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To analyze the naval requirements associated with low- intensity conflict, one may look at some recent examples in the Persian Gulf (1987-88), Central America (Panama,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras), and Grenada. In each the United States was involved in a limited way in terms of its political objectives, military resources, and the length of time its forces could be involved without violating the War Powers Resolution. These lactors placed stringent rules of engagement on naval commanders that considerably reduced the combat initiative and the defense in depth of the naval forces assigned to the region.
Each of these conflicts also imposed unique geographical constraints. The shallow, restricted waters of the Persian Gulf kept the carrier battle group operating well to the east of the Straits of Hormuz, in the Gull of Oman. Fighter air cover was an hour away on call. While air superiority was not an issue in either Grenada or Central America, there are vast regions of extremely shallow and uncharted water on the Nicaraguan shell and in the Caribbean surrounding Grenada. If, as was once proposed, an arms blockade had been imposed between Cuba and either of these two countries, search-and-seizure operations in the shallow-water areas could only have been possible with patrol boats.
In each of these three low-intensity conflicts the naval threat to U.S. forces was limited to coastal naval forces of the states involved. These consisted mostly of patrol boats, plus, in the case of Iran, a few corvettes and frigates of limited capability. In pitched battle, most notably the 18 April 1988 engagement of Iranian forces on sortie from Bandar Abbas, the Iranian surface forces were no match for U.S. surface-launched missiles and tactical aircraft, which promptly sunk the Iranian frigate Sahand and the fast attack craft Joshan and severely damaged the Irig- ate Sabalan. Nevertheless, for many months preceding that engagement, Iranian Boghammer speedboats armed with 40-mm. grenade launchers and minor-caliber guns harassed and set fire to over 200 tankers. The Iranians also used modified landing craft to sow floating mines that proved lethal to the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) and inflicted serious damage on several tankers, including the Bridgeton on her first voyage as a reflagged U.S. ship.
Low-intensity conflict provides a resourcelul enemy with many opportunities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. This can be a particularly serious problem for the United States because of the asymmetry ot the torccs involved. Simply stated, the United States incurs tremendous risk
when major Beet assets such as aircralt carriers, cruiseis, destroyers, and frigates arc arrayed against much smaller, less expensive coastal forces. Weapons as diverse as naval mines, missile-armed patrol boats, coastal submarines, and shore-launched antiship missiles (such as the Silkworm) can be used in such a way as to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of larger U.S. ships in these restricted situations. Under these circumstances, the United Slates, with its large ships, is placed at a military disadvantage relative to the risks involved. In the highly charged political atmosphere surrounding low-intensity conflict, the loss of a single ship can take on the dimensions of a national disaster (witness President Ronald Reagan s reactions to the USS Stark [FFG-311 incident).
Finally, the rules of engagement that constrain the superior capabilities of U.S. forces are olten used to the advantage of Third World navies involved in low-intensity conflict. The need to ascertain belligerency and to classily positively the threat in regions where neutral or allied forces are free to operate shrinks the battle space and reduces reaction time. Thus engagements often occur at short range well inside the primary defense envelopes ot larger ships, making them particularly vulnerable. 1 he dilemma of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) in shooting down the Iranian airliner highlights the problem faced by Captain Will Rogers, who had to choose in seconds between defending his ship and attacking an unknown target.
The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath in 1967 by a Styx antiship missile launched from an Egyptian Komar- class patrol boat moored in Port Said harbor demonstrated the enormous striking power contained in modern patrol boats equipped with missiles. This watershed event in naval warfare ushered in an era of strategic deployments that has seen the Soviet Union export Komar class and follow-on O.s’a-class patrol boats to some 27 Third World states around the world. Many of these countries Libya, Cuba, South Yemen, and North Korea, to name a few arc situated within close striking distance of major sea lines of communication. These patrol boats, armed with four improved SS-N-2C Styx missiles, can launch surprise attacks against warships from a range of 30 miles, or attack tankers and merchant ships using missiles, torpedoes, and guns. This represents a worldwide threat that could be used unexpectedly against U.S. warships or merchantmen in low-intensity conflicts.
Capt. V. A. Meyer, U.S. Naval Reserve
airbus, the Vincennes (CG-49) was Under attack by Boghammers and she had to execute a hard turn to bring her after gun to bear when the forward mount jammed. The outcome might have been different if patrol boats had been available to screen or engage the Boghammers so the Vincennes could devote her full attention to the antiair warfare problem.
Wartime missions for patrol boats are almost too numerous to list, but cer
tainly the historical ones of reconnaissance and screening, coastal patrol, choke point interdiction, and defense of the amphibious landing force ships have been well documented. With the introduction of compact autonomous missiles and torpedoes, surface strike and shore fire support may be added to the list. The shoulder-fired Stinger missile has been adapted to at least one lightweight naval mount, thereby providing an excellent antiair warfare point
defense capability to patrol boats. Finally, with more development, patrol boats could perform an antisubmarine warfare role similar to that of a LAMPS helicopter. Operating in pairs, they could use off-board distributed arrays or sonobuoys to gain a submarine contact, a dipping sonar or an autonomous vehicle to localize, and a lightweight torpedo such as the Mk 50 to engage.
All of this may seem too ambitious
Proceedings / October 1990