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Stick close to your desks and never go to sea And you all may be Rulers of the Queen’s Navee!
HMS Pinafore
There are many areas of recent excellence in the Naval Reserve. For example, the surface and air programs have been consolidated under a single Chief of Naval Reserve (CNavRes)/Director of Naval Reserve for improved coordination, control of reserve dollars, and continuing representation at the Chief of Naval Operations level. The Naval Reserve has been restructured to align it more closely with the active Navy. Naval Reserve mobilization potential has been greatly improved. A massive shipboard simulator (SBS) program has been launched. Three ship intermediate maintenance activity units have been established. Modem equipment has begun to be horizontally integrated into the reserve. And two ten-month Naval War College billets have been established for inactive duty reservists.
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Despite these improvements, the real combat readiness among reserve officers of the surface line is still lacking. In most institutions—and the Naval Reserve is no exception—such major problems go unsolved, because they are easier to work around than to correct. The Naval Reserve must now heed CNavRes Rear Admiral Robert F. Dunn’s call for “ . . . more innovation and imagination.” Obviously, the combat readiness of the reserve surface line can be improved by increased attention to its education and training and by the correction of those mechanisms which interfere with that education and training.
Five major problems reduce the combat readiness of the reserve surface line: a shortage of junior officers, a low degree of professionalism, a low degree of technical competence, isolation of the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) from
the remainder of the surface reserve, and less-than-opti- mum unity, control, and effort. The first three problems can be reduced by education and training. The last two interfere with training.
Junior Officer Shortage: New officer inputs are meager, and the Vietnam-period reserve officers are moving into the senior ranks. The Naval Reserve has lost the correct mobilization grade mix. There is a serious shortfall of available, trained, drilling reservists in the three junior grades. The Navy and Naval Reserve line rank distribution is shown in Table 1.
Adjusting the reserve promotion flow point to 17 years, instead of the Navy’s 15, for entry into the lieutenant commander selection zone would be helpful. Reserve officers would be lieutenants two years longer and commanders two years less than their active counterparts. No other flow points would need to change. Such an adjustment would contribute to mobilization and drilling needs by reducing both the lieutenant shortage and the commander surplus. Most reservists would be pleased because they could remain in a drill-pay status two years longer. (Currently, reserve commanders who are not assigned to authorized pay billets receive no pay but must continue to drill in order to be eligible for future pay assignments and benefits.)
Pending such an adjustment, only officer education programs can help resolve the shortage. The number of warrants and commissions made available through the Naval Reserve should be temporarily increased to improve the current mobilization mix.
Warrants are difficult for reservists to secure, but they should not be. More than 29% of enlisted reservists have associate degrees or are technical school graduates. A large number of reserve first class and chief petty officers, in the desired ratings and age groups, have the technical education and experience to become warrants. Reserve units could screen warrant candidates. Excellent warrant preparation would be to self-train in the knowledge portions only, at the E-4 level in each rating other than his own within the warrant speciality group. Currently, warrants must pass their own chiefs’ examinations. The re-
Table 1 Navy and Naval Reserve
Line Rank Distribution Naval Rank Navy* Reserve* | Drilling Reserve (1980 Sample) | ||
Rear Admiral | 0.75% | 28 total | 28 total |
Captain | 6 % | 1.5% | 4.8% |
Commander | 12 % | 7 % | 18.5% |
Lieutenant |
|
|
|
Commander | 18 % | 22 % | 44.3% |
Lieutenant | 24.75% | 37 % | 27.2% |
Lieutenant (i.g.)/ |
|
|
|
Ensign | 38.5% | 32.5% | 5.3% |
♦Authorized under Title | 10, U. S. Code. |
|
|
serve would provide better warrants if it also require them to pass the third-class examinations, except performance tests, in the other ratings of their warrant field-
The Naval Reserve should also commission junior of*1" cers from its own membership. E-4 and senior naval reservists holding college degrees in appropriate majors an meeting the required age criteria could become junior on1' cers if their reserve centers were located near Naval Re' serve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) units. Drill*11? Officer Candidate (DOC) units could be established under the joint operation of the NROTC and the reserve Center- Reserve surface warfare officers, supplemented vj NROTC instructors, would operate a modified and acce' erated NROTC educational program. DOCs would spen their next three tours of active duty for training (AcDuTra on midshipman cruises. This program would supplement not replace, Officer Candidate School.
Professionalism: Except for the NRF program, the degree of professionalism among reserve surface officers *s lower than necessary. Far too few reserve officers are surface warfare officers (SWOs).
During the last six selection periods, the number of surface flag eligibles not surface warfare qualified has decreased from 73% to 64%. Similarly, during the same si* selection periods, the number of surface captain eligible not SWOs decreased from 82% to 70.9%. In fiscal yea| 1983, 73.3% of the surface commander eligibles a*1 62.3% of the surface lieutenant commander eligibles were not SWOs.
Fortunately, this HMS Pinafore syndrome, althoug real, is less grim than the statistics reflect. The major reason for the shortage of SWOs among senior reserve sur face line officers is not that so few had duty afloat but. rather, that the designator did not exist during their active duty service. However, reserve unrestricted line off*cerS (1105s) with the most successful and adequate duty afl°at could have been “grandfathered” to reserve surface warfare officers (1115s). There is need for additional professional experience afloat for those who did not qualify'
A major educational step toward increased professionalism was the 1982 reinstatement of the Reserve OfficefS Naval Operations Course conducted by the Naval ^af College.
Another reason for the shortage of SWOs in the Nava Reserve is the lack of an officer detailing system. Too fevV reserve surface officers steam in NRF ships. Too many choose their career-long unit affiliations based upon l°ca billet availability, friendships, and personal convenience- Local cliques sometimes influence officer assignment^ The Navy’s need for planned careers providing graduate readiness training has been largely ignored. Officers **j seagoing designators, living within 100 miles of » ships, are not rotated through those ships and shore un*ts to obtain the most appropriate readiness training for tf*e largest number and to keep the NRF ships fully manned- Increased readiness demands the establishment of reserve career patterns and detail desks. Mobilization potential maximum training benefits to reserve surface officers, and individual merit—not local politics and provincialism-"
II1Ust be the m'fwia • • .. rr.
cers cntena governing assignment of reserve offi-
Nat' Career'enhancing billets.
^etaili°nW'^e Personnel detailing would not be effective. D’ander^ p1USt become a function of the readiness com- c°niDoS’ resently, the reserve surface is divided into two billet nCvS.’ eacb isolated from the other. Ashore-afloat the rem°‘ ^ cannot become a reality until the NRF and cornel air|der of the surface reserve come under the same
Resat regional level.
by 'erve SUrface officer detailing should be reinforced $\VQsn.erat*n8 positive Naval Reserve preference for Units h° command major and afloat staff units, NRF VvarfarS 1P.au8mentati°n units, mobile inshore undersea ifainin6 Un?ts’ naval control of shipping units,, and fleet is too f Units- Perhaps this preference exists today, but it general rCi?Uen^y wa'vc<P Readiness command inspectors tended fS ?U^ a*so be 1115 officers. Tours should be ex- essarv t° taree years or billets dropped one grade, if nec- °fficer ° SCCUre ^WOs. The reserve should restrict 1105 This act't0 cornmand of other sustaining units only, feserve 100 Wou^ increase professionalism by requiring Passed SUr^ace officers to earn 1115 designators or be of iack°Ver *or selection to the next higher grade because Serve Si°f command experience. A policy motivating re- shiDo „ r'ace line officers to compete for tours in NRF
P* cannot be all bad.
Reserveefvenam DouSlas R- Burnett suggested in “Naval the juj | Beer Leadership: An Institutional Failure” in °f dripy 981 Proceedings, the professional competence ThCy 'ng reserve line officers should be tested annually.
Pr°Priat °U ^ teste<f on SUfface warfare knowledge ap- edgc ,,e to §rade and on gaining command billet knowl- a reseecause inactive reserve management is also part of also h Ve officer’s professional competence, they should tested in this area.
Tests should be graded on a fixed scale or a bell curve, whichever results in a higher score. The three tests should be weighted as follows: for lieutenants and below—40%, 40%, 20%; for lieutenant commanders—37.5%, 37.5%’ 25%; and for commanders and captains—35%, 35%’ 30%. If an officer’s weighted total is failing on two successive years, he should be removed from drill-pay status until he achieves a passing weighted total. The surface warfare knowledge test should be prepared, jointly, by the SWO school in Newport, Rhode Island, and the Naval Operations Department of the Naval War College. The Naval Reserve management test should be prepared by CNavRes. Both tests should be administered by the Naval Examining Center. The mobilization readiness test should be prepared and administered by the “gaining command” during annual unit AcDuTra. All tests should be updated annually, and all test results should be published to reporting seniors. Such a testing program would be expensive, but two significant improvements would result: reserve surface officers would increase their own levels of professionalism in order to retain drill-pay billets; and Naval Reserve administrators would be graphically alerted to deficiencies in the education and training of the reserve surface line, and they would be motivated to correct them.
Technical Competence: Time and rapidly expanding technology cause the third major problem reducing combat readiness of the reserve surface line: officer “skill
m ight
selves, would be free for training. Senior officers
unfe'
time
free
fade” in technical, tactical, and operational areas. Because there will be no time for training after mobilization, the maintenance of technical competence must be a vital objective of the Naval Reserve.
But the Naval Reserve is not meeting this objective for surface officers. Highly mobilizable, young surface officers ashore spend more time in administrative duties than in enhancing their mobilization skills. A reserve surface warfare school should be established at each reserve center as a branch of the nearest Navy SWO school. The local school would be staffed by senior reserve surface warfare officers and, until the reserve was able to qualify additional SWOs, by regular and reserve SWOs who had been retired for less than five years. Perhaps an amendment to the retirement law could allow strictly limited retired pay raises for such vital contributions by retirees. The school would drill one weekend a month. The curriculum would be jointly prepared by the SWO school in Newport and the Naval Operations Department of the Naval War College. Instructors would prepare one day and teach the next. Operational and surface warfare training would be provided to ship augmentation officers, and consolidate training would be provided to enlisted reservists. MaXI mum use would be made of training vans and, where m stalled, of the SBS. The ship augmentation units won drill on the same weekend as the school, and their person nel would drill one day in school and one day as a un ^ Training would be improved because it would be c° ducted by personnel with no other responsibilities. w enlisted personnel in school one day, unit officers, then* spend one-fourth of their time attending the school. Pe^ haps working on the Naval War College Employment1 Naval Weapons Course to prepare themselves for mom zation to staff billets. They, particularly the reserve
stricted line officers, would spend their remaining doing local management and administrative work to ship augmentation officers for operational training- Amazingly, in this period of technological evolutm^ we have no program to keep regular and reserve SWOs
those
driHs’
gested amendment to the retirement law would permit use. We must realize that, under full mobilization personnel might be called too.
Not only is there little time for officer training at but there is too meager correspondence course partictP tion by officers, as well. Correspondence course comp tion should be encouraged by allowing retirement P01 for certain vital courses to fall outside the 60-point l*1111 tion, as does AcDuTra. This should be permitted. h° ever, only for lieutenant commanders and below.
1‘MP
gaining command’s commitment to the reserve.
the lack of attention from the
Uctiv,
sUrf naval amphibious, cruiser-destroyer, service, and thand^ ^rouPs' Continuity has suffered with group comity ,ers changing at least twice a year. Active group com- h0mCrs deploy one-third of the time. When they are at dgp,6’ they are too pressed with preparations for the next -Uyment to fight for their NRF squadrons.
ree SUr^ace reserve waits a long time to receive training Plead^016111^ ^r°m 8a'n'n§ command. Reserve units The pnT ^*S material> wdh varying degrees of success. f°r (, av^es fleet liaison representatives need to press tjVeese requirements frftm the top. Perhaps, administra- °f those gaining commands should note
ers in af‘.on °f ^lc NRF: Directly under the fleet command- ation i' !?^’ TiRF program has been blessed with oper- NRpa.’h- 0ne navy” benefits. However, the heavy use of detraS ]PS to meet fleet commitments has sometimes reset-0' . *rom primary mission of training selected in t,i Vljlts- The control exercised by the fleet commanders activ'e C0U^ ke improved at the fleet staff level and at the atjvg6 aaval group level. CNavRes fleet liaison representing S ave ^en employed mainly in NRF ship schedul- The'vh °at matters’ and AcDuTra arrangements.
s0rs j ave functioned less as expert Naval Reserve advi- gro0 dle fleet commanders in chief and to the latter’s have^. Cornmanders—none of whom could be expected to Bea detailed knowledge of Naval Reserve management, staff tun t*le ^eet liaison representatives do not completely the r ■ management for the fleet commander in chief, hac /aiSon between the gaining command and CNavRes 38 been less than optimum. s° damaging has been th
home eplo _
rese 6 ^ ^ h’ is isolated from the remainder of the surface ageVe and outside the mainstream of Naval Reserve mantle shCnt ^hde billet mobility exists between the NRF and of r °re'based programs. As a result, the largest number tional°rVe surf‘lce officers cannot enjoy optimum opera- °f j Gaining and sea-shore reserve tours through billets detaj?reas'n§ responsibility. Sea-shore billet mobility and cannot become a reality until the NRF and the tr0i . der °f ihe surface reserve come under the same con- ca the regional level.
Thevr readiness commanders should wear two hats. (flotilM°Uld Serve as uondeploying NRF surface group a (ra- . commanders. A surface reserve flag officer with Surfacln^ 3nd ^ministration of the Naval Reserve (TAR) WarfaC Warfare (1117) captain or an active duty surface the re.C 110) captain as a deputy would command both Ctsjave.§u,n and the NRF. He would be controlled by turnes and the fleet commander in chief. He would, in mandC°ntr°l the assigned NRF squadron(s). Area com- W°uiderf WouId reduce his span of control ashore. They c0rtltTie assigned only in regions where the readiness ArCaander was also an NRF surface group commander, head C°mmanders would be 1117, 1110, or 1115 captains ti°nal artCred at ccntra* ^BS drill sites. This organiza- Pr°vi .Scbeme would permit optimum personnel detailing, tnand C, §reater continuity than deploying group comers do, and permit the CNavRes fleet liaison representative to function as an expert Naval Reserve advisor to the fleet commander in chief, as well as afford him time to actively staff NRF management policies for the fleet. Operational control over the NRF ships would remain with the fleet commanders in chief, as CNavRes favors.
Unity and Control: Policies and laws need to be amended from time to time. For example, currently, drill pay is linked to a mobilization billet. This is the reasoning of accountants, not managers. A more valid policy might be to link drill pay with mobilization readiness. This policy recognizes that some overhead is necessary for an institution to excel in its work. It permits the surface reserve to employ senior reserve surface warfare officers, with no mobilization potential, as local supervisory commanders.
Each readiness commander controls 34 diverse “surface programs.” The average readiness commander controls 163 units in 15 reserve centers. Five readiness commanders each control an average of 199 units. A typical readiness commander may be the reporting senior for 189 officers. Five readiness commanders each report on 200 or more officers. The readiness commanders cannot possibly carefully evaluate each of their officers and write a valid fitness report for them. In contrast, naval air reserve units and the reserve naval construction force control no more than 32 units and report on no more than 50 officers.
Local supervisory commands are nonexistent in the surface reserve ashore, contributing to the excessively broad span of control for each readiness commander and the less-than-optimum unity and control at the local drill sites.
There are too many small units, at each reserve center, to permit efficient support. The average center supports eight units, and the largest may support 28. The average unit has 28 members, including three officers. Obviously, there are too few officers in each unit to effectively meet current Naval Reserve administrative requirements and to engage themselves in meaningful surface warfare training.
At each reserve center many inexperienced junior officers are thrust into reserve unit command without apprenticeship under a senior reserve commanding officer and without the guidance of a local supervisory command. The planning board for training, chaired by the reserve center commanding officer, is an awkward substitute for a local coordinating command. The reserve center commanding officer cannot adequately fill the local supervisory command void because Naval Reserve tradition keeps him outside the reserve chain of command and because he may not be the most effective choice. A shortage of TAR officers has caused gaps in 6% of the reserve centers, which must be filled by absentee commanding officers. Twenty- one percent of the reserve centers are commanded by lieutenants, encouraging the poor practice of juniors reporting on seniors. Finally, although we want to increase the professionalism and training of the reserve surface line, 45% of the reserve center commanding officers, themselves, are not SWOs. Perhaps, the situation has improved since these 1981 statistics. Certainly, everyone hopes it has.
Establishing drill site commanders would provide local unity and effort and reduce the readiness commander’s span of control. A reserve surface warfare captain or corn-
Captain Brown received his bachelor of architecture degree Iron1
mander should serve as the drill site commander at each reserve center. The chain of command would move from the readiness commander, to the area commander (at the central drill site and if assigned), and, in dual and parallel lines, to the drill site commander and the reserve center commanding officer. The drill site commander would have a small staff and would be the reporting senior for the local unit commanding officers. He would operate the local surface warfare school, chair the planning board for training, and coordinate local consolidated training.
Enough well-qualified reserve surface warfare senior officers are available to serve as drill site commanders. They have been promoted out of pay billets and are drilling in volunteer training units. Seventy-two percent of the 475 reserve surface captains in the Individual Ready Reserve are drilling in voluntary training units. Only 29% of the Naval Reserve captains draw drill pay compared with 100% of the Air National Guard, 99% of the Army National Guard, and 75% of the Air Force Reserve colonels.
Pay is what prevents the establishment of drill site commanders, but it need not. The Naval Reserve has admitted that to assure readiness within the surface program, it must have a few more paid officers than the most strict interpretation of mobilization billets permits. We made this admission when it established the 2,200 to 2,500 drill pay “reserve overhead” mobilization billets. I have proven the necessity of linking drill pay to mobilization readiness, although this policy is subject to more accountability abuse than the policy of linking drill pay to mobilization billets. For this reason, the law should be amended; one- half of drill pay should be a mobilization retainer and the other half should be for drill participation. Reserve commanders and captains could then be paid half pay for drill participation, since their mobilization potential would be low. Thus, the Naval Reserve would increase its readiness by paying talented, experienced, senior reserve officers without mobilization billets to serve as commanders, managers, and instructors. Full pay should be provided for AcDuTra.
Recommendations: The Naval Reserve can solve these five problems, which reduce the combat readiness of the reserve surface line, by applying the following recommendations:
► Adjust the reserve promotion flow point to 17 years for entry into the lieutenant commander selection zone
► Pending such adjustment, increase the number of
rant selectees from the Naval Reserve and establish a dr ing reserve commissioning program 0
► Establish a sea-shore reserve surface officer detail* =■ system to provide readiness training at the appr°Pria time for optimum professional development
► Continue and expand the Naval War College’s Reset'^
Officers Naval Operations AcDuTra Course ^
► Exercise positive preference for SWOs to comma major and afloat staff units, NRF units, ship augmentatj ^ units, inshore undersea warfare units, and fleet train r units and to serve in the billets of readiness comma inspectors general
► Conduct annual surface warfare, mobilization rea ness, and reserve management tests, and make oft1 drill-pay assignment dependent upon passing those te
► Establish a reserve surface warfare school within ea
drill site command at each reserve center f
► Modify the retirement law to permit the employment^ recently retired regular and reserve SWOs less than years old as instructors
► Encourage correspondence course participation by
lowing retirement point credit for vital courses to fall 0 side the 60-point limitation for lieutenant commanders a below . . .
► Increase efforts to secure gaining command train
requirements e
► Double-hat coastal readiness commanders to also se as nondeploying NRF surface group (flotilla) command^
► Establish area commanders, headquartered at cen SBS drill sites, only in regions where the readiness co mander is also an NRF surface group commander
► Establish paid drill site commanders to both pr°vl.. unified local effort and reduce the readiness command^ span of control.
th«
Ohio State University and his bachelor of arts degree from the Uni'1-’ ^ of Arizona. He is a newly retired SWO whose reserve drill assign1111 ^ included service as a senior evaluator and advisory liaison odi'''1,, Readiness Command 19, commanding officer of a volunteer lra>of] unit. Naval Reserve group commander, and commanding office) ^ surface division. Captain Brown’s active duty billets included servl_jjo) navigator and operations officer in the USS McCoy Reynolds (DE- and communications officer in the USS Leo (LKA-60).
____________________________________ Still at Sea_________________________
The reunion chairman of a high school class wanted to find the latest address of a career Navy man. He wrote to the Military Personnel Records Center in Washington, D.C., hoping to obtain the present whereabouts of his much-traveled classmate.
The military reply simply noted that the information requested couldn’t be disclosed without the written consent of the individual involved.
“If you are able to obtain a written consent, kindly return your request to us,” was the official Navy response.
Dick Stedler
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)