This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
“Sir, the running lights have been extinguished and the chronometer allowed to run down.”
“Sir, the galley fires have been doused and the crew’s r^tions commuted.”
“Sir, the shaft has been locked and the rudder put
Midships.”
“Sir, all secure about the decks. The cannonballs have been
Amoved .............. and the ship’s
cannon has 1 iPQFI" been spiked.”
Upon re- A 11C i/vilUI ceiving the report, the Coast _ Guard’s Vice Commandant does an # about-face, salutes
^dmiral James Stevenson, the
^th Commandant, and reports, “Sir,
ir^Coast Guardi,;’,,
i Commandant Stevenson returns the salute and responds, ‘Very well. The Coast Guard is disestablished.”
“Strike eight bells. Retire the colors.”
On 4 August 1994, exactly 204 years to the day since lts inception, the U. S. Coast Guard ceased to exist.
By Lieutenant Commander Christopher Walter, U. S. Coast Guard
rhe Coast Guard has been on the verge of starving to death on its anemic budget for quite some time. So ty . far, it has managed to hang on despite neglect—as p Us overt attacks on its very essence. And, just like a <>n 'ent vvh°'s debilitated by a recurring illness but lives Sv' l^e Coast Guard’s frequent scrambles for existence are smPtoms of impending death rather than an ability to Cve- In a 1987 Proceedings article. Commander Bruce ^s’ U. S. Coast Guard, pointed out:
In the winter of 1982, the Coast Guard narrowly avoided becoming a civilian agency without credible Military tasks. A Department of Transportation (DoT) study group proposed this restructuring during a review (’I the Coast Guard’s roles and missions. After review- ln8 the Coast Guard’s military operations, military preparedness, and reserve training requirements, the study’s draft report recommended reexamining the statutory requirement to transfer the Coast Guard to the Navy in wartime and suggested that civilians conduct the majority of Coast Guard missions.’’1
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Council successfully fought this proposal. They wanted to keep strategically important “peacetime” functions (e.g., law enforcement, port safety, and aids to navigation) under the control of the military and to preserve critical Coast Guard wartime missions, such as port security, coastal antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and search and rescue.2 But the Coast Guard is waning and the Navy is playing a major role in its decline.
The
Background
A quick recounting of Coast Guard history and its implications for the future was provided in a 1984 Proceedings article.
“The Coast Guard is a multi-mission organization, providing maritime services to the nation. It traces its origins to the Revenue Cutter Service, established in 1790 to collect duties on seagoing cargo. Five federal agencies—the Lighthouse Service, Steamboat Inspection Service, Bureau of Navigation, Revenue Cutter Service, and the Life Saving Service—grew until their responsibilities began to overlap and become interdependent. In 1915, the Life Saving Service and Revenue Cutter Service combined under the name Coast Guard. By 1943, the other three agencies had joined the Coast Guard.”3
The Coast Guard performs many missions, and almost every Coast Guard operational unit contributes to most of those missions. The Coast Guard has to get the most out of its resources. For example, patrol boats and cutters routinely perform search and rescue, law enforcement, and oil pollution missions—all in the same day. The Coast Guard’s multimission nature also provides quick response at low cost. The Navy,
by comparison, has a single mission—national defense.
The Coast Guard’s historical growth and multimission nature come from congressionally mandated requirements to provide maritime services. These additions have increased until the Coast Guard is the seagoing analog of one-stop shopping. A rash of increased responsibilities arose during the 1970s and 1980s. Those tasks mandated by law include enforcing the 200- mile fisheries conservation zone, oil spill cleanup, port and tank vessel safety, a massive increase in drug interdiction, and many others. Other tasks heaped on the Coast Guard that are not mandated by law but which increase the service’s workload include immigration control (i.e., the 1980 Cuban refugee exodus and today’s flood of Haitian refugees) and a new initiative, the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ).
Organizational Cannibalism: When the Life Saving Service and Revenue Cutter Service combined in 1915, the personnel of both agencies were retained. When the Coast Guard absorbed the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection in 1943, almost all of those personnel moved to the Coast Guard.
When the Lighthouse Service was transferred to the Coast Guard in 1939, the Coast Guard got everything.
After 1970, a plethora of maritime-related laws were enacted while the additional resources
The Function 400 Category: Part of the problem is that the Coast Guard budget is dumped into a DoT budget category known as “Function 400”— the budgetary equivalent of “other,” along with Amtrak, urban mass transit, air traffic control, and highway safety.15 This category hurts the Coast Guard. More visible, more politically sensitive programs are being funded at the expense of the service.
No Interest Groups Support the Coast Guard: The Coast Guard’s services are many and small in nature and unlikely to be supported strongly by any politically significant force. For example, there is no “National Association for Convicting Drug Smugglers” that lobbies for in
provided, if any, to enforce those laws were woefully inade' quate. The seemingly unlimited funds available for government spending during the 1960s were drying up.
New budgetary catchwords^ (e.g., “growing from within, “doing more with less,” and “zero-based budgeting”) were harbingers of bad news for the Coast Guard. The half-serious lament of Coast Guardsmen-" “we do more and more with less and less until we can do everything with nothing”—too on new meaning.
The Kozlovsky Study: After appealing a severe cut in the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 198* budget, DoT directed the Coast Guard to:
“Study (the) Coast Guards total requirements for mil>ta - personnel necessary to accomplish Coast Guard pr°' gram objectives rather than examine only the marginal personnel requirements to accomplish the more recent legislative mandates.”4
The members of the Kozlovsky Study (named for its chairman, Rear Admiral Will*3 P. Kozlovsky, U. S. Coast Guard) concluded in their Sep' tember 1981 report that the Coast Guard had been deplete to such a degree that organiz3'^ tional cannibalism was a fact1 life. The Coast Guard had to feed on itself to satisfy the ad 1 tional, unfunded demands p
creased funding for stronger maritime law enforcem(
The Coast Guard saved more than its weight in - ^ (49,332) during fiscal years 1980-87. Yet, these 49,3 people have not banded together to pressure Congress more search-and-rescue helicopters, boats, and ships the Coast Guard. .j.
These problems are faced by an agency that was cons1 ered by the Congressional Budget Office in the eafa', 1980s as one of the two best run federal agencies. Or, Congressman Gerry Studds (D-MA) of the House Su committee on the Coast Guard and Navigation put j “The Coast Guard is doing its job very, very cheaply a very, very well.”16
30
Proceedings / June
3^°nnel strength was then the'°°0, yet the study found that
Coast Guard’s current output
°n't- The report stated that:
“As a result of additional Asking in recent years, with- °ut comparable additional resources being provided, it appears that the Coast Guard has reached a depletion stage, ^equate maintenance has n°t been performed, person- ne| are undertrained for re- ^Otfed tasks, people are retired to work excessive °vertime, and large numbers ok experienced personnel are eaving the Coast Guard.”5
sh^6rePort s bottom line was n»°Ck'n§- Coast Guard military
Hie pUrnk)er required to sustain
Jh°ut depleting personnel and yj 'Pment was a staggering a ’ 14 or 37% more than au- ne°r|Zed'6 i bc personnel strength e oed to perform optimally in 74 'l 0Perating program was —91% above the can- ^ ulistic level.7 By 1981, so experienced Coast Guards- ^ n had left because of over- of°rk and undertraining that 50% |e^ts uniformed personnel had jj, s lhan two years’ service.8 At S^, I'1116ok the Kozlovsky resources to reduce the normal workweek at a search-and-rescue station from more than 80 hours per week to only 68.9
These conclusions pale in comparison to the reaction to the study—none at all. No one accused the Coast Guard of inflating these figures in a shabby attempt to build an empire. No outraged reaction occurred because DoT recognized the study’s validity. Two DoT personnel and one person from the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were even on the steering committee.10 The Kozlovsky Study’s claim that the Coast Guard needed 37% more personnel may have actually triggered the 1982 DoT study’s recommendation to kill the Coast Guard.
Even more amazing was a subsequent series of cuts in personnel strength. An August 1987 Sea Power magazine article referred to fiscal year 1988 problems: ‘‘The Coast Guard’s active-duty personnel strength had dropped a few years ago to approximately 37,500. It now stands close to 39,000. The goal is 39,500.”" Personnel were actually cut after DoT, OMB, ^and the Coast Guard exhaustively studied the service’s severe undermanning.
The service’s budget woes continue unabated. Paradoxically, Congress gave the service substantial funds in fiscal year 1987 to purchase planes and vessels to fight drug smuggling. Yet, The Washington Post states
Congress’s fiscal year 1988 budget cuts will drastically change the service:
‘‘The problem, according to sources in the administration and on Capitol Hill, is that the Coast Guard is funded in the Transportation Department budget, and the House Appropriations transportation subcommittee decided to cut $150 million from the Coast Guard to help restore funding the administration had tried to cut from Arntrak, highway construction and big-city mass transit projects.”12
At the same time, the Coast Guard was directed not to cut its drug enforcement efforts. This forced the service to reduce the remaining 78% of its budget.13
The Coast Guard is effective.
It returns more than it receives in its budget. Coast Guardsmen saved approximately 5,500 lives in fiscal year 1987—one every 96 minutes. If one life is worth just $500,000, Coast Guard search and rescue, by itself, pays for its entire fiscal year 1988 budget of $2,739 billion.
In 1987, the Coast Guard interdicted $2.53 billion of drugs ($6.9 million each day). These two missions account for only 44.6% of the Coast Guard’s budget, yet they seem to justify the cost for the service twice
14
over.
Lieutenant Commander Christopher Walter, U. S. Coast Guard
If the Coast Guard were disestablished, it would mean more than the death of a service. Without Coast Guard search-and-rescue teams, a life would have been lost at sea every 96 minutes last year.
No More DoD Funds?: The Coast Guard received a $275 million bailout ($100 million for operating expenses, the remainder for Acquisition, Construction, and Improvement [AC&I| or capital expenditures) from funds transferred in 1987 from the DoD budget.17 This stopgap measure will not be repeated, especially when an automatic cut of $23 billion, half from domestic programs and
and dumped it into a budget category of “other.’ f The Coast Guard never has been heavily funded- two decades, its taskings have far outstripped its ability
half from defense, was triggered by the budget deficit- reduction law in November 1987. The Navy will suffer $12.3 billion of the $33 billion defense cut.18 This is a double blow to the Coast Guard; not only have DoD bailout funds dried up (although DoD support in kind amounts to $103 million) but the Coast Guard has had to curtail its operations to accommodate 1988 budget cuts of $103 million and added unanticipated expenses.
Another damaging blow is OMB's $278 million limit on the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 1988 AC&l budget. This amount is far below the $500 to $600 million needed yearly to maintain the Coast Guard’s $13 billion plant.19 That is not a fat AC&I budget when compared to the $990 million that the Navy spends to purchase a single Aegis class cruiser.
DoT Will Not Help: DoT shortchanges the Coast Guard for several reasons, including the following:
► Coast Guard Headquarters is physically removed from DoT.
► DoT and its civilian leadership have no ties or real-life experience with the Coast Guard and there are no promotion paths from the Coast Guard into DoT’s leadership ranks.
► While Coast Guard personnel make up 64% of
employees, the Coast Guard’s budget only accounts 10% of DoT’s total. As far as its budget is concerned,1 Coast Guard is just not important to DoT. aS
► Coast Guard missions are not as politically sensitive issues such as the sale of Conrail or the air traffic contf° lers’ strike.20 As a result, DoT has ignored the C& Guard, tried to civilianize it, forced it to cannibalize 'tse
perform those jobs adequately, despite heroic effofts ^ streamline operations and despite highly dedicated petS°' nel who are willing to work harder and longer in a l°slJ^ battle to keep the Coast Guard’s motto of Semper Parch^ “Always Ready"—from slipping to “Semi-Paratus even “Semi-Paralysis.”
The Navy’s Role: If the Coast Guard is disestablish®^ the Navy will be principally to blame and will suite' out of proportion to any benefits it gains. At the sa' j time, the Navy holds the key to the continued survival a viability of its sister service. ,0
The maritime services that the Coast Guard provides ^ the nation include search and rescue, marine environ'"® | tal protection, port safety and security, commercial ve^, safety, domestic and polar icebreaking, maritime law forcement, and aids to navigation. These services are £ erally thought to benefit the commercial fishing indus
32
Proceedings /
Rational boaters, commercial shipping firms, port fa- qJ les> and the war on drugs. But the Navy also uses tLast Guard maritime services, and it must speak up for e Coast Guard before it is too late.
safe
and
Port
Navy has always relied upon the Coast Guard to
§uard harbors, port facilities, and channels for Navy commercial vessels during war. Functions that sup- Navy missions include maritime law enforcement, Jhniercial vessel safety, port safety, and aids to navigate peacetime functions—as well as port security. e MDZ gives the Coast Guard national defense respon-
l^'ities from the docks to 200 miles offshore. These mis- S|0n.c h;. be r
;,0ns directly support the Navy during peacetime and can
thSckly mobilized to secure the safe havens from which Navy needs to operate.
be Navy exists to bring force to bear against the ene- j(Cs °f the United States, and it can only exert that force if n as safe ports and access to the sea. Every Navy ship in 'ycm Roads, Virginia, could be trapped by one ship ^ |tted in Thimble Shoal Channel.
Can *985, a Hampton Roads-based Coast Guard cutter ^ §ht a U. S. tug smuggling 62 tons of marijuana into ttieSrC0Untry- There are 20,000 tugboats and 38,000 com- at()rcial fishing boats in the United States, some with oper- ^ who will smuggle drugs that kill and injure other NlsCriCans- They will undoubtedly mine strategic chan) the price is right.
»e ,iUr'n8 Solid Shield ’87, the Coast Guard cutter Aquid- heL 1309) broke off from the exercise and appre
down drug smugglers in bays and harbors as an Island- class cutter is at acting as an antiair warfare platform. The Navy should quit worrying that Congress will equate the two services to the detriment of the Navy. Coast Guard planes, helicopters, and boats cannot be substituted on a one-for-one basis for Navy resources any more than Navy resources can be plugged into Coast Guard missions.
Even the ASW-capable Hamilton- and Rear-class cutters are best used for coastal ASW within the context of the MDZ concept. Using these cutters within the MDZ frees Navy ships to do what they do best: control the high seas. And these cutters are the only ones that pose any kind of threat to the Navy’s 600-ship fleet.
The Navy’s leadership must recognize that the Coast Guard complements the Navy and it is uniquely qualified to perform an integral and powerful role in the MDZ. The Navy also must realize that the Coast Guard is dying and it needs strong support in Congress, in OMB, with the President, and with DoT. The Navy must understand that the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions are vital during war and that DoT and OMB budget cuts hurt national defense. The Navy must impress that fact upon DoT and OMB and argue for an adequately funded Coast Guard. Failure to do so may be the coup de grace for the Coast Guard.
^ded;
s»The
1 a drug smuggler in the middle of the exercise area, w nese examples clearly show the importance of the ari(jSt puard to the Navy in safeguarding ports, channels, critical commercial facilities. Yet the Navy is reluc- •j,to endorse the Coast Guard’s national defense role. dee Navy continually argues for its 600-ship fleet but 7|^r Mentions the Coast Guard’s 12 Hamilton (WHEC- sPe n*aSS bigh-endurance cutters. Each of these high- 7 cutters is or soon will be equipped with a
t^'75 76-mm. gun, Mk-32 Mod-7 surface vessel torpedo ^N/SQS-38 sonar, chaff, Nixie, sonobuoys, Har-
biij.11 punchers, and Phalanx during the current fleet reha" ahpn and modernization (FRAM) program and post- outfittings.21 The cutters sound suspiciously like
^ _______________________________ t___
Hjilpb'Ps. Incidentally, the contract award price was $352 J°n> of which the Navy provided $294 million.
/, the 13 cutters in the 270-foot Bear (WMEC-
ity ' '•*«ss are equipped with 76-mm. guns, have the abil- Pq0° handle helicopters, and can be retrofitted with Har- (]iJrin and Phalanx. They are useful assets to the Navy f0n§ v ‘
-p, **y me \„oasi vjuaiu s waiiimc Cctpictuinuca.
hoin 6 Nayy wants and needs the Coast Guard, but with
con
.'n§ War. The Navy apparently is afraid to recognize the Coast Guard’s wartime capabilities.
• , .. c0at Lrormal recognition of the Coast Guard’s defense
'ts r'L ’
'Cdr. Bruce Stubbs, USCG, “The Coast Guard’s Dilemma,” Proceedings, April 1987, p. 44.
2Ibid.
3Lt. Steven P. Carpenter, USCG, “In Search of Excellence in the U. S. Coast Guard,” Proceedings, January 1986, p. 111.
4Radm. William P. Kozlovsky, USCG, et al, "Zero Based Military Personnel Requirements Study,” September 1981, p. iii.
5Ibid., p. 8.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
“Ibid., p. 1-2.
9Ibid., p. 1-4.
,0Ibid., pp. i-ii.
nL. Edgar Prina, “Another USCG SAR Mission Needed?” Sea Power, August 1987, p. 28.
I2“Coast Guard Sees Fund Woes,” Washington Post News Service in the Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA), 6 October 1987, p. A8.
I '-'Ibid.
l4LCdr. Christopher Walter, USCG, “An Average Day,” Commandant’s Bulletin, . issue 17-87, 30 September 1987, p. 18. l5Capt. Donald A. Naples, USCG, “Justice for the Coast Guard,” Proceedings, July 1987, p. 86.
'“Honorable Gerry E. Studds (D MA), Commandant's Bulletin, issue 9-84, p. 22. l7Prina, p. 24.
'“Lawrence J. Cavaiola, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. House of Representatives.
19Prina, p. 24.
“Naples, p. 86.
2lLt. George A. Russell, Jr., USCG, “FRAMing the 378s,” Proceedings, June 1987, pp. 102-103.
22See Stubbs, p. 47.
J-'bution to avoid weakening the Navy’s arguments for
platforms.22
mis0a« Guard resources perform vital national defense rineSl°ns lhat the Navy cannot, and vice versa. A subma- b0atCann°t patrol a security zone; a Coast Guard patrol /,co»w e9ually useless as a strategic deterrent. Similarly, a nderoga (CG-47)-class cruiser is as useless running
Lieutenant Commander Walter is currently Chief of the Investigations Department at the Marine Safety Office Hampton Roads in Norfolk, Virginia. He has served on the cutters McCulloch (WHEC-386), Winnebago (WHEC-40), and Duane (WHEC-33). His shore duty has included serving as a machinery and hull inspector and investigating officer at the Marine Safety Office Toledo and tours at Coast Guard Headquarters in the Office of the Comptroller and the Marine Investigations Division. He graduated from the Coast Guard Academy in 1970 and received master’s degrees from the University of Toledo and George Washington University.
edln8s/June 1988
33