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Contents:
Persona—16
Hang More Standoff Weapons on the P-3—16
Put Harpoons on EA-6Bs—18
Commanders Must Command—18
Tanks! Tanks! Direct Front!—18
All Strike Fighters for the Air Wing—19
From a Commissioner—19
It’s Going to be a Bumpy Ride—20
Be Careful of What You Ask For . . .—20
What Men or Gods Are These?—23
Why the Navy Didn’t Find Amelia—29
The Coast Guard Reserve: Ready for What?—31
One Mistake Does Not Mean You’re A Brig Rat—31
The Commission—19
The Polling Data—19
Gays & Women—20
Fight as a Team—24
Why No Gays?—26
“Persona”
(See D. R. Oliver, pp. 54-57, January 1993
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was through the warm-up stage of Admiral Oliver’s interesting article—the truisms on the uniqueness of life at sea—and a little bit into the hardsell part—advocating that health-inspection teams be sent to ships for a two-week quiz of all hands—when, suddenly, I had a strange flashback.
It was 1943.1 was sitting in the wardroom of a Soviet minesweeper bashing its way through White Sea ice en route to Murmansk. Four or five Red Navy lieutenants and 1 were drinking tea and munching black bread spread with bacon fat, the usual mid-morning snack. It was a real treat for these eager, good-natured chaps to be able to chat—probably for the first time in their lives—without restraint on all manner of things with a creature from Outer Space. Then the door opened and in walked an officer with white between his gold stripes. The other Soviet officers immediately fell silent. Our newcomer was the ship’s Politich- eskii Rukovoditel’ (or Politruk), the political director and internal spy of the NKVD, answerable only to the Communist Party.
Sometimes, internal spying isn’t so menacing; it merely takes the form of meddling. While I was commanding the U.S. Naval Base at Yokosuka, Japan, a couple of gung-ho young civil servants were sent out by some Pacific Fleet staffer—at considerable expense in commercial travel and per diem—to monitor my transportation department for two months. One of their no-no’s was the recreational transportation I provided to submarines that had come in after one-month submerged patrols, the ships’ companies pale and long-haired. Naturally, I paid no attention to my watchdogs. It was, of course, a piddling item. But, if compounded, such piddling annoyances can destroy command performance—that goes for any other interferences from outside the chain of command.
So, do captains really need a politruk with ten helpers mucking around their
ships when their division commanders are competent enough to catch and help with any shortcomings? There must be a better way to correct a ship’s toilet-paper shortage, or pinch the rare skipper who may pinch too randomly—because any other approach is better than internal espionage in any form. □
“Hang More Standoff Weapons on the P-3”
(See J. A. Koepke and G. K. Smalt, pp. 83-84,
January 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon W. Rudd, U.S. Army—The authors have defined a cost-efficient role for a weapons platform previously limited by its slow speed and vulnerability to antiair weapons. The demise of the ASW requirement would seem to doom the P-3 Orion to oblivion. However, as the submarine threat has subsided, so, too, has the threat of advanced antiair weapons; therefore, the U.S. military has a golden opportunity to reassess the potential of its existing platforms—including the P-3.
Squadrons of P-3s capable of launching large numbers of cruise missiles certainly would complement a shrinking surface Navy and Air Force. However, Commander Koepke and Lieutenant Smalt only scratched the surface in describing how the P-3—with its long range, high endurance, and impressive load capacity—could be used effectively in low-intensity environments—from drug interdiction to littoral operations.
Replacing ASW equipment with the equipment needed to detect and engage weapons against surface, even air, targets is appropriate. However, the suggestion that the P-3 could use the Sidewinder as a defensive weapon does not track with its low speed, its vulnerability to air-to- air threats, and its previous use in a neutral-threat environment. Sidewinders on the P-3 would be more appropriate as offensive weapons in a neutral-threat environment where they might be used for interdiction of aircraft involved in drug smuggling. As the P-3 shifts from the ASW role to a multi-purpose weapons platform, its value will be of greater interest to the other services. □
■OS
m
“All Strike Fighters for the Air Wing”
(SeeW. Hamblet, pp. 63-67, February 1993
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Rodolfo Llobet, U.S. Navy— Lieutenant Hamblet’s proposal of an all strike fighter air wing is more than likely an inevitability. However, the versatility of a single type of multi-role aircraft lacks the diversity needed to adapt to a wide range of ever-changing threat scenarios. In the long run, maintaining the capabilities unique to U.S. carrier aviation may prove to be more cost-effective than putting all our eggs in one basket. A Persian Gulf War scenario without six months to prepare could not be met as efficiently as with a “regional littoral warfare” carrier battle group. □
“The Commission”
(See W. A. Lawrence, pp. 48-51, February 1993 Proceedings)
“The Polling Data”
(See G. C. Sadler, pp. 51-54, February 1993 Proceedings)
Trom a Commissioner”
(.See E. Donnelly, pp. 55-56, February 1993 Proceedings)
Richard T. Egan—Captain Sadler’s article left me hoping for more. As the issue °f women in combat is very prominent r'ght now, I was looking for an answer to a question: Do men and women inside and outside the military services have significantly different opinions on this issue? Laptain Sadler touched on this question briefly, but I would like to see it answered directly. □ brigadier General Samuel G. Cockerham, V-S. Army (Retired)—The vituperative l°ne of Admiral Lawrence’s criticism of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed forces—on which I was honored to serve—demonstrates one of the reasons why a convincing case for “women in combat” simply was not made. As some lawyers say: If the facts aren’t there, ben abuse your opponent. Those of us who took a consistent stand against Women in combat based our case on the acts and a compelling record—not personal attacks.
I take issue with Admiral Lawrence’s inclusion that 375 years of tradition in exempting women from combat can be
ignored because the commission’s official Roper Poll showed that “the U.S. public by a two-thirds majority favored opening combatant ships and aircraft roles. The readers of Proceedings should know that this level of public support for women in certain combat roles was primarily evident among respondents who mistakenly believed that women are already assigned to those combat units, and among those who support it only as a voluntary option. Contrary to most news reports, the commission determined that the “voluntary option” is not workable where combat is concerned. It would be irresponsible to make serious recommendations based on misunderstandings and misinformation.
Admiral Lawrence and Captain Sadler both failed to mention that military personnel support current policies exempting women from direct combat positions by a margin of about 57% to 42%, while those with direct combat experience are most strongly opposed to the repeal of the current exemptions. The commission also received several thousand letters in response to a survey of retired flag officers, the overwhelming majority of whom were strongly opposed to women in combat. It is most interesting to note that Admiral Lawrence failed even to mention the commission’s survey of retired flag officers. Of the retired flag officers who responded, 71% opposed allowing women to fly fighters and bombers; 76% opposed opening the cockpits of attack helicopters to them. Furthermore, 78%, 88%, 90%. and 83% were against the assignment of women to artillery, armor, infantry units, and combat engineer units, respectively. Asked about the assignment of women to combatant ships, 76% of the respondents opposed the idea.
As a commissioner, I could not ignore these surveys and letters, and the statements made to us while on fact-finding trips around the country. My ultimate concern is for the security and safety of young soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen serving in combat units. Therefore, military necessity—encompassing national security, combat readiness, combat effectiveness, and mission accomplishment—was the primary consideration governing my actions throughout the commission’s deliberations. We were charged by the Congress and the President to consider not only career interests of individuals, but the needs of the military itself.
My area of knowledge is Army aviation, particularly helicopters used in combat and combat support. In my opinion, the evidence showed that the introduction of female personnel into a direct-
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combat environment—which includes Apache and Cobra attack helicopters and Kiowa scout helicopters—would be a giant distraction that would reduce the effectiveness of combat units across the board. I believe an all-male combat force is the most effective one, and that the current policy of excluding women from “closed” positions should be retained. Therefore, I not only fully support current Army policy, but also recommend that the Secretary of the Army be given authority to reexamine specialties in combat-support and combat-service-support units to preclude the unnecessary training of female soldiers in specialties that are closed.
I agree with Commissioner Donnelly that our deliberations were thorough and fair, and that our findings and research are too important to be ignored by Congress. The homework has been done. Now let a responsible debate begin. □
H. J. Lindenbaum—Admiral Lawrence’s article might have been made more forceful if it had been noted that his daughter graduated from the Naval Academy in 1981. I understand from my son, one of her classmates, that she was very well- liked and professionally admired by her peers. □
It’s Going to be a Bumpy Ride”
(See T. P. M. Barnett and H. H. Gaffney, pp. 23-26, January 1993 Proceedings
“Be Careful of What You Ask For . . ”
(See S. O’Keefe, pp. 73-76, January 1993
Proceedings)
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, U.S. Navy (Retired); Chief of Naval Operations, 1978-1982—Having spent a major portion of my shore-duty career on the 4th deck of the E Ring of the Pentagon, I learned to expect the news media—and even some lesser-informed members of the executive branch and Congress—to misrepresent the professionalism and motivation of the naval services, either intentionally or from ignorance. In recent years, however, I have been dismayed to observe similar criticism coming from those on the inside who surely should know better.
I refer to the ridiculous statements of Drs. Gaffney and Barnett who seek, for some obtuse reason, to perpetuate the myth that the Navy and the Marine Corps lack objectivity or are unwilling to be team players. To wit: “One thing is clear: naval forces cannot go their separate ways anymore.” And, “the Navy and Marine
Corps seem disappointed they were not asked to run the show all by themselves [during the Persian Gulf War].” Since both of these gentlemen are employees of the Center for Naval Analyses—which thereby attributes to them an unusual degree of credibility in naval affairs—let me suggest that the readers of Proceedings deserve better from them. It would be interesting to have them identify specific instances when the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have insisted upon going “their separate ways” in matters of strategic importance. They should have documented their claim that the two services asked to run the Persian Gulf War “all by themselves.” Who made such a request? The Chief of Naval Operations? The Commandant of the Marine Corps? The fleet commanders?
In point of fact, were these two “strategists” to make half an effort to visit the U.S. Pacific Command, for instance, they would find a highly integrated joint strategy in which all of the services participate to their fullest capabilities, and in which the Navy and Marine Corps have been highly cooperative team players for a long time. If visiting the forces in the fleet is too burdensome a task for Drs. Gaffney and Barnett, at the minimum, they should take the time to chat with Vice Admiral Bill Owens—the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements & Assessment— about the level of jointness and cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps in the Sixth Fleet, where Admiral Owens recently was commander. If he is unavailable, then they should talk with Admiral Stan Arthur, the current Vice CNO, past Seventh Fleet commander, and the senior U.S. Navy commander during the Gulf War.
Deplorably, Drs. Gaffney and Barnett are not alone in this careless and reckless support of the proposition that the Navy and Marine Corps are not team players. In the same issue of Proceedings, former Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe reinforced the myth: “We must avoid the historical pitfall of single-service attempts to produce the entire solution from start to finish.”
Where do these experts get this garbage anyway? □
“Gays & Women”
Lieutenant Judy Hale Young, U.S. Navy—While the contents and merits of the three articles in the January Proceedings concerning “Gays & Women’’ certainly are worthy of discussion, what struck me first and hardest was that head-
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line on the cover: “Gays & Women.”
First, it implies either a connection between women and homosexuals or a likening of women with homosexuals. I cannot think of any such connection which is not either inaccurate or offensive to me as a woman in the Navy. What are the possible connections? It is true that both are minority groups, but the connection breaks down when you realize that women are a minority because of their sex while homosexuals are a minority because they subscribe to an alternative lifestyle. While I cannot speak for all other women in the Navy, I find highly offensive any inference that my sex is equivalent in any way to such an alternative lifestyle.
I suppose another possible connection might be that these are two groups whose roles within the naval service are currently in the public eye. Again, if we look beyond the apparent truth of that connection, it begins to break down. Women are already integrated members °f the naval service and have been for years. Recent events have served to call public attention to our evolving roles and °ur future in the Navy, but the undeniable immediate fact is that we’re here! Homosexuals, on the other hand, are not—at least officially. In this sense, "’omen are being equated with a group °f personae non gratae—something unlikely to find favor with most Navy "'omen.
I admit a tenuous connection—i.e., that there are issues related to both groups that are worthy of professional discourse. However, that connection exists among all the subjects covered in Proceedings. Operating on this premise, the headline nould have been “Gays & Arleigh Burke,” Submarines & Women,” or even “Submarines & Arleigh Burke.” Do these sound absurd? My point exactly.
Finally, since this headline emits a slight whiff of sensationalism, I wonder h it was not chosen as much for shock value as anything else. I hope not.
I can imagine—and in fact have heard—someone saying, “Come on, it’s lust a headline.” But it is a headline on the front cover, and for a magazine, the cover is its face. It is what it presents f° the world first, which creates the first tmpression of what is inside.
I hope that my first impression as influenced by this particular headline is not Ate image the editors of Proceedings are trying to create. □
Auitor’s Note: As cover copy, “Gays ^ Women ” proved too ambiguous, but it Vvav selected only to inform readers about c°ntent in relatively few words. □
“What Men or Gods Are These?”
(See J. L. Byron, pp. 28-32, December 1992; J. E. Colvard, T. A. Sylvester, J. L. Burke, pp. 1618, February 1993; A. F. Campbell, p. 20,
March 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James N. Olmsted, U.S. Navy—Captain Byron’s idea of allocating a controlled number of “A” grades and “definitely promote” recommendations for each reporting senior is solid. Apparently, the Army tracks grades given by each reporting senior in order to “break the pack” in the Army’s officer corps. Over the long term, a reporting se
nior’s grading record is expected to match some “normal” type of distribution, and he is held accountable for it.
In the Navy, there have been stories of multiples of officers receiving the coveted l-of-8 ranking from a single senior. True or not, many officers are ranked together in packs with straight-A fitness apparently the norm, making the job of a selection board quite difficult. Top performers go unrecognized amid the packs of officers whose real performance ranges anywhere from fair to superb—but all of whom have been rated as outstanding. It
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is also unfair to the lesser performers because they lose opportunities to receive counseling, in order to improve. Requiring reporting seniors to spread out the grades would not only make the work of the selection boards easier—but also would place the responsibility and accountability for evaluating officers where it should be: with commanding officers.
The point about excessive verbal gymnastics involved in writing a fitness report was well-taken. Because the language of the fitness report is not plain English, writing a “good” fitness report has become too complex a task for most officers to accomplish unassisted. Consequently, they turn to the plethora of fitness-report writing manuals on the market. A simpler and shorter fitness-report form—with less room for flowery phrases
of praise—would help eliminate this problem.
Captain Byron’s other points have merit and should be adopted—with one exception. There should be no surprises on a fitness report. Therefore, the counseling and reporting processes should run concurrently, and a junior officer should see and be able to comment on his fitness report. If the commanding officer and executive officer are doing their jobs, a junior officer already will be trying to correct any identified problems—or deservedly receive a low mark. If counseling and reporting are kept separate, and proper counseling is not forthcoming, a junior officer might be rudely surprised when he is not selected for promotion.
Furthermore, Captain Byron’s proposed central system of adverse-report referral could solve many problems, but it won’t give junior officers an opportunity to address deficiencies directly, while at the same command. There is no need for another level at the Bureau of Personnel (BuPers) to debate and defend adverse marks over the phone, with irate officers. Honesty—while sometimes painful— should be part of reporting and counseling. Captains command; let them—not a faceless bureaucracy—explain adverse marks to their junior officers.
The Navy needs a fitness report that is quicker and easier to write, truer to life, and a better yardstick for BuPers to measure performance. As the current system provides: some will be promoted; some will not; and some will think they have been burned by the new system. But such a modified system will require less whitewash, paperwork, and time—and will allow the Navy to maintain its best- qualified officers. □
Commander Kolin M. Jan, U.S. Navy— My recurring thought when reading this article was “If the Navy is serious about Total Quality Leadership (TQL), this should be the starting point for institutional change.” The naysayers will argue that, in time, any system will become corrupted; so don’t bother changing what we have. But we can improve the system by rendering it less susceptible to manipulation. In time, other improvements will be incorporated when required—further legitimizing a much needed, more honest, and functional evaluation process. I would offer one refinement to Captain Byron’s proposal: provide for some sort of review by the chain of command. If the evaluee is not offered the opportunity to see the report, determination of adversity somewhere in the personnel bureaucracy may not be enough to counterbalance personality conflicts.
In its present state, our evaluation system is a highly developed art form, with the rewards going to the artists wielding the finest brushes with the brightest paints, regardless of the subject matter. It requires a truly practiced eye to discern the often-subtle shades of difference among fitness reports.
Despite Dr. W. Edwards Deming’s assertion in his principles of Total Quality Management, it is difficult to envision the armed services without some sort of personnel-evaluation system. If TQL serves no other purpose than to facilitate a radical change in how we evaluate our people, it will be a success. After all, we continually affirm that people are our most valuable resource; the present system belies that statement. Improvement and changing our present system will add credibility to our “people first” approach.
While we’re at it, we should further embrace the principles of TQL by overhauling the present personal awards system and applicable instructions and canceling the Battle E program. With regard to the former—personal awards, rather than recognizing truly outstanding performance, are now often viewed as “expected,” especially at the end of a tour. This system also has been corrupted, further dulling the distinctions between the true superstars and the majority of the fleet. With the Battle E program, problems have been evident for years. This award is an increasing source of divisiveness, generating bad feelings, ill will, and low morale. “Gaming the system” and internal community politics often determine the winners. This proposal probably is unpopular with many of the “heavies”—but the day of the Battle E’s usefulness has passed.
It’s time to change, not for the sake of change, but for improvement. Isn’t that what TQL is all about? □
“Fight as a Team”
(See J. H. Cushman, pp. 58-62, January 1993;
C.E. Mundy, p. 14, March 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, U.S. Air Force (Retired); former Chief of Current Doctrine Division, Airpower Re' search Institute—Before, during, and even after World War II, many senior naval officers clung to the idea of naval aviation as a supporting arm to the final arbiter of naval power: the battle line. They could not—or would not—see that the advances in aviation had revolutionized the conduct of war at sea and made air power the key to successful naval operations.
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Like these traditionalist naval officers of the past, General Cushman is preoccupied with a paradigm of warfare that is dominated by surface combat. He fails to recognize that because of developments in aviation technology related to low-observable navigation, target acquisition, and precision attack, air power has revolutionized war on land as thoroughly as it did at sea in World War II. Perhaps it is because General Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf shared General Cushman’s view of joint warfare that they stated repeatedly that air power alone could not do the job in the Persian Gulf War. It may also explain why General Schwarzkopf told President Bush that he would need “about five times more force than I ended up getting, and that it would take seven or eight months longer than it actually took to do the job.”
In the future, a joint-force commander would be wise not to follow General Cushman’s guidance regarding air power. Unlike General Cushman, he should recognize that modern air power should not be viewed solely as “tactical air.” Thanks to technological advances, strategic air attacks might be able to achieve his objectives. When the objective is the defeat of an enemy’s army, air power—from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—can be the primary instrument. In these cases, he should center his land forces’ operations on making the enemy more vulnerable to air attack. □
“Why No Gays?”
(See E. T. Gomulka, pp. 44-46, December 1992; J. R. Williams, p. 13, January 1993; D.
B. Noonan, A. Sinclair, A. G. Webb. S. W. Surko, pp. 21-22, February 1993; D. K.
Hodges, E. Dangler. R. C. Peniston, E. T. Gomulka, pp. 15-19, March 1993 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Hugh Sage, U.S. Coast Guard—Those who profess to be leaders should start identifying and solving the real problems which will come when homosexuality is no longer a disqualification for military service. We must distinguish those personal matters which are properly a concern of the military from those which are private. It is time to begin reversing the effects of decades of anti-homosexual rhetoric. Let us not waste time and words on a destructive dispute. □
Lieutenant Gene Milowicki, U.S. Navy— Those who favor lifting the ban on homosexuals in the U.S. military state that homosexuals have been in the ranks and have served honorably for years. No one among those who support the ban has been able to contend that point successfully—for the simple reason that it is a 100% true statement. But also in the U.S. armed forces, there are—and have been— adulterers, wife beaters, and thieves. Does the fact that a man beats his wife or cheats on her affect the performance of his duty? Maybe yes; maybe no. Is it wrong that he does these things? The answer is a resounding yes.
Allowing homosexuality in our military will permit homosexuals to flaunt their sexuality, and, potentially, to attempt to gain legal minority status. Very few people equate being a gay man or a lesbian to being an African-, a Latin-, or a Native-American. The vast majority of servicemen and servicewomen will balk at any moves toward affirmative action or any type of homosexual tolerance training, because it would directly conflict with—and make a mockery of—their own value systems, specifically, their religious beliefs.
When people enter the military, they give up certain rights that other Americans take for granted. This is recognized as necessary for the good of the military and the country. People in the military are very restricted in their ability to voice their political concerns and opinions—e.g., military people cannot organize to lobby Congress. For this reason, servicemen and servicewomen depend on their top leaders to represent their best interests properly and effectively in such matters. Therefore, leaders in the military and the Congress must demonstrate the moral courage to fight lifting the ban on moral and ethical grounds. They are the only arguments that cannot be shot full of holes by the opposition.
What will be the long-term effects of lifting the ban? The current military edge is a direct result of the high-quality people that we attract into our all-volunteer force. Certainly, many parents will not want to send their children into an organization that directly affronts to their religious and cultural values by legitimizing open homosexuality. That means a smaller pool of people from which to recruit and a detrimental effect in the overall quality of the military.
The bottom line is that the United States does not need this change nor do the vast majority of Americans want it- President Clinton’s crusade on this issue will only serve to alienate him further from the armed forces for which he bears the ultimate responsibility of leading. The final question in this debate must be: Will this change make the U.S. military a more effective or less effective fighting force? □
Commander Frank M. Sperry, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—I spend a lot of time and effort speaking to young people, trying to attract them to a military career- To them—and their parents—I stress the idea of serving their country and the advantages they can derive from a military career. However, I could not ask them, in good conscience, to enter a military m which homosexuality is a legitimate form of behavior. □
“Why the Navy Didn’t Find Amelia”
(See R. E. Gillespie, pp. 73-77, February 1993 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Francis D. Foley, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I enjoyed Mr. Gillespie’s article on the search for Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan, and wish him well in his search for the long-sought solution to this unsolved mystery.
However, as a junior participant in the Navy’s search for the lost pair, I take \ issue with his criticisms of the Navy’s preliminary arrangements regarding the flight and his failure to accord the Navy proper credit for the Herculean search effort it made once it was called upon.
The U.S. government had no obligation whatsoever to make contingency plans for the failure of the flight, but only to cooperate with the venture of a U.S. citizen that, if successful, would reflect Well upon the nation. Mr. Gillespie notes the modest contribution of the Navy— stationing a fleet tug, the USS Ontario (AT-13), halfway along the island chain from Lae to Howland and a small seaplane tender, the USS Swan (AVP-7), at sea between Howland and Hawaii—and the U.S. Coast Guard—the USCGC Itasca (WPG-321) had ferried aviation fuel to Howland and, from there, would broadcast homing signals as a radio navigational aid. At the time, these measures seemed both appropriate and adequate, and, to my knowledge, were quite acceptable to Earhart.
It is true that the Swan was capable of carrying a small seaplane, but she had no catapult and was incapable of making a suitable slick for an open-sea landing and recovery. Therefore, even if the Swan had carried a plane, she could have operated tt safely only in protected waters.
Had a fast cruiser—with a cruiser’s Usual four-to-six plane aviation detachment—been available in Pearl Harbor on 2 July 1937—I am certain she would have been called upon to search for Earhart and Noonan. However, the response of the USS Colorado (BB-45)— loading fuel and supplies, recalling her ship’s company, recovering her aircraft, and getting under way in less than 17 hours—is an impressive achievement for a battlewagon that deserves Mr. Gillespie’s praise, not his scorn.
In retrospect, it may seem incongruous for the Colorado to be indulging in Ihe crossing-the-line rituals while her aircraft were out searching Gardner’s Island E>r Earhart and Noonan. But there was httle else the ship could have done exCept to have her Marine detachment and landing party alerted for a foray ashore
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A SBU-1 of Admiral Foley’s VS-1 is spotted on the deck of the USS Lexington (CV-2) during the search for Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan. All told, this part of the Navy’s search for the two lost aviators covered 138,000 square nautical miles.
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*. —I who were ashore and sped 90 miles to San Pedro, California. After refueling and reprovisioning, she raced another 90 miles south and anchored off Coronado Beach. There, she embarked about 700 maintenance personnel and a few spare pilots from six squadrons that had been alerted at North Island—including mine, Scouting Squadron One (VS-1) of the USS Ranger (CV-4). VS-1 contributed 14 SBU-1 scout bombers with crews—plus several spare pilots and crewmen—to the 63-plane group of two-seat scouting planes and bombers that flew out to the Lexington when she departed Coronado Beach at high speed on 5 July.
The Lexington and four accompanying destroyers made a record run to Hawaii at 28 knots with no pause for flight operations en route. One destroyer, suffering a machinery problem, was detached, but the other three—the USS Cushing (DD-376), the USS Drayton (DD-366), and the USS Lamson (DD-367)—refueled at Pearl Harbor and rejoined the Lexington at Lahaina Roads where she was refueling from an oiler that had been recalled from her deployment to the Western Pacific. The Lexington topped off at 100%—5% more than normal—which put a three-degree list on her to starboard because of her heavy battery of 8- inch guns which she—and her sister, the USS Saratoga (CV-3)—had until the war.
Throughout the voyage from California to the vicinity of Howland Island, the squadron commanders met with senior officers in the ship, pored over reports— from the 14th Naval District, the Colorado, the Swan, Fleet Weather Control, and the Coast Guard—and developed the search plan. Because nearby islands were being covered, it was decided that we would concentrate upon the open water westward from Howland—with the Equatorial Belt as a nearby axis. This constituted a backtrack of the final corridor Earhart and Noonan would have flown to reach Howland from Lae.
Having steamed more than 4,200 miles in seven days at sea since leaving Coronado, the Lexington and her three consorts began their search on 13 July. Although this was 11 days after Earhart and Noonan had been lost, there are many instances of people surviving at sea much longer than that. Also, Earhart and Noonan had prepared for such an emergency. Therefore, we were optimistic about their chances of survival.
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should it have been called for. They were ready. Besides, King Neptune’s visit was always a morale builder.
Mr. Gillespie touches on one reason why the Navy patrol squadrons at Ford Island did not make more of a contribution to the search when he mentions the “24 new PBY-ls.” These were brand-new planes that had just replaced older equipment. Furthermore, the squadrons were in the midst of a stand-down that occurred every June and July because of changes affecting at least one-third of their personnel.
In the light of the recent physical evidence produced by Mr. Gillespie—i.e., the lady’s shoe, a heel, and fragment of aircraft aluminum sheet metal—all found on Gardener’s Island, it appears that the Colorado's senior aviator, Lieutenant Lambrecht, may well have observed signs of recent human habitation on the island. However, his assertion was not backed up by Lieutenant Bill Short. I am confident that Captain Friedell questioned both men closely—probably together—upon their return to the ship. Apparently, he was not persuaded by Lieutenant Lambrecht who, after all, had sighted no human being and received no response to his many signals.
With the Itasca at Howland broadcasting homing signals from the east—in effect providing the latitude—and Fred Noonan’s ability to take a morning sun sight to determine longitude, the flight should have had an excellent fix along the last 100 miles or so to Howland. That such an experienced aerial navigator could have missed his target by 350 nautical miles—especially when Howland and Gardner are virtually on the same longitude meridian equidistant from Lae—made it doubtful that what Lambrecht observed was evidence of Earhart and Noonan.
Mr. Gillespie’s criticism of the response of the Lexington (CV-2) is unnecessarily harsh. Alerted late on 2 July 1937 while anchored at Santa Barbara, California, she recalled those crewmen
Two searches were flown a day. A group of 24 planes fanned out one mile apart in line abreast and flew to starboard from the ship’s track for 120 miles; another group flew to port. Each group then made a simultaneous 90° turn parallel to the track for 24 miles, then made another 90° turn back toward the Lexington. We flew at 500 feet and an airspeed of 120 knots; and, although we ran into several minor rain squalls, visibility was almost unlimited and winds very light. One destroyer acted as plane guard, while the other two were stationed 60 miles abeam, port and starboard, to act as navigation checks for the flights and to investigate any promising discovery. Also, two Grumman amphibians—each capable of carrying two extra passengers and making a carrier landing—were kept ready on the flight deck to assist in any way required. Because we had spare planes and crews—and experienced only one minor landing mishap—search aircraft availability was 100%. -
We quickly became quite adept at executing the somewhat unusual task of maintaining 24-aircraft fronts. It was quite impressive to see aircraft stretched out at low altitude as far as the eye could see over the horizon. Each pilot searched toward the guide while his rear-seat man searched—often with binoculars—to the opposite side. The effort went on for six days, eventually covering 138,000 square nautical miles—more than half the size ; of the state of Texas—to a density of one- half mile! I know of no concentrated air search ever made which exceeded this accomplishment. Sadly though, for our ef- j forts, we sighted only an occasional oil slick, some obvious trash debris, fish, and seaweed.
After the Lexington replenished her “small boys” for the third time, they de- j tached to return via Pearl Harbor. The carrier proceeded—alone, at low speed to conserve fuel, and with flight operations ( suspended to retain enough aviation gasoline for emergencies and the final fly- ; off—directly to North Island. On the voy- I age home, our long-postponed Shellback indoctrination was held, the handful of available movies were shown over and over again, and a few of the aviators requalified as officers of the deck. All hands were happy to be homeward bound from a frustrating but determined effort. □
Editor’s Note: Admiral Foley will be a participant in the panel discussion “Where in the World Is Amelia Earhart?” that will take place on 28 April 1993 as part of the U.S. Naval Institute’s 1993 Annapolis Seminar and 119th Annual Meeting—see page 8.