despite the passage of the Panama Canal Treaty’s generous provisions in the U. S. Senate. Even before the current revolutionary trend appeared in Central America, Panama issued a decree in 1968 which allowed ships under its registry to contradict U. S. policy and sail to Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and China. This move shattered the argument of the Defense Department and the foreign-flag shippers that all vessels in the “effective control” fleets would be subject to the same rules as U. S.-flag ships.
During the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense was unable to obtain sufficient U. S.-flag shipping to meet its cargo lift requirements. As a result. DoD went beyond the already dangerous practice of relying on American-owned foreign-flag ships and used foreign-owned vessels with unreliable crews. At the peak of American involvement in the war, 1965-1968, there were at least 12 recorded instances of refusals of foreign crews to sail American cargo to Vietnam. In addition, protests by the All' Japan Seamen’s Union forced Japanese shippers to suspend shipments to Vietnam in 1965 and again in 1968. As a result of U. S. Government policy, which was in violation of the intent of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the fate of military cargo was decided by the whims of foreign crews and shippers, and by too lenient an American maritime policy.
As the American role in Vietnam diminished, there were new threats to U. S. security in Latin America and Africa. In December 1971, for exam' pie, the Cuban Navy seized the Lylia Express an the Johnny Express in international waters. Bot ships were U. S.-owned but were registered by fbe Bahama Line in Panama. Despite the capture of 3 U. S. citizen and the shelling and ramming of ships, there was no military response by the Unite States. Considering the growing ties between Cub* and Panama since that incident, there should be se rious concern that the so-called effective contm fleets have become less reliable than previously-
Beyond the question of Cuban influence in Centm America and political instability in Panama is th problem of U. S.-owned Liberian shipping. Durmr the Middle East crisis of 1973-1974, the late PreSlg dent William Tolbert issued a proclamation bannms all Liberian registered ships from carrying mu tions to the Middle East. The Liberian Governing clearly wished to prevent the shipment of arms Israel on Liberian-registered, U. S.-owned ship ' The fact that Liberia took this position demo
j'les- In short, the existence of Liberian control over ® actions of its flag fleet increases the power of an otherwise insignificant international actor, while si- altaneously reducing the range of policy choices vailable to the United States, y n the wake of the coup last year in Liberia, the i- n,ted States should be even more wary about re- 'ar>ce on that country than in 1973. Although the aritime policy of Tolbert’s regime survived the i^ssful coup, there is no guarantee that the next ernational crisis will not create an even more re- i rictive policy regarding U. S. use of Liberian-reg- doered ships. The answer to this lack of security , es not lie with a substitute registry but in the velopment of a strong U. S. maritime policy, a lch must include public investments to modernize ^rican shipyards and federal purchases of mer- aant vessels, in order to guarantee the construction bud USe American-flag ships. Since the current and8et'cutting mood of the Reagan administration p !^e Congress would militate against the ex- aitedltures involved in these two general proposals, taxr.native plans would include specially targeted 0plncentives to encourage the construction and andrat'0n of U. S.-flag ships, as well as the building fu Purchasing of vessels by maritime union pension tj0s' tThe Marine Engineers Beneficial Associa- q’ AFL-CIO, did the latter in 1980.)
°p incentive for this country to end its reliance iHa . e effective control concept is the dangerous egi'me Policy of the Soviet Union. Soviet strat- atid S| ^ave made maritime expansion a top priority Up] ? ace no faith in theories of “effective control.” viet C FI. S. Department of Defense, the Solicit Unc*erstand that they need maritime self-suf- t\yenc^ 'n lime of war. The crucial differences ben the Western alliance and the Communist bloc
in a maritime emergency of short duration are these:
► There would be no time for the so-called effective control fleets to join the U. S. defense effort.
► The geographical distance between the United States and most of the NATO countries would impede efforts to coordinate their maritime resources.
► Ships allegedly under effective control might be captured by Warsaw Pact forces.
In order to prevent the disastrous consequences that would follow a Soviet-NATO naval confrontation, given our current maritime weakness, the United States must take the lead in developing a merchant navy for the West within the unified NATO command structure.
Some experts argue that a strong U. S.-flag fleet is unnecessary for strategic reasons in a nuclear age, and that, therefore, the questions of runaways and national security are unrelated. This argument is dangerous, not only because it assumes that nuclear war is the only possible kind of war, but also because it makes nuclear war more probable by taking away conventional naval alternatives.
In addition to the national security issues involved in the flag-of-convenience dispute, there is the question of maritime safety. Runaway owners commonly argue that their foreign-registered ships are as safe
erational overview for each U. S.-flag ship fr0tri j, first day of construction until the vessel is scrappy The program, carried out by the U. S. Coast Gua j is based in part on safety of life at sea (SOL . international standards, but it goes far be>
as U. S.-flag vessels. This is not the case if one analyzes the relative safety performance and the governmental regulation in regard to convenience fleets. Figures supplied by Lloyds Register statistical tables for the years 1975 to 1979 are particularly revealing. In total numbers of ships, flag-of-conve- nience registries plus Greece accounted for 15.7% of the world’s fleets but 36.4% of total ship losses. In terms of gross tonnage, flags of convenience plus Greece represented 34.6% of the world’s fleets and a staggering 70.2% of world shipping losses. During that same period, the world average, in terms of total numbers of ships lost per year was 0.579%. U. S.-flag ships were safer than average at 0.391% while flags of convenience plus Greece had a much higher loss rate than average at 1.340%. Percentages for individual nations were Cyprus, 2.750%; Liberia, 0.542%; Panama, 1.816%;andGreece, 1.333%.
The accident and loss rates of the flag-of-conve- nience vessels strike home when we evaluate just how active these ships are in American waters. Taken collectively, Liberian, Panamanian, and Greek tankers carried 64% of our petroleum crude tonnage and 61% of our petroleum product tonnage in 1979. The United States, with its better safety record, carried only 3% of our petroleum crude and 5% of our petroleum products in 1979. By increasing American petroleum carriage, we would be taking considerably less risk with our marine environmen ■ Given the fact that depth limitations in U. S. p°rts prevent the entrance of new very large and ultra large tankers of the PanLibHon fleets, our discus sion of these vessels is primarily limited to m smaller tankers, up to approximately 100,000 ton deadweight. Most tanker construction over the PaS decade has been in VLCCs and ULCCs. . s Not surprisingly, most flag-of-convenience snip serving U. S. ports are at least 10 years old. Und ^ 100.000 tons, the average age of Panamanian a|^ Liberian tankers is approximately 10.6 years wn the average age of Greek tankers is 15.5 years. ™ is important, because it makes a difference in tan propensity to accidents and deficiencies. Accord' to Exxon, tankers that were no more than five yea( old accounted for 25.4% of the examinations only 9.1% of the deficiencies. Tankers that were least 11 years old made up 55.1% of the exam' tions and a striking 73.6% of the deficiencies.
The role of the government is a fundamental e ment in the vessel safety record of a country- f U. S. Government’s involvement assures ow compliance of U. S.-flag vessels with this naIl^e safety standards; Panama and Liberia cannot m | the same claim of a responsible governmentalve safety program. U. S. laws mandate a contm program of inspection, casualty analysis, and
make F'ag-of. ?hecks at
^°ast Guard personnel are present in U. S. shipyards to ensure that safe vessels are built. After a ^ssel is finished, she is inspected every two years dur>ng her time in service. In addition, personnel Gaining for the U. S.-flag fleet is accomplished at a w»de variety of training facilities; the Coast Guard Sets the experience and examination standards a8ainst which the training is measured. Because °n'y U. S. licensed or documented personnel may lad on board U. S.-flag vessels, the control by the °ast Guard is complete.
These regulations are not paper tigers. If the °Wner is negligent and does not have the ship injected by the established two-year period, the ship s then held to be not in compliance and is almost ways uninsurable. Not only does the Coast Guard nsure vessel safety, but the maritime unions also ct to correct safety problems that arise. If a U. S. jaman observes a safety problem, he can rely on js union or the Coast Guard to respond to his com- naint. “Liberian” and "Panamanian” seamen can- the same claim.
■convenience shipowners have few of the id balances that ensure safe vessels. If ' er'a or Panama were to implement more rigorous teetV standards, shipowners would simply reregis- mr Ur*der another runaway flag. Consequently, no a ter how much these countries attempt to imf jVe their safety records, the result will always fall ^ short of U. S. standards. Panama has the rudi- ^ nts of a governmental safety program. A ship ters{ Pass an inspection in accordance with the in- istnat'°nal SOLAS requirements in order to be reg- 8anfed Under the Panamanian flag. Panama also be- aud h Worldwide vessel inspection program in 1976 Cjail us made some progress in ship safety, espe- V in licensing and inspection, am °Wever, glaring deficiencies do exist in the Panhay n*-an safety program. The government does not cl e.its own inspection program and must rely on ShiSSl^cati°n societies such as Lloyd's Register of PP,ng and the American Bureau of Shipping.
Unfortunately, the classification societies can inspect a vessel only upon the owner’s request. Consequently, the owner can avoid the biennial inspections that are required of U. S.-flag ships.
Panama still accepts licenses from seamen of any country party to agreements of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). This has resulted in some incompetent crews since the requirements for a seaman’s license vary widely from country to country. According to the Maritime Administration publication “Maritime Subsidies,” Panama has a provision that at least 10% of the crew should be of Panamanian nationality if native Panamanians are available at the port at which the crew signs on. Consequently, if the crew signs on in a port with few available, the ship need not have the requisite percentage of Panamanians. Rules such as this support our contention that Panamanian regulations are ineffective.
We have further reason to question the future of the Panamanian program on safety. According to an article in the Journal of Commerce, the situation is such that, “In the wake of Liberia’s political upheaval, Panama has embarked on a campaign to regain some of its lost flag business.” This development casts some doubt on just how strict the Panamanian Government will be on safety standards.
Liberia has more complete maritime regulations applicable to its fleet than does Panama. Safety standards are limited in scope and, in general, are those specified in SOLAS and the Load Line Convention. In order to be registered under the Liberian flag, a vessel must be built in accordance with the construction standards of one of the five major classification societies and must be maintained in its class as acceptable evidence of seaworthiness.
Unlike the United States, there is much conflicting information about the extent of the Liberian Government’s direct involvement with its flag fleet. Liberia has contracted with the National Cargo Bureau, a private nonprofit U. S. organization based in New York, to be the Liberian inspection service in the United States. The service which the National Cargo Bureau performs on a not-to-interfere basis with its primary cargo inspection duties, is condition reporting only. The inspection checks license information and other safety features. Judgment is not passed on upkeep, maintenance, or the competency of the crew. The National Cargo Bureau does not maintain the thorough record of specific inspections that the U. S. Government does. The Liberian marine safety system cannot detect vessels in poor material condition, as in the case of the Argo Merchant.
The Argo Merchant was a Liberian-flag tanker that broke up off the coast of Massachusetts in 1976 and spilled all of her petroleum cargo into the Atlantic Ocean. A description of the shipwreck would best serve to emphasize the point that the Liberian
When the Argo Merchant ran aground near Nantucket Island in December 1976, she created a major oil spill. The ship herself was in dubious condition, and her officers followed faulty navigation practices as they neared U. S. waters.
government in its strange position allows unseaworthy ships to sail. In the final report of the Liberian Marine Board on the stranding of the Argo Merchant is a section on the testimony of Commander Dominic Calicchio, then executive officer of the Coast Guard marine safety office in Boston: “He [Calicchio] placed her in the 'lower half of the scale’ of the large number of vessels he had inspected. He described the crew quarters as unsanitary and ‘horrible’ due to lack of maintenance. He also noted rust accumulations on deck and that ladders were deteriorated because of rust. Heating coils for two tanks had been leaking and cargo was being heated by temporary coils from the top. There was accumulated rust on the tank top domes. There were no glands to seal the shaft of the cargo pumps where it passed through the bulkhead between the pump room and the engine room. When he attempted to dog shut the vessel's portholes, he found that 80% of the dogs were rustbound, that some dogs had been painted in an open position and that some portholes had missing gaskets. He also noted that at the time of stranding certain cargo valves on deck and in the pump room were frozen and rusted.”
In addition, the Argo Merchant was six months beyond the due date for her “annual” inspection. The testimony uncovered the fact that the gyro compass broke down about 100 miles off Nantucket and the magnetic compass was used from then on. The master of the ship was relying on charts that were six years old. With no effective regulations, the owners have a free rein to sail ships like the Argo Merchant.
Even more important than the poor physical condition was the lack of a competent crew. The chief officer made a mathematical error of 31 minutes that resulted in the ship losing her bearings. The master and officers then ignored warnings that the ship was entering shallow water. There was no explanation for the alleged simultaneous failure of the radar and radio direction finder in locating the Nantucket Light House after both instruments had been operating properly during the voyage. There was no lookout on the bow during part of the time of entry into U. S. waters.
Little wonder that the master and the chief officer were less than completely truthful in testimony at the hearing on the accident. The second officer, who
U. S. COAST
was young and inexperienced, was lambasted at the hearings. The report published by the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs concludes of his performance, “His data was wrong; his judgment was baCl and his assurance unjustified.” ,
Defenders of the flags of convenience conten that the Argo Merchant was a fluke. They do no answer how a broken-down ship like this coul “slip” into the Liberian-flag fleet. They do not answer how this calls into question any control th Liberian Government pretends to have over the L‘ berian-flag vessels.
The July 1980 mishap of the Liberian-flag tanker Energy Concentration near Rotterdam is still mo damaging to the claim of safe runaway ships. A cording to the Dutch commercial journal Handel hlad, the Energy Concentration started her voyaj? from the Persian Gulf, unloaded petroleum at ’ port of Le Havre, and then continued on to R°tte dam where the ship broke up. In Le Havre. 1 petroleum was pumped off the ship improperly. 1 credibly, nobody on board knew how to operas machine which measures tension of the oil flovV . it is pumped to the shore. Consequently, the capta simply allowed the oil to be pumped ashore at u equal tension. There was another mistake ma ^ The captain ordered the first navigation office[., £ pump oil into the empty tanks on board ship- > navigation officer did not carry out this order, 3 the captain did not check for compliance. v
According to the Handelsblad newspaper. e. perts thought it incomprehensible that the had not broken up before arriving at Rotterda According to the Dutch Deputy Director of the B terdam Port Authority, Mr. Van Krimpan, this cident presented a clear example of what can haPP with an inexperienced crew. He called the inc . petent manner in which the petroleum was unloa “a typical beginner’s mistake.” Since this incid ^ Rotterdam inspectors have been instructed to cn flag-of-convenience ships much more carefully•
84
Proceedings
/ Octot*r
In summary, a comparison of the marine sa schemes of the United States, Liberia, and points out the overwhelming deficiencies ot
tio'ta* nat'onal interest rather than merely as a func- fa °f private business. The transfer should also erC| 'tate coordinated transportation policies in en- 8y and national defense.
in- aird, although the present mood in Congress is ^avical to new spending programs, sooner or later United States must make large capital invest- ifents in coal mines, coal railroads, and coal ports °Ur dependence on foreign oil and our trade im
safety programs of the flag-of-convenience counties. Accountable ownership, competent crews, and direct government involvement are necessary to provide positive results. In the case of the runaways, there will be little meaningful change in the Poor governmental control, the concurrent irresponsible ownership, and the incompetent crews. Surely, these flag-of-convenience countries cannot °e expected to bite the hand that feeds them.
Conclusion: If the United States is serious about rebuilding its maritime economy, protecting its environment, and preserving its freedom, it must take some necessary steps.
First, it is vital to recognize the danger and prob- erns of relying on flag-of-convenience shipping.
. Second, it is necessary to make the U. S. shipping 'adustry economically more competitive. The prin- ClPle was established in 1936 that the U. S. Government should restore our companies to the same c°mpetitive level as foreign competitors. This parity concept arose from national security concerns vv'hich, as we have described, are absolutely vital °day. The existing aids are inadequate and need to e improved. The government should take such l^asures as reevaluating and strengthening the ex- lst,ng operating subsidy program, offering shipbuild- ln8 financing at more competitive interest rates, and Anting more favorable tax treatment to the U. S. rtlerchant marine industry.
At the same time, we are realistic enough to rec- °gnize that America’s mixed economy is still pri- Jttariiy capitalist and that such remedies as cargo Preference would be unacceptable in Congress un- er current political conditions. Consequently, pol- ^Vmakers are faced with the problem of bringing merica’s defense needs into balance with eco- °jnic considerations. As a practical matter, this *11 be difficult to achieve, given the Reagan admin- ration’s policies on corporate freedom and fiscal tj"straint. Nonetheless, Congress can take some of e outlined actions which would benefit both the c°nomic and security needs of this country and l^ace such narrow concerns as oil company profits ^ a Position subordinate to higher values. Fortu- ■ e*y, Congress has already taken a positive step ^ ransferring the Maritime Administration from the •j,ePartment of Commerce to the Department of ^rausportation. The move, which took effect on 6 av.\U?t’ indicates that shipping should be treated as balances are ever to be reduced. Frightened by the amount of American and other Western capital involved in present and potential Soviet energy and industrial projects, several members of Congress have introduced legislation this year favoring coal ports and other new transportation developments. If Congress passes legislation giving federal support to coal ports, we would favor supplementary statutes requiring coal held at federally developed ports to be carried in U. S.-flag ships in both coastwise and international trade. As an immediate step to be taken before the adoption of major legislation on coal shipping, the Jones Act (which requires that internal U. S. trade be conducted in U. S.-flag ships) must be amended so that Virgin Islands trade is considered domestic commerce. Otherwise, the large oil companies, which own the major portion of American coal reserves, would have yet another channel for avoiding the U. S. flag. As it is now, oil companies can carry Alaskan oil on board foreign- flag ships to refineries in the Virgin Islands.
Fourth, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, which clarifies the statutory powers of the Coast Guard to enforce safety regulations in U. S. waters, should be vigorously administered. The Coast Guard should require those doing business in American ports to improve their safety record. American citizens should not have to endure maritime disasters such as the Argo Merchant stranding.
If the people of the United States are unwilling or unable to pay these costs, then they will continue to suffer economic decline, bear with dangerous tanker accidents, and, worst of all, live in increasing fear of Soviet power. We would do well to remember the words of Sir Walter Raleigh: “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.” Even if Americans do not believe this, the Soviets certainly do. While we advocate no return to the days of Western naval imperialism, we see no need to encourage Soviet imperialism through the weakness of our merchant marine.
Mr. Caplan was graduated from Columbia University in 1979 with a B.A. degree in political science. He is now a candidate for a J.D. degree at Boston College Law School. During the summer of 1980, he was an intern with the National Maritime Union of America and the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee.
Mr. Ryan received a B.S. degree in foreign service from Georgetown University in 1980. He is now a candidate in the M.A./Ph.D. program in government at Georgetown and a teaching assistant in the department. He served as an intern with the National Maritime Union of America and the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee in the summer of 1980.