It's a politically unattractive issue, but first-term enlisted Marines with families cost the Corps more money—money that could be put toward equipment or facilities—than their single counterparts. Cash incentives to encourage junior Marines to remain single could save money and improve readiness.
In 1993, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Carl Mundy proposed that the Marine Corps limit married accessions and require command-level counseling and education to first-term enlisted Marines prior to marriage. Political fallout forced a hasty retreat. Six days after the message was issued, it was canceled.
General Mundy's belief that the Marine Corps needs to address the issue of first-term marriages, however, still is relevant. But this time, the focus must be on the cost to the Corps in real dollars and forgone opportunities for modernization, infrastructure, and readiness.
Recent studies have shown that Marines, especially enlisted personnel, are more likely to get married during their initial enlistments than ever before.1 First-term Marines marry at twice the national average. From a "knuckle-dragger" perspective, it is easy to see why. Married Marines get paid more. They get to move out of the barracks and into "free" housing. They receive all the perceived advantages of married life. The question the service now must ask is, Are the benefits to the Corps of accommodating married first-term Marines worth the cost?
The U.S. Marine Corps in fiscal year 1998 had about 103,000 first-term enlisted Marines (from private to corporal), of which about 26,100—roughly 25%--were married. Based on March 1997 U.S. Census data, only about 11.6% of men age 18-24 in the general population are married (the Marine Corps is about 95% male, so the national rate for men is an appropriate baseline). Do Marines wed at more than twice the civilian rate because of the perception of improved quality of life and monetary gain? More important, are we doing the right thing by providing these incentives for our young Marines?
Married Marines receive basic allowance for housing (BAH) or on-base housing, family medical and dental, day care, and other intangibles. Table I captures how much these incentives cost the Marine Corps.
Of the 26,000 married first-term Marines, about 7,000 live on base in government quarters and the rest live off base. The total direct expense, above what a single Marine costs the Corps, is about $196 million for fiscal year 1998 and $185 million for fiscal year 1999. On average, this equates to $7,500 per married junior Marine for fiscal year 1998 and $7,100 for fiscal year 1999—and this does not include medical, dental, family separation allowance, family service center staffing, or other incidentals such as time lost for family emergencies.
Table 2 shows the cost by rank for married first-term Marines (above what the Corps pays its single first-term Marines) and the current data on marital status for those ranks. Is the additional $11,000 per year per married junior Marine worth the tradeoffs in spare parts, equipment, ammunition, etc.? The official answer, obviously, is yes, otherwise, why would the Corps support such a policy?
The Marine Corps justifies its high first-term marriage rate with two major metrics—married junior Marines perform better, and they reenlist at a higher rate—both of which provide long-term benefits. A closer look at these issues, however, reveals a different perspective. Table 3 compares married and single first-term Marines in promotion to corporal, job skill performance, and retention.
Table 4 compares the average proficiency and conduct grade (on a 5.0 scale) for all first-term Marines, private through corporal. Note that there is no significant difference in performance or conduct grades based on marital status that would prompt the Marine Corps to "encourage" first-term Marines to marry. In fact, the only statistically significant difference exists in the conduct grades between married and single privates first class. The single Marines in this rank have a significantly higher conduct grade, perhaps lending credence to anecdotal evidence of leadership problems faced by small-unit commanders regarding married junior Marines.
The Marine Corps reenlistment goal for first-termers historically is around 20%. For fiscal year 1998, it was 4,464 out of 21,824 eligible, or 20.5% of the eligible population, and the Marine Corps has claimed publicly that it had no trouble enlisting or reenlisting qualified Marines. The fiscal year 1999 goal is 5,450 out of 23,832 eligible, or 22.9%. Logically, then, the service does not need to reenlist higher-cost married Marines. The single Marines are out there, are just as qualified, and cost the Marine Corps much less money.
We cannot, by law, deny a Marine the money that accrues to him when he marries, but what if we offered some incentive for a first-termer to stay single? In 1994, the Center for Naval Analyses looked at this issue, and concluded that paying a bonus at the end of the first enlistment to all single Marines was not cost-effective. If we paid for each year a Marine stayed single, however, reducing the event horizon, the idea could be cost-effective.
A simple spreadsheet can be used to determine what percentage of Marines who married would have to have remained single (for that year) for the Marine Corps to break even fiscally, if a cash incentive were offered. The model assumes a reduction in basic allowance for housing, lower on-base housing costs, and a constant proportion of married first-term Marines. If only 30% of the married Marines had stayed single, we could pay out the amounts shown in Table 5 to all single first-term Marines, and still spend less than we currently do.
Consider the impact of an additional $13-17 million savings from personnel accounts for the Marine Corps—modern barracks facilities, a higher quality of life, computers, the HMMVW replacement, or the five-ton truck replacement, to name a few. The potential impact on readiness accounts and the ability of the Corps to accomplish its mission is apparent. There are numerous advantages to encouraging our first-term Marines to remain single, and to targeting single Marines for reenlistment.
A policy that does not allow marriage for first-term enlisted Marines would be the "cheapest" fix, but it would be hard to implement and rife with political pitfalls. A policy of cash incentives to encourage junior Marines to stay single, on the other hand, might go a long way toward reducing the costs incurred by the Marine Corps in providing for families and level the playing field regarding pay for all Marines.
The issue of first-term married Marines will not go away just because it is politically unattractive or because senior leaders choose to ignore it. Commanders at all levels realize that it is a problem that takes up an inordinate amount of our noncommissioned and junior officers' time. We must address the problem head-on, from a leadership as well as a budgetary perspective.
Major Long, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School, retired in 1999. While on active duty, he served as an operations/program analyst at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and in a variety of operational billets from the company level through the regimental and group levels, and taught math at the Naval Academy.